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THE    PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 


NOW  READY  AT  ALL  BOOKSELLERS.      CROWN  8vo.      9s.  net. 

PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

By  MARSHAL   FOCH 


AS  The  Principles  of  War  is  a  book  mainly 
■*^  suitable  for  specialists  and  students  of 
military  history,  Messrs.  Chapman  &  Hall  are 
issuing  in  Precepts  and  Judgments  a  cheaper 
and  more  elementary  text-book  suitable  for  all 
Officers  and  N.C.O.s  in  the  British  Army.  It  is 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  the  official  text-book 

of  modern  warfare. 

****** 

It  explains  and  interprets  the  bare  maxims  of 
Field  Service  Regulations,  and  deals  with  all 
questions  of  supply  and  transport,  as  well  as 
with  the  various  details  of  an  engagement  such 
as  reconnaissance,  advance  guards,  rear  guards, 
communications.  Its  freshness  and  vigour  will 
be  very  welcome  to  those  who  are  usually  dis- 
couraged by  the  dullness  of  the  official  text-book. 
And  it  should  be  especially  useful  to  Scout  Masters 
and  to  Commanding   Officers  of    Public  School 

O.T.C.s. 

****** 

Major  A.  Grasset  contributes  to  Precepts  and 
Judgments  a  biographical  sketch  of  the  Marshal, 
and  gives  an  account  of  his  career  before  he 
took  over  the  supreme  command.  In  the  general 
enthusiasm  that  has  been  aroused  by  his  triumphs 
as  Commander-in-Chief,  some  of  his  earlier 
achievements  have  been  forgotten,  and  Major 
Grasset  does  a  great  service  to  Marshal  Foch 
in  reviving  the  memory  of  his  gallantry  and  skill 
in  the  earlier  actions  of  the  War,  at  Marhange, 
the  Marne,  and  the  Yser. 

CHAPMAN  &  HALL,  Ltd.,  ii  Henrietta  St.,  W.C.2 


THE 
PRINCIPLES  OF  WAR 


BY 

MARSHAL    FOCH 


TRANSLATED    BY 

HILAIRE  BELLOC 


WITH   TWENTY-THREE  MAPS   AND   OTHER   DIAGRAMS 


NEW  YORK 
HENRY   HOLT   AND   COMPANY 

1920 


u 

lOL 

mo 


The  original  of  this  translation  is  a  work  known 
as  ^'Des  Principes  de  la  Guerre."  This  work  is  a 
summary^  in  book  form,  of  lectures  delivered  to  the 
French  Staff  College  by  Marshal,  then  Lieutenant- 
Colonel,  Foch  seventeen  years  ago.  It  first  appeared 
as  a  book  in  1903. 


Printed  in  O'reat  Britain  by  R.  Clay  &  Sons,  Ltd. ,  London  and  Bungay. 


f  2^™')' .^OLLEGE  LIBRARY 
CHhSTNUT  HILL,  MA  02167 

-^^^  5  0  1983 


PREFACE  TO   THE    FIRST   EDITION 

"  Shepherds^  fires,  lit  on  a  stormy  coast,  to  guide  the 
uncertain  seaman  "  :  these  lines  might  well  be  applied 
to  the  following  pages.  They  were  written  for  young 
officers.  The  reader  must  not  look  to  find  in  them  a 
complete,  a  methodical,  still  less  an  academic  account 
of  the  art  of  war,  but  rather  a  mere  discussion  of 
certain  fundamental  points  in  the  conduct  of  troops, 
and  above  all  the  direction  which  the  mind  must  be 
given  so  that  it  may  in  every  circumstance  conceive  a 
manceuvre  at  least  rational.  If  it  prove  useful  in  this 
respect,  by  enlightening  the  reader,  or  by  giving  him 
a  sound  direction,  this  book  will  have  fulfilled  its 
purpose. 

When  young  officers  join  their  regiments  and  propose 
to  study  the  conduct  of  troops  in  the  field,  they  hear 
talk  of  certain  principles  which  govern  war.  They 
attempt  in  vain  to  discover  those  guiding  principles; 
they  cannot  find  them  either  in  what  they  have  been 
previously  taught,  or  in  the  reading  of  military  works. 
"  Principles,"  they  are  told,  "  are  a  matter  of  common 
sense,  of  judgment;  their  application  varies  according 
to  circumstance ;  they  cannot  be  written  down  or 
learned." 

When  the  moment  comes  for  exercise  on  varied  ground 
and  for  the  autumn  manoeuvres,  they  hear  their  senior 
officers  criticise  in  the  name  of  these  same  principles 
the  tactics  adopted.  It  then  appears  that  though  their 
elders  know  these  famous  principles,  they  often  apply 
them  wrongly.  It  is  yet  another  example  of  the  great 
gulf  between  the  knowledge  of  a  truth  and  its  use  in 
practice. 

It  has  been  attempted,  in  the  present  book,  to  define 
those  principles;  to  explain  from  what  necessities  they 
arise,  to  what  results  they  lead ;  how,  being  unchange- 
able, they  can  be  applied  in  practice,  with  the  arms  of 
to-day,  to  modem  war,  the  new  features  of  which  have 


vi  PREFACE   TO   THE   FIRST   EDITION 

so  profound  an  effect.  For  "  though  it  is  true  that  the 
principles  of  miHtary  art  are  everlasting,  the  factors 
that  art  deals  with  and  has  to  take  into  account  suffer 
a  ceaseless  evolution "  (von  der  Goltz).  Principles 
sometimes  seem  to  contradict  each  other.  You  have 
to  disperse  troops  in  order  to  march ;  you  have,  again, 
to  send  out  detachments  for  scouting  and  covering 
purposes;  yet  you  must  concentrate  in  order  to  fight. 
Which  is,  at  a  given  moment,  in  the  midst  of  the 
unknowns  of  war,  the  commanding  necessity,  the  dis- 
position to  be  taken?  When  and  how  must  that 
disposition  be  altered  in  order  to  meet  a  new  situation  ? 
Such  questions  show  why  it  is  necessary  in  a  course  of 
instruction  to  give  the  mind  a  direction  which  should 
enable  it  to  judge  rightly  in  every  case.  They  also 
show  why  it  is  necessary  to  place  at  the  student's 
disposal  a  system  of  forces  which  should  guarantee  the 
possibility  of  reaching  definitely  a  desired  result.  To 
this  end  resort  has  been  taken  here  to  the  detailed 
analysis  of  concrete  historical  instances.  It  is  by  such 
a  method  that  this  book  attempts  to  foster,  from  the 
military  point  of  view,  a  development  of  intelligence 
and  will  combined  with  the  highest  conception  of  duty, 
and  this  in  order  to  attain  by  the  most  direct  approach 
the  strongest  grasp  possible  of  the  only  art  that  matters 
in  war — Battle  :  Battle  for  victory. 

Le  Lieutenant-Colonel  d'artillerie  hrevete, 

F.  FocH. 
1903. 


AVANT-PROPOS  DE  LA  TRADUCTION 
ANGLAISE 

En  1903,  ce  livre  paraissait  tel  que  :  "  Les  feux  de 
patres,  allimies  sur  la  cote  orageuse  pour  guider  le 
navigateur  incertain."  C'etait  un  ouvrage  elementaire. 
II  fixait  certaines  verites  indiscutables,  mais  insuffisam- 
ment  etablies  dans  leur  nature  et  leur  application,  les 
principes  de  la  conduite  des  troupes  a  la  guerre.  II 
orientait  ensuite  les  esprits  vers  la  solution  des  problemes 
toujours  varies  de  la  guerre,  par  une  gymnastique  intel- 
lectuelle,  basee  sur  Fetude  de  I'histoire.  C'est  ainsi  qu'il 
comptait  les  preparer  a  pratiquer  a  la  guerre  I'art 
contemporain,  d'apres  la  connaissance  de  I'art  ancien. 

En  1918,  sans  parler  des  conditions  morales  :  buts  et 
procedes  de  guerre  qui  ont  mis  en  scene  la  partie  jusqu'ici 
inoffensive  de  la  population  et  par  la  Fame  meme  de  la 
Nation  entiere,  mais  simplement  par  suite  des  progres 
de  Farmement  et  du  developpement  de  Findustrie,  FArt 
a  marque  une  evolution  profonde  par  Femploi  de  moyens 
nouveaux. 

Pour  n'en  citer  qu'un  exemple,  la  mitrailleuse  et  le 
fil  de  fer  barbele  ont  permis  Forganisation  rapide  de 
centres  defensifs  d'une  valeur  indiscutable.  lis  ont 
donne  en  particulier  a  la  tranchee  ou  a  un  obstacle 
naturel  une  solidite  qui  permet  d'etendre  les  fronts 
defensifs  sur  des  espaces  insoupyonnes  jusqu'a  ce  jour, 
au  total  d'organiser  promptement  un  large  systeme 
defensif  facile  a  tenir.  L'offensive  momentanement  im- 
puissante  a  cherche  de  nouvelles  armes.  Apres  s'etre 
donne  une  formidable  artillerie,  elle  a  organise  les  chars 
d'assaut,  mitrailleuses  ou  canons  a  la  fois  blindes  et 
automobiles,  capables  en  tout  terrain  d'avoir  raison  du 
reseau  de  fil  de  fer  et  de  la  mitrailleuse  ennemie. 

vii 


viii  AVANT-PROPOS 

A  cote  d'une  fabrication  de  canons  et  d'une  con- 
sommation  de  munitions  aux  proportions  completement 
inconnues  jusqu'a  present  est  venue  s'imposer  une 
production  d'autres  engins  reclamant  encore  de  I'acier. 
C'est  ainsi  que  la  puissance  industrielle  des  Nations  a 
seule  permis  aux  Armees  d'attaquer,  ou  que  son  im- 
puissance  les  a  reduites  a  se  defendre,  au  meme  titre 
que  le  nombre  de  leurs  soldats. 

L'aviation  par  des  progres  techniques  gigantesques  a 
ouvert  le  theatre  de  Fair;  elle  assure  la  maitrise  des 
communications  et  des  actions  aeriennes  au  mieux  arme 
et  au  plus  puissamment  arme  des  deux  adversaires. 
Autre  appel  a  la  lutte  industrielle. 

Et  de  meme  de  la  fabrication  des  obus  toxiques  et 
des  materiels  de  toute  nature  que  reclament  des  Armies 
de  plus  en  plus  difficile  a  nourrir,  a  abriter,  a  trans- 
porter. Une  fois  encore  la  capacite  industrielle  de  I'un 
des  adversaires  determine  en  partie  la  puissance  de  ses 
Armees. 

Comme  on  le  voit,  ce  sont  bien  des  conditions  nouvelles 
pour  un  Art,  la  Guerre,  qui  se  fait  deja  avec  des  moyens 
nouveaux.  Autant  dire  qu'elle  est  un  art  tout  nouveau. 
Comment  en  trouverait-on  les  regies  precises  dans  un 
ouvrage  de  1903  ? 

Malgre  cela,  les  verites  fondamentales  qui  regissent 
cet  art  restent  immuables,  de  meme  que  les  principes 
de  la  mecanique  regissent  toujours  I'architecture,  qu'il 
s'agisse  de  constructions  en  bois,  en  pierre,  en  fer,  ou 
en  ciment  arme;  de  meme  que  les  principes  de  I'har- 
monie  regissent  la  musique  quel  qu'en  soit  le  genre. 
II  reste  done  toujours  n^cessaire  d'etablir  les  principes 
de  la  guerre. 

Malgre  cela,  et  meme  a  cause  de  cela,  les  hommes 
appeles  a  conduire  les  troupes  devront  se  preparer  a 
traiter  devant  un  horizon  de  plus  en  plus  large,  des  cas 
de  plus  en  plus  varies.  C'est  bien  encore  en  developpant 
par  I'etude,  leur  puissance  d'analyse,  puis  de  synthase, 
c'est- a-dire  le  conclusion,  dans  un  sens  purement  ob- 
jectif,  devant  des  cas  vecus,  pris  pour  cela  dans  I'histoire, 
afin  d'eviter  toute  d6viation  de  I'etude,  qu'on  leur 
donnera  la  capacite  d'asseoir  une  decision  prompte  et 
judicieuse,  qu'on  leur  assurera  de  plus  par  la  conviction 


AVANT-PROPOS  ix 

de   savoir,   la   confiance   suffisante   pour  prendre  cette 
decision  sur  le  terrain  de  Taetion. 

C'est  ainsi  que  le  present  ouvrage,  quoique  datant  de 
1903,  peut  encore  servir  a  la  formation  des  hommes 
appel^s  a  eonduire  des  troupes  ou  simplement  desireux 
de  r6flechir  aux  n^cessites  de  la  guerre. 

F.  FocH. 

1.9.18. 


CONTENTS 


CHAP.  PAdE 

I.     On  the  Teaching  of  Wae     ....         1 


II.  Primal  Chabacteristios  of  Modern  War 

III.  Economy  of  Forces       .... 

IV.  Intellectual  Discipline — Freedom  of  Action 

as  a  Function  of  Obedience 

V.  The  Service  of  Security 

VI.  The  Advance  Guard     .... 

VII.  The  Advance  Guard  at  Nachod    . 

VIII.  Strategical  Surprise    .... 

IX.  Strategical  Security    .... 

X.  The  Battle  :  Decisive  Attack 

XI.  Battle  :  An  Historical  Instance  . 

XII.  Modern  Battle    ..... 


22 
48 

97 
116 
138 
160 
232 
252 
281 
304 
327 


XI 


LIST   OF    PLANS 

I-IN  THE  TEXT  „  . 

Facing  page 

A.  Battle  of  Nachod.     Position  about  9  a.m.   .         .         .         .     182 

B.  ,,  ,,  Position  before  10  a.m.         .         .         .     190 

C.  ,,  ,,  Position  at  10.30  a. m 190 

D.  ,,  „  Fighting  between  11.30  and  12     .         .     212 

E.  ,,  ,,  Conjectured     positions    of     the    First 

Brigade 204 

F.  ,,  ,,  Conjectured  attack  of  the  First  Brigade      204 

G.  „  „  Position  about  12.30    .         .         .         .222 

H.       ,,  ,,  Attack  on  Wysokow  by   Waldstatten's 

Brigade 224 

I.  Theatre  of  Operations  of  the  Italian  Army  in  Hungary  (1809)    252 

J.  Neighbourhood  of  Saalfeld 304 

K.  Battle  of  Saalfeld,  1st  movement,  11  a.m.  .         .         .     316 

L.        ,,  ,,         2nd  movement,  1  p.m.  .         .         .     318 

M.        ,,  ,,         3rd  movement,  1.30  p.m.       .         .         .     320 

N.       ,,  ,,        4th  movement,  2.30  p.m.       .         .         .320 

II— ENCLOSED  IN  ENVELOPE  AT  END  OF  VOLUME 

1.  Maritime  Alps  and  Apennines,  1792-1796. 

2.  Battle-field  of  Dego,  1794-1796. 

3.  Conjectured    position  of    the  Fifth  French  Army  during 

August  4th  and  oth,  1870. 

4.  Neighbourhood  of  Dijon. 

5.  Neighbourhood  of  Nachod. 

6.  Position  of  the  Second  German  Army,  August  15th,  1870. 

7.  Position  taken  by  the  Second  German  Army  on  the  evening 

of  August  16th,  1870. 

8.  Position  taken  by  the  Second  German  Army  on  the  evening 

of  August  17th,  1870. 

9.  Concentration  of  the  German  Army  of  the  Lower  Rhine  in 

1815. 

10.  Conjectured  position  of  the  Second  German  Army  on  the 
evening  of  August  14th,  1870. 

11.  Conjectured  position  of  the  Second  German  Army  on  the 
evening  of  August  15th,  1870. 

xiii 


THE    PRINCIPLES    OF    WAR 

CHAPTER  I 

ON   THE   TEACHING   OF   WAR 

"  It  is  not  some  familiar  spirit  which  suddenly  and  secretly  discloses 
to  me  what  I  have  to  say  or  do  in  a  case  unexpected  by  others ;  it  is 
reflexion,  meditation." — Napoleon. 

Gentlemen, 

On  the  pediment  of  this  building  ^  may  be  read 
the  inscription  :    Ecole  de  Guerre  (School  of  War). 

Can  these  two  words,  school  and  war,  be  associated  ? 

How  can  one  conceive  that  this  function,  war,  which 
displays  itself  on  battle-fields,  in  the  midst  of  the  un- 
foreseen and  of  danger,  which  makes  use  of  surprise 
and  of  all  the  attributes  of  force,  violence,  and  brutality, 
in  order  to  create  terror,  may  be  prepared  by  that  other 
fmiction,  study,  which  can  only  live  in  calm,  in  method, 
in  reflexion,  in  discussion,  and  in  reason? 

In  a  Avord,  "  Can  war  be  taught?  Does  its  nature 
allow  it  to  be  taught  ?  " 

If  the  teaching  of  war  is  possible,  on  what  matter  does 
such  teaching  bear?  Up  to  what  limits  can  such 
teaching  extend  ? 

Under  what  form  can  teaching  prepare  for  action'? — 
without  wliich  nothing  is  of  any  avail  when  fighting  is 
the  thing  in  hand.  Shall  it  be  a  course  of  lectures,  a 
book,  which,  once  understood  and  learned,  would  allow 
you  to  start  on  a  campaign  with  the  conviction  of  being 
able  to  solve  any  difficulties  that  might  arise  and  to 
conquer  no  matter  in  what  circumstances? 

Finally,  to  what  faculties  of  your  mind  does  such  a 
teaching  make  its  appeal  with  the  object  of  training 

^  The  "  Ecole  de  Guerre  "  in  Paris. 


2  THE    PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

them,  of  developing  thein,  of  preparing  yon  for  action; 
also,  what  dispositions  docs  it  require  from  you? 

Such  are  the  three  points  which  must  be  solved  in 
order  to  determine  the  line  to  be  followed  and  to  foresee 
the  possible  results. 

War  has  been  taught  in  all  times,  from  Xenophon 
(who,  in  the  Cyropoedeia,  gives  more  room  to  his  own 
views  on  the  subject  than  to  the  deeds  of  his  hero)  down 
to  Jomini,  without  mentioning  A^egetius  and  others.  In 
spite  of  that,  it  was  not  before  1882-3  that  Avar  was 
taught  in  France  on  a  rational  and  practical  basis, 
and  this,  although  our  School  had  been  founded  in  1876. 
Putting  an  inscription  on  the  wall  had  not  sufficed  to 
create  a  real  War  School. 

Where  was  the  difficulty  ?  Did  it  reside  in  the  question 
how  to  determine  the  subject  to  be  taught,  the  true  theory 
of  war ;  or  in  the  manner  of  teaching  that  theory  once 
it  had  been  established? 

The  difficulty  came  from  two  sources. 

The  different  causes  which  contribute  towards  deter- 
mining the  result  in  war  were  enumerated  well  enough  : 
moral  superiority,  superiority  in  instruction,  command, 
armament,  system  of  supply,  of  fortification,  etc.  .  .  . 
It  was  rightly  pointed  out  that  this  result  is  a  function 
of  all  these  variables  : 

/  (a,  b,  c,  .  .  .  k,  1,  m) 

These  variables  were,  however,  divided  into  two 
groups  : 

(1)  In  the  first  group  were  placed  the  moral  factors  : 
the  quality  of  the  troops,  of  the  command,  of  the  will, 
of  the  passions  aroused,  etc.,  which  cannot  be  appreciated 
with  accuracy,  notably  in  quantitative  terms.  These 
factors  were  systematically  set  aside  from  a  rational 
study  and  from  a  theory  of  war  which  was  intended  to 
be  accurate ;  or  rather,  they  were  supposed  to  be  equal 
on  each  side.     In  the  function 

/  (a,  b,  c,  .  .  .  k,  1,  m) 

the  first  set,  a,  b,  c  .  .  .  were  given  a  constant  value, 
and  the  function  of  variables  therefore  became 

/  (k,  1,  m). 
It  only  included  a  small  number  of  variables. 


ON   THE   TEACHING   OF   WAR  3 

(2)  These  latter  variables  were  the  material  factors 
which  of  course  exert  an  influence  upon  the  result : 
armament,  supply,  ground,  numerical  superiority, 
etc.  .  .  .  but  which  are  far  from  being  everything. 

At  the  same  time,  while  the  moral  factors  were  sup- 
pressed as  causes,  they  were  also  suppressed  as  effects. 
Defeat  thus  came  to  appear  in  the  eyes  of  this  school  as 
a  product  of  material  factors,  though  we  shall  see  later 
on  that  it  is  in  fact  a  purely  moral  result,  that  of  a 
mood  of  discouragement,  of  terror,  wrought  in  the 
soul  of  the  conquered  by  the  combined  use  of  moral  and 
material  fa^ctors  simultaneously  resorted  to  by  the  victor. 

The  conclusion  of  the  old  theory,  then,  was :  in 
order  to  conquer,  you  must  have  superior  numbers, 
better  rifles,  better  guns,  more  skilfully  chosen  positions. 
But  the  French  Revolution,  Napoleon  above  all,  would 
have  answered  :  "  We  are  not  more  numerous,  we  are 
not  better  armed;  but  we  will  beat  you  all  the  same, 
because,  thanks  to  our  plans,  we  will  manage  to  have 
superiority  in  number  at  the  decisive  point;  because 
by  our  energy,  our  instruction,  the  use  of  our  arms,  fire 
and  bayonet,  we  will  succeed  in  stimulating  our  own 
spirit  to  a  maximum  and  in  breaking  yours. 

These  theories,  which  men  had  believed  to  be  accurate 
because  they  had  been  entirely  based  on  certain  and 
mathematical  data,  had  in  fact  the  misfortune  of 
being  radically  wrong;  for  they  had  left  aside  the  most 
important  factor  of  the  problem,  whether  in  command 
or  execution,  namely  that  factor  which  animates  the 
subject,  wliich  gives  it  life :  man,  with  his  moral, 
mental,  and  physical  faculties.  They  were  further  in 
error  because  they  tended  to  make  war  an  exact  science, 
forgetting  its  true  nature  :  that  of  a  "  dreadful  and 
impassioned  drama"  (Jomini).  It  was  much  as  if, 
in  order  to  learn  riding,  you  should  confine  yourselves 
to  manipulating  that  jointed  cardboard  figure  which 
represents  a  horse  in  the  schools ;  as  if  you  should  limit 
yourselves  to  disjoint  and  then  put  together  again  the 
pieces  of  the  figure,  and  to  learn  the  names  and  places 
of  the  various  parts  of  a  horse's  body.  Would  anyone 
be  foohsh  enough  to  try  and  learn  riding  in  that  way, 
without  taking  into  account  the  movement  of  the  horse, 
its  hfe,  blood,  and  temperament— without  bestriding 
the  hving  being? 


4  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Such  was  the  false  attitude  of  those  systems  of  miHtary 
science  which  we  will  summarily  study  in  the  next 
lecture,  and  the  fundamental  errors  of  which  were  fully 
disclosed  when  the  French  Revolution  threw  into  warfare 
an  outburst  of  passions  hitherto  unknown. 

These  theories  lead  to  the  worst  possible  consequences. 
The  first  consequence  attached  to  the  teaching  in  our 
military  schools;  that  teaching  only  aimed  at  the 
material  side  of  the  subject.  Hence  that  exclusive  study 
of  ground,  fortification,  armament,  organisation,  ad- 
ministration, more  or  less  cleverly  situated  bases,  a 
study  touching  but  the  earthly  part  of  the  art  of  war. 

As  for  the  divine  part,  that  which  results  from  man's 
action,  it  was  so  loftily  treated  that  it  could  be  neither 
understood  nor  explained.  Scarcely  was  it  glanced  at 
in  a  whole  course  of  historical  studies,  and  then  after 
the  manner  of  Alexandre  Dumas,  as  a  series  of  extra- 
ordinary, unexplained,  unexplainable  deeds.  Nay,  some 
would  go  so  far  as  to  admit  the  existence  of  mystical 
causes,  connected  with  the  marvellous  or  with  fatality; 
the  incomprehensible  genius  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
(for  instance)  or  even  his  luck. 

But  such  a  teaching  was  bound  to  lead  to  fetishism 
or  fatalism,  to  contempt  for  work,  to  the  belief  in  the 
uselessness  of  intellectual  culture,  to  a  certain  laziness 
of  mind. 

It  was  assumed  that  either  you  had  gifts  or  you  had 
none;  that  either  you  were  inspired  or  you  were  not; 
that,  moreover,  you  could  only  fmd  that  out  on  the 
battle-field. 

1870  woke  us  out  of  that  sleep,  for  it  gave  us  an 
enemy  formed  by  the  teaching  of  history — by  the  study 
of  concrete  facts.  It  was  in  such  a  fashion  that  Scham- 
horst,  Willisen  and  Clausewitz  had,  from  the  beginning 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  formed  the  Command  of 
the  Prussian  Army. 

In  order  to  know  and  understand  war  they  had  not 
confined  themselves  to  examining  the  tool  which  is  used 
in  warfare,  and  taking  it  to  pieces  in  its  component 
material  parts  without  taking  man — ^who  uses  it — into 
account. 

In  the  book  of  History,  carefully  analysed,  they  had 
found  the  living  Army,  troops  in  movement  and  action, 


ON  THE   TEACHING   OF   WAR  5 

with  their  human  needs,  passions,  weaknesses,  self- 
denials,  capacities  of  all  sorts  :  "  Far  from  being  an  exact 
science,  war  is  a  dreadful  and  impassioned  drama^ 

There  lay  the  essence  of  the  subject  to  be  scrutinised, 
as  well  as  the  starting  point  of  rational  study. 

Seeing  this,  the  true  nature  of  war,  which  had  been 
overlooked  by  a  fonii  of  teaching  too  mathematical,  in 
presence  also  of  the  gaps  and  mistakes  which  such  a 
teaching  had  led  to,  another  school  arose.  It  arose 
more  especially  within  the  French  Army.  It  summarised 
its  views  in  the  following  axiom  :  War  can  only  he  taught 
by  War. 

I  will  not  discuss  the  nature  of  the  experience  supplied 
by  such  an  apprenticeship,  nor  the  particular  stamp 
which  mind  and  w^ill  derive  from  the  habit  of  taking 
decisions  in  presence  of  an  actual  enemy — and  even  more 
of  the  unavoidable  disturbance  produced  by  the  enemy's 
blows. 

For  that  school  is  not  a  continuous  school  at  all :  it 
can  neither  be  opened  at  will,  nor  kept  going  for  the 
benefit  of  our  learning. 

It  is  even  insufficient,  for  it  could  not  prepare  us  for 
the  first  actions  (which  will  also  be  the  most  decisive 
ones)  of  the  next  war.^  The  campaign  would  be  over 
when  our  instruction  had  only  begun ;  and  at  the  price 
of  results  very  likely  unfortunate. 

Moreover,  one  ought  not  to  be  mistaken  concerning 
the  meaning  and  the  reach  of  such  a  teaching. 

We  need  not  go  back  to  Marshal  de  Saxe's  "  mules" 
in  order  to  see  that  waging  war  without  previous  re- 
flexion on  its  character  does  not  indicate  a  clear  percep- 
tion of  the  principles  which  govern  war,  even  when  the 
question  is  merely  how  to  establish  a  line  of  outposts, 
to  defend  a  river  or  a  frontier,  or  to  determine  the 
mission  of  a  vanguard.  Situations,  however  grave,  do  not 
produce  of  themselves  light  and  felicitous  extemporisa- 
tion. Generally  speaking,  grave  situations  partially 
obscure  even  a  bright  intellect.  It  is  therefore  with  a 
fully  equipped  mind  that  one  ought  to  start  in  order  to 
make  w^ar  and  even  to  understand  war. 

The  truth  is,  no  study  is  possible  on  the  battle-field ; 
one  does  there  simply  what  one  caii  in  order  to  apply 
^  Words  written  before  the  Great  War  of  1914. 


6  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

what  one  knows.  Therefore,  in  order  to  do  even  a 
httle,  one  has  ah'eady  to  Jaiow  a  great  deal  and  to  know 
it  well. 

This  principle  explains  the  weakness,  in  1866,  of  the 
Austrians  (whom  the  war  of  1859  ought  to  have  made 
wiser),  as  against  the  Prussians  who  had  not  fought 
since  1815.  We  shall  see  this  in  detail  later  on.  The 
first  made  war  without  understanding  it  (as,  by  the  way, 
did  the  French  in  1870,  though  they  also  had  recently 
gone  to  war).  The  second  had  understood  war  without 
making  it,  by  means  of  careful  study. 

Between  these  two  extremes,  the  positivist  teaching 
of  a  scientific  theory  which  put  aside  the  living  element 
of  war  and  thus  became  monstrous,  and  a  teaching 
through  action,  no  choice  was  possible ;  both  had  to  be 
rejected;  one  had  to  create  a  new  system.  But  one 
could  not  create  by  basing  oneself  either  on  the  material 
factors,  which  are  incomplete,  or  on  both  the  material 
and  moral  factors,  the  latter  being  necessarily  changing 
and  undetermined. 

One  had  therefore  to  give  up  the  attempt  to  construct 
a  complete  theory  of  war  by  abstract  mental  work  and 
a  mere  process  of  reasoning.  One  had  to  create  a  new 
system  by  basing  oneself  on  facts. 

We  said  :  "If  war  is  indeed  a  '  dreadful  and  im- 
passioned drama,'  let  us  study  the  drama  itself.  Let  us 
look  at  the  actors  while  they  act  in  the  different  scenes 
that  compose  the  play." 

With  this  object  in  view,  let  us  examine  the  facts 
which  history  gives  us.  In  order  to  understand  this 
complex  phenomenon,  war,  under  the  numerous  shapes 
it  assumes,  let  us  take  those  facts  one  after  the  other, 
let  us  examine  them  as  closely  as  we  can,  under  a 
microscope,  so  to  speak;  let  us  resort  to  microbiology, 
and  let  us  do  this  while  placing  ourselves  in  the  midst 
of  the  circumstances  under  which  those  facts  arose  : 
time,  place,  temperature,  fatigue,  numerous  depressing 
causes,  misunderstandings,  etc.  .  .  .  ;  let  us  consider 
the  questions  the  actors  have  had  to  solve,  the  company 
in  its  zone  of  action,  the  battalion  in  the  same  way,  the 
brigade,  the  army  corps.  Let  us  see  the  difficulties 
they  had  to  conquer,  and  how  they  overcame  them. 
Let  us  discuss  the  decisions  taken,  the  result  obtained; 
let  us  treat  the  question  anew.     Tlicn  only  shall  we  see 


ON   THE   TEACHING   OF   WAR  7 

the  moral  factors,  so  often  mentioned,  appear  during 
the  whole  course  of  the  study  in  their  right  proportions. 
Then  only  are  we  able  to  take  them  into  account  and  to 
ascribe  to  them  their  due  place  in  the  result. 

This  minute  study,  as  we  shall  see,  has  been  com- 
pleted in  the  case  of  several  local  actions  (Saint-Privat, 
Froeschwiller,  etc.  .  .  .)  which  we  shall  follow.  After 
that  we  shall  come  to  the  operations.  We  have  then 
to  consider  in  detail  the  functioning  of  a  living  and 
operating  army;  the  kind  of  existence  necessary  to 
each  of  its  component  units;  its  needs,  its  difficulties, 
the  role  assigned  to  it. 

The  teaching  of  our  School  has  resulted  from  the  sum 
of  such  minute  studies. 

History  is  the  base.  "  The  more  an  army  is  deficient 
in  the  experience  of  warfare,"  writes  General  de 
Peucker,  "  the  more  it  behoves  it  to  resort  to  the 
history  of  war,  as  a  means  of  instruction  and  as  a  base 
for  that  instruction.  .  .  .  Although  the  history  of  war 
cannot  replace  acquired  experience,  it  can  nevertheless 
prepare  for  it.  In  peace-time,  it  becomes  the  true  means 
of  learning  war  and  of  determining  the  fixed  principles  of 
the  art  of  war.'''' 

What  is  the  form  of  this  teaching  bom  from  history 
and  destined  to  grow  by  means  of  further  historical 
studies  ? 

It  came  out  in  the  shape  of  a  theory  of  war  which  can 
be  taught — which  shall  be  taught  to  you — and  in  the 
shape  of  a  doctrine,  which  you  will  be  taught  to  practise. 

What  is  meant  by  these  words  is  the  conception  and 
the  ijractical  application  not  of  a  science  of  war  nor  of 
some  limited  dogma,  composed  of  abstract  truths  outside 
which  all  would  be  heresy,  but  of  a  certain  number  of 
principles,  the  apjilication  of  which,  though  they  will 
not  be  open  to  discussion  once  they  shall  have  been 
estabhshed,  must  logically  vary  according  to  circum- 
stances w^hile  always  tending  towards  the  same  goal, 
and  that  an  objective  goal. 

The  doctrine  will  extend  itself  to  the  higher  side  of 
war,  owing  to  the  free  development  given  to  your  minds 
by  a  common  manner  of  seeing,  thinking,  acting,  by 
which  everyone  will  profit  according  to  the  measure  of 
his  own  gifts ;  it  will  nevertheless  constitute  a  discipline 
of  the  mind  common  to  you  all. 


8  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Let  us  at  once  be  more  precise  in  order  to  avoid 
confusion. 

Let  us  listen  to  Dragomirow  : 

"  First  of  all,  science  and  theory  are  two  different 
things,  for  every  art  may  and  must  be  in  possession  of 
its  own  theory,  but  it  would  be  preposterous  to  claim 
for  it  the  name  of  a  science.  .  .  .  Nobodj'^  will  venture 
to-day  to  assert  that  there  could  be  a  science  of  war. 
It  would  be  as  absurd  as  a  science  of  poetry,  of  painting, 
or  of  music.  But  it  does  not  in  the  least  follow  that 
there  should  not  be  a  theory  of  war,  just  as  there  is  one 
for  each  of  these  liberal  and  peaceful  arts.  It  is  not 
theory  which  makes  a  Raphael,  a  Beethoven,  or  a 
Goethe,  but  the  theory  of  their  art  placed  at  their  dis- 
posal a  teclinique  without  which  they  could  not  have 
risen  to  the  summits  they  reached. 

"  The  theory  of  the  art  of  war  does  not  lay  claim  to 
forming  Napoleons,  but  it  supplies  a  knowledge  of  the 
properties  of  troops  and  ground.  It  draws  attention 
to  the  models,  to  the  masterpieces  achieved  in  the 
domain  of  war,  and  it  smoothes  thereby  the  path  for 
those  whom  nature  has  endowed  with  military  ability. 

"  .  .  .  It  does  not  allow  a  man  to  think  quietly  that 
he  knows  the  whole  business,  while  he  oiAy  knows  part 
of  it.  Receipts  for  creating  masterpieces  such  as 
Austerlitz,  Friedland,  Wagram,  for  conducting  cam- 
paigns such  as  that  of  1799  in  Switzerland,  or  battles 
such  as  that  of  Koniggratz,  all  this  theory  cannot 
provide.  But  it  presents  those  models  as  types  of 
study  for  the  meditation  of  military  men  .  .  .  and 
this  not  in  order  that  they  should  imitate  them  in  a 
servile  way,  but  in  order  that  they  should  imbue  them- 
selves with  their  spirit,  and  derive  from  them  their 
inspiration. 

"  .  .  .  If  theory  has  erred,  it  is  because  very  few 
theorists  had  seen  war.  .  .  ." 

There  is,  then,  such  a  thing  as  a  theory  of  war.  That 
theory  starts  from  a  number  of  principles  : 

The  principle  of  economy  of  forces. 
The  principle  of  freedom  of  action. 
The  principle  of  free  disposal  of  forces. 
The  principle  of  security,  etc.  .  .  . 

Some  have  called  in  question  at  the  outset  the  exist- 


ON   THE   TEACHING   OF   WAR  9 

ence  of  such  principles,  and,  next,  their  foundation  in 
reason.  Napoleon,  however,  writes  :  "  The  principles 
of  ivar  are  those  which  have  directed  the  great  Commanders 
whose  great  deeds  have  been  handed  down  to  us  by  History.^* 

For  Napoleon,  then,  principles  of  war  really  exist. 
These  are  to  be  found  by  studying  the  great  deeds  of 
the  great  Commanders.  Therefore  it  is  not  surprising 
that  they  should  have  arisen  before  us  from  the  history 
of  Napoleon's  wars. 

Again  Lloyd  :  "  For  want  of  safe  and  fixed  principles 
one  falls  into  continuous  changes,  whether  it  is  a  matter 
of  organisation,  formations,  or  manoeuvres '' 

Again,  Marshal  Bugeaud  :  "  There  are  few  absolute 
principles,"  he  said,  "  but  still  there  are  some.  When 
you  try  to  lay  do\\ai  a  principle  concerning  war,  at  once 
a  great  number  of  officers,  thinking  they  are  solving 
the  question,  exclaim :  '  Everything  depends  upon 
circumstances,  you  must  sail  according  to  the  wind.' 
But  if  you  do  not  know  beforehand  what  arrangement 
of  sail  agrees  with  what  wind  and  what  course,  how  can 
you  sail  '  according  to  the  wind  '  ?  " 

Again  Jomini  :  "  Sound  theories  founded  on  principles 
both  true  and  justified  by  facts  are,  to  our  mind,  in 
addition  to  history,  the  true  training  school  of  com- 
mand. Of  course  they  do  not  make  a  great  man,  for 
great  men  make  themselves  under  circumstances  favour- 
able to  their  development;  but  they  form  leaders 
sufficiently  skilful  to  play  their  part  perfectly,  under 
the  direction  of  great  generals." 

We  may  conclude  with  reason  :  The  art  of  war,  like 
every  other  art,  possesses  its  theory,  its  principles  ;  other- 
wise, it  would  not  he  an  art. 

This  teaching  of  principles  does  not,  however,  aim  at 
a  platonic  result  such  as  mere  learning  or  as  merely 
filling  your  mind  with  a  number  of  new  and  certain 
truths.  "  War  is  before  all  a  simple  art,  an  art  wholly 
of  execution  "  (Napoleon).  To  know  the  principles,  if 
one  did  not  know  how  to  apply  them,  would  lead  to 
nothing.  In  war,  a  fact  has  priority  over  an  idea, 
action  over  talk,  execution  over  theory. 

Useless  would  be  any  teaching  that  should  stop  at 
the  idea,  talk,  or  theory;  which  did  not  extend  to  the 
application  of  principles. 


10  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Therefore,  the  teaching  of  war  does  not  concern 
itself  only  with  knowledge  (savoir),  but  also  with  power 
to  achieve  (pouvoir) ;  beyond  the  cognizance  of  principles, 
it  enforces  their  constant  application,  which  alone  is 
capable  of  fostering  judgment,  will,  the  ability  to  act 
rationally  and  therefore  efficiently. 

In  order  to  have  power  to  achieve  (pouvoir),  one  must 
know  (savoir).  This  is  undeniable.  "  Knowledge  is  far 
from  achievement;  but  the  leap  does  not  start  from 
ignorance;  quite  on  the  contrary,  from  knowledge. 
Vom  Wissen  zum  konnen  ist  immcr  em  Sprung ;  der 
Sprung  aher  ist  vom  Wissen  und  nicht  vom  Nichiwissen  " 
(Wilhsen). 

Moreover  knowledge,  a  necessary  condition,  soon 
provides  convictions,  confidence,  the  faculty  of  en- 
lightened decision.  It  creates  the  power  to  act,  and 
indeed  makes  the  men  of  action.     It  lies  at  the  root  of  will. 

"  When  a  fighting  man,"  says  General  de  Peucker, 
"  has  the  intimate  feeling  of  being  enlightened,  when 
he  knows  that  the  instruction  he  has  acquired  enables 
him  to  find  his  way  easily  amidst  very  difficult  circum- 
stances, his  will  becomes  more  firm;  he  acquires  the 
faculty  of  taking  a  clear  resolution  at  the  right  time  and 
of  carrying  it  out  in  a  practical  way. 

"  Anybody,  on  the  contrary,  who  is  conscious  of  his 
o^vn  ignorance  or  of  his  need  to  ask  for  other  people's 
advice  is  always  undecided,  perplexed,  apt  to  lose  his 
spirit. 

"  This  quality  of  will  is  of  course  the  prime  element 
in  a  fighting  man,  but  where  can  energy  lead  to,  if  one 
is  not  sufficiently  educated  to  know  what  goal  must  he  aimed 
at  and  what  is  the  way  to  reach  the  goal  ?  " 

How  can  judgment  and  decision  be  trained  in  a  school  ? 
Let  Marshal  von  Moltke  tell  us  : 

"  The  teaching  of  military  knowledge,"  he  writes, 
"  has  before  all  the  object  of  bringing  the  student  to 
utilise  his  intellectual  equipment  (?'.  e.  the  theory  his 
master  has  taught  him).  Such  a  reciprocal  and  quicken- 
ing action  cannot  be  obtained  when  the  master  merely 
teaches  and  the  student  merely  listens.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  takes  place  quite  naturally  wlien  the  professor 
adds  to  his  technical  lessons  some  exercises  in  the  course 
of  which  the  matters  taught  are  applied  to  some  particular 
cases.'''' 


ON  THE   TEACHING   OF  WAR        11 

Here,  then,  is  the  method  :  once  a  matter  has  been 
taught,  j^ou  must  apply  it  to  particular  cases.  We  will 
see  later  on  what  is  meant  by  "  particular  cases." 

General  de  Peucker  adds  on  the  same  subject : 
"  Officers  following  a  course  of  instruction  must  be 
amply  trained  to  act  by  themselves,  in  order  to  develop 
their  ability  to  utilise  their  theoretical  knowledge  in 
the  practice  of  life.  ...  To  grasp  a  scientific  truth  does 
not  mean  that  one  is  able  to  find  it  again  later  on  by 
means  of  reasonmg.  There  is  a  long  distance  between 
an  intellectual  conception  and  that  priceless  faculty 
which  allows  a  man  to  make  acquired  military  knowledge 
the  basis  for  his  decisions  in  the  field. 

"  Between  those  two  terms,  scientific  conception  and 
the  art  of  comynanding,  there  is  a  gulf  which  the  method 
of  teaching  must  bridge  if  it  is  to  deserve  the  name  of  a 
practical  method. 

'"''  Aiyplication  must  therefore  be  resorted  to." 

Here  appears,  at  the  same  time  as  the  method,  the 
object  which  is  being  aimed  at :  it  consists  in  passing 
from  the  scientific  conception  to  the  art  of  comixianding, 
from  truth  mastered  and  knoMTi  to  the  practical  applica- 
tion of  that  truth.  The  gulf  was  bridged  by  the  Prussian 
School.  In  proof,  consider  the  commanders  of  the  van- 
guards in  1866.  Although  they  had  only  recently  left 
their  school,  they  started  the  business  of  that  campaign 
with  a  pluck,  a  skill,  and  thereby  an  efficiency  which 
had  hitherto  been  thought  to  belong  exclusively  to  men 
who  had  already  fought  both  often  and  well. 

Let  us  do  the  same ;  let  us  cross  the  gulf  by  the  same 
roads,  the  same  bridges. 

Li  order  to  do  this,  we  must  have  a  practical  teaching 
including  application  made  to  particular  cases  of  fixed 
principles,  drawn  from  history,  in  order  (1)  to  prepare 
for  experience,  (2)  to  teach  the  art  of  commanding, 
(3)  lastly,  to  impart  the  hahit  of  acting  correctly  without 
having  to  reason. 

We  have  mentioned  particular  cases  instead  of  general 
cases,  for  in  war  there  are  none  but  particular  cases; 
everything  has  there  an  indi\i.dual  nature;  nothing 
ever  repeats  itself. 

In  the  first  place,  the  terms  (donnees)  of  the  problem 
are  only  seldom  certain  ;   they  are  never  final.     Every- 


12  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

thing  is  in  a  constant  state  of  change  and  reshaping. 
These  terms,  therefore,  only  possess  a  relative  value  as 
compared  to  the  absolute  value  of  mathematical  terms. 

Where  you  have  only  observed  one  company,  you  find 
a  battalion  when  you  come  to  attack. 

One  regiment  of  3000  rifles,  if  well  cared  for,  repre- 
sents, after  a  few  days  campaigning,  2800  rifles;  less 
well  managed,  it  will  no  longer  include  more  than  2000. 
The  variations  in  the  moral  are  at  least  as  ample.  How 
then  compare  two  regiments  with  each  other?  Under 
the  same  name  they  represent  two  utterly  different 
quantities.  Illness,  hardships,  bivouacking  at  night, 
react  on  the  troops  in  various  ways.  Certain  troops 
after  such  an  ordeal  are  soon  only  a  force  in  name. 
They  are  notliing  but  columns  of  hungry,  exhausted, 
sick  men.  Or  you  may  have  a  division  still  called  "  a 
division  "  though  it  shall  have  lost  part  of  its  batteries, 
etc.  .  .  .  The  same  is  true  of  the  tactical  situation, 
which  varies  as  seen  by  the  one  side  or  the  other.  The 
interest  of  one  of  the  adversaries  is  not  the  mere  reverse 
of  the  interest  of  the  other  :  so  with  their  tactics.  Sup- 
pose one  force  has  to  escort  a  convoy,  while  the  other 
has  to  attack  it ;  do  you  believe  that  the  manner  of 
fighting  would  be  the  same  on  both  sides?  Evidently 
not.  On  the  same  ground,  under  the  same  circum- 
stances of  time  and  place,  one  would  have  to  proceed 
differently  in  each  of  these  cases. 

The  same  regiment,  the  same  brigade,  will  not  fight 
in  the  same  manner  when  they  have  to  carry  out  the 
pursuit  of  a  beaten  enemy  and  when  they  will  have  to 
meet  a  fresh  adversary,  although  they  will  use  in  both 
cases  the  same  men,  the  same  rifles,  the  same  numbers. 

Again  as  regards  two  advance-guard  engagements  : 
one  can  never  be  a  mere  repetition  of  another  because, 
independently  of  the  fact  that  the  ground  varies  from 
one  to  the  other,  they  are  both  governed  by  similar 
differences  other  than  those  of  time  and  space. 

The  consequence  of  all  this  is  that  each  case  con- 
sidered is  a  particular  one,  that  it  presents  itself  under 
a  system  of  special  circumstances  :  ground,  state  of  the 
troops,  tactical  situation,  etc.  .  .  .  which  are  bound  to 
impress  upon  it  an  absolutely  original  stamp.  Certain 
factors  will  assume  an  additional  importance,  others  a 
lesser  one. 


ON   THE   TEACHING   OF   WAR        13 

This  absence  of  similarity  among  military  questions 
naturally  brings  out  the  inability  of  memory  to  solve 
them;  also  the  sterility  of  invariable  forms,  such  as 
figures,  geometrical  drawings  (epures),  plans  (schemas), 
etc.  The  only  right  solution  imposes  itself :  namely, 
the  application,  varying  according  to  circumstances,  of 
fixed  principles. 

Fixed  principles  to  be  applied  in  a  variable  way; 
according  to  circumstances,  to  each  case  which  is  always 
a  particular  one  and  has  to  be  considered  in  itself ;  such 
is  our  conclusive  formula  for  the  time  being.  Now 
does  not  such  a  conclusion  bring  us  back,  on  the  field 
of  practical  application,  to  the  very  intellectual  anarchy 
we  had  hoped  to  remedy  by  creating  unity  of  doctrine 
and  establishing  a  theory? 

Not  in  the  least.  Whatever  may  be  your  present 
impression,  you  will  soon  find  that,  in  applying  fixed 
principles  to  various  cases,  concordance  reappears  as  a 
consequence  of  a  common  way  of  facing  the  subject — 
a  purely  objective  way. 

From  the  same  attitude  towards  things  will  first  result 
a  same  ivay  of  seeing  them,  and  from  this  common  way 
of  seeing,  arises  a  common  way  of  acting. 

The  latter  will  soon  become  itself  instinctive  :  another 
of  the  results  aimed  at. 

Wliat  I  have  just  said  needs  expansion. 

"  From  the  same  attitude  towards  things  results 
a  same  way  of  seeing  them." 

Just  as  the  aspect  of  a  monument  varies  according 
to  the  place  from  which  it  is  looked  at  and  remains 
the  same  to  all  the  observers  who  approach  it  from  the 
same  side,  so  do  military  questions  extract  the  same 
answer  from  all  when  they  are  being  faced  from  the  same 
point  of  view.  But  there  is  at  war  only  one  manner 
of  approaching,  of  facing  the  questions,  namely,  the 
objective  one. 

The  military  art  is  not  an  accomplishment,  an  art 
for  dilettante,  a  sport.  You  do  not  make  war  without 
reason,  without  an  object,  as  you  would  give  yourself 
up  to  music,  painting,  hunting,  lawn  tennis,  where  there 
is  no  great  harm  done  whether  you  stop  altogether  or 
go  on,  whether  you  do  little  or  much.  Everything  in 
war   is    hnked    together,    is   mutually   interdependent, 


14  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

mutually  interpenetrating.  When  you  are  at  war  you 
have  no  power  to  act  at  random.  Each  operation  has 
a  raison  d'etre,  that  is  an  object ;  that  object,  once 
determined,  fixes  the  nature  and  the  value  of  the  means 
to  be  resorted  to  as  well  as  the  use  which  ought  to  be 
made  of  the  forces.  That  object  is,  in  each  case,  the 
very  answer  to  the  famous  question  Verdy  du  Vernois 
asked  himself  when  he  reached  the  battle-field  of 
Nachod. 

In  presence  of  the  difficulties  Avhich  faced  him,  he 
looked  into  his  oAvn  memory  for  an  instance  or  a  doctrine 
that  would  supply  him  with  a  line  of  conduct.  Nothing 
inspired  him.  "  Let  history  and  principles,"  he  said, 
"  go  to  the  devil  !  after  all,  what  is  the  jjroblem  ?  "  And 
his  mind  instantaneously  recovered  its  balance..  This 
is  the  objective  way  of  treating  the  subject.  Every 
military  operation  must  be  approached  from  the  side 
of  its  object,  in  the  widest  sense  of  that  word.  What  is 
the  Problem  ? 

That  common  attitude  towards  things,  followed  by  a 
common  way  of  seeing  them,  produces,  as  may  well  be 
suspected,  a  common  way  of  acting.  But  further,  once 
the  question  is  put  in  that  Avay,  the  answer  that  follows 
is  at  the  same  time  complete  and  appropriate,  involving 
the  adaptation  without  reserve  of  the  means  to  the  end.  It 
is  an  a  priori  logical  solution  in  so  far  as  it  is  exclusive 
of  any  preconceived  form  and  is  inspired  solely  by  the 
one  particular  case  and  handles  that  case  wholly  in 
itself.  A  rational  conduct  proceeding  from  objective 
study — such  is  the  first  certain  and  common  result  which 
all  will  attain  who  approach  the  study  of  a  military 
case  by  asking  themselves  :  What  is  the  Problem  ? 
Once  the  habit  has  been  acquired  of  studying  and  acting 
thus  in  numerous  concrete  cases,  the  work  is  done 
unconsciously,  instinctively,  automatically,  so  to  speak, 
and  this  in  consequence  of  the  training  the  intellect  has 
received.  Verdy  du  Vernois  is  the  proof  of  it.  He 
sent  history  and  jirinciples  to  the  devil,  but  he  used  the 
knowledge  he  possessed  of  them,  for,  without  his  possess- 
ing his  subject,  without  the  acquired  habit  of  reflecting, 
discussing,  deciding,  he  could  not  have  acted  in  face  of 
a  difficult  situation. 

Such  results  are  again  illustrated  by  another  and 
more  commonplace  instance.     A  wild  fowl  flies  up  in 


ON   THE   TEACHING   OF   WAR        15 

front  of  a  sportsman ;  if  it  goes  from  right  to  left,  he  fires 
in  front  and  to  the  left ;  if  from  left  to  right,  he  fires  in 
front  and  to  the  right ;  if  it  comes  on  him,  he  fires  high ; 
if  away  from  him,  he  fires  low. 

In  each  of  these  cases,  he  applies  in  a  variable  way 
the  fixed  principle  :  to  get  three  points  upon  one  straight 
line,  his  eye,  the  sight  and  the  quarry,  at  the  moment 
the  shot  takes  effect. 

Whence  does  he  derive  his  method  of  application? 
Does  he  resort  to  discussion  of  the  problem?  He  has 
not  got  the  time.  He  unconsciously  derives  his  method 
of  application  from  the  sight  of  his  object  under  the 
particular  surrounding  circumstances  :  he  swings  from 
left  to  right,  or  the  reverse,  at  a  given  speed;  a  purely 
objective  process.  And  from  seeing  as  quickly  as 
possible,  there  naturally  results  a  tension  of  all  the 
means  in  one  single  direction;  he  has  practised  the  art 
of  acting  rationally  without  reflecting. 

AVhat,  then,  is  wanted  in  order  to  supply  a  principle, 
is  to  look  at  the  object  in  itself  under  the  conditions  of 
the  moment,  and,  so  to  speak,  through  the  atmosphere 
of  the  particular  case  characterising  the  situation. 
Our  own  object  is  the  enemy,  on  whom  we  want  to 
react  in  a  given  way  according  to  the  day,  to  the  mission 
we  have  been  given;  we  have  to  make  reconnaissance 
of  the  enemy,  or  to  pin  him,  or  to  delay  him,  or  to 
strike,  etc. 

Thence — ^from  the  sole  consideration  of  the  object — 
must  be  derived,  first  by  means  of  reasoning  (when,  as 
here,  in  this  school  we  have  to  study),  later  when  in  the 
field,  automatically  our  whole  conduct,  our  whole 
manner  of  acting. 

Such  an  application  of  principles,  even  in  the  case  of 
a  sportsman,  implies,  however,  that  he  is  aware  of  the 
means,  that  he  knows  how  to  use  them,  that  these  means 
are  ready :  his  gmi  is  in  good  condition,  and  loaded ;  his 
arm  is  active ;   his  eye  is  well  trained. 

This  is  the  subjective  part  of  the  business  and  must 
have  been  arranged  beforehand. 

This  will  explain  to  you  why,  before  coming  to  the 
combined  use  of  troops  of  all  arms,  you  have  to  know 
them,  to  be  able  to  handle  them.  The  same  is  true  of 
the  ground,  a  fouith  arm  placed  at  your  disposal;   it  is 


16  THE    PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

necessary  to  master  everything  it  contains  in  order  to 
be  able  to  find  in  it  what  you  will  have  made  up  your 
mind  you  must  be  looking  for.  So  again  with  fortifica- 
tion, which  is  but  the  strengthening  of  ground  with  a 
view  to  the  defensive. 

•'•  This  consideration  j  ustifies  the  necessity  of  establishing, 
besides  general  tactics,  the  teaching  of  the  technique  of 
all  these  arms  and  of  the  way  of  using  each  of  them. 

Once  we  have  reached  this  point  of  defining  both 
the  principles  and  their  method  of  application,  our 
teacliing  must  not  stop  there.  Otherwise,  owing  to  the 
dryness  of  such  a  mathematical  construction  of  things, 
we  should  still  miss  the  very  nature  of  war,  "  a  dreadful 
and  impassioned  drama." 

By  adopting  such  a  defined  form  we  would  set  a  limit 
to  study.  But  war  is  a  truly  unlimited  ground.  The 
fields  of  great  human  activities  are  never  closed.  Their 
present  term  is  marked  by  the  extent  of  what  can  be 
seen,  by  the  horizon.  But  the  horizon  moves  when  we 
advance  or  rise.  Who  would  think  of  fixing  limits  to 
human  eloquence,  to  art  in  general,  to  industry,  com- 
merce, medicine  ?  The  limits  are  determined  at  any 
moment  only  by  the  point  which  laiowledge,  acquired 
science,  and  the  power  of  the  applying  brain,  have  for 
the  moment  reached.     It  is  the  same  with  war. 

As  Clausewitz  has  put  it :  "  War  is  not  a  system,  a 
closed  doctrine.  Every  system,  every  doctrine,  has  the 
limitative  nature  of  a  synthesis.  There  is  necessarily 
a  contradiction  between  such  a  theory  and  war  itself, 
for  the  practice  of  war  extends  itself  in  all  directions  to 
undetermined  limits." 

In  order  to  keep  open  the  field  of  our  studies,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  animate  them  by  the  sight  of  action, 
we  shall  enter  (always  by  means  of  history)  upon  the 
higher  parts  of  war.  Teaching  in  that  department  will 
be  less  didactic,  but  none  the  less  profitable. 

"  The  paths  that  lead  to  knowledge  are  then,  on  one 
side,  the  historical  path,  and  the  philosophical  path  on 
the  other;  both  must  and  can  complete  each  other  in 
order  to  promote  knowledge  about  war  and  to  prepare 
for  the  power  which,  improved  in  peace-time  by  instruc- 
tion, must  finally,  as  being  the  art  of  conducting  troops, 


ON   THE   TEACHING   OF   WAR        17 

allow  military  action  to  reach  an  efficiency  which  can 
only  be  guaranteed  by  the  soundest  judgment,  the 
firmest  will"  (von  Scherf). 

Napoleon  has  said :  "  Tactics,  the  science  of  the 
engineer,  of  the  gunner "  (what  he  calls  the  eartlily 
part  of  science),  "  can  be  taught  nearly  as  well  as 
geometry.  But  the  knowledge  of  the  higher  parts  of 
war  can  only  be  acquired  from  experience  and  from 
studying  the  history  of  the  wars  of  the  great  Com- 
manders. You  cannot  learn  from  a  grammar  how  to 
write  a  book  of  the  Iliad,  a  tragedy  of  Corneille." 

This  does  not  mean  that  it  is  useless  to  study  grammar, 
but  only  that,  in  a  matter  concerning  art,  to  know  the 
rules  is  not  synonjanous  to  being  able  to  create. 

After  we  have  studied  the  granmiar  of  the  thing  and 
seen  how  it  is  applied,  we  peruse  the  masterpieces  in 
order  to  follow  the  human  mind  as  it  displays  itself  in 
the  higher  parts  of  military  art,  more  especially  in 
strategy.  You  will  then  see  how  strategy  manifests 
itself,  and  you  will  understand  that  though  you  can 
easily  analyse  its  component  parts,  it  is  not  as  easy  to 
build  up  the  whole ;  that  though  good  strategy  is  easily 
miderstood  once  it  has  been  done,  it  is  not  a  thing  easy 
to  do. 

Marshal  von  Moltke  shall  tell  us  in  what  the  matter 
consists  and  also  which  is  the  best  method  of  treating  it. 

"  What  is  necessary,"  he  writes,  "  is,  in  the  midst 
of  particular  cases,  to  discover  the  situation,  such  as 
it  is,  in  spite  of  its  being  surrounded  by  the  fog  of 
the  unknown ;  then  to  ai^prcciate  soundly  what  is  seen, 
to  guess  what  is  not  seen,  to  take  a  decision  quickly, 
finally  to  act  with  vigour,  without  hesitation. 

"  One  has  to  take  two  elements  into  account,  the 
first  a  known  one  :  one's  own  will ;  the  other  one 
unknowTi :  the  enemy's  will.  But  one  has  also  to  add 
factors  of  a  different  kind,  which  escape  prevision,  such 
as  temperature,  sickness,  railway  accidents,  misunder- 
standings, mistakes,  in  a  word  all  the  elements  of  which 
man  is  neither  the  creator  nor  the  master,  be  they  called 
luck  or  fatality  or  be  they  treated  as  providential.  This 
does  not,  however,  imply  that  war  is  to  be  conducted 
arbitrarily  or  blindly.  The  calculation  of  probabilities 
shows  that  these  chance  events  must  necessarily  turn 
out  as  often  to  the  good  as  to  the  bad  for  either  party. 

c 


18  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

"  Therefore  any  general  who,  in  each  particular  case 
takes,  if  not  the  best  possible  decisions,  at  least  rational 
decisions,  has  always  a  chance  of  reaching  his  goal. 

"  Clearly  enough,  theoretical  knowledge  does  not  suffice 
for  this  ;  what  is  required  is  a  free,  practical,  artistic 
development  of  mind  and  will,  based  of  course  on  a 
previous  military  culture  and  guided  by  experience — 
either  by  experience  derived  from  the  study  of  military 
history,  or  by  experience  acquired  in  the  course  of  one's 
own  existence." 

After  considering  whether  strategy  is  an  art  or  a 
science,  he  concludes  : 

"  Strategy  is  a  system  of  devices.  It  is  something 
more  than  a  science.  It  is  knowledge  transferred  into 
real  life,  a  development  of  the  original  directing  thought 
made  in  accordance  with  everchanging  events,  the  art 
of  acting  under  the  pressure  of  the  most  difficult  cir- 
cmnstances." 

Such  is  the  opinion  of  Moltke,  whom  some  have 
thought  possible  to  characterise  by  stating  that  he  had 
"  the  merit  of  doing  well  all  he  did,"  an  appreciation 
which  would  make  him  a  sort  of  superior  scholar,  a  sound 
appreciation  all  the  same,  as  it  throws  a  keen  light  on 
a  man  who  served  his  country  so  well  and  attained  by 
hard  work  such  high  results  that  he  reached  genius 
merely  by  being  methodical. 

Those  are  his  methods  :  "  take  rational  decisions," 
and  in  order  to  do  this,  "  develop  freely,  practically, 
artistically  the  mind  and  the  will,  with  the  help  of  a 
previous  military  culture  resulting  either  from  the  study 
of  history,  or  from  one's  own  experience." 

In  other  words,  strategy  is  but  a  question  of  will  and 
common  sense  ;  in  order  to  keep  that  double  faculty  in 
the  field,  you  must  have  fostered  it  by  training,  you 
must  possess  a  complete  Tnilitary  culture  (humanites 
militaires),  you  must  have  examined  and  solved  a  number 
of  concrete  cases. 

This  is  the  method  we  shall  follow.  In  the  course 
of  the  practical  applications  our  strategical  studies  will 
lead  us  to,  you  will  also  arrive  at  what  we  call  the 
doctrine  or  mental  discipline,  which  consists  first  in  a 
common  way  of  objectively  approaching  the  subject; 
second,  in  a  common  way  of  handling  it,  by  adapting 


ON   THE   TEACHING   OF   WAR        19 

without  reserve  the  means  to  the  goal  aimed  at,  to  the 
object. 

Moreover,  study  of  history  thus  conceived  will  be 
to  us  not  only  a  means  of  teaching,  but  also  a  means  of 
discovering,  and  thereby,  a  way  of  developing  teaching. 
After  General  Maillard,  who  lectured  in  this  school 
on  the  division  and  the  army  corps,  we  had  General 
Bonnal,  who  studied  in  the  same  way  an  army,  the 
conduct  of  an  army  under  the  first  Empire. 

An  army,  as  much  as  an  army  corps,  is  nowadays  a 
subordinate  unit.  It  does  not  involve  creation,  the 
exercise  of  an  art,  but  simply  execution.  One  has  to 
rise  liigher  and  study  the  functioning  of  a  group  of  armies. 
The  accomplished  facts  then  reappear  as  a  sort  of  field 
to  be  explored  in  order  to  feed  our  science  and  to  provide 
our  theories  with  some  foundation. 

The  great  discoveries  of  man  proceed  from  empiricism ; 
consider  steam,  electricity,  vaccination,  etc.  .  .  .  Genius, 
a  gift  of  nature,  creates  by  itself;  this  is  art.  Then 
comes  work,  which  takes  up  the  facts,  analyses,  classifies, 
establishes  relations  as  between  causes  and  effects, 
wherefrom  logic,  laws,  that  is  science,  are  bound  to  result. 
The  art  of  war  does  not  escape  that  rule. 

Are  we  to  say  that  the  power  of  Genius  is  supreme 
and  mere  Work  suffers  from  radical  impotence?  This 
might  be  a  well-founded  conclusion  if  Genius  were,  as 
Work  is,  within  reach  of  everybody.     But  it  is  not. 

We  will,  on  the  contrary,  lay  stress  on  the  efficiency 
of  work,  of  method,  of  science,  in  the  absence  of  genius, 
which  is  as  rare  as  all  the  great  gifts  of  Nature.  We 
shall  see  Theory  start  by  getting  her  lessons  from  genius, 
and  then  comment  and  discuss  those  lessons  :  "Is  not 
what  genius  has  done  the  best  of  rules  to  be  followed, 
and  can  theory  do  anything  better  than  show  why  and 
how  this  is  true?"  (Clausewitz).  Also  we  shall  find 
later  on  "  Science  giving  a  great  number  of  its  adepts 
the  benefit  of  its  fruits,  putting  within  reach  of  an 
average  intellect  the  understanding  and  the  conduct 
of  great  military  affairs,  infusing  into  the  very  veins 
of  an  army  the  principles  of  experience,  warranting  in 
other  words  a  community  of  thought,  wherefrom  in- 
dividual initiatives  and  rational  decisions  spring  up  as 
an  ultima  ratio  "  (General  Bonnal).  We  shall  see  the 
results  of  work,  method,  science.     We  shall  see  1870, 


20  THE    PRINCIPLES    OF    WAR 

the  Prussian  General  Staff,  a  set  of  average  minds,  suc- 
cessfully conducting  a  great  war  with  three  or  four 
armies,  though  the  difliculties  which  the  matchless 
genius  of  Napoleon  had  met  in  1812  and  1813  are 
notorious.  In  spite  of  his  scale,  Napoleon  failed  in  his 
task.  The  body  had  but  one  head ;  it  lacked  muscles, 
articulations,  arms,  without  which  such  a  vast  whole 
could  not  live. 

Yet  what  were  the  numbers  of  1812  and  1813  as 
compared  with  those  of  1870  ?  What  are  these  latter 
as  compared  with  those  of  to-morrow?  The  technical 
side  of  war — railways,  balloons,  telegraphy,  etc. — has 
increased  in  a  similar  way.  "  To-day,  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  cannot  sum  up  everything  in  his  own  person, 
Genius  itself  will  want  auxiliaries  full  of  initiative  and 
well  taught.  How  much  more  will  any  general  who  does 
not  belong  to  the  stars  of  first  magnitude  need  to  be 
helped  and  completed !  Managing  an  army  is  too 
complex  for  a  single  man.  Certain  tecluiical  branches 
require,  besides,  special  knowledge  "    (von   der  Goltz). 

How,  then,  in  the  enforced  absence  of  a  sufficient 
genius,  can  the  means  be  found  rationally  to  conduct 
the  enterprise,  the  war,  with  such  masses  of  men,  if  not 
among  a  corps  of  officers  who  shall  have  been  trained 
by  method,  work,  science,  whom  the  same  spirit  shall 
pervade,  who  shall  submit  to  a  common  mental  disci- 
pline, who  shall  be  numerous  enough  to  be  able  to  move 
and  manage  the  heavy  machine  of  modern  armies  ? 

The  foundation  being  laid  down,  in  what  mental 
disposition  should  the  student  set  to  work? 

The  first  thing  to  do  is  to  grasp  a  certain  number  of 
truths  :  therefore  we  must  have  freedom  of  mind,  no 
prejudices,  no  prepossessions,  no  fixed  ideas,  no  opinion 
accepted  without  discussion  and  merely  because  it  has 
been  always  heard  or  practised.  There  should  be  one 
test  only  :  reason.  In  the  second  place,  those  truths 
must  be  applied  to  'particular  cases  :  first  on  the  map, 
then  on  the  ground,  later  on  the  battle-field.  Let 
us  beware  of  analogy,  let  there  be  no  appeal  to 
memory — it  flies  at  the  very  first  shot.  Let  us  also 
do  away  with  set  plans,  or  any  form  possessing  no  more 
than  an  intrinsic  value  limited  to  itself.  We  want  to 
reach  the  field  of  action  with  a  trained  judgment.     To 


ON  THE  TEACHING   OF   WAR        21 

have  this  it  is  enough  to  train  and  to  begin  training 
to-day.  With  this  object  in  view,  let  us  look  for  the 
raison  d'etre  of  things.  It  will  teach  us  how  to  make 
use  of  them. 

Finally  we  must  automatically,  unconsciously  apply 
those  truths.  We  must  therefore  have  an  intimate 
knowledge  of  them;  they  must  penetrate  our  very 
marrow,  become  part  and  parcel  of  ourselves. 

Those  are  happy,  who  have  been  born  believers,  but 
they  are  rare  men.  One  is  not  born  with  learning 
either.  Every  one  of  us  must  make  for  himself  his 
faith,  his  convictions,  his  knowledge  of  things.  Here, 
again,  the  result  will  not  be  produced  by  a  sudden  reve- 
lation of  light  coming  in  a  flash  or  by  an  instantaneous 
development  of  our  faculties.  We  shall  only  reach  it  by 
a  continuous  effort  of  penetration,  absorption,  assimila- 
tion, by  a  repeated  and  detailed  labour.  Do  not  the 
most  elementary  of  arts  require  the  same  from  us? 
Who  would  boast  of  teaching  within  a  few  moments  or 
even  within  a  few  lessons  fencing,  riding,  etc.  ? 

Your  work  here  consists  in  a  constant  appeal  made 
to  reflexion :  never  take  dispositions  which  are  not 
based  on  reason;  make  a  note  during  a  lecture  of  the 
thoughts  that  strike  you ;  after  practising  on  the  map, 
determine  the  points  of  doctrine  which  henceforth 
appear  to  stand  beyond  discussion ;  after  an  essay  has 
been  corrected,  compare  your  own  views  with  those 
of  the  instructor.  Then  only  will  your  minds  exert 
themselves  in  the  direction  of  the  subject  just  studied ; 
then  only  will  the  principles  be  assimilated  so  as  to 
become  a  basis  for  the  decisions  you  will  have  to  take. 
You  will  be  asked  later  on  to  be  the  brain  of  an  army. 
I  tell  you  to-day  :  Learn  to  Think.  In  presence  of 
each  question,  considered  freely  and  in  itself,  you  must 
first  ask  yourselves  :  What  is  the  Problem  ?  There  is 
the  beginning  of  the  state  of  mind  we  are  looking  for; 
there  is  the  direction  wanted,  a  purely  objective  one. 

"It  is  not  some  familiar  spirit  which  suddenly  and 
secretly  discloses  to  me  what  I  have  to  say  or  do  in  a 
case  unexpected  by  others ;  it  is  reflexion,  meditation  '* 
(Napoleon). 


CHAPTER  II 

PRIMAL   CHARACTERISTICS    OF    MODERN   WAR 

"  Whoever  writes  on  strategy  and  on  tactics  ought  to  confine  him- 
self to  teaching  national  strategy  and  tactics  only,  for  no  other  can  be 
profitable  to  the  nation  he  is  addressing." — Von  der  Goltz. 

Our  task  is  to  study  and  teach  war.  Before  we  under- 
take that  study,  it  behoves  us  to  determine  exactly 
what  this  thing  "  war  "  of  which  we  are  speaking  really 
is.  Do  we  all  agree  about  the  subject  we  have  in  mind 
when  we  use  the  word  "ojar.?" 

If  we  do  not,  if  we  are  not  engaged  in  analysing  the 
same  idea,  misunderstandings  and  therefore  mistakes 
are  bound  to  begin. 

Let  us,  then,  fix  to-day  the  general  features  of  war, 
in  particular  its  object  and  means,  the  rational  way  in 
which  the  goal  must  be  conceived  in  the  France  of  to- 
day, so  that  we  may  find  in  that  study  the  foundation 
of  our  conduct,  that  is,  of  our  tactics. 

For  "  war  is  produced  by,  and  receives  its  form  from, 
the  ideas,  feelings  and  relations  which  obtain  at  the  moment 
it  breaks  out  "  ( Clause witz). 

Evidently  enough,  were  I  to  speak  about  strategy 
and  general  tactics  in  Brussels  instead  of  in  Paris, 
my  study  would  bear  on  a  peculiar  form  of  war.  The 
situation  of  Belgium  is  known  to  j^ou  :  a  neutrality 
guaranteed  by  Europe,  which  is  perhaps  nothing  more 
than  a  word,  but  has,  in  any  case,  hitherto  guaranteed 
the  existence  of  that  little  State ;  further,  the  immediate 
neighbourhood  of  two  great  Powers,  Germany  and 
France,  from  neither  of  which  does  any  serious  military 
obstacle  separate  that  State,  by  either  of  which  it  might 
be  easily  conquered  if  the  other  neighbour,  or  Europe 
as  a  whole,  did  not  intervene  in  the  struggle.  The 
special  theory  of  war  that  would  have  to  be  presented 
to  the  Belgian  Army  would  have  a  well-determined 
object,  namely  that  of   delaying  as  much  as  possible 

22 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR    23 

the  advance  of  the  invading  neighbour.  The  study 
would  then  consist  in  finding  out  how  the  Belgian  Army 
can  perform  such  a  part,  by  avoiding  the  decision  by 
arms  and  adjourning  the  judgment  of  battle. 

Such  a  conclusion  would  necessarily  influence  the 
whole  military  state  of  the  nation :  organisation, 
mobilisation,  armament,  fortification,  as  well  as  the 
instruction  of  the  troops,  not  excluding  the  training  of 
the  company,  of  the  individual  private. 

If  from  Brussels  we  proceed  to  London,  we  again 
find  a  different  situation,  different  ambitions.  Those 
are  equally  familiar  to  you.  There  you  would  find  an 
insular  situation  which  ought  to  be  maintained  intangible 
by  a  protecting  organisation ;  also  the  ambition  of  main- 
tainin  and  developing  an  Empire  beyond  the  seas  and 
in  both  hemispheres.  This  would  require  another  way 
of  handling  the  problem,  another  theory  of  war. 

So,  again,  in  Madrid.  Every  idea  of  territorial  ex- 
tension on  the  Continent  is  temporarily  discarded  by 
Spain  in  view  of  its  geographical  situation,  of  the  nature 
of  its  frontiers,  of  its  political,  financial  state,  etc.  .  .  . 
WTiat  does,  then,  such  a  country  request  from  its  army  ? 
The  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  national  territory. 
Would  not  in  that  case  the  best  lesson  on  the  art  of  war 
be  derived  from  reading  certain  pages  of  the  history  of 
Spain  from  1808  to  1814  ? 

The  same  is  true  of  Rome,  or  Berne.  Each  country 
finds  itself  in  a  different  situation,  requiring  a  distinct 
handling  of  the  problem. 

You  must  not  conclude  that,  in  the  matter  of  warfare, 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  absolute  theory  and  that  you 
have  only  to  deal  with  contingencies.  You  must  not 
adopt  Pascal's  sceptic  views  :  "  Verite  en  de§a  des 
Pyrenees  erreur  au-dela " ;  or  his  "  trois  degres  au- 
dessous  du  pole  qui  contiennent  toute  la  jurisprudence.'* 
Let  us  simply  and  first  be  aware  of  the  existence,  in 
the  study  we  are  making,  of  the  concrete  case ;  in  that 
concrete  case,  one  of  our  data  is  evidently  found  in  the 
geograpliical  position  of  a  State,  from  which  we  must 
start  in  order  to  establish  the  theory  which  mil  allow  us 
to  reach  a  specifically  national  end.  To  such  a  geograph- 
ical position  we  add  the  political,  financial,  military  state 
of  the  nation,  also  the  shape  of  its  territory,  the  situa- 
tion of  its  neighbours,  the  nature  of  the  rights  to  be 


24  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

defended  or  the  claims  to  be  asserted  by  it — all  things 
which  differentiate  a  given  nation  from  all  the  other 
Powers. 

Moreover,  the  same  applies  to  time,  which  represents 
another  datum  of  the  problem,  another  determining 
factor  of  the  concrete  case. 

Suppose  that,  instead  of  speaking  for  the  French  of 
to-day,  I  had  to  treat  the  same  subject  eighty  years 
earlier,  on  the  morrow  of  the  great  lessons  of  the  Revolu- 
tion and  of  the  Empire.  In  that  case,  without  losing 
sight  of  the  very  nature  and  essence  of  war,  I  should 
have  to  take  into  account  the  state  of  the  Continent. 
In  presence  of  a  Europe  exhausted  by  the  struggles  it 
had  just  gone  through,  a  Europe  which  had  temporarily 
renounced  conquest  and  the  appeal  to  arms  and  had 
adopted  for  its  ideal  a  Holy  Alliance  framed  for  the 
maintenance  of  dynastic  legitimacy,  what  France  re- 
quested from  her  army  was  the  means  of  holding  her 
rank  in  such  a  Europe  attached  to  monarchic  and 
d;yTiastic  interests,  as  well  as  the  means  of  supporting, 
if  need  be,  by  some  armed  demonstration,  a  cabinet 
policy,  that  is  a  diplomatic  policy  based  on  admitted 
international  manners,  or  rather  conventions. 

Hence  a  special  condition  of  military  affairs,  involving 
a  particular  kind  of  recruiting,  instruction,  and  fortifica- 
tion, and  an  equally  particular  conception  of  war.  Hence, 
again,  the  study  and  the  preparation  of  a  restricted 
type  of  war,  diplomatic  war,  which  sufficed  for  the  needs 
of  the  time. 

The  true  theory,  that  of  the  absolute  war  which 
Napoleon  had  taught  Europe,  could  afford  to  make 
concessions  in  these  moments  of  general  exhaustion, 
of  restrained  ambitions,  of  reduced  means,  and  still 
lead  to  some  measure  of  success.  In  order  to  conquer, 
it  is  enough  to  be  more  ambitious  and  stronger  than  the 
adversary.  It  is  not  necessary  to  be  very  ambitious 
and  very  strong  if  he  has  but  little  strength  or  ambition. 
This  will  explain  to  you  our  successes  of  1854  and  1859, 
two  wars  with  a  purely  dynastic  object,  namely  the 
object  of  destroying  the  treaties  of  1815,  the  black  page 
of  Napoleon's  history.^ 

^  The  war  of  1870  was  again  a  dynastic  war,  undertaken  by  the 
French  Government  in  order  to  consolidate  their  tottering  i^ower  by 
presumably  easy  victories. 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR     25 

Such  a  theory  of  war,  hmitcd  as  it  was  in  its  ends  and 
means,  was  no  longer  of  service  from  the  day  when 
an  ambitious  nation,  Prussia,  rose  up  out  of  conserva- 
tive and  monarchical  Europe,  resolved  to  take  German 
interests  in  hand,  and  capable  of  imposing  military 
conscription,  thereby  once  more  giving  to  war  a  fully 
national  character  and,  what  is  more,  the  scale  and  the 
pace  of  the  Napoleonic  contests. 

It  is  because  we  ignored  that  radical  transformation 
among  our  neighbours  and  the  consequences  it  was 
bound  to  bring  about  that  we,  who  had  created  national 
war,  became  its  victims.  To  a  people  in  arms,  organised 
for  conquest,  invasion,  a  fight  to  a  finish,  we  opposed 
a  damaged  tool,  a  reduced  army,  an  army  recruited 
among  the  poorest  and  least  instructed  part  of  the  nation, 
as  well  as  the  processes  of  the  eighteenth  century  (one 
does  not  go  without  the  other)  which  could  only  do 
for  a  diplomatic  war,  for  a  war  with  a  limited  end. 

It  is  because  the  whole  of  Europe  has  now  come  back 
to  the  national  thesis,  and  therefore  to  armed  nations, 
that  we  stand  compelled  to-day  to  take  up  again  the 
absolute  concept  of  war,  such  as  it  results  from  history. 
Now  precisely  because  we  are  looking  out  for  an  absolute 
concept,  it  is  not  immaterial  whether  we  study  such  or 
such  page  of  history,  such  or  such  war,  even  if  conducted 
with  success,  in  order  to  extract  the  theory  we  want. 

We  cannot  draw  our  inspiration  indifferently  from 
Turenne,  Conde,  Prince  Eugene,  Villars,  or  Frederick 
the  Great,  even  less  from  the  tottering  theories  and 
degenerate  forms  of  the  last  century.  The  best  of  these 
doctrines  answered  a  situation  and  needs  which  are  no 
longer  ours. 

Our  models,  and  the  facts  on  which  we  will  base  a 
theory,  we  must  seek  in  certain  definite  pages  of  history, 
namely  from  that  period  of  the  French  Revolution 
when  the  whole  nation  was  arming  itself  for  the  defence 
of  its  dearest  interests  :  Independence,  Liberty ;  from 
that  period  of  the  Empire,  when  the  army  born  of  that 
violent  crisis  was  taken  in  hand  and  led  by  the  greatest 
military  genius  that  ever  was,  and  thus  gave  rise  to 
matchless  masterpieces  of  our  art. 

To  proceed  in  that  way  does  not  imply  following  a 
preconceived  idea  or  a  fixed  system.  War,  like  all  other 
human  activities,  undergoes  changes ;  it  does  not  escape 


26  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

the  law  of  evolution.  We  live  in  the  century  of  rail- 
ways, coaches  were  none  the  less  useful  in  their  day. 
But  we  must  not  use  coaches  when  we  want  to  travel 
fast  and  well. 

To  deny  the  change  wrought  in  warfare  amounts  to 
calling  in  question  the  French  Revolution,  which  was 
not  only  philosophical,  social,  and  political,  but  also 
military.  Not  only  did  it  dare  to  declare  war  on  kings 
and  tyrants,  but  also  victoriously  to  oppose  the  in- 
experienced but  at  the  same  time  violently  impassioned 
bands  of  the  levee  en  masse  to  the  minutely  and  rigidly 
trained  troops  of  the  older  Europe. 

Nor  can  one  call  in  question  Napoleon's  victories, 
the  causes  of  which  have  been  given  by  Clausewitz,^ 
when  he  wrote : 

"  Under  the  energetic  leadership  of  Bonaparte,  the 
French,  treading  underfoot  the  ancient  processes  of 
warfare,  undertook  the  conquest  of  Europe  with  a 
wonderful  and  hitherto  unexperienced  success.  Up- 
setting everything  on  their  way,  they  sometimes,  at 
their  very  first  stroke,  shook  to  its  foundation  the  most 
powerful  State." 

Later  on  we  shall  see  what  ought  to  be  understood 
by  "  ancient  processes."  After  he  had  thus  explained 
the  past  by  the  present,  Clausewitz  looked  ahead  with 
anxiety  to  the  future,  which  might  well  forget  the 
fundamental  lessons  of  these  wars,  and  added  : 

"  Who  knows  whether,  within  a  few  generations, 
people  will  not  again  take  a  fancy  for  the  old  fencing 
and  for  antiquated  methods  ;  whether  Bona'parte'' s  fights 
and  battles  will  not  then  be  condemned  as  being  acts  of 
bai'barity  ? 

"  All  the  efforts  of  military  writers  must  tend  to  warn- 
ing against  these  dangerous  errors.  May  Heaven  grant 
our  labours  to  exert  a  wholesome  influence  over  the  minds 
of  the  men  whom  He  has  marked  out  for  directing  the 
government  and  the  affairs  of  our  dear  country  !  " 

It  is  from  this  prophetic  wish,  once  it  became  a  reality, 

^  Contrary  to  what  happened  with  the  social  revohition  which  had 
produced  all  its  effects,  good  or  bad,  among  ourselves,  raising  certain 
classes,  lowering  others,  the  revolution  wrought  in  the  art  of  war 
developed  all  its  power  at  the  expense  of  our  enemies.  It  was  there- 
fore natural  that  foreigners  should  have  studied  and  measured  the 
extent  and  cause  of  the  phenomenon  before  we  did  so  ourselves.  We 
were  the  last  to  understand  it. 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR    27 

that  the  Prussian  General  Staff  was  born.  It  arose 
from  the  dropping  of  "  the  old  fencing  and  antiquated 
methods  "  ;  from  the  conscientious  study  of  Napoleon's 
battles,  considered  not  as  acts  of  barbarity  but  as  the 
only  means  of  warfare  in  the  truest  sense  of  the  word. 

Let  us  profit  by  this.  Let  us  begin,  as  they  did,  by 
setting  aside  the  "  ancient  processes,''^  the  fancy  for  "  old 
fencing,''''  the  "  antiquated  methods  "  which  were  upset 
by  the  wars  of  the  Emperor.  His  enemies  maintained 
them — to  their  own  misfortune — until  finally,  taught  by 
experience,  the  Allies  in  1812,  1813,  1814,  learnt  (to  the 
glory  of  their  arms)  how  to  make  war  national  in  prin- 
ciple, and  how,  in  practice,  to  make  it  a  war  of  movement 
and  of  shock. 

To  us,  at  this  moment  of  history,  in  the  midst  of 
modern  Europe,  that  old  fencing  and  those  antiquated 
methods  are  illustrated  by  a  certain  kind  of  warfare  in 
which  there  is  no  decisive  solution,  nothing  but  a  limited 
end — a  warfare  consisting  in  manoeuvres  without  fighting, 
submitted  on  the  other  hand  to  absolute  rules,  of  which 
I  will  here  give  a  few  typical  instances  : 

Joly  de  Maizeroy  gave  the  following  definition  of 
war  :  "  The  science  of  war  consists  not  only  in  laiowing 
how  to  fight  but  even  more  in  avoiding  the  fight,  in 
selecting  posts,  in  directing  the  marches  so  as  to  reach 
the  goal  without  committing  oneself,  ...  so  again  as 
to  decide  to  fight  a  battle  only  when  it  is  deemed  indis- 
pensable."    To  defer,  to  put  off,  such  is  the  formula. 

We  again  come  across  this  ''''war  without  battle""  in 
the  pages  of  Massenbach,  who  considered  it  the  supreme 
form  of  the  military  art  and  said  in  particular,  referring 
to  Prince  Henry,  brother  of  Frederick,  and  thinking 
he  was  speaking  highly  of  that  Prince  : 

"  He  knew  how  to  conquer  fortune  by  bold  march- 
ing; more  successful  than  Csesar  at  Dyrrachium, 
greater  than  Conde  at  Rocroy,  he,  like  the  immortal 
BerTN^ck,  achieved  victory  without  fighting." 

Therefore  a  man  of  his  time !  To  him  manoeuvres, 
positions  are  the  whole  of  warfare.  No  wonder  we  see 
him  act  in  1806  as  a  great  inspirer  of  disastrous  schemes ; 
more  particularly  when  he  thought  that  the  salvation 
of  the  Prussian  army  lay  in  the  position  of  Ettersberg 
near  Weimar.     Thither  did  he  urge  the  remnants  of 


28  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

the  army  flying  from  Jena  to  repair;  as  if  that  hill 
could  have  possessed  in  itself,  without  a  strong  army  to 
hold  it,  the  power  of  stopping  the  victorious  flood  of  the 
French  ! 

Again,  the  same  kind  of  warfare  was  characterised 
in  the  following  way  by  Marshal  de  Saxe  himself, 
albeit  a  man  of  undeniable  ability  :  "I  am  not  in  favour 
of  giving  battle;  especially  at  the  outset  of  a  war.  I 
am  even  convinced  that  a  clever  general  can  wage  war 
his  whole  life  without  being  compelled  to  do  so." 

Entering  Saxony  in  1806,  Napoleon  writes  to  Marshal 
Soult :  "  There  is  nothing  I  desire  so  much  as  a  great 
battle."  The  one  wants  to  avoid  battle  his  whole  life ;  the 
other  demands  it  at  the  first  opportunity.  Further,  these 
theories  have  the  vice  of  building  up  magnificent  systems 
on  the  mere  properties  and  intrinsic  value  of  ground. 

Again,  we  see  Schwartzemberg,  in  1814,  proceed  by 
Bale,  run  up  against  the  obstacles  of  Switzerland, 
comiDletely  isolate  his  own  army  and  expose  it  a  hundred 
times  to  the  striking  blows  of  an  even  disarmed 
Napoleon,  face  all  these  risks,  in  order  to  secure  the 
advantage  of  entering  France  through  the  Langres 
plateau;  because  the  Langres  plateau  gives  birth  to 
the  Marne,  the  Aube,  the  Seine,  etc.  .  .  .  and  constitutes 
(geographically)  the  strategical  key  to  France.  Bliicher's 
judgment  about  this  \dew  is  well  known. 

To  be  brief,  the  idea  of  a  result  to  be  obtained  by 
conquering  had  totally  disappeared  from  all  these  con- 
ceptions. The  notion  of  force  had  been  replaced  by  the 
notion  of  figure  ;  the  mechanics  of  war  had  become  the 
geometry  of  war ;  intention  stood  instead  of  fact  ;  threat 
instead  of  stroke,  of  battle. 

"  The  mistake  made  was  the  giving  to  war  as  its 
object  tlie  execution  of  nicely  combined  manoeuvres, 
instead  of  the  object  of  annihilating  the  adversary's 
forces.  The  military  world  has  always  fallen  into  such 
errors  whenever  it  has  abandoned  a  simple  and  straight- 
forward notion  of  the  laws  of  war  and  attempted  to 
malic  abstraction  of  matter,  neglecting  thereby  the  natural 
trend  of  things  and  the  influence  of  the  human  heart 
over  human  plan  "  (von  der  Goltz). 

Such  a  formalism  also  leads  to  pedantry.  The  Austrian 
Generals,  after  they  had  been  beaten  by  Bonaparte, 
were  heard  to  exclaim  :    "It  is  not  possible  to  disregard, 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR    29 

as  much  as  does  this  man,  Bonaparte,  the  most  essential 
principles  of  the  art  of  war  !  " 

These  are  precisely  the  views  we  must  neglect  in  the 
Europe  of  to-day;  Ave,  who  are  the  successors  of  the 
Revolution  and  the  Empire,  the  heirs  of  the  art  which 
was  newly  born  on  the  ground  of  Valmy,  which  astounded 
old  Europe,  surprised  in  particular  Marshal  von  Bruns- 
"sdck,  a  pupil  of  the  great  Frederick,  drew  from  Goethe, 
in  presence  of  the  immensely  expanding  horizon,  that 
profound  cry  :  "  I  tell  you,  from  this  place,  and  from 
this  day  begins  a  new  era  in  the  history  of  the  world." 
The  wars  of  the  Idngs  were  at  an  end ;  the  wars  of  the 
peoples  were  beginning. 

These  words  were  addressed  by  that  philosopher  to 
the  officers  of  Saxe-Weimar  around  the  bivouac  fires, 
before  Valmy,  in  the  evening  of  September  20,  1792. 

"  The  French  Revolution,"  said  Clause witz,  "  had 
given  to  politics  and  war  another  character,  which  the 
great  Frederick  had  not  foreseen;  for  it  is  impossible 
to  know,  on  the  eve  of  any  great  event,  what  direction 
things  will  take. 

"  By  the  strength  and  energy  of  its  principles,  by  the 
enthusiasm  with  which  it  enraptured  the  people,  the 
French  Revolution  had  thrown  the  whole  weight  of  that 
people  and  all  its  forces  into  the  scale  which  had  hitherto 
nothing  but  the  weight  of  a  limited  army  and  of  the 
limited  {regular)  revenues  of  the  State. 

"  Paying  little  heed  to  the  calculation  of  political 
alliances  whereby  cabinets  anxiously  weighed  war  or 
alliance,  a  calculation  which  weakened  the  force  of  the 
State  and  subordinated  the  brutal  element  of  fighting 
to  the  reserves  of  diplomacy,  the  French  army  went 
haughtily  forward  through  the  countries  and  saw,  to 
its  own  surprise  and  to  that  of  its  opponents,  how 
superior  are  the  natural  force  of  a  State  and  a  great 
and  simple  motive  to  the  artificial  diplomatic  assemblage 
in  which  these  States  stood  mutually  involved." 

He  added  :  "  The  prodigious  action  of  the  French 
Revolution  is  certainly  less  due  to  the  use  of  new 
mihtary  methods,  than  to  a  wholly  transformed  political 
and  administrative  system,  to  the  character  of  the 
government,  to  the  state  of  the  nation,  etc.  .  .  .  that 
the  other  governments  did  not  know  how  to  appreciate 
those  new  conditions,  that  they  tried  to  meet  by  ordinary 


30  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

means  a  display  of  overwhelming  forces,  this  was  the 
source  of  all  their  political  errors." 

Truly  enough,  a  new  era  had  begun,  the  era  of  national 
wars,  of  wars  which  were  to  assume  a  maddening  pace ; 
for  those  wars  were  destined  to  throw  into  the  fight 
all  the  resources  of  the  nation ;  they  were  to  set  them- 
selves the  goal,  not  a  dynastic  interest,  not  of  the  con- 
quest or  possession  of  a  province,  but  the  defence  or 
the  propagation  of  philosophical  ideas  in  the  first  place, 
next  of  principles  of  independence,  of  unity,  of  im- 
material advantages  of  various  kinds.  Lastly  they 
staked  upon  the  issue  the  interests  and  fortune  of  every 
individual  private.  Hence  the  rising  of  passions,^  that 
is  elements  of  force,  hitherto  in  the  main  unused. 

Remember  Bonaparte's  first  proclamation^ :  "  Soldiers, 
you  are  naked,  ill  fed,  the  government  owe  you  much, 
they  can  give  you  nothing.  Your  patience,  the  courage 
you  show  amid  these  crags,  are  admirable;  but  they 
secure  no  glory  for  you,  no  splendour  shines  on  you. 
I  will  lead  you  into  the  most  fertile  plains  of  the  world. 
Rich  provinces,  great  towns  will  be  in  your  power. 
You  will  find  there  honour,  glory  and  wealth.  Soldiers 
of  the  Army  of  Itah%  can  you  now  lack  courage  or 
steadfastness?  " 

He  knew  well  the  French  wealoiess  :  lack  of  stead- 
fastness. 

And  then,  from  the  summits  of  the  Alps  to  the 
Apennines,  comes  one  answer  shouted  by  the  depleted 
battalions  of  our  hungry  soldiers  :  "  Forward  !  "  The 
new  war  is  launched.  Henceforth  it  will  be  waged  with 
the  soldiers'  heart. 

It  is  truly  a  new  era,  that  of  the  struggles  of  the  peoples, 
of  wild  and  tragical  struggles,  the  records  of  which  were 
to  be  written,  first  by  French  arms.  Later  they  were 
written  by  our  enemies;  the  dreadful  landmarks  of 
whose  reaction  were  to  be  named :  Saragossa,  the 
Kremlin,  Leipzig. 

Do  you  now  catch  the  antithesis  of  these  two  epochs  ? 

On  one  side,  an  extreme  utilisation  of  human, 
ardently  impassioned,  masses ;  an  absorption  of  all  the 
activities  of  society;    an  entire   subordination  to  the 

^  Already,  in  the  past,  the  most  violent  contests  had  been  caused 
by  the  rehgious  wars,  wliich  were  wars  for  an  idea. 
2  To  the  Army  of  Italy  in  passing  the  Alps. 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR     31 

needs  of  the  hour  of  the  material  parts  of  the  system, 
such  as  fortification,  supply,  use  of  ground,  armament, 
billeting,  etc. 

On  the  other  side  (eighteenth  century),  to  the  con- 
trary, a  regular  and  methodical  utilisation  of  those 
material  parts  which  become  the  bases  for  various 
sj^stems ;  for  systems  which  would  of  course  change 
with  the  moment,  but  would  none  the  less  always  tend 
to  make  such  a  use  of  the  troops  as  to  spare  the  army, 
the  capital  of  the  sovereign  :  an  army  not  really  caring 
for  the  cause  for  which  it  is  fighting,  though  not  lacking 
in  the  professional  virtues,  in  particular,  of  military 
spirit  and  honour. 

In  that  latter  case,  the  very  matter  of  war  suffers 
*'  abstraction."  This  abstraction  determined  the  con- 
duct of  the  fighting  men,  albeit  living  and  thinking 
beings,  and  this  in  order  to  fix  the  rules  of  an  art  which 
is  bound  under  such  a  system  to  remain  second-rate. 
It  is  much  as  if  a  painter  should  ask  his  brush  to  supply 
him  with  inspiration  or  to  fix  a  limit  to  his  talent, 
whereas  the  true  end  of  that  instrument  is  but  to  express 
ideas  supplied  by  a  genius  outside  itself. 

The  fancy  for  "  old  fencing,'.'  for  "  antiquated 
methods,"  for  "  ancient  processes,"  periodically  reap- 
pear in  peace-time  among  those  armies  which  do  not 
study  history  and  therefore  forget  the  very  thing  which 
above  all  gives  life  to  war :  namely  action,  with  all  its 
consequences. 

The  undeniable  reason  for  this  is  that  all  these 
systems  are  wholly  based  on  things  you  can  touch  in 
peace-time,  on  the  material  factor  which  keeps  all  its 
importance  in  mere  drill  and  manoeuvres,  while  in  peace- 
time the  7noral  factor  cannot  be  either  clearly  grasped 
or  made  use  of. 

For  instance,  the  battle  of  the  Alma  or  any  similar 
one,  if  it  w^ere  reproduced  in  the  course  of  manoeuvres, 
would  turn  out  a  Russian  victory  and  a  French  defeat; 
the  gromid  demands  such  a  result.  You  would  conclude  : 
escarpments  of  such  a  nature  as  those  of  the  Alma  being 
insurmountable,  it  is  useless  to  guard  them. 

Such  and  such  a  percentage  is  attained  by  rifle-fire 
against  a  target;  such  and  such  are  the  effects  of 
artillery.  Therefore  attack  must  be  utterly  incapable 
of  success.     The  conclusion  drawn  from  this  Avould  be 


32  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

that  you  must  yourself  avoid  attack,  and  await  for 
that  of  your  adversary  :  go  back  to  the  Avar  of  posi- 
tions and  skilful  manoeuvring;  starve  your  enemy  of 
supplies  by  outflanking  him,  etc.  At  each  improvement 
in  armament  you  would  have  to  return  to  the  defensive. 

Now  the  same  problems,  if  studied  in  the  book  of 
history,  suggest  an  exactly  contrary  answer. 

The  battle  of  the  Alma  was  undeniably  a  French 
victory.  It  follows  therefrom  that  any  ground  may  be 
successfully  stormed  by  the  enemy  if  it  is  not  defended 
by  rifle-fire,  that  is  by  watchful  and  active  men. 

Any  improvement  of  firearms  is  ultimately  bound  to 
add  strength  to  the  offensive,  to  a  cleverly  conducted 
attack.     History  shows  it,  reason  explains  it. 

For,  if  rational  tactics  have  always  finally  consisted, 
on  the  offensive,  in  assembling  on  a  given  spot  more 
rifles  and  more  guns  than  the  enemy,  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  such  tactics  would  assemble  to-day  on  that  spot 
better  rifles  and  better  guns,  and  that  the  advantage  of 
the  assailant  would  thereby  be  increased.  Nothing  is 
easier  than  to  give  a  mathematical  demonstration  of  that 
truth  : 

Suppose  you  launch  2  battalions  against  ....  1 

You  then  launch  2000  men  against  .....     1000 

With  a  rille-fire  of  1  shot  to  a  minute,  1000  defenders 

will  fire 1,000  bullets. 

With  the  same  rifle,  2000  assailants  will  fire        .         .     2,000 


Balance  in  f  avoiu:  of  the  attack  ....  1,000 
With  a  rifle  firmg  10  shots  a  minute,  1000  defenders 

will  fire  within  1  minute         .....  10,000 

With  the  same  riflu,  2000  assailants  will  fire         .          .  20,000 


Balance  10,000 

As  you  see,  the  material  superiority  of  fire  quickly 
increases  in  favour  of  the  attack  as  a  result  of  improved 
firearms.  How  much  more  quickly  will  grow  at  the 
same  time  the  ascendancy,  the  moral  superiority  of  the 
assailant  over  the  defender,  of  the  crusher  over  the 
crushed.  Evidently  enough,  the  attacking  force  will 
have  to  be  more  careful  while  pushing  forward  and 
engaging  entirely  their  2000  men,  their  2000  rifles ;  they 
will  nevertheless  keep  the  final  superiority,  even  from 
the  point  of  view  of  mere  fire. 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR    33 

People  are  often  inclined,  though  they  may  be  follow- 
ing history,  to  ascribe  to  purely  material  causes  the 
great  results  of  a  given  war.  "  The  French  people," 
writes  von  der  Goltz,  "  have  in  all  times  been  masters 
in  matters  of  formality.  They  scrupulously  followed 
the  war  of  1866  and  tried  to  explain  the  Prussian  victory 
merely  by  the  superiority  of  Prussian  armament.  Wliile 
thus  looking  at  the  external  side  of  Prussian  military 
power  alone,  they  acted  in  the  same  way  with  regard 
to  the  means  which  were  to  be  used  against  it.  It 
became  to  the  French  army  an  article  of  faith  that  you 
must  utilise  to  the  utmost  the  power  of  armament  and 
keep  to  an  absolute  defensive.  They  thought  that  the 
offensive  strength  of  the  Prussian  army  would  fail  to 
break  a  defensive  action  relying  upon  their  new  and 
terrible  firearms.  Our  adversaries  did  much  more  in 
developing  this  system  than  had  previously  been  done 
by  any  other  army,  and  yet  they  failed  to  secure  victory. 

"  For  they  ruined  by  that  doctrine  the  spirit  of  their 
own  army.  External  form,  the  increase  of  material 
power  actually  attained,  could  replace  neither  the  moral 
strength  that  was  lost  nor  the  confidence  that  was 
shaken  by  a  defensive  doctrine.  This  it  was  that 
turned  the  scales.  Whatever  is  done  within  an  army 
must  always  aim  at  increasing  and  strengthening  its  moral 
force.'''' 

Failing  the  conscientious  following  of  history's  lessons, 
peace-time  instruction  is  bringing  us  slowly,  but  surely, 
back  to  the  "  old  fencing,"  by  virtue  of  the  omnipotence 
falsely  ascribed  to  material  power. 

The  French  of  1870,  just  hke  the  Prussians  of  1806, 
are  a  proof  of  this  truth.  In  both  cases,  as  von  der 
Goltz  puts  it,  "  when  the  enemy  becomes  threatening, 
strategists  give  themselves  up  to  the  study  of  the  gromid, 
estabhsh  imaginary  plans  of  campaign  and  look  for 
positions  which  they  may  or  may  not  discover." 

Is  tliis  not  the  very  summary  of  our  last  war  and  its 
pitiful  history? 

1.  Positions  :  there  is  Cadenbronn,  there  is  Froesch- 
willer,  there  is  the  forest  of  Haye,  all  of  which  are 
supposed  in  turn  to  ensure  the  country's  salvation. 

2.  Imaginary  plans.  We  decide  that  the  Rhine  must 
be  passed  :  where,  when,  how,  with  what  means  ?  It 
does  not  matter.     The  junction  with  the  Austrians  will 


34  THE    PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

be  made  in  Bohemia.  They  beheve  they  can  deposit 
military  plans  at  a  solicitor's.  They  beheve  any  com- 
bination to  be  vahd  by  itself,  independently  from  cir- 
cumstances of  time,  place,  goal  to  be  reached.  It 
reminds  one  of  a  lawyer  preparing  what  is  called  an 
"  omnibus  "  speech,  a  speech  suitable  to  any  possible 
case. 

3.  The  notion  of  battle  has  totally  disappeared — 
and  it  has  disappeared  because  people  believe  they  can 
do  without  it,  because  they  believe  they  can,  like  the 
immortal  Berwick,  earn  victory  without  fighting — 
that  when  troops  are  being  led  into  the  fight,  it  is  from 
a  skilful  handling  of  these  troops,  mutually  related  to 
each  other,  from  a  perfect  way  of  falling  in,  from  some 
new  formation  or  general  disposition,  that  success  will 
come.  A  battle  is  prepared  for  as  if  it  were  a  parade  ; 
no  mention  is  made  either  of  the  enemy,  or  of  blows  to 
be  delivered  {see  the  orders  for  the  battle  of  Champigny), 
or  of  the  hammer  that  must  strike  the  blow.  No 
mention  is  made  of  the  use  of  Force. 

These  erroneous  considerations  will  frequently  re- 
appear, without  your  knowing  it,  in  your  own  decisions ; 
they  will  call  forth  my  criticism  whenever  you  under- 
take outflanking  operations  or  operations  on  the  rear 
of  the  enemy  which  will  draw  all  their  assumed  value 
from  the  mere  direction  in  which  they  will  be  made ; 
wiienever  you  undertake  to  threaten  without  attacking  ; 
whenever  you  resort  to  mere  plans,  geometrical  drawings^ 
as  if  certain  dispositions,  certain  figures  possessed  a 
virtue  in  themselves. 

All  this  is  as  flimsy  as  a  paper  wall. 

You  cannot  push  a  staunch  adversary  back  by  means 
of  a  skilfully  selected  direction.  You  cannot  even  stop 
him  without  really  attacking,  any  more  than  a  paper 
wall  can  prevent  rain  and  frost  from  entering  a  house. 

Being  positive  in  its  nature,  war,  which  we  are  about 
to  study,  only  admits  of  positive  solutions.  There  is 
no  effect  without  a  cause ;  if  you  want  to  produce  an 
effect,  you  must  develop  the  cause ;  and  in  war  you  must 
apply  force. 

If  you  want  to  push  the  enemy  back,  heat  him  ;  other- 
wise, nothing  is  done;  and  there  is  only  one  means  of 
doing  tliis  :  namely  fighting.    No  victory  without  fighting. 

"  Blood  is  the   price  of  victory.      You  must   either 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR    35 

resort  to  it  or  give  up  waging  war.  All  reasons  of 
humanity  which  you  might  advance  will  only  expose 
you  to  being  beaten  by  a  less  sentimental  adversary  " 
( Clause  witz). 

Now  that  Ave  have  seen  how  war  must  not  be  made 
and  compared  the  obsolete  war  of  the  eighteenth  with 
that  of  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  let  us 
study  the  war  we  have  to  prepare. 

Let  me  first  show  you  that  this  war  possesses  in  a 
singularly  enhanced  degree  a  national  nature  which  is 
bound  to  produce  a  more  intense  form  of  warfare. 

"  The  war  of  1870  will  be  child's  play  compared  with 
that  of  to-morrow,"  said  Bismarck. 

War  became  national  in  the  first  instance  as  a  means 
of  conquering  and  guaranteeing  the  independence  of 
each  existing  nation.  (French  of  1792-3,  Spaniards  of 
1804-14,  Russians  of  1812,  Germans  of  1813,  Europe 
of  1814.)  It  was  marked  at  this  stage  by  those  glorious 
and  powerful  manifestations  of  national  passions  which 
are  named  Valmy,  Saragossa,  Tarancon,  Moscow, 
Leipsig,  etc. 

Later  on,  war,  though  still  national,  was  made  with 
the  object  of  acquiring  by  force  unity  of  races,  nation- 
ality. This  was  the  thesis  of  the  Italians  and  Prussians 
in  1866,  1870.  This  will  be  the  thesis  in  the  name  of 
which  the  King  of  Prussia,  made  Emperor  of  Germany, 
will  claim  the  German  provinces  of  Austria. 

But  we  find  to-day  a  third  kind  of  national  war 
arising,  bent  on  conquering  economic  advantages  and 
advantageous  treaties  of  commerce  for  each  nation. 

After  having  been  the  violent  means  by  which  peoples 
enforced  their  ovm.  admittance  into  the  world  of  nations, 
war  is  now  becoming  the  means  they  use  to  enrich 
themselves. 

"  Modern  wars  have  become  the  nations'  way  of  doing 
business.  Nations  have  their  interests  as  have  indi- 
\iduals.  National  egotism  cannot  be  separated  from 
national  greatness"  (von  der  Goltz). 

National  egotism,  national  greatness,  such  are  the 
words  which  are  now  connected  in  policy;  such  are  the 
emotions  from  which  war  arises  : 

A  £  ■  4.       if  less  and  less  interesting, 

A  war  of  mterests  \  ^  _         •   ,       f  7 

[  more  and  more  interested, 

having  as  object  the  wealth  of  nations.     What  wealth? 


36  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

The  wealth  of  nations  has  undergone  the  same  change 
as  that  of  individuals.  It  used  to  be,  and  still  is  in  some 
absolute  monarchies,  a  landed  wealth.  It  has  become 
largely  personal  wherever  the  State  is  based  on  national 
representation  and  parliamentary  government.  Wealth 
has  become  based  on  a  piece  of  paper  :  with  the  in- 
dividual, a  bond ;  with  the  nation,  a  treaty  of  commerce. 

The  means  for  a  nation  to  obtain  wealth  and  satisfy 
its  cravings  is  found  in  waging  war.  Here  is  the 
proof : 

By  their  victories  of  1870-71,  the  Germans  have  no 
doubt  secured  for  themselves  a  mere  territory  :  Alsace- 
Lorraine;  they  have,  however,  also  secured  a  new 
political  position,  the  rank  and  situation  of  an  Empire, 
that  is,  of  a  great  Power  of  fifty  million  inhabitants 
with  corresponding  influence  in  Europe — of  an  Empire 
which  provides  everyone  of  its  subjects  abroad  with  a 
better  situation,  and  ensures  outlets  to  German  industry 
and  commerce;  for  industrial  orders  always  follow  on 
any  success — even  a  military  success.^ 

The  Germans  also  secured  from  France  "most 
favoured  nation  treatment  "  as  regards  tariffs  and  com- 
merce; that  is,  the  means  of  introducing  into  this 
country,  under  favourable  terms,  the  products  of  their 
industry  as  well  as  the  means  of  absorbing  our  wealth. 
It  is  an  advantage  to  all  the  Germans,  which  shows  well 
enough  that  a  nation's  wealth  largely  consists,  now- 
adays, in  drawing  an  income  from  its  neighbour. 

Thus  general  interests,  as  safeguarded  by  victory,  no 
longer  differ  from  the  sum  of  individual  interests. 

The  German  victories  of  1870  have  enriched  the  indi- 
vidual German.  Every  German  has  a  share  in  the  profits, 
and  is  directly  interested  in  the  firm,  in  the  constitution , 
and  in  victory.  That  is  what  is  now  meant  by  a  peopWs 
war. 

Moreover,  what  have  the  Germans  made  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  ?  They  have  made  it  an  imperial  territory, 
the  very  cement  of  unity  under  Prussian  leadership, 
involving  an  obligation  for  all  the  confederates  to  take 
up  arms  if  the  western  neighbour  should  cross  the  border 
and  imperil  the  profits  secured. 

^  The  British,  who  are  experts  in  business,  truly  say :  "  Trade 
follows  the  flag." 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR    37 

Here  is  another  proof:  the  Chinese  and  Japanese 
War. 

After  numerous  and  undeniable  victories,  Japan 
signed  at  Simon  ozaeki  a  treaty  by  which  they  secured 
meagre  territorial  concessions  but  at  the  same  time 
enormous  commercial  advantages,  in  particular  the  right 
to  penetrate  China,  a  right  which,  besides  providing, 
them  with  certain  undisputable  moral  advantages  and 
with  an  undeniable  political  influence  over  the  whole 
of  the  East,  also  ensured  the  development  of  their  own 
market. 

The  guns  of  Wei-hai-wei  and  of  the  Jalu  paved  the 
way  for  a  mercantile  navy  which  would  export,  first 
to  the  Eastern  seas,  then  to  the  Western,  articles  which 
Japan  manufactured  under  conditions  no  longer  possible 
in  Europe. 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  (which  was  entirely  inspired 
by  German  methods  in  its  preparation  and  execution) 
supplies  us  with  a  small-scale,  but  none  the  less  complete 
model  of  the  nature  of  contemporary  warfare ;  for  war, 
to-day,  is  a  commercial  enterprise  undertaken  by  the 
whole  nation.  It  concerns  the  individual  more  directly 
than  did  war  in  the  past,  and  therefore  appeals  much 
more  to  individual  passions. 

Further  proofs  :  the  Spanish-American  War ;  our  own 
last  difficulties  with  the  British  over  Fashoda.  What 
were  we  all  seeking  ?  For  commercial  outlets  to  an 
industrial  system  which  produces  more  than  it  can  sell, 
and  therefore  is  constantly  smothered  by  competition. 
What  happens  then  ?  New  markets  are  opened  by 
force  of  arms. 

"  The  Stock  Exchange  has  acquired  such  an  influence 
that  it  is  able,  in  order  to  protect  its  interests,  to  launch 
armies  into  war"  (von  Moltke).  Who  was  responsible 
for  the  Boer  War  ?  Certainly  not  the  Queen  of  England, 
but  the  merchants  of  the  City. 

National  egotism,  breeding  self-interest  in  politics 
and  war,  and  making  war  a  means  of  satisfying  the 
growing  cravings  of  the  nations,  these  nations  therefore 
bringing  into  the  fight  a  growing  concentration  of 
passion;  a  more  and  more  excessive  feeding  of  war, 
including  the  use  of  the  human  factor  and  of  all  the 
resources  of  the  country — such  is  the  picture  of  modem 
warfare.     It  was  truly  said,  then,  that  "  Nations  are 


88  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

like  men  who  prefer  losing  their  life  to  losing  their 
honour  and  who  prefer  staking  their  last  resources  to 
confessing  themselves  vanquished.  Defeat  is  the  ruin 
of  all "  (von  der  Goltz).  Such  are  the  origins  of 
modern  war.  Here  is  its  moral  :  you  must  henceforth 
go  to  the  very  limits  to  find  the  aim  of  war.  Since 
the  vanquished  party  now  never  yields  before  it  has 
been  deprived  of  all  means  of  reply,  what  you  have 
to  aim  at  is  the  destruction  of  those  very  means  of 
reply. 

What,  then,  are  the  means  of  furthering  this  more 
and  more  national,  more  and  more  interested,  more  and 
more  egotistic  policy;  of  furthering  a  more  and  more 
impassioned,  violent  war  ? 

"  Mobilisation  nowadays  takes  up  all  the  intellectual 
and  material  resources  of  the  country  in  order  to  ensure 
a  successful  issue"  (von  der  Goltz). 

All  resources  :  a  noteworthy  difference  with  previous 
systems  of  recruiting  (such  as  enlistment,  drawing  of 
lots,  substitution,  etc.),  which,  even  under  the  Revolu- 
tion and  the  Empire,  left  unused  a  great  number  of 
citizens. 

All  intelligent  resources :  while  previous  systems 
allowed  the  wealthy  and  educated  part  of  the  nation 
to  escape. 

Moreover,  mobilisation  takes  men  already  trained  to 
military  service ;  they  have  all  previously  gone  through 
a  course  of  military  training,  while  the  mass-levies  of 
1793  or  the  German  landwehrs  of  1813  embodied 
unexperienced  men  only. 

Therefore,  while  being  more  considerable  in  numbers 
and  better  trained,  the  modern  mass  is  also  more 
sensitive. 

The  human  factor  already  possessed  an  undeniable 
predominance  over  the  material  factor  at  the  beginning 
of  the  nineteenth  century.  Is  it  not  clear  that  this 
predominance  is  still  growing  in  every  way  ? 

But,  again,  the  army  we  propose  to  set  up  is  not  a 
professional  army.  It  is  an  army  of  civilians  belonging 
to  all  callings,  to  all  ranks  of  society,  and  wrung  from 
their  own  people  :  which  callings,  society,  people, 
cannot  indefinitely  do  without  them.  War  brings  dis- 
comfort,  puts  everywhere  a  stop  to  life.     Hence  the 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR    39 

consequence  that  such  war  cannot  last  long,  that  it 
must  be  conducted  with  violence  and  reach  its  goal 
quickly;  otherwise  it  will  remain  without  result. 

It  may  be  stated,  then,  that  such  features  as  war 
already  possessed  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century  are  still  more  marked  at  the  end  of  the  century  : 
a  national  war ;  a  war  of  numbers ;  a  war  violent  and 
at  quick  march. 

Such  being  the  terms  of  our  study,  where  shall  we 
study  war  save  in  that  period  of  the  Revolution  which, 
from  its  start,  raised  to  so  high  a  level  the  goals  ascribed 
to  war,  the  means  (number,  enthusiasm,  passion)  de- 
voted to  its  furtherance  ?  Where  save  in  the  acts  of 
Napoleon,  that  matchless  genius,  who  came  on  after, 
who  utihsed  a  military  situation  already  produced  and 
showed  how  genius  could,  in  the  first  place,  work  with 
human  emotions;  in  the  second  place,  manoeuvre 
masses  of  men;  in  the  third  place,  conduct  military 
operations  at  the  highest  potential  ever  known. 

You  may  accept  such  a  conclusion.  Bit  it  is  hardly 
possible  to  grasp  its  contents  without  knowing  whence 
it  was  derived. 

A  soldier  cannot  afford  to  ignore  either  the  origins  or 
the  goal  of  war,  or  the  nature  of  the  means  placed  at 
his  disposal  by  war,  for  it  is  by  studying  all  these  factors 
that  he  will  determine  how  to  make  use  of  those  means, 
what  tactics  he  must  adopt,  what  is  the  value  of  the 
results  he  is  aiming  at.  A  war  not  only  arises,  but 
derives  its  nature,  from  the  political  ideas,  the  moral 
sentiments,  and  the  international  relations  obtaining  at 
the  moment  when  it  breaks  out. 

I  will  draw  an  illustration  from  the  fundamental 
changes  which  the  armies  of  Europe  that  fought 
Napoleon  had  to  undergo  in  order  to  achieve  victory. 

"  Little  by  little,"  said  Rustow,  "  every  Power  built 
up  a  national  army  intimately  connected  with  its  own 
country.  Then  only  did  all  the  armies  take  up  for  them- 
selves all  the  changes  wrought  in  the  art  of  war  by  the 
French  Revolution;  while  the  spirit  of  the  new  art  of 
command  showed  itself  everywhere  and  assumed  appro- 
priate forms."  (The  spirit  he  was  alluding  to  was  the 
end  of  cunning,  of  subtlety,  of  threats,  of  manoeuvres 
without  fighting;  it  resorted  to  blows,  to  fighting,  and 
it  involved  the  unlimited  use  of  human  material.    "  The 


40  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

tactics  of  a  definite  result"  to  be  arrived  at  by  the 
unsparing  use  of  force.) 

"  Until  that  moment,"  he  added,  "  people  might 
imitate  the  7iew  forms  given  to  zvar,  but  they  could  create 
nothing.  Napoleon  s  campaign  was  copied,  but  without 
result."  (To  manoeuvre  by  the  right  or  the  left  does  not 
in  itself  lead  to  success,  a  manoeuvre  in  itself  =  0.  In 
order  to  create,  you  must  have  artistic  adaptation  of 
the  means  to  the  end,  an  adaptation  which  involves  a 
very  clear  knowledge  of  the  means  and  of  the  end  :  in 
other  words,  you  cannot  create  anything  before  knowing 
the  component  elements  of  art.) 

"  But  when  Spain,  Russia.  Germany  rose,  they 
discovered  at  once  that  form  of  war  which  suited  each 
of  them.  All  these  national  armies  had  certain  common 
features  and  quickly  got  hold  of  the  new  forms  which 
France  had  brought  into  strategy." 

This  amounts  to  saying :  try  and  know  why  and 
with  the  help  of  what  you  are  going  to  act;  then  you 
will  find  out  how  to  act. 

"  In  presence  of  this  cardinal  fact  of  national  risings 
against  France,  all  the  other  causes  of  Napoleon's 
repeated  defeats  are  insignificant.  The  reason  why  he 
no  longer  appreciated  with  accuracy  the  forces  in 
conflict,  was  largely  because  he  had  never  thought  of 
the  possibility  of  a  national  rising  among  his  enemies ; 
when  he  had  suddenly  to  face  such  a  rising,  he  did  not 
know  how  to  fight  it.  He  could  no  longer  neglect, 
as  he  had  done  when  opposed  by  the  antiquated  system 
of  his  adversaries  (1805,  1809,  Italy),  the  old  maxim  of 
Rome :  never  to  wage  two  wars  at  once." 

The  enlightened  soldiers  and  German  patriots  of 
1812-13  had  discovered  how  to  hold  their  own  against 
the  French  armies  by  studying  the  occasionally  vic- 
torious resistance  which  Vendee  and  Spain,  acting 
alone,  had  furnished.  From  that  study  they  had 
deduced  processes  which,  once  transferred  from  the 
Bocage  of  Vendee,  or  from  the  hilly  ground  of  the 
Peninsula  into  the  plains  of  Northern  Europe,  proved 
totally  inapplicable  or  powerless.  The  principle  of 
national  rising  had,  none  the  less,  survived.  They 
had,  therefore,  only  to  determine  the  forms  of  war 
which  suited  best  their  own  temperament  and  country 
in  order  to  attain  the  results  we  know. 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR    41 

Conversely,  the  misappreciation  of  "  the  nature  of 
the  subject"  explains,  to  a  large  extent,  the  impotence 
of  our  armies  on  the  Loire  in  1870-71.  The  mass-levy, 
revolutionary  in  its  essence,  decreed  by  the  dictator 
Gambetta,  ill  suited  a  certain  type  of  mind  which 
issued  from  the  imperial  armies  and  had  been  trained 
to  expect  little  more  than  order,  method  and  perfect 
regularity  in  an  armed  force. 

To  take  a  more  immediate  example ;  it  is  in  the  same 
spirit  that  fighting  in  open  order  {ordre  en  tirailleurs) 
may  be  understood  as  a  normal  form  of  fighting  and  as 
having  to  be  rationally  and  quite  soundly  developed 
until  it  becomes  that  "  rush  of  a  team  "  which  turns 
a  modern  battle  into  a  struggle  between  armed  crowds. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  such  methods  can  be  applied 
with  success  where  the  private  has  no  direct  interest 
in  war  and  is  not  the  true  defender  of  a  national 
cause. 

It  is  not  likely  that  such  methods  would  succeed 
where  you  have  an  army  of  mercenaries,  or  of  old 
soldiers,  as  in  the  case  of  the  present  ^  English  army, 
which  necessarily  makes  an  appeal  to  steadfastness 
and  discipline  in  the  ranks  in  order  to  make  up  for  the 
moral  qualities  of  man,  for  individual  valour  and 
initiative;  the  same  applies  to  an  army,  such  as  the 
Austrian,  composed  of  various  races,  of  heterogeneous 
elements,  each  with  distinct  aspirations. 

Now,  w^hat  arguments  shall  we  find  for  this  new  sort 
of  war,  more  and  more  national  in  its  origins  and  ends, 
more  and  more  powerful  in  its  means,  more  and  more 
impassioned;  a  war  which  does  away  with  all  systems 
founded  on  positive  quantities;  ground,  position,  arma- 
ment, supply;  a  war  which  consigns  to  the  background 
the  possession  of  territorj^,  the  capture  of  towns,  the 
conquest  and  occupation  of  strong  positions.  What 
arguments  are  the  supporters  of  such  a  war  to  use  ? 
Failing  the  systems  they  discard,  what  methods  do 
they  propose  to  use  ?  What  conduct  will  they  adopt  ? 
\Miat  w\]l  be  their  starting-point  and  what  their  end  ? 
By  what  principle  shall  such  war  live  ? 

As  we  have  already  seen,  and,  for  general  reasons 

1  1900. 


42  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF    WAR 

explained  above/  it  is  to  the  theory  of  decision  by 
arms  that  war  is  now  wholly  returning;  one  can  now 
apply  no  other.  Instead  of  condemning  Bonaparte's 
battles  as  acts  less  civilised  than  those  of  his  precedessors, 
this  theory  considers  them  as  the  only  efficient  means; 
it  seeks  to  repeat  them  by  seeking  the  same  sources  of 
action  as  he  had. 

We  find  ourselves,  for  the  war  we  pr^uppose,  in 
presence  of  an  adversary  who  has  the  same  idea  of 
fighting,  ^\ho  takes  up  arms  for  an  idea,  a  principle — 
a  change  of  tariff,  for  instance  :  no  matter  what  the 
end  so  that  it  be  a  policy  to  be  attained.  Invasion  or 
occupation  of  territory  will  therefore  trouble  him  very 
little;  these  operations  cannot  be  the  end  of  the  war. 
He  intends,  moreover,  as  do  we,  to  back  his  political 
and  financial  theories  by  force.  He  will  only  renounce 
those  theories  when  he  has  been  deprived  of  the  means 
of  defending  them.  He  will  only  confess  himself  beaten 
when  he  is  no  longer  able  to  fight;  that  is,  when  his 
army  shall  have  been  materially  and  morally  destroyed. 

Therefore  modern  war  can  onlj^^  consider  those  argu- 
ments which  lead  to  the  destruction  of  that  army  : 
namely  battle,  overthrow  by  force. 

"  Bonaparte  always  marched  straight  up  to  the 
goal  without  troubling  in  the  least  about  the  strategical 
plan  of  the  enemy;  knowing  that  everything  depends 
on  tactical  results  and  never  doubting  that  he  would  get 
them,  he  akvays  and  everywhere  sought  an  opportunity 
for  battle""  (Clausewitz). 

To  seek  out  the  enemy's  armies — the  centre  of  the 
adversary's  power — in  order  to  beat  and  destroy  them; 
to  adopt,  with  this  sole  end  in  view,  the  direction  and 
tactics  which  may  lead  to  it  in  the  quickest  and  safest 
way  :  such  is  the  whole  mental  attitude  of  modern  war. 

Let  us  therefore  give  up  talking  of  manoeuvres  de- 
vised a  priori  to  reach  the  enemy's  communications,  to 
get  hold  of  his  stores,  to  enter  such  and  such  more 
easily  accessible  part  of  his  territory;  none  of  these 
results  affords  any  advantage  by  itself;  it  can  only  be 
of  use  if  it  leads  to  fighting  under  advantageous  tactical 

^  The  similarity  between  to-day's  situation,  means  and  end,  and 
those  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  leads  to  and  restores  the  same 
conduct  of  war. 

i- 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR     43 

conditions,  if  it  permits  the  most  favourable  utilisation 
of  our  forces. 

Tactical  results  are  the  only  things  that  matter  in 
war.  Nothing  but  decision  by  arms  makes  an  award 
possible,  for  such  a  decision  alone  makes  a  victor  and  a 
vanquished ;  alone  does  it  modify  the  respective  situa- 
tion of  the  opposing  parties,  ,of  which  one  becomes  the 
master  of  his  own  acts,  while  the  other  has  to  submit 
to  the  mil  of  the  adversary.  Where  there  is  no  battle, 
there  is  no  award,  nothing  is  accomplished.  Valmy 
proves  it.  Dumouriez  finds  himself  in  Sainte-Mene- 
hould.  Is  he  outflanked  ?  He  is,  for  he  finds  himself 
cut  off  from  direct  communications  with  Paris;  he 
resorts  to  indirect  communications.  But  there  has  been 
no  decision  by  arms,  no  tactical  result.  He  decides 
that  nothing  is  yet  concluded  :  he  does  not  withdraw. 
When  he  is  attacked,  he  defends  himself.  As  he  is  not 
beaten,  it  is  the  enemy  who  are  beaten,  for  they  have 
failed  at  the  bar  of  battle. 

No  strategy  can  henceforth  prevail  over  that  which 
aims  at  ensuring  tactical  results,  victory  by  fighting. 

A  strategy  paving  the  way  to  tactical  decisions 
alone  :  this  is  the  end  we  come  to  in  following  a  study 
which  has  produced  so  many  learned  theories.  Here, 
as  everywhere  else,  as  in  politics,  the  entrance  upon  the 
stage  of  human  masses  and  passions  necessarily  leads 
to  simplification. 

"Although  one  may  follow  many  roads  in  war, 
fighting  is  the  only  means  of  reaching  the  end.  Every- 
thing in  war  constantly  remains  subordinated  to  decision 
by  arms,  which  alone  in  the  last  instance  pronounces 
judgment.  Once  your  adversary  seems  decided  to 
resort  to  that  supreme  jurisdiction,  you  must  of  all 
necessity  follow  him  in  his  appeal  (unless  you  are  certain 
he  does  not  intend  to  proceed).  To  adopt  from  the 
start  a  more  cautious  line  of  conduct  is  to  risk  losing 
the  case.  .  .  .  War  has  but  one  means  at  its  disposal, 
namely  fighting.  .  .  .  Therefore,  whichever  system  is 
adopted,  be  it  offensive  or  defensive,  it  is  always  and 
necessarily  tactics  which  decide  the  issue.  And  all 
strategical  combinations  must  aim  at  reaching  tactical 
results,  for  these  alone  are  the  fundamental  cause  of 
every  successful  solution.  .  .  ."  (Clausewitz). 

As,  then,  strategy  does  not  exist  by  itself,  as  it  is 


44  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

not  worth  anything  without  tactical  efficiency,  as 
tactical  results  are  everything,  let  us  see  out  of  what 
those  results  are  made. 

There,  again,  "  modern  war  proceeds  from  Napoleon's 
views,  as  he  was  the  first  to  throw  light  on  the  importance 
of  preparation  and  on  the  omnipotence  of  mass  multi- 
plied by  impulsion,  with  the  object  of  breaking,  in  a 
battle  sought  from  the  outset  of  the  war,  the  moral  and 
material  forces  of  the  adversary  "  ( Clause witz). 

Later  on,  when  we  shall  study  force  in  action,  we 
shall  reach  by  mere  reasoning  that  very  same  way  of 
conceiving  battle  :  the  necessity  of  organising  a  shock 
both  supreme  and  final. 

Let  us  for  the  moment  keep  to  the  synthesis  we  can 
deduce  from  history.  It  is  characterised  by  three 
things  :   preparation ;  mass ;  impulsion. 

Preparation  in  modern  war  is  more  necessary  and 
must  be  pushed  further  than  in  the  past. 

Unless  one  acts  thus,  one  is  forestalled  and  out- 
distanced by  the  adversary.  One  thing  alone  is  of 
import :  the  point  of  preparation  reached  at  the  actual 
outbreak  of  war. 

It  is  not  by  months,  or  weeks,  but  by  days  and  hours 
that  the  progress  of  these  preparations  has  now  to  be 
measured.  The  results  of  mere  moments  in  this  matter 
reach  very  far. 

"  A  three  days'  advance  in  the  French  mobilisation," 
wrote  von  der  Goltz,  "  would  enable  the  French  to 
surround  Metz  and  Thionville,  to  cut  the  communi- 
cations of  Strasburg,  and  to  reach  the  Sarre  before 
the  Germans  could  resist.  The  latter  would  then  be 
compelled  to  withdraw  their  point  of  concentration 
back  to  the  very  ground  where  it  took  place  in  1870 — 
that  is,  on  the  Rhine." 

The  same  is  true  of  the  place  of  assernbly,  located  as 
near  the  frontier  as  possible.  It  is  quite  obvious  and 
•certain,  for  instance,  that  Chateau- Salins  is  sixteen 
miles  distant  from  Nancy,  also  that  Nancy  is  occupied 
by  a  strong  French  garrison,  that,  therefore,  considerable 
German  masses  will  be  concentrated,  in  the  very  first 
moment  of  a  war,  around  Chateau-Salins. 

Thus  the  nature  of  the  napoleonic  preparation  has 
been,  so  to  speak,  reinforced ;   it  has  been  reinforced  to 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR     45 

such  a  degree  that  the  results  of  the  first  operations 
have  been  both  hastened  and  made  crushing  and 
final. 

The  necessity  of  pushing  preparation  as  far  as  possible 
is  to  be  found  in  the  conduct  of  any  tactical  operation 
you  nia}^  have  to  study,  the  object  being  not  to  be  fore- 
stalled by  the  enemy,  as  well  as  to  avoid  mistakes  in 
the  field,  with  the  tragic  sacrifices  these  involve  from 
the  ruthless  efficiency  of  modern  arms. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  tactical  action. 

In  what  does  it  consist  ?  There  is  but  one  means 
of  treating  with  the  adversary,  namely  to  heat  him, 
and  therefore  to  overthrow  him.  Hence  the  idea  of  a 
shock  composed  of  two  terms  :  mass  and  impulsion. 

We  have  mentioned  mass ;  it  absorbs  in  modern 
warfare  all  the  physical  and  moral  forces  of  the  country. 
The  same  will  be  true  of  any  tactical  operation,  however 
small  it  be.  The  greatest  part  of  our  forces,  if  not  the 
whole,  will  be  reserved  as  a  masse  de  choc. 

As  for  impulsion,  a  new  idea  brought  into  war,  it  un- 
avoidably carries  with  it  the  idea  of  movement.  Tactics 
on  the  battle-field  will  be  the  tactics  of  movement. 

The  last  word  of  offensive  or  defensive  fighting  will 
be  therefore  :  the  troop  in  movement — ^that  is,  attacking. 

But  before  launching  troops  into  battle,  can  they  be 
at  least  conceived  as  being  in  another  situation  than 
movement?  No.  The  theory  which  aims  at  achieving 
the  strongest  possible  shock  prescribes  to  strategy  as  a 
primordial  condition  to  bring  to  the  point  of  shock  all 
available  troops.  It  is  by  movement  that  troops  assemble 
and  prepare  for  battle.     Movement  governs  strategy. 

May  we  not  stand  and  await  that  shock?  Of 
course  not.  If  we  did  not  seek  it,  it  might  well  either 
not  occur  at  all,  or  occur  under  bad  conditions ;  we 
might  then  fail  to  destroy  the  forces  of  the  adversary, 
which  is  in  war  the  only  means  of  reaching  our  end. 

You  must  seek  the  shock ;  hence  a  new  set  of  reasons 
for  movement  :  movement  in  order  to  seek  battle ; 
movement  in  order  to  assemble  one's  forces  on  the 
ground ;  movement  in  order  to  carry  out  the  attack. 

Such  is  the  first  law  that  governs  the  theory,  a  law 
from  which  no  troop  can  ever  escape  and  which  has 
been  expressed  by  the  military  formula  :  of  all  faults, 
one  only  is  degrading,  namely  inaction. 


46  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Combined  with  the  idea  of  shock,  this  law  makes  the 
conduct  of  troops  a  working  of  forces,  within  time  and 
space,  that  is  a  piece  of  mechanics. 

But  while  one  thus  moves  in  order  to  seek  battle,  to 
prepare  for  it,  to  carry  it  out,  all  this  is  done  against  an 
adversary  himself  in  movement. 

The  mere  mechanics  of  our  own  forces  therefore 
produce  a  highly  complex  dynamic  problem,  in  which 
one  term  is  known  :  namely  the  situation  and  size  of 
one's  own  forces;  while  the  other,  namely  the  enemy's 
situation  (in  size,  direction  and  trend),  is  but  vaguely 
known  :  a  consideration  which  shows  how  limited  in 
war  is  the  power  of  mathematical  combination. 

That  mobile  and  unknown  enemy  must  first  be 
discovered  ;  then  reconnoitred  ;  then  fixed,  or  pinned,  so 
that  the  play  of  our  forces  may  strike  him.  Hence  a 
first  series  of  detachments  with  special  missions,  which  have 
to  manceuvre  if  they  would  carry  out  those  missions. 

But  an  unbeaten  adversary  retains  his  freedom  to 
act  as  much  as  we  do.  That  combination  of  forces  we 
are  trying  to  set  up  must  therefore  be  guarded  against 
his  attacks,  which,  otherwise,  would  prevent  us  from 
marching,  assembling,  and  striking.  Hence  the  neces- 
sity for  a  service  of  security ;  that  is,  of  other  detachments 
which  will  have  to  manoeuvre  in  their  turn. 

But,  again,  at  the  very  time  during  which  we  are 
attempting  to  concentrate,  we  try  to  maintain  dispersion 
among  the  enemy ;  at  the  very  time  we  attempt  to  keep 
our  freedom  of  action  in  order  to  carry  out  our  plan, 
we  are  trying  to  deprive  him  of  his  freedom  of  action 
in  order  to  strike  him  :  another  reason  for  creating 
yet  another  series  of  detachments. 

Thus  the  simplified  notion  :  "  approach  battle  with 
the  main  body  of  your  forces,"  involves  : 

(1)  The  obligation  of  always  keeping  that  main  body 
at  one's  disposal,  and  also  of  manoeuvring  it,  which  is  a 
matter  of  course. 

(2)  But  at  the  same  time  the  obligation  of  supplying 
numerous  detachments  all  destined  to  enable  the  main 
body  to  function,  having,  therefore,  to  perform  a  sub- 
ordinate part,  and  compelled  to  manoeuvre  too.  A 
circumstance  which,  to  begin  with,  implies,  at  least 
seemingly,  dispersion,  the  very  reverse  of  the  concen- 
tration which  was  sought. 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MODERN  WAR     47 

We  shall  see,  in  the  course  of  the  next  lecture,  how 
the  principle  of  economy  of  forces  gives  us  the  means 
of  reconciling  these  apparently  contradictory  conditions  ; 
to  strike  with  an  assembled  whole,  after  having  supplied 
nil mcrous  detachments. 

I  shall  have  reached  my  aim  to-day  if,  after  showing 
you  what  theories  must  be  dropped,  I  have  made  you 
grasp  the  singularly  reinforced  nature  of  war  at  the  end 
of  the  nineteenth  century  :  a  more  and  more  national  war ; 
more  and  more  considerable  masses;  ever-increasing 
predominance  of  the  human  factor;  hence  a  necessity 
for  going  back  to  that  conduct  of  troops  which  aims  at 
battle  as  at  the  final  argument;  which  manoeuvres  in 
order  to  reach  that  goal ;  a  conduct  characterised  by  : 
preparation,  mass,  impulsion. 

As  for  these  last  features,  they  go  so  deep  that  they 
stamp  themselves  on  all  the  acts  of  war,  however  in- 
significant. No  action  will  be  well  conducted  on  your 
part  unless  it  answers  three  conditions  : 

Preparation  :  there  must  be  in  your  mind  a  plan  of 
action,  based  on  a  thorough  study  of  the  task  or  mission 
assigned,  as  well  as  on  a  detailed,  minute  examination 
of  the  ground;  a  plan  liable,  of  course,  to  alteration. 
You  must  have  troops  disposed  and  drawn  up  so  as  to 
be  able  to  prepare  and  undertake  the  execution  of  that 
plan ;  so  that  you  may  be  able,  so  to  speak,  to  express 
it :  advance  guards  and  flank  guards  in  particular : 

Mass :  that  is  a  main  body,  as  strong  as  possible, 
assembled,  kept  in  hand,  available  for  carrying  out  the 
execution  of  the  plan  : 

Possibility  of  multiplying  that  mass  by  impulsion : 
that  is,  of  finally  hurling  that  mass,  more  or  less  scattered 
at  first,  later  on  regrouped,  with  all  the  means  it  pos- 
sesses :  guns,  rifles,  bayonets,  swords,  appropriately 
used ;  of  hurling  it  as  one  whole  on  one  objective. 


CHAPTER   III 

ECONOMY    OF    FORCES 

"  The  art  of  war  consists  in  always  having  more  forces  than  the 
adversary,  even  with  an  army  weaker  than  his  own,  on  the  point  where 
one  is  attacking  or  being  attacked." — Napoleon. 

As  we  have  previously  seen,  modern  war  knows  but 
one  argument :  the  tactical  fact,  battle.  In  view  of 
this  it  asks  of  strategy  that  it  should  both  bring  up  all 
available  forces  together,  and  engage  in  battle  all  these 
forces  by  means  of  tactical  impulsion  in  order  to  produce 
the  shock. 

This  theory  dictates  both  the  movements  and  the 
manoeuvre  of  each  task. 

But  at  the  very  time  one  is  thus  seeking  such  a  battle 
of  concentration 

(^discover  the  enemy; 
reconnoitre  the  enemy; 
fix  the  enemy; 
cover  and  protect  one's  own 

concentration ; 
keep  the  enemy  scattered ; 
prevent  the   enemy's   con- 
centration. 


one  discovers  the  necessity 
of  supplying  detachments  \ 
in  order  to  : 


While  theory,  then,  prescribes  concentration,  execution 
carries  with  itself  dispersion,  at  least  by  involving  the 
setting  up  of  numerous  detachments.  Does  this  not 
prove  theory  to  be  impracticable  ? 

The  same  theory  appears  to  be  even  less  practicable 
when  the  movement  of  forces  is  being  taken  into  account. 

It  is  easily  conceivable  that  one  should  have  managed 
to  bring  to  the  same  battle,  to  the  same  place,  at  the 
same  time,  an  army  such  as  that  of  Turenne  or  Frederick, 
provided  with  tents  and  stores.  Such  an  army  could 
move  as  one  block.  Its  not  very  numerous  elements 
could  easily  march  and   arrive   together;  and  this   in 

48 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  49 

presence  of  an  enemy  in  position,  whose  strength  partly 
lay  in  his  very  immobility,  and  who  therefore  gave 
you  the  time  to  assemble  your  columns  and  deploy 
them  methodically.  To-day,  however,  with  an  estab- 
lishment which  at  the  first  grouping  comes  to  more 
than  one  million  of  men,  the  army  cannot  march,  live, 
be  housed,  without  spreading  far  and  wide.  It  divides 
itself  into  numerous  lengthy  columns.  The  space 
occupied  in  front  and  depth  is  immense. 

Two  army  corps  marching  on  the  same  road,  one 
behind  the  other,  represent  in  their  fighting  elements 
alone  a  length  of  about  forty  miles.  To  deploy  them  on 
a  front  in  line  v/ith  the  head  of  the  column  is  an  opera- 
tion which  requires  nearly  three  days.  Conceive  what 
depths  are  involved  by  the  presence  of  a  second-line 
army  behind  the  first-line  army  ! 

The  same  is  true  of  the  extension  of  the  modern 
front. 

The  three  German  armies  of  1870  which  Marshal  von 
Moltke  intended  to  throw  into  the  same  battle,  on  August 
9th,  on  the  Sarre,  had,  even  by  August  4th,  a  front  of 
sixty  miles. 

There  is  no  exaggeration  in  foreseeing  an  initial 
extension  in  the  future  of  from  sixty  to  ninety  miles. 
How,  then,  can  theory,  in  face  of  such  an  extension,  aim 
at  organising  battle  on  the  basis  of  unity  of  space  ? 

The  same  applies  to  time.  In  presence  of  a  manoeu- 
vring adversary,  how  is  it  possible  to  secure  the  long 
days  necessary  for  the  lateral  columns  to  join  the  central 
ones,  for  the  rear  of  the  columns  to  close  on  the  front  ? 

The  same,  again,  is  true  of  manoeuvre.  How  can  you 
find  time  to-day  to  develop  it  in  face  of  an  enemy  who 
does  not  stand  on  a  position  but  attacks  ? 

Again,  the  same  is  true  of  battle.  Is  there  any  means 
of  conducting  an  action  which  involves  such  immbers 
and  is  undertaken  on  such  a  scale  in  space  ? 

Must  we  not  leave  everything  to  luck,  to  improvisa- 
tion, to  everybody's  initiative,  to  the  private's  valour? 

Does  not,  then,  that  art  of  war  which  had  been  thought 
to  have  become  a  great  art  after  all  the  resources  of  the 
country  had  been  placed  at  its  disposal,  does  not  such 
an  art  become  the  7iegation  of  art,  that  is,  an  impotence 
to  create  ? 

This  was  the  view  of  the  eighteenth  century,   and 


50  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

thence  sprang  the  conception  of  a  maximum  army : 
one  should  not  handle  more  than  a  certain  number  of 
men;  beyond  that  limit  disadvantage  would  grow  at 
a  quicker  rate  than  advantage. 

But,  then,  will  not  such  a  war — a  war  which  admits 
of  none  but  cruel  arguments,  which  rejects  the  elegant 
and  elusive  manoeuvres  of  the  eighteenth  century  and 
only  recognises  one  means  of  reaching  its  end,  namely 
bloodshed — will  it  not,  in  view  of  the  apparent  impossi- 
bility to  direct  it,  hark  back  to  the  confusion  of  the 
barbaric  invasions  ? 

No,  it  will  not.  The  object  of  to-day's  lecture  is  to 
establish  the  existence  of  a  superior  principle  which 
enables  us  to  achieve,  even  with  considerable  numbers, 
even  against  a  manoeuvring  enemy,  that  handling  of  the 
forces  which  theory  demands;  to  portion  them  out  in 
time  and  space  and  to  employ  them  in  both  ways — of 
the  mass  and  of  detachment — so  as  finally  to  succeed  in 
applying  them,  strategically  as  well  as  tactically,  to- 
gether on  a  given  spot ;  on  the  basis  of  unity  of  time  and 
unity  of  space. 

Those  conditions  will  always  ensure  the  greatest 
possible  efficiency. 

This  superior  principle,  which  we  call  the  principle 
of  econo7ny  of  forces,  arose  during  the  period  of  the 
Revolution  contemporaneously  with  the  difficulties  it 
was  designed  to  meet. 

What,  then,  is  the  principle  of  economy  of  forces  ? 

A  mere  definition  will  not  serve  us. 

There  is  a  proverb  which  says  ;  "  You  cannot  hunt 
two  hares  at  the  same  time  "  ;  you  would  catch  neither 
of  them.  You  also  have  the  Roman  Senate's  old 
maxim :  "  You  cannot  wage  two  wars  at  the  same 
time."  Effort  must  be  concentrated.  Frederick  was 
commending  the  same  principle  when  he  wrote  :  "  You 
must  know  how  to  lose  opportunely,  to  sacrifice  a 
province  (who  wants  to  defend  everything  does  not 
save  anything),  to  march  in  the  meantime  with  all 
one's  forces  against  the  opposing  forces  of  the  enemy, 
to  compel  them  to  fight,  to  make  the  greatest  possible 
effort  to  destroy  them;  then  send  out  detachments  to 
meet  the  remainder  of  the  enemy's  forces." 

That  is  not  all. 

Those  who  would  say  at  this  stage,  economy  means 


ECONOMY   OF  FORCES  51 

sparing  one's  own  forces,  being  careful  not  to  disperse 
one's  own  efforts,  would  only  state  part  of  the  truth. 
Those  would  come  closer  to  the  truth  who  would  assimi- 
late it  to  the  art  of  laiowing  how  to  spend,  to  spend 
in  a  useful  and  profitable  way,  to  make  the  best  possible 
use  of  available  resources. 

It  is  easier  to  understand  what  our  principle  is  not. 

"  Suppose,"  as  Rustow  puts  it,  "  an  individual  who, 
in  the  administration  of  his  income,  should  divide  it 
into  four  equal  parts  :  one  for  housing,  one  for  clothing, 
one  for  food,  one  for  petty  entertainments.  He  would 
always  have  too  much  on  one  side,  and,  above  all,  too 
little  on  the  other." 

This  is  called  in  financial  matters  the  specialisation  of 
credit,  which  is  incompatible  with  all  kinds  of  specula- 
tion and  therefore  with  all  kinds  of  large  benefits. 
This  is  the  theory  oi  fixed,  invariable  rejiartition,  which 
will  always  be  beaten  by  the  theory  of  available  reserves. 

The  principle  of  economy  of  forces  is  the  art  of  pouring 
out  all  one's  resources  at  a  given  moment  on  one  spot; 
of  making  use  there  of  all  troops,  and,  to  make  such  a 
thing  possible,  of  making  those  troops  permanently 
communicate  with  each  other,  instead  of  dividing  them 
and  attaching  to  each  fraction  some  fixed  and  invariable 
function ;  its  second  part,  a  result  having  been  attained, 
is  the  art  of  again  so  disposing  the  troops  as  to  converge 
on,  and  act  against,  a  new  single  object. 

Again  :  the  Econom.y  of  Forces  is  the  art  of  making 
the  weight  of  all  one's  forces  successively  bear  on  the 
resistances  which  one  may  meet,  and  therefore  of 
organising  those  forces  by  means  of  a  system. 

The  necessity  of  this  principle  was  felt  from  the 
outset  of  the  wars  of  the  Revolution — because  national 
wars  deal  "vvith  large  numbers.  One  must  not  assume, 
however,  that  it  arose  suddenly,  magically,  from  the 
compelling  nature  of  circumstance,  nor  that  it  was 
immediately  understood  and  faithfully  applied. 

When  the  Convention  decreed  the  mass-levy,  they 
at  first  produced  in  the  military  field  nothing  but  chaos 
in  all  its  forms,  as  well  as  that  impotence  which  I  have 
just  mentioned  of  conducting  operations  of  war. 

Creating  a  new  order  of  things  does  not  involve  the 
ability  to  give  to  that  order  from  the  outset  the  power 
of  working,  nor  even  life. 


52  THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   WAR 

Just  as  the  political  revolution,  which  had  recently 
taken  place,  might  have  come  to  an  end  after  an 
ephemeral  existence — with  the  Directory,  for  instance — 
had  not  Bonaparte  proved,  by  taming  it,  that  it  was 
possible  to  base  on  these  new  principles  the  organisation 
of  a  lasting  society ;  so,  ■without  superior  mmds  such  as 
Hoche,  Camot,  Bonaparte,  and  certain  other  generals 
of  the  Revolution,  the  conception  of  the  mass-levy,  of 
war  Avith  unlimited  resources,  would  have  risked  remain- 
ing a  mere  fancy,  an  utopia  confuted  by  the  armies 
and  theories  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

To  master  that  epoch  of  the  Revolution,  it  would 
not  have  sufficed  to  apply  ancient  processes  to  the  new 
situations  and  resources  created  by  it,  as  did  common- 
place men. 

I\Iind  has  a  larger  share  than  that  in  the  use  of  material. 
"  But,  thanks  to  our  good  luck,  the  development  of 
material  resources  suppUed  by  the  mass-levy  was 
connected  with  such  a  development  of  passions,  feelings 
and  ideas,  that  a  new  manner  of  concei\nng  the  play  of 
mihtary  forces,  a  new  art  of  war,  resulted  from  it."  ^ 
Therein  lies  the  greatness  of  a  time  wliich  supplied  the 
man  who  was  to  launch  the  new  principles — Camot — and 
the  men  who  were  to  apply  those  principles  :  Hoche, 
Bonaparte,  etc. 

So  long  as  the  early  generals  of  the  Revolution  were 
left  to  themselves,  they  continued,  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  they  were  waging  a  national  war,  to  apply  the 
methods  of  the  eighteenth  century  to  seek  positions, 
lines,  cordons. 

IMoreover,  as  a  result  of  the  new  processes  (for  in- 
stance, the  army  housed  and  fed  by  the  country  it 
occupied)  and  of  the  considerable  numbers  used,  the 
hne,  the  cordon  were  still  extended ;  weakness  increased. 

For  a  long  time  the  remedy  was  not  perceived  by 
average  minds. 

Let  us  remember  that  Moreau  liimself  entered  Ger- 
many in  1800,  four  years  after  1796,  with  an  army 
which  by  destination,  by  organisation,  contained  o?ie 
centre,  two  zvings,  one  reserve — an  eminently  rigid  con- 
ception of  things;  while  every  one  of  these  organs  like 
every  early  army  of  the  Republic,  had  its  own  distinct, 
and  purely  geographical,  object.  This  brings  us  back 
^  General  Bonnal. 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  53 

to  the  metaphor  of  the  specialisation  of  credit;  to 
fixed  and  invariable  apportionment. 

And  as  one  infirmity  involves  another,  what  do  we 
see  when  Moreau  enters  Germany  ? 

Such  a  block,  composed  of  elements  not  interchange- 
able, dra"\Mi  up  on  an  invariable  model,  sometimes  ad- 
vancing, then  going  back,  stopping  in  order  to  establish 
itself  on  a  position,  never  seeking  battle — such  are  the 
manoeuvres  of  1800  around  Uhn,  the  retreat  from  the 
Black  Forest,  etc. 

The  new  mechanics  were  no  more  grasped  by  Moreau 
and  the  early  generals  of  the  Revolution,  than  later  on 
by  the  French  generals  of  the  Restoration  who  reor- 
ganised the  lineal  order,  or  than  by  the  authors  of  our 
Field  Ser\ace  Book  of  1883,  wiiich,  until  1895,  a  few 
years  ago,  continued  to  affirm  that :  "  Armies  are 
composed  of  a  centre,  wings,  and  reserve;  marching 
armies  use  the  greatest  possible  number  of  roads,  etc." 

The  new  mechanics,  the  spirit  of  which  must  pene- 
trate our  minds,  the  importance  and  novelty  of  which 
we  shall  understand  when  we  come  to  see  how  difficult 
they  are  to  grasp  and  to  set  in  practice,  consist  in  the 
follo\^ing  things  : 

Instead  of  resorting  to  the  eighteenth-century  model, 
to  processional  orders  by  means  of  wings,  centre  and 
reserve  as  in  1800,  to  our  regulations  up  to  1895  which 
guarantee  nothing  hut  form,  you  must  apply  the  whole 
on  the  same  spot,  and  therefore  organise  the  mass 
according  to  a  certain  system  of  attack,  provide  that 
mass,  so  to  speak,  with  interchangeable  limbs,  each 
functioning  by  itself,  but  all  aiming  at  the  same  positive 
result,  which  is,  to  overthrow  the  same  objective  by 
separate  means. 

It  was  Carnot  who  first  initiated  this  manner  of 
understanding,  organising,  and  conducting  war.  This 
we  have  from  Dumouriez,  the  victor  of  the  Argonne, 
who  cannot  be  suspected  in  the  matter  since,  after 
betrajdng  his  country,  he  never  failed  to  sneer  at  his 
contemporaries— more  especially  at  those  in  office.  Yet 
he  wrote  in  his  Recollections  : 

"  Camot  it  was  who  created  the  new  state  of  things 
in  military  affairs ;  a  state  of  things  which  Dumouriez 
had  barely  the  time  to  adumbrate  and  which  was 
perfected  by  Bonaparte." 


54  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

The  reason  why  the  application  was  not  at  first  very 
clear  was  because  Carnot  did  not  himself  act  in  the 
field.     Nevertheless  it  was  he  who  wrote  these  words  : 

"  All  the  armies  of  the  Republic  will  have  to  act  offen- 
sively, but  not  everywhere  with  the  same  amount  of  means 
{the  apportionment  of  means  depends  on  the  goal  to 
he  reached).  We  must  have  a  most  offensive  and 
decisive  campaign;  we  must  constantly  pursue  the 
enemy  until  he  shall  be  completely  destroyed  (a  new 
result  to  aim  at !)." 

All  his  correspondence  shows  that  he  was  the  first, 
in  that  period  of  commotion  and  revolutionary  chaos, 
to  try  and  put  things  in  order  once  more.  He  sought 
to  remedy  the  scattering  and  crumbling  which  were 
ruining  France's  considerable  forces  (fourteen  armies  in 
1794),  by  means  of  convergence  of  effort  and  singleness 
of  goal. 

The  numerous  divisions  set  up  tended  to  scatter,  to 
isolate  themselves,  in  order  to  live,  march,  and  enjoy 
their  independence;  he  showed  them  the  importance  of 
aiming  all  at  one  same  point. 

To  the  block  of  the  ancient  armies,  which  could  no 
longer  reappear,  for  it  was  utterly  incapable  of  manoeu- 
vring on  the  new  scale,  he  tried  to  substitute  concordance 
and  synchrony  in  many  efforts  starting  from  various 
points. 

To  reunite,  to  induce  to  co-operate  troops  apparently 
scattered,  such  was  the  first  result  he  aimed  at  and 
reached. 

And  likewise,  in  one  particular  battle,  at  Wattignies, 
Carnot  being  present,  the  idea  of  an  attack  by  superior 
forces  on  a  point  of  the  line  first  made  its  appearance. 

All  this  is  economy  of  forces. 

Carnot  did  more  than  that,  and  indicated  how  the 
result  must  be  sought.     Thus  he  wrote  : 

"  We  prescribe  to  the  generals  commanding-in-chief 
the  armies  operating  in  Germany  to  see  that  the  numer- 
ous and  brilliant  combats  they  have  sustained  shall 
be  followed  bj^  more  serious  actions  the  results  of  which 
should  be  final.  It  is  but  by  winning  great  battles  that 
they  will  succeed  in  completely  dissolving  the  Austrian 
army,  and  however  skilful  that  army  may  be  in  retiring 
from  one  position  to  another,  we  hope  that  by  coming 
into  contact  with  it,  they  will  enforce  a  general  engagement 


ECONOMY   OF  FORCES  55 

the  consequence  of  which  will  be  to  compel  the  enemy 
to  fall  far  back.  ..." 

We  have  travelled  a  long  way  from  Marshal  de 
Saxe;  from  that  good  general  who  thought  he  could 
wage  war  his  whole  life  without  giving  battle.  We 
are  very  near  Napoleon,  who  said  :  "  There  is  nothing 
I  desire  so  much  as  a  great  battle  "  ;  who,  according  to 
Clausewitz,  alwaj^s  looked  out  for  a  chance  of  fighting. 

Carnot  wrote  again  to  Jourdan  on  Messidor  5th, 
An  IV  (1796)  : 

"...  What  you  have  to  do,  is  to  draw  the  enemy 
into  a  great  and  decisive  battle  in  his  own  country,  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Rhine;  and  the  most  suitable  spot 
is  precisely  for  you  the  place  in  which  just  now  he 
finds  himself;  that  is,  between  Dlisseldorf  and  the 
Sieg  or  the  Lahn,  where  he  cannot  escape  being  exter- 
minated if  he  is  attacked  well  in  time  and  pressed  from 
behind  by  General  Moreau."  (This  is  the  true  war  of 
manoeuvre,  of  movements  aiming  at  battle.) 

"...  Beware,  my  dear  General,  from  assuming  a 
defensive  attitude,  the  courage  of  your  troops  would 
be  weakened  and  the  boldness  of  the  enemy  would 
become  extreme.  ..."  (Things  nobody  would  have 
taken  into  account  before  that  time  in  a  plan  of 
operations,  albeit  they  were  in  existence.) 

"  You  must,  I  repeat  it,  give  battle  on  a  great  scale ; 
you  must  give  it  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  as 
near  Dlisseldorf  as  possible,  at  the  moment  the  enemy 
turns  round  in  order  to  face  Moreau;  finally,  you  must 
fight  with  all  your  forces,  with  all  your  well-known 
vigour,  and  unceasingly  follow  up  the  enemy  until 
he  shall  be  entirely  scattered.  ..."  (That  last  part 
of  the  programme  was  to  be  carried  out  by  Napoleon 
after  Jena,  by  Bliicher  after  Waterloo.) 

"  The  enemy  will  not  fail  to  send  a  body  of  troops 
round  your  left  in  order  both  to  outflank  you  and  to 
bring  you  to  a  standstill.  You  must  keep  a  division 
for  the  special  purpose  of  facing  such  a  detached  body, 
a  division  which,  either  by  its  force,  or  by  its  unassailable 
positions,  shall  shatter  the  attack  or  at  least  contain  it.  .  .  ." 
In  what  we  have  just  read,  there  is  the  idea  of  pro- 
voking a  battle,  and  also  the  idea  of  how  to  provoke 
that  battle,  to  engage  it  with  all  possible  forces  by 
employing  the  mass. 


56  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Camot  bids  Jourdan  subordinate  all  means  to  the 
attainment  of  the  main  end;  and,  in  order  not  to  be 
deterred  by  the  enemy,  "  who  will  not  fail  to,"  etc.  .  .  . 
to  cover,  to  guard  himself :  but  to  guard  and  to  cover 
himself  by  a  detachment  as  weak  as  'possible,  by  a 
minimum  of  forces.  He  bids  him  devote  a  maximum 
of  forces  to  the  main  attack,  and  only  a  minimum  to 
such  secondary  operations  as  are  intended  to  protect  it. 

Such  is  the  principle  of  the  economy  of  forces,  once 
it  passes  into  the  domain  of  execution. 

But  how  will  that  minimum  detachment  succeed  in 
holding  back  the  body  detached  by  the  enemy?  By 
force,  if  it  is  strong  enough,  in  which  case  it  wall  scatter 
the  adversary ;  or  by  means  of  an  unassailable  position, 
if  it  is  not  strong  enough,  in  which  case  it  will  confine 
itself  to  holding  the  enemy  in  check,  which  again  answers 
the  part  ascribed  to  it. 

Thus  we  see  a  new  feature  of  organised  force  make 
its  appearance ;  for  such  a  force  is  capable  of  two  actions 
varying  in  nature  :  (1)  breaking  up  the  adversary  by 
means  of  a  shock,  overthrowing  him,  that  is  clear ;  but 
also  (2)  holding  him  in  check,  maintaining  oneself,  how- 
ever weak  one  may  be,  in  his  presence  by  means  of  the 
defensive.  This  can  be  done  by  the  use  of  position, 
according  to  Carnot;  but  it  can  also  be  done  by  the 
use  of  manoeuvre,  as  we  shall  see,  with  Napoleon.  The 
new  feature  is  the  economy  of  resisting  power  in  a  given 
body. 

Now  the  utiHsation  of  that  new  property  of  organised 
force,  resisting  power,  means  of  lasting  out,  jointly  with 
the  properties  already  familiar  (power  of  striking,  of 
breaking  up),  will  allow  for  the  realisation  and  practical 
application  of  the  principle  of  economy  of  forces. 

"  From  that  mechanical  principle  were  to  arise, 
thanks  to  Bonaparte's  genius,  a  series  of  combinations 
both  numerous  and  various  which  had  the  result  of 
opening  to  our  armies  the  doors  of  the  capitals  of 
Europe."  ^ 

Once  found,  the  practical  application  of  the  principle 
of  economy  of  forces  will  enable  us  to  satisfy  com- 
pletely the  theory  of  implacable  war,  with  masses 
however  considerable,  M'hatever  time  be  required, 
whatever  space  be  occupied;  it  will  enable  any  troop, 
^  G6n6ral  Bonnal. 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  57 

whatever  their  numbers  may  be,  to  reach  the  maximum 
of  efficiency;  finally,  it  will  enable  us  to  fight  with  the 
main  body  of  our  forces,  to  put  everything  in,  to  strike 
the  adversary  a  blow  from  which  he  shall  not  recover. 

Hence  Bonaparte's  words  to  the  Austrian  generals  at 
Leoben.  "  There  are  7nany  fine  generals  in  Europe, 
but  they  see  too  many  things  at  the  same  time  ;  I  only 
see  one,  namely  the  masses.  I  try  to  destroy  them,  feeling 
S'ure  that  the  accessories  will  then  tumble  down  of  them- 
selves." 

There  are  many  fine  generals,  but  they  try  to  keep 
an  eye  on  too  many  things;  they  tr}^  to  see,  to  keep, 
to  defend  everything :  depots,  lines  of  communication, 
the  rear,  such  and  such  a  strong  position,  etc.  Using 
such  methods,  they  end  by  adopting,  when  on  the  de- 
fensive, the  cordon  system ;  when  on  the  offensive,  they 
end  by  attacking  in  several  directions,  or  rather  in 
conducting  several  attacks  at  the  same  time;  in  the  one 
case  as  in  the  other,  they  end  in  dispersion,  which  pre- 
vents them  from  commanding,  from  combining  one  single 
affair,  from  striking  hard;  they  end  in  impotence. 

"/  see  only  one  thing,  the  masses  ;  I  try  to  destroy 
them,  feeling  sure  that  the  accessories  will  then  timible 
do"^^Ti  of  themselves."  That  is  the  counter- thesis  to  the 
old  theory;  the  destruction  of  the  enemiy's  masses 
and,  therefore,  the  necessity  of  organising  the  use  of 
our  owTi  masses. 

There  is  one  absolute  principle,  which  must  direct 
all  our  combinations  and  dispositions,  and  this  is  that, 
in  order  to  dispose  of  the  adversary's  masses,  we  have 
to  ensure  the  working  of  our  own.  Such  must  be  the 
directing  thought  of  any  cMef. 

From  that  condition,  namely  to  ensure  the  working 
of  our  own  masses — which  is  the  main  item  of  any 
contemplated  manoeuvre — will  arise  all  those  sub- 
ordinate parts  assigned  to  detachments  (advance 
guards,  flank  guards,  rear  guards)  to  which  we  apply 
the  general  name  of  advance  guard  :  accessory  troops 
which  mil  have  upon  each  proper  occasion  to  perform  a 
clearly  determined  mission  and  to  adopt  special  tactics. 

Once  that  mission  has  been  determined,  how  is  the 
commander  of  the  advance  guard  to  perform  it  ? 

By  using  the  main  body  of  his  forces. 


58  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Because,  once  the  main  goal  has  been  reached,  acces- 
sory functions  can  always  be  fulfilled. 

In  every  case,  then,  whether  the  question  is  to  direct 
the  mass  or  to  conduct  a  detachment,  the  commander  of 
the  mass  as  well  as  the  commander  of  the  detachment, 
must  : 

(1)  Determine  the  main  goal  to  be  aimed  at  (it  results 
from  his  mission);  (2)  devote  to  it  the  main  body  of  his 
forces;  (3)  organise  the  accessories,  supply  the  detach- 
ments necessary  to  the  main  body's  success;  (4)  estab- 
lish communications  between  the  main  body  and  the 
accessories;  that  is,  set  up  his  forces  in  a  system  such 
that  these  forces  may  finally  act  in  conjunction. 

What  is  a  system? 

It  is  a  combination  of  the  two  qualities  present  in  all 

troops:  I  ^f^^^^^gP^™"- 
^       [  strikmg  power. 

TAdvance   guards   utilising    the 
It    is    a    repartition    of)     resisting  power ; 

forces  into  :  1  Main  body  or  battle  troop  util- 

[     ising  the  striking  power; 

such  repartition  being  so  organised  in  time  and  space 
that  all  the  forces  may  finally  act  simultaneously  against 
a  common  objective. 

Outposts 

The  most  simple  system  is  that  of  outposts.  Suppose 
a  troop  is  billeted  in  a,  b,  c,  and  has  to  be  covered  on 
the  line  D  E  from  an  enemy  whose  presence  has  been 
signalled  to  the  north;  suppose,  further,  that  one  regi- 
ment (of  say  four  battalions)  has  been  entrusted  with 
the  task  of  organising  the  outposts. 

The  first  idea  might  be  to  extend  the  troop  in  a 
uniform  fashion  along  D  E.  If  D  E  is  4000  yards  long, 
this  repartition  will  give  one  man  per  yard;  this  would 
provide  some  power  of  resistance,  but  a  weak  one. 

The  advancing  enemy  would  hurl  his  advance  guard 
against  the  whole  front,  and  nail  the  defenders  to  the 
spot  along  the  line  D  E ;  meanwhile,  bringing  his  main 
body  on  to  a  given  point — for  instance,  L — of  the  line, 
he  would  easily  overcome  any  resistance  he  might 
meet  with. 


I 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  59 

Against  100  or  200  men,  he  misjht  use  more  than 
3000. 

The  principle  of  economy  of  forces,  apphed  here, 
will  make  an  appeal  to  the  resisting  power  as  well  as  to 
the  striking  j^ower  of  the  troops  :  two  factors  instead 
of  one. 

That  principle  suggests  to  us  that,  instead  of  uni- 
formly occupying  D  E,  it  is  enough  to  consider,  on  D  E, 
the  road-directions  K,  L,  M,  N,  along  which  the  enemy 
may  advance,  and  to  hold  them  with  detachments 
respectively  located  in  K,  L,  M,  N,  each  of  which  points 
is  chosen  from  its  power  to  enable  the  occupying  troop 


.b 


to  make  a  vigorous  stand ;  in  other  words,  it  is  enough 
to  establish  a  number  of  detachments  in  "  points 
d'appui." 

Once  those  points  have  been  occupied,  the  whole 
Hne  is  held,  as  the  enemy  cannot,  owing  to  the  range 
of  modern  arms,  pass  between  those  points.  He  there- 
fore must  attack  them. 

In  the  rear  of  those  detachments,  the  mission  of  which 
is  to  resist  on  those  supporting  points,  we  must  estab- 
lish a  reserve  capable  of  moving  up  to  any  point  attacked 
before  its  resistance  is  overcome,  and  also  capable  of 
acting  on  that  point. 

As  every  main  guard  must  be  warned  in  time  of  the 
enemy's  arri^'al,  it  will  establish  in  front  of  it  a  number 
of  observers,   that  is,   sentries ;   and   since   these   need 


60  THE    PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

in  their  turn  to  be  both  supported  and  if  necessary  to 
be  able  to  fall  back,  they  must  have  small  outposts 
behind  them.  The  enemy  comes  on;  the  sentries  give 
the  alarm.  It  is  sent  on  to  the  main  guards  and  the 
reserve;  the  main  guards  prepare  to  resist,  and  the 
reserve  to  march.  If  the  enemy  continues  to  advance, 
he  has  to  accentuate  his  attack  in  order  to  break  the 
resistance  of  the  point  he  wants  to  carry.  The  reserve 
proceeds  to  that  point  to  support  it  while  it  still  holds. 

Take,  for  instance,  a  regiment  of  4000  men  with, 
sa3%  four  companies  (of  250  men  each)  detached  for 
your  main  guard.  Suppose  such  a  force  to  be  holding 
the  line  D  E.  Then  when  the  attack  upon  some  par- 
ticular point  falls,  you  have  this  distribution  of  force  : 
3000  men  (your  reserve)  +  250  men  (the  main  guard  at 
the  point  of  attack)  =  3250. 

If,  instead  of  thus  practising  an  economy  of  force, 
you  had  attempted  mere  uniform  distribution,  you  might 
have  had  at  the  point  of  attack,  say,  100  men  at  the 
most. 

But  in  order  that  manoeuvring  be  possible,  the 
forces  must  be  arranged  according  to  a  system  and 
distributed  thus  : 

(1)  Main  guards  capable  of  holding  out,  therefore 
established  on  certain  strong  points;  that  is,  points 
offering  a  good  field  of  fire. 

(2)  A  mobile  reserve,  able  to  manoeuvre  within  a 
given  time  and  space ;  located  therefore  within  reach 
of  the  necessary  roads ;  assembled ;  sheltered  from  enemy 
blows. 

(3)  Sentries  whose  stations  are  chosen  with  a  view 
to  their  powers  of  observation. 

The  same  considerations  apply  to  the  defence  of  a 
water  line  :  in  that  case,  also,  you  have  to  occupy  on 
the  roads  of  approach  a  number  of  strong  points  (gener- 
ally located  on  the  river,  because  ^^llages  are  usually 
to  be  found  at  the  passages  which  the  enemy  is  com- 
pelled to  use).  Those  points  should  be  able  to  hold 
out  long  enough  to  allow  the  reserve  R  to  proceed  to 
the  point  attacked — for  instance,  to  M — and  to  apply 
all  its  forces  in  that  direction ;  the  reserve  must  be  able 
to  send  its  whole  force  into  action  :  the  whole  regiment 
if  it  is  a  regimental  action;  the  whole  brigade  if  a 
brigade  is  in  question. 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES 


61 


The  same  principle  applies  to  the  investment  of 
towTis,  which  with  a  due  economy  of  forces  may  be  done 
by  besieging  forces  no  more  than  equal  to  the  besieged 
(Metz  and  Paris  in  1870  are  examples). 


In  what  does  such  an  investment  consist  ? 

In  a  line  of  permanentli/  occupied  outposts,  enabling 


1 


the  investing  force  to  occupy,  in  case  of  attack,  a  pre- 
viously organised  first  lifie  of  resistance.  The  attack 
occurring,  alarm  is  given  by  the  outposts;  the  first 
line  of  resistance  is  then  occupied;  the  reserves  prepare. 
After  the  attack  has  dealt  (perhaps  easily)  with  the 
hne  of  outposts,  it  must,  in  order  to  advance,  break 
this  fii'st  hne  of  resistance.     In  this  attempt  it  is  com- 


62  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

pelled  to  concentrate  its  efforts  and  therefore  to  disclose 
the  direction  it  is  taking.  Such  reserves  and  investing 
troops  as  are  not  being  attacked  and  are  nearest  to 
that  direction,  proceed  to,  and  estabhsh  themselves  on, 
a  previously  organised  inain  line  of  resistance,  while 
the  resistance  of  the  first  line  is  maintained.  They 
there  offer  a  further  resistance  which  gives  the  whole 
investing  army  the  time  to  concentrate  at  /,  in  the 
direction  adopted  by  the  attacking  force,  and  thus  to 
fight  there  with  all  available  forces  combined. 

The  same  principle  applies  to  attack.  There,  too, 
the  maximum  of  efficiency  is  secured  by  applying  the 
principle  of  economy  of  forces  and  by  arranging  one's 
forces  according  to  an  organised  system. 

An  attack  could  not  be  efficient  if  it  were  made  in 
several  directions  at  the  same  time.  One's  forces  would 
be  separated  into  several  parts.  If  the  enemy  presents 
himself  from  two  different  directions,  the  offensive  is 
organised  in  one  direction  only,  the  most  advantageous 
one ;  in  the  other  direction,  one  does  no  more  than  hold 
the  enemy  in  check.  The  reserves — that  is,  the  main 
body — are  therefore  placed  (1)  so  as  to  support  and 
accomplish  the  attack  which  has  been  devised  by  the 
commander  and  which  is  the  main  object  of  his  plan; 
(2)  so  as  to  be  able  if  necessary  to  reinforce  eventually 
the  parrying  blow  elsewhere,  which  otherwise  might 
prove  inadequate.  In  proportion,  as  decision  comes 
nearer,  all  these  reserves  stream  towards  the  point  of 
attack,  where  the  day  will  be  decided,  and  thus  bring 
into  play  all  available  forces. 

The  principle  applies  to  every  military  act  which  is 
characterised  by  movement.  In  every  case,  the  forces 
detached  in  view  of  the  necessities  we  have  successively 
acknowledged  are  but  the  eyes,  fingers,  arms  of  a  body 
(the  main  body)  for  which  they  are  working.  The 
constitution  they  must  be  given  results  therefrom; 
hence  also  their  close  connection  with  that  body. 

The  detachments  retain  a  relative  independence; 
they  use  their  own  tactics,  just  as  my  arm  is  capable  of 
covering  my  body,  of  striking  forward  or  to  the  right, 
while  I  go  onward.  But  they  must  remain  closely 
connected  with  the  main  body,  in  the  movement  of 
which  they  participate,  from  which  they  draw  their 
life,  for  the  benefit  of  which  alone  they  do  their  work; 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  63 

that  connection  must  be  close  enough  as  to  allow  the 
body  always  to  concentrate  its  whole  weight  as  well  as 
all  disengaged  forces  in  the  direction  where  the  adver- 
sary has  been  perceived  or  seized  :  a  final  result  which 
can  only  be  attained,  as  we  have  just  seen,  by  means 
of  a  systematic  organisation  involving  :  eyes  turned 
towards  such  directions  as  are  of  interest  to  the  issue; 
arms  extended  in  such  directions  as  menace  peril; 
freedom  of  movement  for  the  main  body  to  strike  at 
last  as  a  whole  in  the  direction  selected  for  the  result. 

Any  troop,  therefore,  which  manoeuvres  in  compliance 
with  the  principle  of  economy  of  forces  does  not  divide 
itself  on  the  field,  as  did  the  armies  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  into  three  arms,  nor  even  generally  into 
groups  of  the  same  kind,  regiments,  battalions,  batteries, 
squadrons;  such  a  distribution  seldom  answers  to 
tactical  requirements.  The  force  will  rather  be  repre- 
sented by  :  one  hody  provided  with  such  organs  as  are 
needed  for  its  tactical  action ;  that  is,  one  main  force 
provided  with  such  advance  guards  as  are  made  necessary 
by  circumstances ;  and  this  disposition  will  be  maintained 
even  during  the  action  itself,  as  we  shall  see  later  on. 
Those  advance  guards  receive  special  component  ele- 
ments (infantry,  cavalry,  artillery)  adequate  to  the 
part  which  has  been  assigned  to  them.  Their  resisting 
power  in  presence  of  superior  enemy  forces  will  result 
either  from  :  (1)  a  defensive  action  utilising  a  strong 
position  and  holding  back  an  enemy  unable  to  overcome 
it;  or  (2)  a  retreating  manoeuvre  the  duration  of  which 
(being  itself  dependent  upon  available  space  and  time) 
will  allow  the  main  body  to  act  in  compliance  with  the 
plan  conceived.  In  that  case  the  detachment  does  not 
hold  the  adversary,  but  only  delays  his  advance. 

A  short  survey  of  the  first  days  of  the  campaign  of 
1796  will  show  us  very  clearly  how  the  principle  of 
economy  of  forces  contrasts  with  the  old  methods  it 
has  supplanted. 


MONTENOTTE,    DeGO,'   MiLLESIMO 

(See  Map  No.  1) 

In  the   first  days    of   March   1796    our  forces  were 
di\'ided  into  an  army  of  the  Alps  and  an  army  of  Italy. 


64  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

The  situation  of  both  armies  was  equally  pitiful.  Money, 
food,  clothing  were  lacking  everywhere.  The  soldiers 
did  not  desert;  they  looted  in  order  to  live  and  refused 
to  listen  to  their  officers,  who,  being  equally  miserable, 
were  resorting  to  the  most  irregular  proceedings.  Mutin}^ 
soon  broke  out.  The  army  would  have  dissolved  had 
the  deficiency  in  mere  necessaries  continued. 

The  Directory  (the  government  of  the  day),  who  felt 
powerless  in  the  presence  of  this  evil — which  they  fully 
appreciated — saw  no  other  remedy  than  to  transfer  the 
army  into  the  rich  provinces  of  Italy.  Even  for  that, 
however,  it  was  necessary  to  set  the  army  in  movement. 
They  undertook  to  get  from  the  Republic  of  Genoa,  by 
fair  means  or  foul,  the  assistance  they  urgently  needed. 

Scherer,  overwhelmed  by  such  a  task  and  by  so  bold 
an  imdertaking,  asked  to  be  relieved  from  his  command 
by  some  younger  and  more  audacious  chief. 

Salicetti  then  appeared  as  Commissioner  of  the 
Government  with  the  army  of  Italy.  His  efforts  were  at 
first  fruitless.  He  tried  in  vain  to  make  Scherer  go  back 
on  his  decision ;  he  asked  the  Senate  of  Genoa  in  vain  to 
lend  a  few  millions  to  France.  He  resorted  to  intimida- 
tion. His  idea  was  that  a  body  of  French  troops  should 
occup}''  Voltri  and,  passing  by  the  Bochetta,  get  hold  of 
the  Genoese  town  of  Gavi.  Scherer  partly  adopted 
these  views,  formed  an  expeditionary  force  of  9000  men 
supplied  by  the  three  divisions  of  Augereau,  Laharpe, 
and  Meynier,  and  handed  over  the  command  of  that 
force,  with  special  instructions,  to  Massena.  The  latter 
proceeded  to  Savona  and  sent  out  towards  Voltri,  on 
March  26th,  under  Pijon,  an  advance  guard  (3000  men) 
the  patrols  of  which  reached  San  Pier  d' Arena,  a  suburb 
of  Genoa.  As  for  the  Gavi  expedition,  it  was  postponed 
until  the  arrival  of  Bonaparte,  who  had  just  been 
appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army  of   Italy. 

On  March  26th,  Bonaparte  arrived  in  Nice  and  took 
over  his  duties.  He  found  there  Berthier,  whom 
Scherer  had  asked  for  as  his  Chief  of  Staff,  and  who 
had  been  granted  to  the  new  Commander  of  the  army. 

The  effects  of  the  impulsion  given  by  Salicetti  were 
already  being  felt.  The  army  had  boots,  some  money, 
promises  of  flour,  of  fodder,  of  mules.  It  was  the  part 
of  wisdom  to  take  advantage  at  once  of  this  change 
for  the  better  and  assume  the  offensive  without  delay. 


ECONOMY   OF  FORCES  65 

As  early  as  the  28th  preparatory  measures  were 
hurriedly  taken.  General  Headquarters  were  trans- 
ferred from  Nice  to  Albenga;  the  troops  were  largely 
reconstituted,  more  particularly  by  reinforcing  the 
active  divisions  (of  battle  and  advance  guard)  with 
drafts  drawn  from  the  divisions  on  the  coast  (Oneglia, 
Nice,  Toulon,  Marseilles).  The  reorganisation  of  the 
infantry  known  under  the  name  of  "  the  amalgam  "  was 
hastened;  the  cavalry  regiments  were  concentrated 
on  the  Riviera  of  Genoa;  stores,  parks,  ambulances 
were  formed;  animals  necessary  for  transport  were 
commandeered.  The  rapid  execution  of  these  measures 
allowed  an  entry  into  operations  about  April  15th,  with 
35,000  bayonets,  4000  horses,  and  some  twenty  guns  of 
small  calibre,  distributed  as  follows  : 

Massena  .....     18,000  men  at      Savona 

Augereau         .....       7,000       „  Loano 

SerurierandRusea.         .         .         .     12,000       „        JBaXetto 

Cavalry  ......       4,800       „  Loano 

Besides  : 
Marc  quart  and  Garnier      .  .  .       7,000  men  at      Tenda 

f  Oneglia 
Divisions  on  the  coast       .         .         .       9,000       „        \  Nice 


iTonlon 


Plan  of  Operations 


Bonaparte  will  assume  the  offensive  : 

(1)  Because  the  army  cannot  live  any  longer  in  the 
Alps,  nor  even  on  the  Riviera. 

(2)  Because  these  are  the  best  tactics  to  be  used 
against  Piedmont  by  reason  of  its  border.^ 

^  "  .  .  •  When  two  armies  stand  on  the  defensive,  that  one  which 
can  more  quickly  reunite  different  posts  in  order  to  carry  the  posts 
opposed  to  it  necessarily  needs  a  smaller  number  of  troops  and,  forces 
being  equal,  always  secures  advantages. 

"  The  frontier  of  Piedmont  is  a  semicircle,  the  two  armies  of  the 
Alps  and  of  Italy  occupy  the  circumference,  the  King  of  Sardinia 
occupies  the  diameter.  The  circumference  we  occupy  is  full  of  passes 
and  of  difficult  mountains.  The  diameter  occupied  by  the  King  of 
Sardinia  is  an  easily  accessible,  fertile  plain,  where  he  can,  within  a 
few  days,  transfer  troops  from  one  end  of  the  diameter  to  the  other. 
The  defensive  system  is  therefore  always  favourable  to  the  King  of 
Sardinia. 

"In  order  to  secure  equaUty  of  forces,  we  must  have  double  the 
nvmaber  of  our  enemies. 

"  These  remarks  are  of  the  greatest  moment :  it  would  be  easy  to 


66  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

(3)  Because — most  of  all — these  tactics  suit  the 
young  Commander-in-Chief's  temperament. 

In  any  case,  the  army  of  Italy  advanced  along  the 
Riviera  in  order  to  live ;  it  occupied  the  points  on  the 
coast;  it  maintained  relations  with  the  Eepublic  of 
Genoa.  The  offensive  had  to  start,  therefore,  from  that 
region.     What  direction  should  it  take  ? 

Carnot,  in  his  memorandum  of  June  30th,  1794,  con- 
cludes, after  showing  the  difficulties  of  entering  Piedmont 
by  way  of  the  liigh  ridge  of  the  Alps  : 

"...  Therefore  if  the  idea  is  to  attack  Piedmont, 
it  must  be  done  from  the  department  of  the  Alpes- 
Maritimes,  by  first  seizing  Oneglia. 

"  These  motives  ought  to  induce  the  Committee  of 
Public  Safety  to  order  an  attack  on  Oneglia,  wherefrom 
it  will  be  easy  for  us  to  enter  Piedmont  later  on,  by 
turning  the  post  of  Saorgia  and  besieging  Coni." 

Bonaparte  knew  better.  He  had  fought  in  that  same 
region  the  campaign  of  1794  (battle  of  Dego).  He  had 
seen  the  country  of  Altare,  Carcare,  Cairo,  a  deep  depres- 
sion from  five  to  iiine  miles  wide  leading  into  the  Italian 
valleys. 

"  The  road  from  Vado  to  Ceva,  the  first  fortified  town 
on  the  frontier  of  Sardinia,  is  eight  leagues  long,  never 
rising  more  than  from  1200  to  1800  feet  above  sea  level. 
These  heights  are  not,  properly  speaking,  mountains  at 
all,  but  only  hills  covered  with  orchards  and  vineyards. 

"  The  passes  are  never  blocked  by  snow ;  there  is 
snow  on  the  summits  in  winter  but  never  in  great 
quantity. 

"  Savona,  a  harbour  and  a  stronghold,  is  well  placed 
for  use  as  a  depot  and  supporting  point.  The  distance 
from  that  town  to  Madona  is  three  miles ;  a  paved  road 
leads  thither,  and  the  six  miles  from  Madona  to  Carcare 
could  be  within  a  few  days  made  practicable  to  artillery. 
At  Carcare  there    are    carriage  roads  which  lead  into 


demonstrate  it  by  describing  the  frontiers  in  detail  and  by  analysing 
the  different  wars  of  wliich  they  have  been  the  scene. 

"  It  would  then  be  clearly  demonstrated  that  each  time  we  have 
kept  on  the  defensive  on  the  frontier  of  Piedmont,  we  have  always 
wanted  a  large  number  of  troops  and  we  have  always  been  worsted 
in  small  affairs. 

"  The  offensive  system  must  be  adopted  for  the  frontier  of 
Piedmont." — Note  of  July  19th,  1794,  attributed  to  Bonaparte. 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  67 

Piedmont  and  Monteferrato ;  that  point  was  the  only 
one  through  which  one  could  enter  Italy  without  butting 
against  mountains"  (Napoleon). 

To  sum  up  :  Bonaparte  had  found  a  low  passage 
(height  from  1200  to  1500  feet),  with  gentle  slopes  and 
practicable  ground;  roads  could  easily  be  made  there; 
from  Savona  to  Carcare  was  one  day's  march.  From 
the  latter  point  one  could  easily  fall  on  the  adversary, 
force  the  gates  of  Piedmont,  and,  in  a  word,  develop 
an  offensive  under  favourable  tactical  conditions. 

There  was  yet  another  advantage  in  marching  on 
Carcare. 

Two  roads  meet  at  Carcare  : 

(1)  That  by  way  of  Acqui  leading  to  Alexandria  in 
Lombardy. 

(2)  That  by  way  of  Ceva  leading  to  Cherasco  in 
Piedmont. 

North  of  Carcare  rises  a  range  from  1800  to  2400  feet 
Iiigh,  which  for  forty  miles,  as  far  as  the  road  from 
Cherasco  to  Alexandria,  cuts  all  communications  between 
both  provinces.  Therefore  by  occupying  Carcare,  the 
armies  of  Piedmont  and  Lombardy,  in  case  they  intended 
manoeuvring  and  fighting  together,  would  be  prevented 
from  effecting  a  junction  save  by  the  road  from  Cherasco 
to  Alexandria. 

Such  an  intention  of  effecting  a  junction  was,  however, 
not  likely  to  exist  at  that  moment.  The  policy  of  the 
AlUes  was  influenced  by  private,  often  contradictory, 
views,  and  by  divergent,  and  sometimes  even  contrary, 
interests. 

Piedmont,  the  first  to  be  drawn  into  the  war  against 
France,  had  already  tired  of  it.  The  people  were  suffer- 
ing ;  the  government,  a  weak  one,  only  went  on  because 
it  feared  reprisals  from  Austria. 

As  for  the  latter  power,  master  of  Dego  and  Millesimo 
since  1795,  its  government  desired  to  extend  its  empire 
as  far  as  Savona,  on  the  Riviera  of  Genoa,  in  order  to 
give  Milan  an  outlet  to  the  sea,  in  order  to  bar  Piedmont's 
aspirations  towards  the  Italian  peninsula,  also  in  order 
to  pave  the  way  for  the  annexation  of  Genoa. 

The  community  of  views  was  no  closer  between  the 
armies  of  our  opponents  than  between  their  governments. 
The  conceit  and  incapacity  of  the  Austrian  generals  in 


68  THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   WAR 

command  of  the  allied  armies  had  brought  about  a  deep 
dissent  between  them.^ 

Therefore  when  the  winter  of  1795-6  came  on,  the 
Sardinians  stayed  in  Piedmont,  Colli' s  army  between 
Ceva,  Mondovi,  and  Cherasco.  The  Austrian  army,  beaten 
at  Loano,  had  withdrawn  into  Lombardy,  where  it  had 
taken  up  its  winter  quarters,  leaving  the  Piedmontese 
alone  in  touch  with  the  French. 

In  the  spring  of  1796,  Beaulieu  had  been  appointed 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Austrian  army,  Colli  had 
kept  the  command  of  the  Sardinian  army. 

Piedmont  had  claimed  the  direction  of  operations  and 
tried  to  push  the  Austrians  into  Savoy.  The  claim  had 
met  with  a  refusal.  The  Emperor  had  even  refused  to 
engage  his  troops  further  than  the  Tanaro,  but  the 
Sardinian  army  was  no  longer  under  an  Austrian  general. 
In  consequence,  the  Piedmontese,  conforming  themselves 
to  the  theories  of  the  time,  were  content  with  holding 
their  frontiers  and  covering  their  capital;  they  rested 
their  line  of  operations  on  Turin. 

"  They  expected  but  small  results  from  their  small 
efforts,"  writes  Clausewitz. 

"  It  was  a  mistake  to  assume  that,  in  order  to  cover 
Turin,  one  had  to  stand  astride  of  the  road  leading  to  that 
town;  the  armies  united  at  Dego  would  have  covered 
Turin,  because  they  would  have  stood  on  the  flank  of 
the  road  leading  to  that  town  "  (Napoleon).^ 

^  For  instance,  a  Sardinian  staff  officer  wrote  : 

"  The  Piedmontese  had  a  growing  belief  that  von  Wins  (who  had 
succeeded  Beaulieu  in  the  command  of  the  Austrian  army)  had  never 
intended  anything  more  than  covering  the  access  to  Lombardy,  keep- 
ing the  French  at  a  distance  from  himself  and  throwing  them  back 
on  Piedmont,  in  compliance  with  the  miserable  pohcy  of  the  Germans 
in  the  old  Avars. 

"  Others  went  so  far  as  to  believe  that  von  Wins  had  not  regretted 
to  see  a  general  he  disliked  embark  upon  an  enterprise  which  apparently 
was  a  doubtful  one,  as  von  Wins  had  never  consented  to  give  a  definite 
order  about  it.  The  commander  of  the  Piedmontese  army  had,  from 
the  start  of  the  campaign,  been  imceasingly  submitted  to  a  thousand 
petty  vexations  on  the  part  of  the  commander-in-chief.  The  kind  of 
indignity  to  which  he  was  reduced,  after  the  war  council  in  Massuco, 
made  his  feelings  still  more  bitter.  General  von  Wins  enjoined  him 
on  that  occasion  not  to  move  any  troops  until  further  orders,  and 
thus  kept  his  hands  tied  until  the  middle  of  October." 

2  In  1870,  the  contingents  of  Southern  Germany,  vuiited  in  the 
Palatinate  with  the  Northern  forces,  covered  Southern  Germany  more 
efficiently  than  if  they  had  established  themselves  on  the  very  borders 
of  their  respective  States. 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  69 

A  divergence  of  military  actions  caused  by  a  diver- 
gence of  political  views,  moreover  a  thorough  misap- 
preciation  of  the  conditions  of  a  great  war  :  such  was  the 
picture  wliich  offered  itself  to  Bonaparte. 

By  marching  on  Carcare,  he  would  not  only  strike  at 
the  centre  of  a  system  of  forces,  but  he  would  determine 
a  complete  separation  of  interests  and  action  and  utilise 
it  in  order  to  beat  each  of  the  adversaries  separately. 
To  the  tactical  result  he  had  been  driving  at  from  the 
start :  "  to  attack  the  enemy  in  the  best  direction," 
would  be  added  a  strategical  result :  "to  attack  one 
isolated  fragment  of  the  opposing  forces,  the  Piedmontese 
army,  once  it  w^as  definitely  deprived  of  any  external 
help." 

"  By  entering  Italy  via  Savona,  Cadibona,  Carcare, 
Bormida,  one  might  hope  to  separate  the  Sardinian 
from  the  Austrian  army,  because,  from  that  direction 
one  threatened  Lombardy  and  Piedmont  equally.  The 
interest  of  the  Piedmontese  was  to  cover  Turin,  that  of 
the  iVustrians  to  cover  Milan"  (Napoleon). 

The  separation  having  been  enforced,  what  should  be 
the  first  objective  ?  The  Austrian  or  the  Piedmontese 
army  ?  There  were  two  opposing  theses  :  the  thesis  of 
Carnot  and  the  thesis  of  Bonaparte. 

Camot  was  so  entirely  dominated  by  his  own  mechani- 
cal theory  of  forces  that  he  carried  it  to  preposterous 
lengths  and  overlooked  a  peculiar  geographical  and 
political  situation  which  did  not  escape  the  eye  of 
Bonaparte.  So  true  is  it  that  in  war  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  an  absolute  system,  and  that  even  the  most 
certain  of  principles  must  be  applied  according  to 
circumstances. 

The  thesis  of  Carnot  ran  thus  :  "  After  capturing 
Ceva  and  bringing  the  left  of  the  army  of  Italy  nearer 
to  Coni  .  .  .  the  Commander-in-Chief  must  direct  his 
forces  on  the  Milanese  country  and  mainly  against  the 
Austrians  ...  he  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that 
the  chief  blo^v  must  be  dealt  against  the  Austrians.  ..." 

By  marcliing  on  the  main  army  and  beating  it,  so 
(thought  Camot)  would  the  war  be  brought  to  an  end; 
because  the  centre  of  gravity  of  the  resistance  to  be  broken 
was  there. 

This  thesis  would  have  been  sound  had  both  armies 
formed  one  system,  that  is   a  collection  of  forces  so 


70  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

arranged  as  to  co-operate.  As  a  fact  they  represented 
two  distinct  groups,  with  divergent  interests ;  two  separ- 
ate masses,  each  of  which  had  its  own  centre  of  gravity 
and  its  own  sphere  of  attraction. 

Both  adversaries  had,  therefore,  to  be  beaten  separ- 
ately, both  questions  had  to  be  treated  separately; 
the  war  could  not  be  brought  to  an  end  by  striking  one 
of  the  enemy  armies,  even  though  it  were  the  stronger 
one  of  the  two. 

On  the  contrary,  once  the  stronger  one  had  been 
taken  as  a  first  objective,  the  weaker  one,  which  was 
manoeuvring  independently,  could  not  be  overlooked. 
One  had  to  find  out  in  what  measure  it  could  oppose 
itself  to  the  action  undertaken.  In  that  respect  the 
geographical  situation  of  Piedmont  and  the  state  of  the 
Sardinian  army  presented  peculiar  features  of  their 
own. 

As  was  pointed  out  by  Bonaparte,  the  French  could 
not  go  on  acting  against  the  Austrians  with  such  a 
precarious  line  of  communications  as  that  of  the  Riviera 
(a  line  which  was  to  be  extended  as  far  as  Lombardy 
and  Venetia)  unless  they  could  efficiently  guard  them- 
selves against  the  Sardinians;  unless,  therefore,  they 
used  for  protecting  that  line  a  number  of  forces  the  ab- 
sence of  which,  in  their  own  state  of  numerical  weakness, 
would  be  doubly  felt  on  the  main  field  of  operations  and 
would  make  any  decisive  result  impossible. 

It  was  necessary,  therefore,  to  begin  by  settling  the 
Sardinian  problem.  The  Austrians  could  not  be  attacked 
before  the  Sardinian  army  should  have  been  beaten 
and  suppressed;  the  road  of  invasion  into  Lombardy 
and  Venetia  went  by  Piedmont.  Here  you  had  that 
"particular  case"  which  is  inherent  to  every  military 
situation  and  gives  each  its  character. 

Such  was,  in  its  general  features,  the  profoundly 
meditated  and  thoroughly  thought-out  plan  of  Bona- 
parte ;  he  was  capable  of  all  the  effort  required  to  carry 
it  out :  he  was  twenty-seven  years  of  age,  had  nothing 
to  lose,  everything  to  gain,  and  he  had  the  will  to  act; 
he  was  equal  to  every  sort  of  independent  action,  for  he 
already  considered  himself  at  least  as  strong  as  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Government  of  France  whom  he  had  saved 
on  the  13th  Vendemiaire.     He  would  dare  anything. 

Opposite  him,  Beaulicu  had  just  taken  over  the  com- 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  71 

mand  of  the  Austrian  army  (he  no  longer  commanded 
the  Sardinians) ;  he  was  seventy -two  years  old  and  had  a 
situation  and  a  reputation  to  save.  "  He  was  the  pro- 
duct of  sixty  years  of  official  pedantry,  the  thing  most 
hkely  to  depress  the  mind  and  the  heart.  He  was  the 
old  servant  of  an  old  monarchy,  the  instrument  of  a 
heavy  and  starched  aulic  council "  (Clausewitz).  What 
would  such  a  man  look  for  ?  Before  all  he  would  try  to 
avoid  risking  either  his  own  reputation  or  the  army  and 
the  interests  of  the  monarchy,  even  if  at  such  a  game 
neither  of  them  should  gain  anything. 

His  schemes,  as  well  as  his  temperament,  were  inferior 
to  those  of  Bonaparte.  He  still  contemplated  taking 
the  offensive,  but  only  in  order  to  drive  the  French  from 
the  Riviera,  to  take  the  department  of  Alpes-Maritimes ; 
join  hands  with  the  English;  thenceforward  continue 
a  war  of  posts  in  the  mountains,  and  threaten,  if  need  be, 
the  French  in  Provence. 

How  greatly  did  such  a  conception  of  warfare  differ 
from  the  new  idea  launched  by  Camot,  "  follow  up  the 
enemy  mitil  complete  destruction  ensues  "  !  Beaulieu's 
type  of  war  was  conducted  for  partial  gains  only.  Pre- 
paration, execution,  would  likewise  involve  but  a  reduced 
and  partial  use  of  the  means  at  hand. 

Thus,  Beauheu  hears  in  Alexandria,  in  the  last  days 
of  March,  that  the  Genoese  Government  has  been 
threatened  by  the  French  Commissioners;  he  hears  of 
an  expedition  against  Gavi,  of  the  occupation  of  Voltri  : 
he  decides  to  attack.  Without  assembling  his  forces, 
we  shall  see  him  attack  with  but  half  of  the  troops  at 
his  disposal.  Will  he  at  least  bring  into  the  attack  he 
is  preparing  that  available  half  of  his  troops  ?  We  shall 
see  that  later  on. 

Beaulieu  thought,  moreover,  that  the  French  army 
was  not  for  the  moment  capable  of  fighting  efficiently. 
He  therefore  proposed,  without  exposing  himself,  to 
accomphsh  the  following  task  :  (1)  To  strike  at  the 
French  right,  which  had  ventured  as  far  as  Genoa; 
(2)  to  cover  Genoa,  the  weakness  of  which  gave  ground 
for  anxiety;  (3)  to  join  hands  with  the  English  Admiral ; 
and  all  this  while  to  avoid  engaging  himself  against  the 
main  body  of  French  forces. 

There,    again,   the    old    general   was    belated   in    his 


72  THE    PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

conceptions ;  for,  in  the  new  warfare,  once  fire  was  set  to 
a  single  point,  the  whole  caught  fire.  The  advance  guard 
being  attacked,  the  whole  army  was  bound  to  come  up. 

In  any  case,  conforming  himself  to  his  plan,  he  sent 
ten  battalions,  on  March  31st,  in  the  direction  of  Novi, 
Pozzolo,  Formigero,  and  from  there  to  the  Bochetta 
(April  2nd). 

He  also  sent  eleven  battalions  under  d'Argenteau 
towards  Sasello;  the  latter  scattered  them  out  in  very 
extensive  cantonments  and  pushed  up  advance  guards 
to  Giovi  and  Upper  Montenotte. 

From  the  2nd  to  the  9th  he  did  not  move ;  he  com- 
pleted his  preparations  for  carrying  out  his  plan,  con- 
certed with  the  English  in  order  to  prepare  an  embuscade 
for  the  Laharpe  division  and  to  capture  that  division 
by  means  of  a  triple  attack. 

Finally  on  the  5th  or  6th,  he  fixed  his  own  dispositions, 
and  gave  out  his  orders. 

In  the  centre  was  a  body  under  d'Argenteau,  composed 
of  four  Piedmontese  battalions  and  twelve  Austrian 
battalions,  the  last  elements  of  which  were  to  assemble 
at  Acqui,  and  march  via  Montenotte  on  Savona,  in  order 
to  cut,  at  that  point,  the  Cornice  road. 

To  the  left,  a  body  of  ten  battalions,  after  assembling 
at  Novi,  were  to  proceed  to  Voltri,  which  it  was  to  attack. 
The  English  squadron  was  to  do  its  best  to  co-operate 
in  this  action  by  gunfire  or  by  landing.  The  Sardinian 
army  was  no  longer  under  an  Austrian  general,  but 
the  relations  with  General  Colli,  who  commanded  the 
Austrians,  were  good.  Relations  were  less  strained,  but 
more  rare,  than  in  the  past.  Both  generals  ought  to 
have  come  to  an  understanding  before  going  into  action, 
but  since  the  end  of  March  (at  which  date  Colli  had 
sent  out  offensive  reconnaissances  against  Serurier)  the 
contact  between  the  two  commanders-in-chief  had  been 
lost.  An  appointment  had  been  made  for  meeting  on 
April  14th ;  but  by  that  date  events  would  have  gone 
far.  The  Sardinian  army  ignored  what  was  happening ; 
it  still  occupied  Ceva  and  covered  the  Tanaro.  It  had 
only  received  from  Beaulieu  a  request  to  send  four 
battalions  to  Dego  under  the  orders  of  d'Argenteau. 

What,  in  the  meantime,  did  Bonaparte  do  now  that 
his  offensive  had  thus  been  forestalled  ? 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  73 

He  met  the  first  actions  of  the  enemy  (aroused  by  the 
imhicky  attempt  on  Genoa  and  marching  on  Voltri)  by 
executing  a  number  of  defensive  countermoves  which 
would  still  allow  him  later  to  carry  out  his  own  plan. 

The  Sardinians  were  making  a  number  of  offensive 
reconnaissances  on  Serurier.  He  reinforced  that  division 
by  sending  out  the  Rusca  brigade  as  far  as  Bardinetto. 

Scherer's  system  of  outposts  M^as  meanwhile  carefully 
revised  and  improved. 

Massena  had  in  Savona  the  3000  men  of  the  Laharpe 
division  and  the  Menard  brigade;  but  in  front  of  him, 
apart  from  the  line  from  Cervoni  to  Voltri,  there  was 
another  line  of  outposts  strongly  established  on  fortified 
positions ;  these  were  the  main  guards  of  Stella,  Monte- 
negino,  Altare,  Monte  Baraccone,  San  Giacomo,  Madona 
della  Neve,  Medogno;  the  latter  four  points  were  held 
by  the  Joubert  and  Dommartin  brigades  which  joined 
the  Rusca  brigade  on  the  Tanaro. 

In  the  rear,  a  number  of  substantial  reserves  of  out- 
posts were  established  near  Stella,  at  the  Madonna  of 
Savona,  at  Cadibone,  at  Quiliano. 

Strong  reconnaissances  came  into  touch  with  the 
enemy  as  soon  as  the  latter  began  to  manoeuvre. 

Finally  Bonaparte  himself  gave  his  instructions;  he 
particularly  ordered  Serurier  and  Rusca  to  keep  to  the 
strictest  defensive,  in  order  not  to  draw  the  enemy's 
attention  in  the  direction  of  Bardinetto,  by  which  he 
intended  to  reach  Millesimo. 

The  same  instructions  ascribed  to  Cervoni  (who  had 
replaced  Pijon  at  the  head  of  the  detachment  in  Voltri) 
a  special  mission.  The  Austrians  seemed  to  intend 
acting  in  the  direction  of  Genoa  (as  appeared  from 
the  concentration  of  their  forces  and  headquarters  at 
Novi).  The  body  under  Cervoni  would  attract  them, 
then  hold  them;  to  this  end  that  commander  was 
reinforced  with  half  a  brigade;  he  was  to  send  out 
reconnaissances  on  San  Pier  d' Arena,  but  to  avoid 
being  crushed  by  Beaulieu  and  to  withdraw  in  time  on 
Varazze,  where  he  would  be  covered  by  the  detachment 
of  Stella. 

We  have  here  an  army  on  a  strategical  defensive;  on 
the  look  out,  so  to  speak;  capable  none  the  less  of  sud- 
denly assuming  the  offensive.  It  was  covered  in  all 
directions  at  a  distance  and  by  forces  which  allowed  it, 


74  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

in  case  of  its  being  attacked;  to  concentrate  under 
shelter,  in  order  to  meet  the  attaclc,  and  that  on  the  very 
point  of  attack;  or  again,  to  steal  away  safely  if  its 
commanders  so  determined. 

Were  that  army  to  assume  the  offensive  in  any  possible 
direction,  its  facilities  for  concentration  would  be  the 
same  as  they  had  been  while  it  was  still  on  the  defensive, 
and,  further,  all  the  important  issues  by  which  it  might 
debouch  were  held. 

Owing  to  that  organisation  consisting  in  a  body  (the 
main  body)  and  limbs  (advance  guards),  owing  also  to 
the  resulting  zone  of  mmiceuvre,  the  army  was  constantly 
in  position  to  strike  with  all  its  mass  on  one  point. 

We  shall  see,  on  the  contrary,  Beaulieu's  three  corps 
operating  independently  of  each  other  in  three  directions 
which  do  not  commimicate  with  each  other,  also  with 
three  distinct  geographical  objectives,  and,  lastly,  under 
an  absolutely  rigid  arrangement. 

That  contrast  was  very  well  explained  by  Bonaparte 
when  he  wrote  ; 

"  Beauheu  was  dividing  his  forces,  for  any  communica- 
tion between  his  centre  and  his  left  was  impracticable 
otherwise  than  by  going  behind  the  mountains,  while 
the  French  army  had  been  placed,  on  the  contrary,  so 
as  to  be  able  to  assemble  within  a  few  hours  and  to  fall 
in  one  mass  upon  one  or  the  other  of  the  enemy  bodies ; 
if  one  of  these  were  beaten,  the  other  would  be  absolutely 
compelled  to  withdraw." 

After  having  thus  warded  off  any  possible  attack 
by  the  enemy,  Bonaparte,  displeased  at  first  with  the 
movement  on  Voltri  which  might  have  hurried  on  events 
before  he  was  ready  for  them,  intended  utilising  that 
movement  as  soon  as  the  advance  of  his  own  prepara- 
tions should  allow ;  even  though  he  should  have  to  alter 
his  original  plan — retaining  its  essentials ;  for,  by  means 
of  reconnaissances,  he  kept  himself  informed  of  the 
situation  at  Cairo,  which  still  remained  unoccupied 
between  Colli  and  d'Argenteau. 

The  Austrians  resumed  their  movement  on  April  9th, 
still  leaving  Colli  without  information.  Reconnaissances 
were  directed  against  our  outposts,  more  particularly 
on  Cervoni.  Bonaparte  hurried  up  from  Albenga  to 
Savona,  coming  nearer  the  point  where  the  enemy  was 
striking. 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  75 

The  Actions  at  Voltri 

Cervoni  maintained  himself  on  the  9th  with  his  right 
at  Pegli,  his  centre  on  Momit  Pascino  and  at  Pra  di 
Melle,  his  left  at  the  Brie  Germano.  He  kept  supporting 
troops  in  Arenzanno  and  Varazze. 

On  the  10th,  the  Austrians  debouched  in  two  fairly 
equal  columns  : 

(1)  Via  Pontedecimo :  Here  Pittony,  with  artillery 
and  cavalry  (4200  men),  was  covered  on  his  right  by  a 
flanking  body.  He  traversed  San  Carlo  and  Sant' 
Alberto.  He  was  held  up  at  Pegli  by  Lannes  with  the 
grenadiers  of  the  70th  and  79th  half-brigades;  he 
opened  artillery  fire  on  them  and  the  situation  remained 
stationary  until  nightfall. 

(2)  Via  Masone :  Sebottendorf  (about  3200  men) 
vigorously  attacked  between  the  Inferno  and  Acqua 
Santa,  carried  the  post  of  Pra  di  Melle,  and  surrounded 
near  Melle  four  companies  of  the  70th  half-brigade, 
which  succeeded,  however  (though  not  without  losses), 
in  reaching  the  mountain  called  "  The  Capuchins,"  near 
Voltri. 

Cervoni  reached  the  summit  of  Germasso;  from 
there  he  watched  the  movements  which,  through  the 
hills  del  Dente  and  Reisa,  might  threaten  his  line  of 
retreat ;  as  the  enemy  did  not  attempt  anything  in  that 
direction,  he  abandoned  his  troops  to  their  uncertain 
fate,  allowed  them  to  withdraw  as  chance  and  local 
opportmiities  permitted,  and  confined  himself  to  rallying 
them  in  the  evening  at  seven  o'clock  around  Voltri. 
Then,  after  having  lit  a  number  of  large  fires,  he  set 
out  to  retreat  (at  10  p.m.),  as  he  had  been  ordered  to 
do,  on  Arenzano  which  he  had  already  occupied;  his 
movement  was  covered  by  three  companies  of  grenadiers ; 
these  latter  held  for  a  certain  time  in  the  Convent  of 
the  Capuchins  in  Voltri  and  left  that  place  at  midnight 
in  order  to  withdraw  on  Arenzano,  where  they  were 
received  by  a  rear  guard  (one  battalion  of  the  99th). 
The  retreat  continued  in  the  same  fashion  on  Varazze, 
where  Cervoni  arrived  without  being  followed  and  having 
lost  only  100  or  200  men.  From  Varazze  he  joined 
hands  with  the  main  guard  at  Stella. 

His  tactics  are  an  excellent  example  of  the  tactics 
which  should  be  employed  by  retreating  outposts.     The 


76  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

line  of  retreat  should  be  safeguarded ;  the  main  points 
of  it  occupied  in  time;  such  movements  of  the  enemy 
as  might  endanger  it,  watched;  fighting  troops  which 
one  intends  to  withdraw  should  not  be  reinforced. 
Such  troops  should  successively  retire  under  protection 
of  supporting  troops.  Finally,  the  main  body  must 
fall  back  without  the  enemy  perceiving  the  movement 
(so  far  as  this  is  possible),  and  covered  by  a  rear  guard 
which  later  on  falls  back  upon  and  is  received  by  the 
main  force. 

Beaulieu  entered  Voltri  at  midnight.  He  had  7000 
or  8000  men  with  him.  He  talked  of  an  offensive,  but 
in  point  of  fact  he  ceased  to  act.  During  the  morning 
of  the  11th,  after  an  interview  with  Nelson  (who  had 
arrived  during  the  night  of  the  lOth-llth),  he  kept 
perfectly  still.  The  strategical  result  he  had  aimed  at, 
namely  the  covering  of  Genoa  and  effecting  a  junction 
with  the  English,  seemed  to  have  been  reached;  why 
should  he  act  ? 

On  the  other  hand,  the  tactical  result  he  had  thought 
of  attaining — crushing  Cervoni  with  three  columns  and 
the  aid  of  the  English  squadron — had  been  missed; 
because  the  enemy,  instead  of  halting,  pinned  to  his 
original  positions,  had  fallen  back.  But  the  situation 
could  not  be  left  at  that.  The  French  could  now 
threaten  the  corps  of  d'Argenteau,  from  whom  no  news 
was  forthcoming.  Beaulieu  began  to  grow  anxious. 
He  perceived  that  he  had  perhaps  done  nothing  but 
endanger  his  own  army.  He  started  in  a  carriage  at 
2  p.m.  from  Voltri  and  went  to  Novi  and  Acqui,  where 
he  might  well  have  to  concentrate  a  certain  force. 
Urgent  help  must  also  be  prepared  for  d'Argenteau  : 
Beaulieu  sent  Wukassowitch  with  three  battalions  to 
support  him  without  delay. 

Thus  the  theory  of  partial  results,  of  restricted  means, 
of  the  conquest  of  geographical  objectives,  began  to 
fall  to  pieces.  Over  against  it,  we  are  about  to  follow 
a  man  applying  the  theory  of  absolute  war. 

The  Action  of  Montenegino 

What  had  been  happening  meanwhile  to  d'Argenteau  ? 
Why  had  he  not  been  able  to  make  his  action  felt  on 
the  Cornice  road  ? 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  77 

It  was  not  till  the  9th  that  d'Argenteau  received  the 
orders  which  enjoined  him  to  act  on  the  10th,  to  proceed 
to  Montenotte,  capture  the  ridge  held  by  French  posts 
and  thus  establish  his  connection  with  the  corps  on  the 
left. 

Under  such  circumstances  he  was  in  no  condition  to 
attack  on  the  10th.  He  devoted  that  day  to  assembling 
the  force  he  thought  proper  to  use;  and  it  was  not  till 
the  11th,  at  the  moment  when  Beaulieu  was  leaving 
Voltri,  that  he  himself  attacked  at  Montenotte. 

On  that  day,  early  in  the  morning,  he  set  three 
columns  moving  : 

(1)  A  column  on  the  left  (four  battalions  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Lezeni)  starting  from  Sasello  over 
the  Giovi  pass,  in  direction  of  Stella.  After  meeting 
with  some  resistance  at  San  Giustino,  it  was  definitely 
held  up  at  Stella  by  the  French  14tli  half -brigade  which 
had  been  sent  from  Savona  in  order  to  occupy  that  post, 
and  by  a  detachment  of  the  Cervoni  brigade  which  had 
just  arrived. 

(2)  A  column  in  the  centre  (three  battalions),  formed 
at  Paretto  and  Maglio,  arrived,  under  d'Argenteau 
himself,  at  Pontinvrea,  where  it  divided  into  (a)  one 
detachment  going  up  the  right  bank  of  the  Erro  (two 
companies);  (b)  the  main  body  still  marching  on 
Garbazzo  (11  a.m.)  where  it  met : 

(3)  The  column  on  the  right  (three  companies  and  two 
battalions)  Avhich  had  come  from  Cairo  and  Dego  along 
the  ridge,  under  the  command  of  Rukavina. 

That  same  morning,  Brigadier-General  Rampon,  sent 
out  from  the  Madonna  of  Savona  on  a  reconnaissance 
towards  Montenotte  with  the  2nd  battalion  of  the 
21st  half-brigade  and  three  companies  of  the  1st  Light 
Infantry,  had  occupied  Ca  Meige  Dett'amore,  Casci- 
nassa  and  Crocetta.  At  about  10  a.m.  the  first  of  these 
posts  was  attacked  and  carried  by  Rukavina.  Rampon 
fell  back  on  the  Brie  Castlas,  which  he  soon  abandoned 
after  d'Argenteau  had  entered  Cascinassa.  He  then 
fell  back  further  on  Ca  di  Ferro,  where  he  found  time  to 
rally  his  last  post  of  the  Crocetta ;  then,  having  collected 
all  his  troops  (900  men),  he  resisted  on  the  Monte  Pra; 
finally,  at  about  1  p.m.,  he  was  back  in  his  works  of 
Montenegino. 

Montenegino  is  a  hill  overlooking  the  ridge  which 


78  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

extends  from  Mount  San  Giorgio  to  Mount  Cucco.  It 
was  reinforced  by  a  redoubt  completed  by  a  Jieche 
commanding  the  northern  slopes,  near  the  pass  between 
the  Monte  Pra  and  the  Montenegino,  and  by  a  small 
southern  redoubt,  twenty-five  yards  below  the  main 
one,  flanking  the  western  slope. 

The  Montenegino  was  held  by  a  main  guard  of  about 
600  men  (two  battalions  of  the  1st  Light  Infantry,  the 
third  one  occupying  the  Doria  Palace). 

Rampon,  having  now  about  1500  men,  including  those 
he  had  brought  in  with  him,  soon  lost  the  fleche,  but  held 
off  the  attacking  Austrians  (about  4000  men)  during 
the  whole  afternoon.  D'Argenteau  gave  up  the  attack 
before  he  had  brought  up  his  artillery;  he  bivouacked 
on  the  Monte  Pra,  opposite  the  enemy,  and  in  order  to 
cover  himself  he  called  for  the  following  forces  :  from 
Lezeni's  command,  one  battalion  which  occupied  the 
Brie  Sportiole,  and  two  companies  placed  at  the  Brie 
Mindo  near  Altare;  while  at  the  Brie  Castlas  he  had 
two  detachments  and  one  battalion  sent  for  from 
Squanello. 

At  five  o'  clock,  Rampon  sent  Bonaparte  a  note  in  which 
he  declared  himself  able  to  push  the  enemy  back  on 
Montenotte  provided  he  were  reinforced  with  one  or  two 
battalions  and  two  3-inch  guns.  Bonaparte's  own  idea 
was  more  far-reaching. 

He  had  gone  up  during  the  day  to  the  sanctuary  of 
the  Madonna  (1200  feet  below  the  Montenegino)  to  find 
Laharpe.  There  he  had  heard  the  incidents  of  the 
fight;  he  had  also  received  reports  from  the  outposts 
and  from  spies  :  the  Piedmontese  had  not  moved ;  their 
main  forces  were  still  between  Ceva  and  Mondovi; 
Carcare  and  Cairo  were  not  occupied;  2000  men  were 
scattered  between  Dego,  Millesimo,  Montezemolo. 

The  Austrians  had  attacked  at  Voltri  with  7000  or 
8000  men,  at  Stella  with  3000  or  4000  men,  at  Monte- 
negino with  about  4000;  three  colmnns  therefore  were 
marching  on  Savona. 

The  space  at  Bonaparte's  disposal  did  not  allow  him 
to  postpone  the  beginning  of  operations  any  longer. 
He  must  act  immediately  lest  he  should  be  surrounded 
by  Beaulieu.  On  the  other  hand,  he  was  in  a  position 
to  muster,  on  the  12th,  on  any  battle-field  he  might 
choose,  in  whatever  direction  he  might  adopt,  nearly 


ECONOMY   OF  FORCES  79 

the  whole  of  his  forces;  while  Beaiilieu,  even  with  the 
greatest  despatch  could  not  assemble  half  of  his  own, 
in  Aaew  of  the  dispersion  noted  above. 

During  the  day,  Bonaparte  sent  his  troops  a  pre- 
liminary order  :    "  Attention  !  " 

He  leaves  for  Savona  with  Laharpe,  sends  for  Massena, 
explains  his  intentions  to  them  by  word  of  mouth. 
Berthier  immediately  informs  the  other  divisions,  with- 
out waiting  for  the  arrival  of  headquarters  which, 
recalled  from  Albenga  in  the  morning,  will  not  be  able 
to  work  in  Savona  before  about  midnight.  (This  way 
of  proceeding  was  later  to  become  the  custom  of  the 
Emperor.)     In  compliance  with  these  orders  : 

Rampon,  reinforced  by  2300  men  and  two  guns,  spends 
the  night  at  Montenegino ;  behind  him,  Laharpe,  after 
leaving  a  few  companies  at  Savona  and  one  battalion 
at  the  Madonna  of  Savona,  whence  he  proposes  to  join 
hands  wth  Massena  by  occupying  the  Monte  Occulto, 
arrives  at  midnight  at  the  Doria  Palace  with  about 
7000  men,  made  up  as  follows  :  the  14th  half-brigade 
lately  arrived  from  Stella,  where  it  had  only  left  a 
detachment;  the  Cervoni  brigade  (70th  and  99th  half- 
brigade)  which  Bonaparte  had  reviewed  at  Savona  in  the 
evening. 

These  troops  have  orders  to  attack  d'Argenteau  at 
the  very  first  moment  possible,  in  front  and  in  flank. 

IMassena  comes  at  midnight  to  the  Plan  del  Melo  with 
the  Menard  brigade  (taken  from  the  Meynier  division 
which  had  been  dissolved) ;  as  soon  as  Laharpe  advances, 
Massena  is  to  attack  at  dawn,  on  Montenotte,  in  order  to 
cut  dWrgenteau  and  rout  all  the  reinforcements  that 
might  come  to  him. 

The  troops  of  the  combatant  body  are  to  bivouac 
about  midnight  south  of  Altare  in  this  order  : 

Augereau  at  Mallare  with  6000  men. 

Dommartm  with  3000  men  at  Montefreddo  1  where  they  are  to  expect 

Joubert  with  2000  men  at  Altare  j     further  orders. 

The  reserve  of  the  artillery  followed. 

Augereau  "  is  to  leave  Mallare  at  5  a.m.,  and  proceed 
to  Cairo.  He  is  to  cover  his  march  by  scouting  on  his 
left  and  to  occupy  the  chapel  of  Saint  Julia  between 
Carcare  and  Cairo.  If  he  finds  the  enemy  there,  he  is 
to  attack  him  and  drive  him  out. 


80  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

"  Once  he  is  beyond  Cairo,  he  is  to  occupy  the  moun- 
tains on  the  left  and  send  out  reconnaissances  to 
Rochetta,  midway  from  Dego,  where  he  will  receive 
further  orders. 

"  On  the  way,  he  will  attack  the  enemy  wherever  he 
meets  him,  and  send  news  of  his  arrival  to  Altare,  where 
headquarters  will  by  that  time  have  been  established." 

Serurier  is  instructed  to  make  numerous  reconnais- 
sances. 

Under  those  conditions,  Bonaparte  calculates  that  he 
will  have,  early  on  the  12th,  the  following  forces  : 


At  Montenegino 
At  the  Doria  Palace  , 
At  the  Plan  del  Melo 
Marching  on  Carcare 
At  Montefreddo 
At  Altare 


Rampon  .  .  .  1  ^  onr, 

T   1,  9,300  men 

Laharpe  .  .  .  J     ' 

Massena  (Menard  brigade)     3,500  „ 

Augereau  .  .  .     6,000  ,, 

Dommartin  .  .  .     3,000  „ 

Joubert  .  .  .     2,000  „ 


23,800 


Plus  the  artillery  reserve. 

The  distance  between  any  two  of  those  places  is  less 
than  five  miles  (exactly  four  and  a  half  from  Altare 
to  the  Brie  Castlas,  three  froin  Altare  to  Carcare). 
Communications  have  been  ensured  for  the  transmission 
of  orders  and  informations. 

Thus  Laharpe  and  Massena  will  attack  with  12,000 
or  13,000  men  the  3000  or  4000  men  which  Argenteau 
discovered  to  the  French  on  the  11th.  And  even  if 
Beaulieu,  by  displaying  prodigious  activity,  should 
manage  to  bring  that  number  up  to  12,000  or  15,000 
men,  Bonaparte  would  still  be  able  to  beat  liim  during 
the  day  with  24,000  men. 

The  Avhole  army  now  concentrated  (all  troops  not 
wanted  for  the  protective  duty,  Joubert,  Dommartin, 
etc.,  had  been  recalled)  was  in  position  to  manoeuvre  on 
Montenotte  against  reduced  forces,  and  this  owing  to  an 
enemy  dispersion  maintained  by  Serurier  more  par- 
ticularly in  front  of  Colli,  and  that  without  using  large 
forces.  The  tactical  result  in  that  direction  had  been 
rendered  absolutely  secure.  The  whole  is  an  example 
of  a  thoroughly  organised  attack. 

But  while  Bonaparte  was  thus  seeking  and  preparing 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES 


81 


for  his  tactical  success  he  also  intended  to  promote 
as  much  as  possible  the  execution  of  his  strategical 
plan  :  that  is,  the  separation  of  the  Austrians  from  the 
Sardinians,  by  occupying  Cairo — which  was  still  un- 
occupied on  the  11  til.     To  tliis  end  he  sent  Augereau 


SITUATION  VERS  6H.DII  MATIN 

h  12  Awl. 


thither,  as  early  as  the  morning  of  the  12th.  Any 
combination  may  be  'parried  if  time  is  left  to  the  adver- 
sary, if  the  adversary  be  not  overtaken  by  speed  and 
surprise.^     In    order   to    take   the   point   of   Cairo   by 

^  "  Strategy  is  the  art  of  utilising  time  and  space.     I  am  more 
economic  of  the  first  than  of  the  second.     I  can  always  regain  space; 
time  lost,  never." — Gneisenau. 
G 


82  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

surprise,  Aiigereau  was  ordered  to  be  there  at  an  early 
hour,  on  the  first  day  of  operations. 

Should,  however,  the  enemy,  being  warned,  have 
occupied  that  point  at  the  last  hour,  he  would  have  to 
be  driven  out  before  receiving  any  reinforcements. 
Therefore  Augercau  had  orders  to  proceed  with  a  strong 
advance  guard. 

Again,  should  the  enemy,  contrary  to  all  forecast, 
have  had  time  to  bring  up  reinforcements  to  Cairo,  the 
main  army  would  still  be  able  to  intervene  in  the  after- 
noon of  the  12th  in  order  to  finish  the  business  undertaken 
by  Augereau's  advance  guard. 

That  advance  guard  would  not  in  any  case  be  lost 
for  the  combatant  body,  and  should  Massena,  during  the 
morning,  come  up  against  strong  resistance — for  instance 
near  Montenotte— the  advance  guard  would  be  in  a 
position  to  overtake  and  help  him.  It  is  only  a  matter 
of  five  or  six  miles. 

In  any  case  this  advance  guard  would  have  a  good 
deal  of  scouting  to  do,  and  it  would  have  to  maintain  its 
connection  with  Massena  to  the  east,  with  Serurier  to 
the  west,  with  Joubert  and  Dommartin  in  the  rear. 
Therefore  it  needed  cavalry ;  it  received  four  squadrons. 

Here,  then,  we  have  the  whole  army  concentrated 
on  the  12th  within  a  narrow  space,  ready  to  act  if  neces- 
sary with  its  whole  weight,  in  the  morning,  in  the  first 
direction  aimed  at,  namely  Montenotte;  ready  also  in 
the  evening  to  act,  if  equally  necessary,  in  the  second 
direction,  Cairo.  In  both  cases  its  action  is  being 
directed,  informed,  prepared  by  advance  guards  : 

Massena  on  Montenotte. 
Augereau  on  Carcare,  Cairo. 

Rampon  and  Laharpe  attacked  d'Argenteau  at  day- 
break with  9000  men  and  outflanked  liim.  Massena, 
who  at  once  grasped  their  move,  carried  by  storm  first 
the  two  companies,  then  the  battalion  which  d'Argenteau 
had  placed  at  Brie  Castlas  and  which,  having  arrived 
during  the  night,  were  insufficiently  entrenched.  He 
fell  on  the  Austrian  rear  and  reached  Upper  Montenotte 
before  them. 

Attacked  from  all  sides,  d'Argenteau  saw  his  be- 
wildered battalions  whirl  in  confusion.  He  managed 
to  collect  700  men  only  as  reinforcement  in  the  course 


ECONOMY   OF  FORCES  88 

of  the  day.  His  reserves,  left  at  Sassello,  Squaretto, 
had  not  the  time  to  intervene.  They  heard  of  the  rout 
from  the  fugitives. 

As  for  Bonaparte,  he  stood  at  daybreak  on  the  ridge 
by  which  Massena  advanced  north  of  Altare.  From 
there  he  saw  a  number  of  points  of  the  battle-field ;  he 
received  quick  information;  in  case  the  action  should 
not  develop  according  to  his  wishes,  he  would  be  in  a 
position  to  intervene  with  such  troops  as  were  available ; 
to  call  back,  if  need  be,  Augereau  and  the  other  colunms. 
It  soon  became  clear  that  everything  was  going  well  on 
that  side.  He  was  therefore  able  to  resume  without 
disturbance  the  march  of  liis  army  upon  Cairo. 

Unfortunatel}''  he  had  to  reckon  with  delay,  caused 
in  this  case  by  the  necessity  of  suppl3dng  such  things  as 
muskets  and.  boots. -"^  Joubert  only  arrived  at  Altare  on 
the  morning  of  the  12th,  Augereau  during  the  day, 
Dommartin  to  Montefreddo  in  the  evening. 

The  ill  effect  of  that  delay  was  made  good,  as  far 
as  possible,  by  forced  marches,  and  particular  tasks 
assigned  to  certain  of  the  troops  had  to  be  altered,  but 
the  programme  developed  in  spite  of  all. 

Massena  was  called  upon  to  perform  part  of  the  task 
which  belonged  to  Augereau.  That  very  evening,  he 
directed  : 

The  21st  half-brigade  on  Cairo; 
The  8th  Light  Infantry  on  Biesaro. 

The  distribution  of  forces,  in  the  evening  of  the  12th, 
was  therefore  as  follows  : 

Laharpe  at  lower  Montenotte  sending  out  patrols  on 
Sassello ; 

Massena  at    .     •  {^s^^i ;  ^^"^"l^^"*^"'^ ' 
Joubert  at  San  Donato  (between  "j  ^ 

Carcare  and  Cairo)  with  main  Yo     ^  ^-mt  -x.   . 

guards  near  JSanta  Margarita; 

Augereau  at  Carcare ; 

Dommartin  at  Montefreddo  (arrives  very  late); 

Bonaparte  at  Carcare. 

1  The  dearth  of  material  of  first  necessity  was  such,  that  in  Augereau's 
Division — to  mention  but  one  fact — 1000  men  out  of  6000  had  no 
muskets. 


84 


THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   WAR 


Augereau's  delay  bore  certain  consequences  :  Provera 
had  2000  men  on  the  small  ridge  which  separates  the 
two  Bormidas;  he  had  the  time  to  assemble  them. 
Aiigereau  and  Joubert,  by  arriving  in  the  morning,  would 
have  enabled  the  French  to  carry  Cosseria  and  Millesimo 


SITUATION  DANS  LA  SOIRU 

tt  II  Airil. 


without  difficulty ;  the  affair,  taking  place  the  next  day, 
was,  on  the  contrary,  to  prove  a  costly  one,  and  the 
castle  of  Cosseria  was  not  carried  until  the  third  day. 

In'spite  of  this,  Bonaparte  carried  out,  on  the  12th,  the 
main  item  of  his  programme.  He  now  occupied  a  central 
position  between  the  Austrians  who  were  falling  back 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  85 

on  Acqui  and  the  Piedmontesc  who,  ignoring  all  that 
was  taking  place,  were  taken  by  surprise  and  remained 
scattered  in  their  cantonments. 

On  April  13th,  Bonaparte  continued  to  carry  out  his 
programme  :  "To  act  in  the  direction  of  Ceva  and 
beat  the  Sardinians,"  his  main  objective,  and  to  follow 
up  d'Argenteau  on  Spigno,  his  secondary  objective."  He 
writes  to  Serurier  :  "  I  attack  to-day  towards  Monte- 
zemolo."  And  he  repeats  to  Laharpe  :  "  It  is  important 
to  occupy  Montezemolo  to-day."  This  is  then  the  main 
idea  of  the  day.  To  its  realisation  Napoleon  devoted 
the  main  body  of  his  forces  ;  to  the  secondary  action  he 
detached  as  few  troops  as  possible  and  for  the  shortest 
time  possible.  With  that  main  object  in  view,  the  action 
in  direction  of  Montezemolo  was  undertaken  by  : 

Serurier,  having  on  his  right  Rusca,  who  was  to  link 
himself  up  with  Augereau  near  Murialdo ; 

Augereau,  following  the  main  road; 

Joubert,  marching  on  Castelnovo  via  San  Giovanni ; 

Dommartin,  who,  if  he  went  beyond  Montefreddo, 
was  to  place  himself  in  reserve  behind  Augereau ; 
in  the  contrary  case,  he  was  to  overtake  Rusca; 

Menard  (with  one  half-brigade)  to  stay  in  reserve 
at  Biestro; 

Massena  and  Laharpe  were  ordered  to  proceed  early 
beyond  Dego,  send  a  few  companies  on  Spigno, 
and  afterwards  fall  back  to  the  right  of  Augereau 
in  order  to  act  in  the  direction  of  Montezemolo. 

Here,  again,  we  have  a  system  of  forces,  of  all  the  forces, 
set  up  in  order  to  attack  the  Piedmontese  army. 

In  compliance  with  these  orders,  Augereau  marches 
early  on  the  13th,  marching  on  Millesimo  (having  Joubert 
and  Menard  under  his  orders).  Provera  had  established 
liimself  with  2000  men  on  the  small  ridge  between  the 
two  Bormidas;  he  was  thus  acting  as  connecting  link 
between  the  Sardinians  in  Montezemolo  and  the  Austro- 
Sardinians  in  Dego.  Attacked  in  the  morning  of  the 
13th  by  Augereau's  columns,  he  soon  loses  Millesimo, 
but  entrenches  himself  in  the  old  castle  of  Cosseria 
(8  a.m.).  Augereau  attempts  in  vain  to  laiock  down  the 
walls  with  four  small  guns  and  one  howitzer;  he  tries 
in  vain  to  parley  in  order  to  get  hold  of  the  place.     At 


8G  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

4  p.m.  he  is  reduced  to  attacking  with  the  6000  men  he 
possesses.  The  attack  only  leads  to  costly  failure  and 
heavy  losses,  more  particularly  for  the  Joubcrt  brigade 
which  has  to  be  relieved  by  the  Dommartin  brigade. 
A  more  regular  form  of  attack  has  to  be  resorted  to  during 
the  night,  a  battery  is  set  up  at  a  short  distance  from  the 
castle. 

Provera  surrenders  on  the  14th,  at  8  a.m. 

However,  Colli,  having  been  informed  early  on  the 
13th  of  the  attack  of  the  Republicans,  has  concentrated 
some  forces  at  Montezemolo.  Bonaparte  is  therefore 
compelled,  while  continuing  to  carry  out  his  plan,  to 
take  Colli's  manifestations  into  account,  and  to  hold 
him  in  check  while  he  carries  the  successive  obstacles 
barring  his  own  progress. 

On  that  same  day,  the  13th,  while  Augereau,  playing 
the  part  of  an  advance  guard  in  the  direction  of  Monte- 
zemolo, was  beginning  to  move,  Massena  had  received 
the  mission  to  carry  Dego,  where  it  was  thought  that 
nothing  but  fugitives  would  be  found. 

Laharpe  and  Dommartin  were  marching  on  Cairo  in 
order  to  reconstitute  a  mass  which  would  allow  for 
manoeuvring. 

But  the  four  battalions  which  Colli  had  sent  to  Dego 
at  Beaulieu's  request  had  arrived  there  on  the  12th. 
Hearing  of  the  events  of  the  day,  they  stayed  there  on 
the  13th  with  the  remains  of  the  Rukavina  column. 
Massena  arrived  in  the  course  of  the  morning  with  about 
2000  men.^  Inhabitants  of  the  country  and  deserters 
informed  liim  of  the  situation.  He  realised  his  forces  to 
be  too  small  for  attack. 

Such  reinforcements  as  might  reach  him — Laharpe, 
Dommartin — arrived  in  Cairo  no  earlier  than  between 
eleven  and  noon.  At  that  moment  also,  the  castle  of 
Cosseria  was  making  its  unexpected  stand.  Colli  was 
showing  some  strength  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Monte- 
zemolo. A  reserve  must  be  formed  in  case  he  should 
attack.  To  this  end,  Bonaparte  kept  Laharpe  and 
Dommartin  in  Cairo.     Massena  was  not  reinforced.     As 

^  Massena  had  at  his  disposal  only  one  battalion  of  grenadiers  and 
carabineers,  500  men  strong  at  the  utmost,  commanded  by  Rondeau, 
and  the  1st  and  3rd  battalions  of  the  21at  half-brigade,  about  1600 
men  strong. 


ECONOMY    OF   FORCES  87 

can  be  already  seen,  the  most  simple  moves  of  an  adver- 
sary have  the  effect  of  delaying  the  march  of  the  most 
audacious  of  chiefs  as  well  as  of  retarding  the  develop- 
ment of  a  plan. 

Bonaparte  did  not  dream  of  cutting  his  reserve  into 
two  parts  in  order  to  reinforce  simultaneously  the  actions 
on  Cosseria  and  Dego,  for  this  would  weaken  him  every- 
where. The  attack  was  to  be  carried  out  on  one  side  : 
Montezemolo;  on  the  other,  it  was  to  be  stopped  until 
further  orders. 

As  for  Massena,  he  had  assembled  his  column  near 
Rochetta  Cairo,  which  he  had  occupied.  What  did  he 
propose  to  do  there,  now  that  he  was  reduced  to  action 
with  his  own  forces  alone  ? 

Powerless  in  front  of  Dego,  he  might  have  marched  to 
the  sound  of  gunfire  which  was  heard  in  the  direction  of 
Cosseria.     Failing  orders  for  this,  he  did  not  do  so. 

He  might  have  confined  himself  to  taking  up  a  defen- 
sive position  at  Rochetta  Cairo  in  order  to  prevent  the 
adversary  from  debouching  on  Cairo.  By  acting  in 
that  way,  he  would  not  have  prevented  the  enemy  from 
manoeuvring  in  other  directions. 

He  kept  faithfully  to  his  orders,  and  to  his  function, 
which  was  that  of  an  advance  guard  on  the  road  to 
Acqui,  a  thing  which  implied,  above  all,  the  paralysing 
of  all  enemy  attempts  coming  from  that  region. 

Held  up  before  IDego  and  unable  to  drive  the  adver- 
sary from  that  place,  we  shall  see  him  attack  indeed,  but 
by  means  of  a  mere  reconnaissance  the  effect  of  which, 
reconnaissance  though  it  was,  and  only  that,  besides 
supplying  information,  was  to  fix,  to  hold  these  superior 
forces,  and  to  make  ready  for  the  main  attack  on  the 
following  day.  Massena  at  about  two  ordered  the 
reconnaissance  on  Dego. 

The  Dego  Reconnaissance 

{April  ISth) 

(See  Sketch  No.  2  in  pocket  at  end  of  volume) 

To  this  end,  the  21st  half-brigade  (with  two  guns) 
climbed  up  the  heights  north  of  Rochetta  Cairo ;  numer- 
ous patrols,  put  forward  as  skirmishers,  pushed  on  and 
reached   Costa   Lupara,    Vermenano   and   the   Brie   of 


88  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Santa  Lucia;  two  guns  (the  whole  available  artillery) 
unlimbered  at  Coletto  and  opened  fire.  The  main  body 
of  the  21st  half-brigade  followed  up  in  reserve,  ready  to 
support  the  elements  engaged. 

In  order  to  extend  the  reconnaissance  further  to  the  right, 
the  Rondeau  column  (about  500  men)  marched  on 
Gerini,  via  Massalapo.^ 

In  order  to  extend  the  reconnaissance  further  to  the  left, 
Massena  utilised  the  70th  half-brigade  which  had  just 
arrived  with  Cervoni.  The  latter  tried  to  cross  the 
Bormida  by  the  ford  at  the  mouth  of  the  rivulet  of 
Bouereu ;  he  had  to  go  back  to  the  bridge  of  Rochetta, 
where  he  left  a  detachment,  while  he  went  on  in  the 
direction  of  Sopravia  with  the  remainder  of  his  force, 
preceded  by  numerous  patrols  which  were  immediately 
thrown  out  as  skirmishers  when  they  came  in  touch 
with  the  enemy. 

To  such  actions,  backed  up  by  intense  infantry  and 
artillery  fire,  the  enemy,  who  believed  himself  attacked, 
replied  with  all  his  means  :  infantry  fire,  artillery  fire. 
It  had  not  the  slightest  effect  on  the  thin,  sparse  French 
numbers  :  what  it  did  do  was  to  disclose  the  disposi- 
tions taken  by  the  Austro-Sardinians  and  to  show 
Massena  which  positions  were  occupied. 

Not  venturing  to  hold,  as  in  1794,  the  heights  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Bormida,  the  Austro-Sardinians  had 
established  themselves  on  the  right  bank.  The  village 
of  Magliani  forms,  roughly,  the  centre  of  the  position, 
the  right  of  which  is  at  the  Brie  Rossa,  while  the  left  is 
at  the  Brie  della  Stella.  A  first  line  of  defence  was 
established  on  the  ridge  of  the  Costa  and  in  Dego  Castle. 

The  artillery  of  the  position  may  be  estimated  at  six- 
teen or  eighteen  guns ;  that  position  contained  besides 
on  the  main  strong  points  a  number  of  works,  sketehily 
traced  of  course,  and  a  redoubt  made  of  stones  without 
mortar  at  the  Brie  Cassano  (north-west  of  Magliani). 

Such  a  set  of  works  could  not  be  carried  by  sudden 
attack.     Early  that  night  Massena,  in  agreement  with 

1  Its  itinerary  was :  down  from  the  Rochetta  heights  into  the 
Bouereu  valley,  above  C.  Ferriera;  up  again  by  the  path  of  the  Brie 
de  Lobe  on  to  the  hill  of  Casteriole,  that  is,  along  the  ridge  around 
which  the  Bouereu  river  makes  a  very  marked  loop  while  flowing 
towards  C.  Nicolena;  crossing  near  Prestaldi  the  rivulet  Rovera, 
tributary  to  the  Grillaro,  and  marchmg  on  Germi. 


ECONOMY   OF   FORCES  89 

Bonaparte,  who  had  arrived  on  the  spot,  ordered  his 
troops  to  fall  back.  He  assembled  them  at  the  bivouac 
of  the  preceding  night,  south  of  Rochetta  Cairo,  where 
he  organised  a  defensive  position  so  as  to  be  able  to 
resist  in  case  the  enemy  should  attack  in  his  turn. 

Such  is  a  reconnaissance  directed  by  Bonaparte  and 
by  Massena  under  very  difficult  circumstances. 

1.  Even  to  these  ardent  men,  the  conduct  of  troops 
did  not  consist  in  rushing  like  a  wild  boar  on  the  enemy. 
You  must  act  with  full  knowledge  of  the  case,  and  pro- 
portion your  aims  and  actions  to  your  available  means. 
You  must  begin  by  reconnoitring. 

2.  In  order  to  reconnoitre,  one  must  compel  the  enemy 
to  shozo  himself  wherever  he  may  be.  To  this  end,  he 
has  to  be  attacked  until  his  position  and  his  front  has 
been  clearly  defined.  Hence  several  attacking  columns 
are  necessary.  The  attack,  however,  is  made  with  the 
intention  7iot  to  bring  on  the  action ;  therefore  each 
coliunn  will  only  supply,  ahead  of  itself,  some  patrols, 
some  skirmishers  who  will  advance,  fall  back,  easily 
disengage  themselves  at  a  given  moment.  The  best 
means  are  :  mainly  action  from  a  distance,  firing  at  the 
longest  range  'possible,  always  so  acting  as  to  exercise 
pressure  on  the  enemy  without  allowing  oneself  to  be 
tied  up. 

In  the  rear  of  the  combatant  troops  a  number  of  main 
bodies  were  held  ready  to  act  as  supporting  troops  (being 
established  on  supporting  points  and  on  points  where 
there  was  observation  for  fire).  The  points  of  cominuni- 
cation  and  assembly  in  the  rear  were  also  held  (Bormida 
crossing,  village  of  Rochetta). 

In  any  case,  the  day  of  the  13th  was  thrown  away  so 
far  as  it  concerned  the  development  of  Bonaparte's  plan, 
which  was  to  march  on  Ceva.  It  had  been  lost  owing 
to  the  resistance  of  Cosseria  (due  to  Augereau's  delay), 
and  to  the  resistance  of  Dego ;  and  as  long  as  Cosseria 
held  out,  Dego  could  not  be  attacked  in  force. 

Two  thousand  men  had  been  pushed  on  by  Augereau 
to  Millesimo  :  this  was  the  only  result  attained  on  the 
13th. 

Moreover,  this  army  all  concentrated  round  Cairo 
lacked  food. 

However,  on  the  morning  of  the  14th,  Pro  vera  surren- 
dered,  the    road   from    Millesimo    to   Montezemolo,   so 


90  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

ardently  desired,  lay  open ;  might  it  not  now  be  possible 
to  resume  the  carrying  out  against  Colli  of  the  plan  which 
Bonaparte  had  nursed  so  long,  which  ill-luck  had  delayed 
for  two  days,  which,  moreover,  the  want  of  food,  the 
complete  penury  and  fatigue  of  the  army  urged  him  to 
conclude  ?  Well,  no.  So  long  as  Dego  was  not  captured, 
there  was  no  true  security  on  that  side  :  Beaulieu  might 
assemble  important  forces  between  that  place  and  Acqui, 
and  thus  endanger  all  the  progress  of  the  army  engaged 
on  Montezemolo.  Dego  must  be  attacked  and  captured. 
The  reconnaissance  of  the  13th  had  shown  all  the  im- 
portance of  that  position ;  that  importance  might  be 
greater  still  on  the  14th  (tlirough  reinforcement  of  works 
and  arrival  of  troops). 

Whatever  be  the  necessity  for  marching  on  Monte- 
zemolo without  delay  on  the  morning  of  the  14th,  the 
main  bod}^  of  the  army  was  ordered  to  take  the  direc- 
tion of  Dego.  During  that  morning  Massena  was  to  be 
reinforced  by  : 

Laharpe ; 

The  Menard  Brigade 
Dommartin 

Part  of  the  Augereau  Division 
under  Victor 


Total  : 

18,000  men  available 

before  Dego. 


The  Attack  on  Dego 
{April  IMh) 

While  keeping  the  adversary  scattered,  Dego  could 
thus  be  vigorously  attacked. 

The  situation  of  the  place  had  been  disclosed  by  the 
reconnaissance  accomplished  the  day  before ;  according 
to  the  latest  information,  no  new  troops  were  supposed 
to  have  arrived  there.  Bonaparte  then  made  up  his 
mind  to  use  his  numerical  superiority  in  order  to  secure 
a  complete,  decisive  result,  and  capture  the  enemj^  forces 
in  Dego. 

To  this  end,  Massena  was  ordered  to  attack  on  the 
right  bank  in  two  columns. 

The  right  column  under  Lasalcette,^  led  by  Rondeau, 

1  It  contained  (1)  the  Rondeau  detachment,  formed  by  the  grena- 
diers of  the  21st,  the  carabineers  of  the  8th  Light  Infantry,  and  200 
men  of  that  half-brigade,  in  total  400  or  500  men;  (2)  the  1st  Light 
Infantry,  1000  or  2000  men. 


ECONOMY   OF  FORCES  91 

whose  force  formed  the  advance  guard,  proceeded  to- 
Gerini  by  the  same  road  as  the  day  before  and  reached, 
at  about  1  p.m.,  the  Brie  of  Sodan. 

Following  that  ridge,  the  advance  guard  marched  on 
the  Brie  del  Caret,  where  it  arrived  and  established  itself 
in  time  to  drive  back  first  a  single  reinforcing  battalion 
which  was  arriving  from  Squanetto  to  Dego,  then  two 
more  battalions.  After  thus  getting  hold,  by  its  advance 
guard,  of  one  of  the  roads  to  Dego,  the  main  body  of 
the  column  marched  in  the  direction  of  Majani,  pushed 
back  the  posts  della  Stella  and  del  Poggio,  and  connected 
itself  with  Massena  at  the  foot  of  Mount  Gerolo,  at 
about  three. 

The  left  column,  under  Massena,^  had  slowly  gone  into 
action  in  order  to  give  the  others  time  to  invest ;  during 
the  greater  part  of  the  day  it  occupied  Vermenano,  Costa 
Lupara,  keeping  up  fire  on  the  enemy  with  numerous 
skirmishers  and  the  two  guns,  which  was  all  the  artillery 
it  possessed.  This  was  a  mere  demonstration :  much 
firing,  few  forces  in  action,  points  strongly  held  in  the 
rear  of  the  combatants.  Only  at  3  p.m.,  seeing  Lasal- 
cette's  progress,  having,  moreover,  established  a  con- 
nection, Massena,  his  reserves  in  hand,  rapidly  climbed 
the  slope  of  Castello,  deployed,  carried  and  went  past 
that  place,  deployed  again  before  Costa,  stormed  Mount 
Gerolo  in  company  with  Lasalcette ;  the  defenders  of 
Gerolo  fell  back  on  Majani,  where  they  found  the 
right  of  the  Piedmontese  equally  driven  back  by 
Laharpe. 

Laharpe  had  manoeuvred  ^  by  the  left  bank  of  the 
Bormida,  which  he  had  crossed  at  Rochetta.  He  was 
followed  by  200  cavalry. 

He  proceeded  on  to  Sopravia,  left  one  battalion  ^  to 
occupy  Bormida,  in  order  to  invest  the  enemy  and  pro- 
tect the  artillery  (three  guns  of  eight)  which  established 
itself  on  the  height  west  of  Bormida,  preparing  at  favour- 
able range  the  attack  on  Castello  by  Massena.  Advanc- 
ing further  on  via  Sopravia,  the  division  again  crossed 
the  Bormida  at  the  ford  of  the  Pra  Marenco,  where  it 
left  one  *  battalion  and  formed  itself  into  three  columns 

^  21st  half-brieade,    ")        -u     t.  o^aa 
1 .,,   ,  ^      '    Y     about  2400  men. 

14th  temporary,     j 

2  With  the  70th  and  99th  half -brigade. 

3  Of  the  99th.  *  Of  the  70th. 


92  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

in  order  to  attack  the  Casan  redoubt.     The  three  columns 
were  : 

1.  To  the  right,  under  General  Causse,  1500  or  1600 
men  ^  via  Piano. 

2.  In  the  centre,  under  Cervoni,  900  men  ^  via  the 
Brie  Rosso. 

3.  In  echelon  behind  to  the  left,  under  the  Chief  of 
Staff  of  the  Boyer  division,  800  men  '^  plus  cavalry 
(200  men). 

The  Piedmontese  withdrew  from  the  Casan  redoubt 
on  Mojani,  wherefrom  they  rapidly  withdrew  through 
the  valley  of  the  Cassinelle.  Trying  to  reach  the  road 
to  Spigno,  they  found  that  road  barred  by  the  advance 
guard  of  Rouleau,  who  fired  on  them  from  the  Brie  del 
Caret ;  pursued  at  the  same  time  by  Laharpe's  200  horses, 
both  battalions  were  compelled  to  surrender;  their 
artillery  had  not  left  its  entrenchments. 

Although  the  march  on  Montezemolo  was  becoming 
urgent,  see  what  a  methodical  spirit  was  exhibited ! 

1.  Utilising  numerical  superiority  in  order  to  secure  a 
radical  decision. 

2.  Progressively  carrying  out  the  investment,  with  a 
minimum  of  forces,  owing  to  the  use  made  of  places  like 
Bormida,  etc. 

3.  Patiently,  slowly,  economically  preparing  the  deci- 
sive act  all  day  long,  then  carrying  it  out  swiftly, 
between  3  and  4  p.m.,  with  nearly  the  whole  of  the 
forces  present  acting  simultaneously  and  together. 

This  we  shall  find  to  be  a  constant  feature  of  the 
operations  conducted  by  those  ardent  men  :  Bonaparte, 
Massena,  Lannes. 

The  whole  day  is  spent  in  manoeuvring  in  order  to 
prepare  the  intended  decision ;  but  the  manoeuvre  is 
undertaken  against  an  enemy  who  has  been  reconnoitred 
here  the  day  before,  fixed,  immobilised  the  whole  day  by 
Massena  who  attacks,  but  only  to  keep  the  enemy  busy  ; 
who,  with  that  end  in  view,  only  brings  into  action 
skirmishers  and  the  whole  available  artillery,  until  all 
the  columns,  after  extending  the  investment  and  over- 
coming, under  cover,  the  difficulties  of  the  ground,  have 
managed,  by  still  using  covered  approaches,  to    place 

1  Two  battalions  of  the  99th. 

2  One  battahon  of  the  70th. 


ECONOMY  OF  FORCES  98 

themselves  at  a  short  distance  in  front  of  their  objec- 
tives, in  columns  of  attack  linked  up  each  with  its 
neighbours. 

The  use  and  combination  of  arms  are  equally  worthy 
of  attention ;  the  artillery  do  nearly  the  whole  of  the 
demonstration  and  prepare  the  attack  on  important 
strong  points  such  as  Castello ;  cavalry  join  that  part 
of  the  decisive  attack  which  has  to  go  the  longest  way, 
in  order  to  scout,  cover,  and  complete  the  decision. 

At  the  very  moment  the  affair  came  to  an  end,  Bona- 
parte (who  had  already  sent  the  Menard  and  Dom- 
martin  brigades  on  to  Montezemolo)  ordered  Laharpe  to 
start  immediately  for  Cairo. 

Massena  was  to  guard  Dego.  Lack  of  food  was,  how- 
ever, absolute.  The  fight  being  at  an  end,  his  division 
dispersed  to  loot  the  neighbouring  villages ;  they  were 
surprised  in  the  greatest  state  of  disorder  by  an  enemy 
detachment  and  driven  out  of  Dego.  The  division  could 
only  be  rallied  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  at  about  10. 

As  we  have  seen,  Beaulieu,  on  leaving  Voltri,  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  11th,  had  sent  three  battalions  under 
Wukasso witch  to  Mount  Pajole,  thence  on  towards 
Sassello.  On  the  13th,  knowing  that  Dego  was  able  to 
offer  some  resistance,  he  had  prescribed  a  concentration 
there  of  the  available  (in  all,  ten)  battalions  scattered 
at  Sassello,  Acqui,  Pacetto,  Spigno.  Five  of  them  were 
beaten  on  the  14th  north  of  Dego  by  Massena's  advance 
guard ;  five,  in  consequence  of  an  error,  only  arrived 
on  the  15th  just  before  daybreak.  These  were  the  two 
battalions  left  by  d'Argenteau  at  Lezeni  and  the  three 
of  Wukassowitch. 

Wukassowitch,  who  commanded  the  whole,  did  not 
hesitate  to  attack,  carried  Dego,  drove  back  Massena 
(whom  Laharpe  received).  Bonaparte  made  again  for 
Dego  with  all  these  forces  and  carried  the  place — but 
only  towards  evening,  and  after  a  rather  lively  action. 

In  spite  of  Wukassowitch's  advice  and  request,  Beau- 
lieu  had  failed  to  send  him  any  reinforcement.  His 
battalions  at  Voltri  were  the  only  ones  untouched,  and 
he  could  not  get  them  up  quickly. 

This  new  Dego  affair  made  Bonaparte  anxious;  he 
feared  lest  the  Austrians  should  counter-attack  on  the 
16th;    information  received  justified  those  fears.     For 


94  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

that  day  he  ordered  Massena  to  keep  on  his  guard  at 
Dego ;  Laharpe  to  post  himself  on  Mioglio  and  Sassello 
and  send  out  reconnaissances  towards  Acqui;  Head- 
quarters to  remain  at  Carcare. 

As  you  see,  two  further  days,  those  of  the  15th  and 
IGth,  are  again  wasted  so  far  as  the  execution  of  the  plan 
is  conceived,  the  manceuvre  on  Ceva. 

However,  the  Piedmontese  have  evacuated  Monte - 
zemolo ;  Augereau  occupies  that  place,  while  Rusca 
proceeds  to  Priero  and  Serurier  to  Malpotremo,  thus 
nearing  the  camp  at  Ceva. 

On  the  16th,  Serurier  attacked  the  camp  established 
on  the  ridge  which,  starting  from  the  town,  leads  down 
to  the  Pedagera.  He  failed.  On  his  right  the  Joubert 
brigade  were  panic-stricken  and  ran  away,  while  the 
Rusca  and  Beyrand  brigades  were  also  thrown  back. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  news  received  by  Bonaparte 
was  on  the  whole  reassuring.  The  seven  battalions  at 
Voltri  had  been  recalled  towards  Acqui,  where  the 
Austrians  were  concentrating.  The  attack  on  Ceva  was 
to  be  resumed  by  Serurier,  Augereau,  Massena :  the 
latter  arriving  to  this  end  in  Monbarcaro  (from  which 
point  he  maintained  the  separation  between  the  Pied- 
montese and  the  Austrians),  attacked  the  left  of  the 
enemy.  The  army  was  also  guarded  by  Laharpe,  who 
occupied  Dego  and  sent  out  reconnaissances  on  Acqui. 

On  the  17th,  the  French  army  found  that  the  camp 
at  Ceva  had  been  evacuated. 

Such  is  the  outcome  in  practice  of  the  new  theory  of 
war,  based  on  the  principle  of  economy  of  forces  and 
characterised  in  the  highest  degree  by  initiative,  attack, 
and  well-conceived  action. 

1.  Action  in  one  direction  (namely  that  which  is 
implied  in  the  strategical  plan)  by  means  of  tactics; 
that  is,  by  using  military  means  as  skilfully  as  possible. 
For  instance,  once  the  direction  of  Voltri  had  been 
abandoned,  the  army  marched  first  on  Montenotte,  then 
on  Dego ;  once  Dego  had  been  given  up,  on  Millesimo ; 
Millesimo  having  been  settled,  the  army  came  back  on 
Dego,  etc. 

2.  In  each  of  the  successively  adopted  directions, 
victory  is  secured  by  using  all  the  forces,  or  at  least  the 
main  body  ;  in  the  other  directions,  safety  is  ensured  by 
as  few  troops  as  possible,  their  mission  being  not  to  beat 


ECONOMY   OF  FORCES  95 

the  enemy,  but  to  delay  him,  to  paralyse  him,  to  recon- 
noitre :  so  Cervoni  in  face  of  Beaiilieu,  Massena  at 
Dego,  Serm-ier  in  face  of  Colli. 

3.  In  strategy  as  in  tactics,  a  decision  is  constantly 
enforced  by  mechanics,  by  applying  to  part  of  the 
enemy  forces  a  main  body  made  as  strong  as  possible, 
by  devoting  to  that  task  with  the  greatest  possible  care 
ail  the  forces  which  have  been  freed  elsewhere.  Once 
this  part  of  the  enemy  forces  has  been  destroyed, 
another  has  to  be  dealt  with  promptly  by  again  apply- 
ing the  main  body,  in  order  to  be  successively  the 
stronger  on  a  given  point  at  a  given  time. 

Bonaparte  wrote  as  early  as  in  1794  :  "  The  same  is 
true  of  war  as  of  the  storming  of  a  fortified  town  :  fire 
must  be  concentrated  on  one  point.  As  soon  as  the 
breach  is  made,  the  balance  is  upset ;  nothing  else  is  of 
any  avail;  the  town  is  taken.  .  .  .  Attacks  must  not 
be  scattered,  but  on  the  contrary,  combined." 

In  order  to  do  things  in  that  way,  forces  must  be 
constantly  arranged  according  to  a  system  : 

(1)  attacking  in  order  to 
reconnoitre ; 

(2)  to  fix  the  enemy,  to  the 
benefit  of 

(3)  the  main  body; 

(4)  or  parrying  an  attack  in 
order  to  cover  the 
main  body; 

2.  In  the  rear,  the  main  body  manoeuvring  in  the 
direction  of  the  objective  aimed  at. 

The  main  body  and  the  advance  guards  must  be  in 
constant  communication  with  each  other,  so  as  to  allow, 
at  a  given  moment,  the  transference  of  the  whole  weight 
of  the  mass  in  the  direction  of  the  objective  attacked. 

A  conversation  between  Bonaparte  and  Moreau  will 
illustrate  this  new  conception  of  military  mechanics. 
The  meeting  took  place  in  1799,  at  Gohier's ;  and  Gohier 
relates  it  in  the  following  manner  : 

"  These  two  generals,  who  had  never  yet  seen  each 
other,  seemed  equally  pleased  to  meet.  It  was  observed 
that  during  this  interview,  both,  for  one  moment, 
looked  at  each  other  in  silence.  Bonaparte  was  the 
fbst  to  speak;  he  told  Moreau  how  anxious  he  had 
been  to  make  his  acquaintance.     '  You  are  just  come 


1.  On  the  periphery,  a 
number  of  advance  ' 
guards 


96  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

from  Egypt  as  a  conqueror,'  answered  Moreau,  '  and 
I  am  just  home  from  Italy  after  a  great  defeat.  .  .  .' 
After  giving  some  explanation  of  the  causes  of  that 
defeat,  he  concluded  :  '  It  was  impossible  to  prevent 
our  gallant  army  from  being  overwhelmed  by  so  many 
combined  forces.     Big  numbers  always  beat  small  ones.' 

"  '  You  are  right,'  said  Bonaparte,  '  big  numbers 
always  beat  small  ones.' 

"  '  Still,  General,'  said  I  to  Bonaparte,  '  you  have  often 
beaten  big  armies  with  small  ones.' 

"  '  Even  in  that  case,'  he  said,  '  the  small  numbers 
were  always  beaten  by  the  big  ones.' 

"  This  led  him  to  explain  his  tactics  : 

"  '  When,  with  inferior  forces,  I  was  met  by  a  large 
army,'  he  said,  '  having  quickly  grouped  my  own,  I  fell 
like  lightning  on  one  of  the  wings,  which  I  routed.  I 
then  availed  myself  of  the  disorder  this  manoeuvre  never 
failed  to  produce  within  the  enemy  army,  so  as  to  attack 
it  in  another  part,  and  again  with  all  my  forces.  I  thus 
beat  the  enemy  piecemeal ;  and  the  ensuing  victory  was 
invariably,  as  you  see,  a  triumph  of  the  larger  number 
over  the  smaller.'  " 

The  art  consisted  in  securing  the  numbers,  in  having  the 
numbers  on  the  selected  point  of  attack;  the  means  of 
doing  this  was  :    an  economy    of  forces. 

Such  mechanics  ultimately  led  to  the  utilisation  to 
the  utmost  of  the  disorder  this  manoeuvre  produces 
within  the  enemy  army,  as  well  as  of  the  moral 
super  ioriiy  created  by  the  same  manoeuvre  within 
one's  own  army. 

That  was  Napoleon's  War. 


CHAPTER   IV 

INTELLECTUAL  DISCIPLINE — FREEDOM   OF   ACTION 
AS    A  FUNCTION    OF   OBEDIENCE 

"  I  am  little  pleased.  .  .  .  You  have  received  an  order  to  proceed 
on  Cairo,  and  you  have  done  nothing  of  the  sort.  No  event  oiighi 
ever  to  'prevent  a  soldier  from  obeying  ;  skill  in  war  consists  in  solving 
any  difficulties  that  may  make  an  operation  difficult,  not  in  allowing 
the  operation  to  fail." — Napoleon. 

We  have  seen  what  sort  of  mechanical  device  this  rigor- 
ous theory  of  war  may  lead  to,  as  it  increases  in  severity  : 
the  principle  of  the  economy  of  force.  In  order  to  fight 
a  battle  with  all  one's  forces  combined,  those  forces 
must  first  be  divided  into  two  parts  and  used  in  two 
different  ways  : 

The  first  group,  the  main  body,  the  battle  divisions  of 
Bonaparte  (Massena,  Augereau,  cavalry),  absolutely 
reserved  for  the  battle,  must  find  that  its  task  has  been 
facilitated  before  the  moment  when  their  striking  power 
is  thrown  in  to  its  utmost. 

Each  must  always  communicate  with  the  other  so 
that  both  may  be  able  to  strike  together  on  the  same 
point  as  an  organised  system  of  forces. 

We  will  now  study  the  next  corollary  to  that  theorem 
of  Economy  of  Force,  namely  the  principle  of  Freedom 
of  Action. 

First  of  all,  where  does  it  come  from?  Why  is  it 
necessary  ? 

As  we  have  seen,  the  starting-point  of  modem  war  is 
the  working  of  masses,  tending  to  some  common  action 
in  which  the  largest  possible  number  of  forces  are  to 
take  part.  Such  common  action  was  submitted  by 
Clausewitz  to  a  twofold  condition  :  union  of  forces  in 
time  and  in  space. 

Those  words  :  common  action,  union  of  forces,  mean 
the  reverse  of  independent,  isolated,  or  successive,  action 
H  97 


98  THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

which  would  fatally  lead  to  dispersion.  It  is  obvious, 
therefore,  that  any  one  of  the  units  which  is  a  com- 
ponent part  of  the  whole  force  is  not  free  to  go  where  it 
wishes  (union  in  space),  nor  to  arrive  zvhen  it  likes  (union 
in  time);  to  allow  itself  to  be  directed  by  its  chief's 
private  views,  however  sound  they  maj^  appear  to  be ;  to 
act  on  its  own  account ;  to  seek  the  enemy  and  fight  him 
where  and  when  it  likes — even  should  the  undertaking 
be  a  successful  one. 

Discipline  is  the  strength  of  armies.  Armed  forces  are 
organised  and  commanded  above  all  in  order  that  they 
should  obey. 

We  have  seen,  beside  this,  that  when  the  moment  had 
come  to  practise  this  working  of  masses,  to  apply  the 
mechanical  scheme  supplied  by  Economy  of  Force, 
Bonaparte  in  1796 

organised  and  divided  his  \  1.  A  main  body, 
army  into  J    2.  Advance  guards. 

The  Tnain  body  was  organised  to  strike,  to  give  the 
adversary  the  decisive  blow. 

The  advance  guards  were  organised  to  facilitate  this 
function  of  the  main  body,  this  use  made  of  the  main 
forces ;  divisions  used  as  advance  guards  were  therefore 
designed  to  play  a  well-determined  subordinate  part  and 
to  practise  a  perfect  discipline. 

Are  the  battle  divisions,  the  troops  of  the  main  body, 
less  subordinate  ?  Evidently  not.  They  receive  their 
orders  directly  from  Bonaparte.  Each  of  them  has  to 
fulfil  a  programme  set  beforehand.  We  may  say,  there- 
fore, that  in  this  army  there  are  none  but  subordinate 
units  ;  that,  with  the  exception  of  Bonaparte,  who  alone 
commands,  all  other  chiefs  do  nothing  but  obey  or,  rather, 
begin  by  obeying  before  they  command. 

If  from  the  army  of  1796  we  go  on  to  the  army  of  1806 
(several  army  corps),  of  1870  (several  armies),  of  the 
future  (several  groups  of  armies),  we  see  nothing  but 
subordinate  chiefs,  subordinate  units. 

The  generalissimo  alone  indulges  in  art,  in  strategy  in 
the  fullest  sense  of  the  term,  while  the  others  confine 
themselves  to  tactics,  to  prose. 

He  alone  writes  music  and  leads  the  orchestra.  The 
others  only  play  their  part  in  that  orchestra. 

Be  it  therefore  a  matter  of  divisions  in  advance  guard 
or  of  battle  divisions,  of  armies,  army  corps,  divisions, 


INTELLECTUAL   DISCIPLINE  99 

brigades,  regiments  as  in  our  present  organisation,  there 
is  nothing  but  subordinate  units. 

Every  chief  of  those  various  units  must  therefore, 
while  concentrated  on  conunand,  be  careful  to  obey; 
before  dictating  his  own  orders,  he  must  draw  his  inspira- 
tion from  the  orders  he  has  received.  In  what  measure 
and  how  ?    That  is  what  we  are  now  about  to  examine. 

To  obey  is  difficult  in  war.  For  one  has  to  obey  in 
presence  of  the  enemy  and  in  spite  of  the  enemy ;  amidst 
danger;  amidst  various  and  unforeseen  circumstances; 
in  face  of  a  threatening  unknown ;  under  a  physical  strain, 
moreover,  due  to  many  causes. 

"  While  dispositions  taken  in  peace  -  time  may  be 
thought  out  at  leisure  and  are  likely  to  lead  without  fail 
to  the  intended  result,  the  same  is  not  true  of  forces  in 
war,  of  operations.  In  war,  once  hostilities  have  begun, 
our  will  soon  meets  the  independent  will  of  the  adver- 
sary. Our  dispositions  clash  with  the  freely  chosen 
dispositions  of  the  enemy  "  (Moltke). 

How,  then,  can  an  order  received  be  carried  out? 
How  can  a  programme,  a  theory,  develop  in  practice, 
imless  it  be  by  maintaining  one's  freedom  of  action  in 
spite  of  the  enemy  ?  "  The  art  of  war  is  the  art  of 
keeping  one's  own  freedom  of  action  "  (Xenophon). 

On  the  eve  of  Montenotte,  we  have  : 

Laharpe,  who  has  to  go  and  help  the  Rampon  half- 
brigade  ; 

Augereau,  who,  starting  from  Savona  at  midnight, 
must  come  and  place  himself  in  reserve  in  the  rear  of 
Laharpe ; 

Massena,  who,  starting  from  Finale  in  two  columns, 
must  reach  lower  Montenotte; 

Serurier,  who  will  have  to  make  a  demonstration  on 
Ceva; 

Cervoni,  who  will  have  to  hold  the  road  to  Voltri; 

Rampon,  who  will  have  to  make  a  stand  at  Monte- 
negino. 

There  are  indeed  as  many  different  parts  as  there  are 
different  bodies  of  troops;  as  many  distinct  missions, 
all  aiming  at  securing  a  common  result :  to  wit,  con- 
centration ;  but  all  acting  in  presence  of  the  enemy  and 
by  various  means  which  will  make  their  separate  appeals 
to  each  commander's  ability. 


100        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

The  result  is  therefore  difficult  to  see  and  to  reach. 
In  proportion  as  numbers  increase,  and  with  them  time 
and  distance,  the  road  for  the  subordinates  becomes 
longer  and  more  difficult.  On  its  side  the  supreme 
command,  in  the  narrow  sense  of  the  word,  loses  some- 
thing of  its  iJrecision.  It  may  still  determine  the  result 
to  be  obtained,  but  no  longer  the  ways  and  means  to 
reach  it.  How  can  these  numerous  scattered  troops  be 
sure  of  arriving  in  time,  unless  each  of  them  keeps  a 
clear  vision  of  the  single  goal  to  be  attained,  unless  each 
of  them  keeps  the  freedom  of  acting  towards  that  end  ? 
In  other  words,  we  must  have  : 

A  mental  discipline,  as  a  ffi'st  condition ;  showing  and 
prescribing  to  all  subordinates  the  result  aimed  at  by 
the  commanding  officer. 

Intelligent  and  active  discijjline,  or  rather  initiative,^ 
a  second  condition,  in  order  to  maintain  the  right  and 
power  of  acting  in  the  desired  direction. 

Here  comes  in  the  superior  notion  of  a  military  spirit 
which  makes  an  appeal,  first  of  course  to  the  will,  after 
that  to  the  intelligence.  Such  a  notion  clearly  involves 
an  act  of  deliberate  thought,  of  reflection ;  it  excludes 
mental  immobility,  want  of  thought,  intellectual  silence 
— all  of  which  are  well  enough  for  the  rank  and  file  who 
have  but  to  perform  (although  it  would  certainly  be 
better  for  them  to  understand  what  they  have  to  per- 
form), but  which  would  never  do  for  the  subordinate 
commander  :  the  latter  must  bring  to  fruit,  with  all 
the  means  at  his  disposal,  the  scheme  of  the  higher 
command ;  therefore  he  must,  above  all,  understand 
that  thought,  and  afterwards  make  of  his  means  the  use 
best  suited  to  circumstances — of  which,  however,  he  is  the 
only  judge. 

A  commander  must,  then,  not  only  be  a  man  of  will 
(that  we  take  as  a  matter  of  course),  but  also  a  man 
capable  of 

understanding  \ 

and  of       Vin  order  to  obey. 
combining     J 

To  passive  obedience,  such  as  used  to  be  in  favour 

'^  "  Initiative  ia  the  manifestation  of  personal  mil  helped  by  judg- 
ment and  acting  in  compUance  with  the  schemes  of  the  high  command." 
— Von  deb  Goltz. 


INTELLECTUAL  DISCIPLINE        101 

under  the  absolute  systems  of  the  past,  we  oppose 
active  obedience ;  it  is  an  imphcit  consequence  of  the 
appeal  constantly  made  to  initiative  as  well  as  of  the 
tactics  of  lesser  independent  masses. 

Such  a  method  of  obeying  will  manifest  itself  by 
security,  by  the  art  of  acting  under  protection. 

Moreover,  we  shall  see  this  notion  of  freedom  of 
action  (which  is  designed  to  safeguard  our  spirit  of 
active  discipline,  and  which  results  from  the  need  of 
supporting  the  action  of  the  main  body  by  the  combined 
acts  of  all  the  performers  however  separate  the  latter 
may  be)  generalise  itself  (just  as  Ave  saw  was  the  case 
with  the  economy  of  force)  so  as  to  become,  one  may 
say,  fundamental  to  all  acts  of  war.  This  justifies  the 
absolute  nature  of  the  following  principle  :  "  The  art  of 
war  is,  in  the  last  resort,  the  art  of  keeping  one's  freedom 
of  action  "   (Xenophon). 

Indeed,  be  it  a  question  of  means  of  war  or  of  opera- 
tions, we  have  just  seen  that  our  constant  preoccupation 
must  be  to  keep  that  freedom :  we  must  be  free  to 
proceed  to  Montenotte,  to  stay  there,  to  operate  on 
Ceva.  And  when  at  the  end  of  the  war  there  will  be 
a  victor  and  a  vanquished,  in  what  will  consist  the 
difference  between  those  two  situations  unless  in  the 
fact  that  the  first  will  be  free  to  do  to,  and  to  exact 
from,  the  other  what  he  wills;  while  the  latter  will  be 
compelled  to  do  and  grant  anything  the  victor  may 
prescribe  ? 

We  must  constantly  penetrate  our  minds  with  this 
necessity  of  safeguarding,  above  all,  our  own  freedom 
of  action,  if  we  want  to  find  ourselves,  at  the  end  of  an 
operation  (still  more  at  the  end  of  a  series  of  operations) 
free;  that  is,  victorious;  not  ruled;  that  is,  vanquished. 

A  constant  preoccupation,  while  we  prepare  and 
combine  an  action  against  the  enemy,  must  be  to  escape 
his  will,  to  parry  any  undertaking  by  which  he  might 
prevent  our  action  from  succeeding.  Any  military 
idea,  any  scheme,  any  plan,  must  therefore  be  con- 
nected with  the  conception  of  security.  We  must,  as 
if  we  were  fencing,  attack  without  uncovering  ourselves, 
parry  without  ceasing  to  threaten  the  adversary. 

Aq  historical  instance  will  illustrate  what  security  is 
in  the  wider  sense  of  the  word. 


102        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

On  the  4th  of  August,  1870,  the  Fifth  French  Corps 
found  itself  in  the  following  situation  : 

One  of  its  divisions  (the  3rd,  General  Guyot  de 
Lespart)  was  at  Bitche  with  one  cavalry  regiment; 

Two  others  (the  2nd,  General  de  I'Abadie,  and  the 
1st,  General  Goze)  at  Sarreguemines  and  its  neighbour- 
hood, having  with  them  three  cavalry  regiments  and 
six  batteries  of  the  artillery  reserve,  as  well  as  the 
supply  column  of  the  army  corps. 

In  the  evening  of  that  day,  General  de  Failly,  com- 
manding the  army  corps,  received  from  general  head- 
quarters at  Metz  the  following  dispatch :  "  Support 
with  your  two  divisions  your  other  division  at  Bitche." 
They  had,  in  fact,  heard  in  Metz  of  the  check  at 
Wissembourg,  and  did  not  doubt  that  the  invasion  of 
Alsace  by  considerable  forces  would  ensue  very  shortly. 
It  had  then  been  decided  to  reinforce  the  troops  of 
Marshal  de  MacMahon. 

On  the  evening  of  the  4th,  then.  General  de  Failly 
had  received  the  order  :  "  Concentrate  all  your  forces 
at  Bitche."  That  was  a  military  order,  an  order  which 
touched  his  conscience  and  discipline.  The  thing  must 
be  looked  at  from  that  high  standpoint  in  order  to 
establish  firmly  what  is  meant  by  discipline ;  something 
inseparable  from  conscience. 

To  be  disciplined  does  not  mean  that  one  does  not 
commit  any  breach  of  discipline;  that  one  does  not 
commit  some  disorderly  action ;  such  a  definition  works 
for  the  rank  and  file,  but  not  at  all  for  a  commander 
placed  in  any  degree  of  the  military  hierarchy,  least  of 
all,  therefore,  for  those  who  find  themselves  in  the 
highest  places. 

To  be  disciplined  does  not  mean,  either,  that  one 
anly  carries  out  an  order  received  to  such  a  point  as 
oppears  to  be  convenient,  fair,  rational  or  possible.  It 
means  that  one  frankly  adopts  the  thoughts  and  views 
of  the  superior  in  command,  and  that  one  uses  all  humanly 
practicable  means  in  order  to  give  him  satisfaction. 

Again,  to  be  disciplined  does  not  mean  being  silent, 
.abstaining,  or  doing  only  what  one  thinks  one  may 
undertake  without  risk ;  it  is  not  the  art  of  eluding 
responsibility ;  it  means  acting  in  compliance  with 
orders  received,  and  therefore  finding  in  one's  own 
mind,  by  effort  and  reflection,  the  possibility  to  carry 


INTELLECTUAL   DISCIPLINE        103 

out  such  orders.  It  also  means  finding  in  one's  own 
will  the  energy  to  face  the  risks  involved  in  execution. 
In  a  high  place,  discipline  implies  mental  activity  and 
a  display  of  will.  Laziness  of  mind  leads  to  indis- 
cipline, just  as  does  insubordination.  In  either  case 
it  is  an  error;  a  guilty  act.  Incapacity  and  ignorance 
cannot  be  called  extenuating  circumstances,  for  know- 
ledge is  within  the  reach  of  all  who  seek  it. 

Anyhow,  in  execution  of  the  orders  received,  Failly 
ordered  on  the  evening  of  the  4th  : 

His  first  division  to  advance  on  the  main  road  to 
Bitche  as  far  as  possible : 

The  2nd  was  only  to  move  the  day  after,  and  only 
partially.  It  included  two  brigades  (Maussion  and 
Lapasset). 

To  set  them  moving  on  the  evening  of  the  4th  would 
have  meant  leaving  Sarreguemines  without  troops. 
But  numerous  enemy  patrols,  which  of  course  did 
nothing  more  than  exchange  a  few  shots  with  our 
skirmishers,  had  for  several  days  been  seen  along  the 
frontier.  Therefore  it  was  not  deemed  possible  to 
abandon  Sarreguemines  on  the  4th.  For  the  same 
reason,  it  could  not  be  abandoned  on  the  5th.  The 
same  motives  were  again  to  be  put  forward  at  Rohr- 
bach,  at  Bitche ;  at  each  place  the  command  would 
act  in  the  same  way — occupy  all  threatened  points — 
and  the  Fifth  Corps  would  not  arrive  at  all.  Instead  of 
going  to  Bitche,  the  Commander  was  guarding  every- 
thing; instead  of  obeying,  he  was  guided  by  personal 
views.  This  is  mental  indiscijyline.  Results  were  not 
long  delayed. 

On  the  evening  of  the  4th,  the  1st  division  (Goze) 
had  covered  four  miles ;  it  bivouacked  at  Wissing  farm, 
one  mile  and  a  quarter  from  the  frontier. 

On  the  5th,  it  proceeded  from  Wissing  farm  to  Frem- 
denberg  farm,  two  miles  west  of  Bitche.  Having 
neither  advance  guards  nor  flank  guards,  it  spent  the 
whole  day  in  covering  the  fourteen  miles  extending 
between  those  two  points;  it  arrived  in  a  state  of 
exhaustion. 

That  same  day,  the  Maussion  brigade  (of  the  2nd 
division),  the  artillery  reserve,  and  one  cavalry  regiment 
(1st  Lancers)  had  left  Sarreguemines. 

The  Lapasset  brigade  (of  the  same  division)  stayed 


104        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

at  Sarreguemines,  waiting  to  be  relieved  by  the  Mon- 
taudon  division,  of  the  Third  Corps.  As  that  division 
would  not  arrive  before  the  evening  of  the  5th,  the 
Lapasset  brigade  would  not  move  that  day.  Besides, 
there  were  also  at  Sarreguemines  one  cavalry  regiment 
and  the  supply  column  of  the  army  corps. 

The  Maussion  brigade  arrived  in  Rohrbach  at  noon, 
on  the  5th,  with  the  artillery  reserve.  It  found  the 
country  in  a  state  of  excitement.  In  the  evening  before 
that  day  a  Prussian  cavalry  regiment  had  crossed  the 
frontier  and  had  come  near  Rohrbach,  after  searching 
the  neighbouring  villages.  The  5th  Lancers,  who 
marched  with  the  Maussion  brigade,  had  gone  to  meet 
the  enemy,  who  had  turr^ed  back. 

A  few  moments  after  the  brigade  had  arrived  jn 
Rohrbach  the  news  came  that  some  enemy  infantry 
and  cavalry  had  appeared ;  part  of  the  brigade  im- 
mediately took  up  arms,  and  skirmishers  had  already 
opened  fire  when  it  was  found  that  the  supposed  enemy 
troops  were  none  other  than  the  5th  Lancers  and  one 
detachment  of  the  68th  Infantry  (of  the  Guyot  de 
Lespart  division),  who  had  been  sent  out  in  the 
morning  to  reconnoitre. 

Under  those  conditions,  the  Maussion  brigade  (which 
was  still  under  orders  to  go  to  Bitche)  thought  they 
could  not  leave  Rohrbach.  They  stayed  there  and 
reported  to  General  de  Failly,  who  approved  of  the 
decision  taken. 

In  the  reports  from  commanding  officers  of  the 
Fifth  Corps  we  find  reappearing,  with  all  their  enchanting 
power,  such  empty  words  as  "The  gajy  (trouee)  of 
Rohrbach,"  a  remainder  of  antiquated  methods  revived 
by  a  thoughtless  kind  of  geography. 

A  gap,  a  valley  is  not  specially  dangerous;  there 
are  roads  outside  the  valleys,  on  the  highest  plateaus; 
indeed,  there  are  roads  wherever  commerce  or  any  kind 
of  necessary  connection  requires  them.  But  a  road  in 
a  valley  or  on  a  plateau  is  only  dangerous  to  us  in  so 
far  as  it  is  or  can  be  used  by  the  enemy.  If  the  enemy 
does  not  utilise  it,  it  does  not  exist  tactically;  that  is, 
everything  goes  on  as  if  it  did  not  exist  at  all. 

If,  then,  the  enemy  was  not  found  (on  the  road  in 
the  gap)  to  be  nearer  than  four  or  five  miles  away  (the 
very  length  of  the  column),  the  Maussion  brigade  could 


INTELLECTUAL   DISCIPLINE        105 

go  on  marching  without  being  held  up  at  Rohrbach. 
If  the  enemy  was  not  less  than  thirteen  miles  distant, 
the  brigade  had  nothing  to  fear  for  the  whole  day. 

That  information  was  not  sought;  but,  as  anxiety 
prevailed,  the  brigade  stopped  at  Rohrbach;  they 
spent  the  night  from  the  5th  to  the  6th  under  arms. 

Paralj^sed  by  wrong  topographical  views,  the  brigade 
halted.  It  thus  evaded  its  orders.  Ignoring  the  true 
meaning  of  security,  incapable  of  guarding  itself,  it 
did  not  take  any  rest  and  entered  upon  the  following 
day's  work  with  tired  troops. 

As  for  the  Fifth  Corps,  the  result  of  its  numerous 
errors  was  the  foUowmg  situation,  on  the  evening  of 
the  5th: 

Guyot  de  Lespart  division,  at  Bitche; 

Goze  division,  at  Fremdenberg; 

Maussion     division      and      artillery     reserve,      at 

Rohrbach ; 
Lapasset  brigade    and    supply    column,   at    Sarre- 

guemines. 

Instead  of  aiming  at  concentration,  wrong  theories 
were  suffered  to  rule  right  through.  Instead  of  a 
military  spirit  and  me?ital  discipline,  we  have  here 
personal  views,  ignorance  of  secm^ity.  As  a  result,  on 
the  evening  of  the  5th,  the  army  corps,  which  ought 
to  have  been,  and  could  have  been,  concentrated  at 
Bitche,  was  spread  out  on  all  the  twenty-two  miles 
between  that  place  and  Sarreguemines. 

The  picture  was  to  change  during  that  same  night. 

By  a  dispatch  sent  out  from  Metz,  on  the  morning  of 
August  5th,  the  Fifth  Corps  had  been  placed  under 
Marshal  de  MacMahon.  The  Major-General,  who  trans- 
mitted this  decision,  believed  the  three  divisions  of  the 
Fifth  Corps  had  met  at  Bitche  in  the  evening.  Marshal 
de  MacMahon,  for  his  part,  telegraphed  at  8  p.m.  to 
General  de  Failly  : 

"  Come  to  Reichshoffen  as  soon  as  possible  with  your 
whole  army  corps."  He  ended  by  saying  :  "  I  expect 
you  to  join  me  in  the  course  of  to-morrow." 

Here  was  again  a  very  clear  order  to  be  carried  out  ; 
to  come  as  soon  as  possible. 

General  de  Failly  answered  at  3  a.m.  on  the  6th ; 


106        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

That  he  could  only  send,  on  the  6th,  the  Lespart 
division ; 

That  on  the  following  day,  the  7th,  the  Goze  division 
would  come  to  Philippsbourg  (it  was  to  guard  Bitche 
on  the  6th) ; 

That  on  the  same  day,  7th,  the  Maussion  brigade 
would  come  to  Bitche ; 

That  the  Lapassct  brigade  and  the  supply  column  are 
at  Sarreguemines,  definitely  cut  off  from  the  rest. 

Thus  (largely  eluding,  as  you  see,  the  spirit  of  the 
order  received)  he  prescribed,  for  the  6th  : 

The  Guyot  de  Lespart  division  to  start  for  Reichshoffen ; 

The  Goze  division  to  halt  (at  Bitche)  and  not  to  be 
at  Philippsbourg  till  the  7th ; 

The  Maussion  brigade  to  come  to  Fremdenberg ; 

The  Lapasset  brigade  to  remain  at  Sarreguemines 
(although  it  had  been  joined  by  the  Montaudon  division), 
because  communications  were  cut.  The  enemy  cavalry 
had  cut  the  railroad  at  Bliesbrucken. 

He  had  not  dared  to  remove  troops  from  Sarregue- 
mines on  the  5th;  on  the  6th  the  Goze  division  was 
kept  at  Bitche,  in  spite  of  the  series  of  orders  received. 
We  find  again  the  same  causes  acting  as  on  the  5th ;  the 
effects  were  equally  disastrous. 

The  same  day,  5th  of  August,  Lieutenant-Colonel  de 
Kleinenberg  arrives  from  Metz  to  Bitche,  at  General  de 
Failly's  headquarters ;  he  announces  the  presence  before 
General  Frossard's  corps  of  a  Prussian  army  corps. 
That  piece  of  news,  added  to  the  rest,  again  draws 
General  de  Faillj^'s  attention  in  that  direction. 

In  any  case  the  Lespart  division  alone  receives  the 
order  to  start  early  on  the  6th,  by  the  road  to  Nieder- 
bronn;  but  the  division,  owing  to  rumours  brought  by 
frightened  peasants,  puts  off  its  departure;  it  does  not 
start  till  7.30  a.m. 

No  intelligence  service  has  been  regularly  organised. 
Military  decisions  are  dictated  by  rumours,  founded  or 
unfounded,  generally  magnified  by  fear;  how  could 
such  decisions  correspond  to  the  reality  of  things? 

General  de  Bernis,  with  the  12th  Chasseurs,  precedes 
the  division.  He  has  neither  an  advance  guard  nor  a 
flank  guard.  Numerous  roads  and  paths  debouch  on 
the    left    of   the    road    followed;  General    de    Lespart, 


INTELLECTUAL   DISCIPLINE        107 

therefore,  fears  lest  he  should  be  attacked  in  flank. 
He  advances  only  step  by  step.  The  column  stops  at 
every  cross  road.  The  country  is  being  searched  in 
front  and  on  the  side  by  cavalry,  often  even  by  infantry 
detachments.  The  whole  division  rolls  itself  up  during 
that  time;  the  column  only  resumes  its  advance  after 
the  reconnaissances  have  come  back  and  stated  that 
one  may  go  ahead  without  danger. 

A  great  number  of  halts  result  from  this,  to  the 
particular  bewilderment  of  the  rank  and  file.  Officers 
and  men,  excited  by  the  noise  of  gunfire  which  has  been 
heard  since  the  morning,  grow  impatient  of  these  delays 
and  find  that  the  measures  taken  are — to  say  the  least 
of  it — ill-timed.  When  they  come  nearer  to  Nieder- 
bronn,  returning  wounded  are  met,  then  fugitives ;  these 
latter  become  more  and  more  numerous :  they  naturally 
say  that  things  are  going  badly ;  they  soon  announce 
that  the  battle  has  been  lost. 

When  they  arrive  on  the  heights  overlooking  Nieder- 
bronn,  a  retreating  flood  is  seen  crossing  the  town;  it 
is  five  o'clock. 

At  that  moment  only  are  communications  established 
between  the  two  parts  of  the  army  of  Alsace. 

Marshal  de  MacMahon  orders  an  infantry  division 
which  arrives  on  the  heels  of  its  cavalry  regiment  : 

To  deploy  one  brigade  to  the  right  of  the  road  (to 
Fontanges) ; 

And  one  to  the  left  (Abbatucci); 

Divisional  artillery  takes  up  a  position. 

Seeing  that  deployment,  the  Prussians  stop;  they 
have  not  gone  beyond  Niederbronn ;  such  is  the  powerful 
impression  made  by  the  arrival  of  fresh  troops. 

The  Guyot  de  Lespart  division  had  been  from  7'30  a.m. 
until  5  p.m. — more  than  nine  hours — on  the  march  to 
cover  the  fourteen  miles  distance  from  Bitche  to 
Niederbronn. 

The  troops  it  was  bringing  up  were  physically  and 
morally  exhausted.  Above  all,  these  troops  were  useless. 
It  was  too  late  ! 

The  whole  of  the  Fifth  Corps  had  failed  to  keep  its 
appointment. 

It  was  its  fault  that  the  battle  was  lost. — This  was  the 
first  consequence. 


108        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Could  that  corps,  at  any  rate,  retrieve  the  harm 
done? 

Could  it  reap  the  benefit  of  all  the  science  and  all  the 
caution  exhibited  along  the  road  from  Sarreguemines 
to  Niederbronn  ? 

The  general  commanding  the  Fifth  Corps,  having  been 
informed  in  the  evening  of  the  6th,  at  Bitche,  of  the 
rout  of  the  army  of  Alsace,  was  reduced,  at  7  p.m.,  to 
summoning  a  council  of  war  in  order  to  examine  : 

(1)  Whether  it  was  possible  for  the  Fifth  Corps,  reduced 
to  three  brigades  (Goze  division,  Maussion  brigade, 
artillery  reserve)  to  risk  a  battle  under  the  walls  of 
Bitche. 

(2)  Whether  that  corps  ought  to  follow  the  retreating 
First  Corps. 

Quite  naturally  the  conclusion  was  in  favour  of 
retreat.  Thus  was  settled  the  question  how  to  occupy 
all  the  important  points  :  Sarreguemines,  Bitche,  Rohr- 
bach;  and  also  the  question  of  the  dangerous  roads 
which,  because  of  imaginary  dangers,  such  and  such  a 
division  had  not  been  allowed  to  take. 

Battle,  the  tactical  fact,  having  been  missed,  there 
was  notliing  but  ^a?2^er  everywhere. 

The  men  who  had  not  been  made  to  march  for  twenty 
miles  in  order  to  be  led  to  victory,  were  now  able  and 
compelled  to  walk  in  a  state  of  demoralisation  for 
nearly  sixty  miles  (Abbatucci  brigade,  from  Nieder- 
bronn to  Saverne)  within  thirty-six  hours. 

Without  having  fired  a  single  shot,  the  Fifth  Army 
Corps,  composed  of  gallant  troops,  of  undeniable  value, 
had  withdrawn  from  the  struggle  in  a  state  of  annihila- 
tion, of  depression ;  the  men  had  been  deprived  of  their 
moral  strength,  they  no  longer  trusted  their  own  chiefs ; 
they  stood  ready  to  be  routed.  In  the  army's  judgment, 
and  for  a  long  time  to  come,  that  corps  was  to  be  held 
responsible  for  the  defeat  at  Froesch wilier ;  rightly 
enough  if  the  command  and  the  rank  and  file  are  made 
jointly  responsible ;  wrongly,  however,  if  one  perceives 
the  truth,  which  is,  that  battles  are  lost  or  won  by 
generals,  not  by  the  rank  and  file. 

A  number  of  wrong  theories,  the  want  of  military 
spirit  and  of  discipline  (of  the  will  and  of  the  intelli- 
gence), complete  ignorance  of  security,  the  organisation 
of  which  is  the  outcome  of  these  military  virtues,  equal 


INTELLECTUAL  DISCIPLINE        109 

ignorance  of  what  freedom  of  action  (which  security  alone 
makes  possible)  may  mean  :  these  were  the  causes  of 
the  disaster. 

Wrong  theories  indeed  !  On  the  enemy  side,  Clause- 
witz  had  killed  the  fancy  for  old-fashioned  sparring, 
and  had  commended  battle  as  the  only  valid  argument; 
all  his  disciples  went  spontaneously  along  that  road. 
On  our  side,  we  had  missed  battle  in  order  to  keep  a 
number  of  strategical  points.  The  general  commanding 
the  Fifth  French  Corps  was  not  an  exceptional  case 
in  our  army;  he  simply  belonged  to  his  time,  to  his 
surroundings. 

Ignorance  of  security  !  Nothing,  indeed,  prevented 
that  general  from  carrying  out  the  very  simple  orders 
he  had  received  :  "  Proceed  to  Froeschwiller  with  all 
your  forces." 

He  was  not  prevented  by  distance :  there  are  but 
thirty-three  miles  from  Sarreguemines  to  Reichshoffen, 
and  he  had  three  days  before  him :  4th,  5th,  6th  of  August. 

He  was  not  prevented  by  the  enemy  :  the  Fifth  Corps 
did  not  meet  a  single  enemy  on  its  way;  everything 
had  gone  on,  however,  as  if  the  enemy  had  been  every- 
where. They  ought  to  have  marched  on  in  spite  of 
him ;  they  did  not  march  on  even  in  his  absence  ! 
They  allowed  themselves  to  be  guided  by  inaccurate 
informations  which  remained  unverified ;  no  scouting 
was  done ;  no  security  service  was  organised.  The 
Fifth  Corps  disobeyed  on  account  of  its  ignorance. 

One  division  was  sent  out,  the  Guyot  de  Lespart 
division.  How  did  it  act  ?  We  have  seen  how.  For  lack 
of  intelligence,  it  started  at  7-80  a.m.  instead  of  starting 
at  the  very  earliest  hour  (which  might  have  been,  on  the 
6th  of  August,  something  like  4  a.m.) ;  it  spent  nine 
hours  and  a  half  in  covering  fourteen  miles.  It  ought 
to  have  done  it  within  five  hours  and  a  half.  If  it 
had  started  at  4  a.m.,  it  would  have  been  in  Niederbronn 
by  9;  having  started  at  7-30,  it  might  anyhow  have 
been  there  by  1  p.m.  What  slowness  and  what  fatigue, 
on  the  contrary,  to  arrive  so  late — after  the  battle  ! 
But  still  if  the  division  did  manage  to  arrive  at  all,  it 
was  only  because  the  enemy  had  not  shown  himself  in  the 
slightest  way.  Suppose  any  kind  of  enemy  should  be 
met  on  the  road,  suppose  a  battalion  should  attack 
at  a  cross  road — ^then  the  division  would  have  to  risk 


110        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

a  battle  on  the  very  road  it  was  following.  In  that  case 
the  march,  already  so  weak  and  so  painful,  would  have 
ceased  altogether.  Well,  without  any  enemy  to  check 
it,  the  division  arrived  too  late  ! 

With  an  enemy  present^  the  division  would  not  have 
arrived  at  all. 

How  far  we  are  from  that  play  of  military  forces, 
that  scheme  of  1796,  which  we  have  just  been  studying  ! 

That  small  army  of  Italy,  concentrated  from  Savona 
to  Finale,  had  three  advance  guards  at  Voltri,  Monte - 
negino,  Ormea,  that  is,  the  possibility  of  acting  in  three 
directions.  Here,  there  was  no  question  of  acting  in 
any  direction  but  one :  and  they  were  imable  to  do 
even  that ! 

After  seeing  what  was  done  in  1870  and  what 
results  Avere  obtained,  let  us  profit  by  this  painful 
teaching ;  let  us  take  the  question  up  again  on  our  own 
account;  let  us  place  ourselves,  on  August  4th,  at 
Sarreguemines,  where  we  receive  the  definite  order  : 
"  Concentrate  first  at  Bitche  .  .  .  proceed  afterwards 
to  Reichshoffen."  (See  Sketch  No.  3  at  the  end  of 
this  volume.) 

What  the  principle  of  freedom  of  action,  which  should 
express  itself  by  organised  security,  must  enable  us  to 
do,  is  to  act  in  spite  of  the  difficulties  on  the  way,  in 
spite  of  the  unknown,  in  spite  of  the  enemy — that 
enemy  who  is  supposed  to  be  everywhere,  who  may  be 
somewhere — it  must  allow  us  to  arrive  so  as  to  comply 
with  the  intentions  of  our  commanders  and  to  safeguard 
discipline,  which  is  the  main  strength  of  armies.  Dis- 
cipline, if  we  know  how  to  fulfil  its  obligations,  will 
give  us  victory  on  August  6th,  keep  up  the  moral 
within  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  save  an  army  corps  for  the 
French  army.  Such  is  the  art  of  serving  though  in 
command. 

How  shall  we  approach  the  question  ?  With  a  view 
to  indulging  in  art  or  science  ?  Not  in  the  least ;  simply 
with  a  will  to  obey,  to  do  what  we  are  expected  to  do; 
also  with  the  fixed  idea  of  finding  in  our  own  minds 
the  means  of  doing  it,  provided  such  means  do  exist. 

What  is  the  problem  ?  We  have  to  go  to  Bitche  with 
the  whole  Fifth  Corps,  afterwards  to  Reichshoffen,  that 
is  all.     Nothing  must  deter  us  from  sticking  to  that 


INTELLECTUAL   DISCIPLINE        111 

purpose.  Therefore  we  have  not  to  thhik  in  the  least 
of  facing  the  Prussian  troops  which  threaten  General 
Frossard ;  of  guarding  Sarregueniines,  Rohrbach,  Bitche ; 
those  points  are  only  important  to  us  in  so  far  as  they  are 
helping  or  hampering  the  march  of  the  Fifth  Corps.  If 
they  can  be  crossed  without  difficulty,  they  do  not  count. 

In  order  to  go  to  Bitche,  we  must  find  one  or  more 
roads,  such  roads  to  be  as  safe  as  possible;  and  as 
these  roads  will  never  be  entirely  safe  by  themselves, 
we  must,  by  means  of  special  dispositions,  give  them 
the  security  they  lack,  that  is,  guarantee  to  the  troops 
the  certainty  of  reaching  Bitche  in  spite  of  everything. 

Let  us  consider  the  material  part  of  the  operation; 
from  Sarreguemines  to  Bitche  there  are  : 

(1)  The  direct  road  via  Rohrbach:  eighteen  miles; 
but  that  road  runs  very  close  to  the  frontier;  to  place 
there  the  main  body  of  the  army  corps  would  make 
protection  impossible. 

(2)  There  is  another  road,  going  via  Zetting,  Diding, 
Kalhausen,  Rahling,  Montbronn,  Lemberg ;  it  is  twenty- 
four  miles  long. 

(3)  There  is  a  third  road  via  Sarralbe,  Saar-Union, 
Lorentzen,  Lemberg  :  thirty  miles. 

The  first  one  is  dangerous,  the  third  one,  long ;  it  is 
the  second  we  must  take  with  the  main  body  of  the 
army  corps,  and,  as  it  will  be  difficult  to  cover  the 
distance  within  one  day,  we  shall  have  to  start  on  the 
evening  of  the  4th.  In  order  not  to  encumber  the 
column,  the  convoys  and  parks  which  are  not  com- 
batant elements  will  have  to  be  thrown  back  on  road 
No.  3. 

Starting  in  the  evening  of  the  4th  on  the  road  via 
Zetting,  Diding,  etc.,  the  army  corps  will  arrive,  and 
bivouac  at  the  end  of  the  first  day's  march,  at  Wittring 
and  Achen.  It  will  reach  Bitche  the  next  day  without 
difficulty. 

But  the  enemy  must  be  prevented  from  impeding 
that  movement.  This  result  will  only  be  reached  if, 
during  the  two  days  of  the  4th  and  the  5th,  either  he 
does  not  appear  (a  thing  which  depends  upon  himself), 
or  if,  having  appeared,  he  is  kept  at  a  distance;  a 
thing  which  depends  on  ourselves. 


112         THE    PRINCIPLES    OF    WAR 

The  first  point  to  solve  is,  then,  to  know  if  the  enemy 
is  appearing,  if  he  sliows  himseK  in  the  region  we  are 
going  to  cross,  or  on  the  flank  of  the  road  we  intend  to 
follow.  This  makes  intelligence  necessary — an  intelli- 
gence service  by  cavalr)\  And  where  should  informa- 
tion be  looked  for  ?  In  all  the  directions  by  which  the 
enemy  may  arrive  in  order  to  reach  our  own  road,  in 
other  words,  on  all  dangerous  roads. 

Such  an  intelligence,  if  sent  in  from  a  sufficiently 
distant  point — twelve  miles,  for  instance — supplies  suffi- 
cient security  if  it  is  of  a  negative  nature.  Is  it  possible, 
however,  to  get  that  intelligence  at  such  a  distance? 
Not  here,  for  a  margin  of  security  of  twelve  miles  would 
compel  our  cavahy  to  operate  towards  Bliescastel  and 
Deux-Ponts,  that  is,  in  the  midst  of  an  enemy  country. 

Intelligence  may,  besides,  be  of  a  positive  nature; 
instead  of  verifying  the  enemy's  absence,  it  may  disclose 
his  presence  within  a  radius  of  less  than  twelve  miles, 
and  it  will  be  then  too  late  to  take  counter-measures, 
unless,  by  thinking  it  out  beforehand,  the  case  has 
been  considered  and  solved. 

It  follows  from  all  this  that,  while  organising  one's 
intelligence  service  by  cavalry,  one  has  to  foresee  at 
the  same  time  the  case  when  the  enemy  is  reconnoitred 
within  less  than  a  day's  march  from  the  column.  In 
order  to  ensure  the  freedom  of  marching  then,  it  is 
necessary  to  locate  between  the  road  followed  by  the 
column  and  the  enemy  some  resisting  force  capable  of 
holding  that  enemy  during  the  time  the  column  is 
marching  past.  The  army  corps  billeted  at  Achen, 
Kalhausen,  Weidesheim,  Wittring  will  be  covered,  on 
the  4th,  by  a  flank  guard  composed  of  one  brigade, 
three  batteries,  one  cavalry  regiment,  and  established 
at  Woelfling,  Wis  wilier,  at  the  junction-point  of  the 
dangerous  roads. 

The  army  corps  will  also  send  out  a  detachment  of 
the  regiment  in  Achen  to  occupy  Singling. 

The  brigade  at  Woelfling  will  guard  itself  by  a  system 
of  outposts  which  will  include  : 

At  Hesmscapel  Farm :  one  company ;  \  Main    guards   oc- 
At  the  northern  corner  of  the  wood  :  I  cupying     "  points 
one  company ;  j  d'appui"  on  all  the 

At  Gross-Rederching :  two  companies  j  dangerous  roads. 


INTELLECTUAL   DISCIPLINE        113 

111  the  rear,  a  reserve  (equivalent  to  one  battalion), 
ready  to  proceed  to  any  point  of  the  attacked  line,  and 
established  therefore  at  the  jimiction  of  the  dangerous 
roads. 

Ahead  of  that  system  of  security  by  resistance,  the 
intelligence  system  should  be  arranged  as  follows  : 

One  cavalry  platoon  at  Bliesbriicken ; 
One        ,,  ,,        atRimling; 

One        ,,  ,,        at  Obergailbach ; 

One  squadron  at  Rohrbach. 

(The  remainder  of  the  regiment  to  be  left  with  the 
main  body.) 

The  following  day,  the  column,  starting  early,  has  to 
cover  a  distance  of  fifteen  miles  in  order  to  reach  Bitche, 
the  head  of  the  column  starting  from  Kalhausen.  It 
can  do  that  without  strain. 

If  the  column  starts  at  5  a.m.  (  on  August  5th), 
the  head  will  be  at  Bitche  six  hours  later,  that  is,  at 
11.15;  the  rear  (length  of  the  column:  ten  miles)  will 
arrive  four  hours  later,  that  is  at  3.15  p.m. ;  and,  after 
intercalating  a  long  halt,  the  whole  column  may  be 
assembled  at  Bitch  by  4.15. 

But  in  order  to  do  this,  one  must  not  be  impeded  by 
the  enemy.  To  this  end,  the  flank  guard  must  go 
and  occupy  in  succession  the  dangerous  roads  while 
the  column  is  on  the  march. 

The  flank  guard  must  therefore  be  at  Rohrbach 
when  the  column  shall  pass  by  Rahling,  at  Petit- 
Rederching  when  the  column  shall  pass  by  Enchenberg. 

How  long  will  the  flank  guard  remain  at  Rohrbach  (for 
the  column  is  not  a  mere  point,  it  is  ten  miles  long)  ? 

As  there  are  five  miles  from  Rohrbach  to  Rahling, 
the  flank  guard  may  leave  Rohrbach  when  the  length 
of  the  column  still  to  pass  through  Rahling  is  not 
superior  to  five  miles.  It  is  obvious  that  any  enemy 
who  should  reach  Raliling  after  that  moment  would 
strike  in  the  void.  As  for  the  column,  its  head  leaves 
Kalhausen  at  5  a.m.,  arrives  at  Rahling  at  6-30,  its 
rear  at  10-30;  its  head  will  be  at  Enchenberg  at  9-30, 
its  rear  at  1-30  p.m. 

Therefore  the  flank  guard  must  be  in  position  at 
Rohrbach  at  6-30;  it  must  start  from  Woelfling  at 
4'30.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  half  the  column  will  have 
I 


114        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

passed  Rahling  two  hours  later,  that  is  at  8*30;  only 
the  latter  half  has  still  to  pass  by,  the  distance  from 
Rohrbach  being  five  miles,  that  is,  a  two  hours'  march ; 
Rohrbach  may  then  be  left  at  8-30  without  peril.  I 
may  add  that  the  flank  guard  may  leave  that  place 
at  least  one  hour  earlier,  owing  to  its  intelligence  service 
performed  by  cavalry. 

For  if  its  cavalry  sends  at  7-30  from  Bettwiller  the 
information  "  that  there  are  no  enemy  forces  at  Bett- 
willer," we  are  certain  that  there  will  be  no  enemy  at 
Rohrbach  at  8 "30,  as  there  is  between  those  two  points 
a  distance  of  two  and  a  half  miles ;  Rohrbach  may  be 
left  at  7-30. 

The  flank  guard  will,  then,  proceed  to  Petit-Rederching 
and  Holbach,  holding  the  dangerous  roads  that  lead  to 
Enchenberg,  and  it  will  remain  there  until  the  length 
of  the  column  to  pass  through  Enchenberg  shall  be 
equal  to  the  distance  between  that  place  and  the  point 
occupied  by  cavalry.  In  order  that  the  flank  guard 
may  manoeuvre,  it  must  be  able  to  reach  at  a  convenient 
time  the  points  of  interposition,  that  is,  the  junctions 
of  dangerous  roads,  and  therefore  it  must  be  nearer  to 
those  ijoints  than  the  enemy  himself  is. 

It  will  reach  Rohrbach  provided,  when  leaving 
Woefling,  that  it  has  received  an  information  to  the 
effect  that  the  enemy  is  not  at  Rimling  (for  the  distance 
between  Rohrbach  and  Rimling  is  equal  to  the  distance 
between  Woefling  and  Rohrbach). 

Again,  when  leaving  Rohrbach,  it  will  reach  the  next 
road  junction,  provided  it  has  received  an  information 
to  the  effect  that  the  enemy  is  not  at  Bettwiller;  then 
the  next  junction,  provided  the  enemy  is  not  abreast 
of  Hottwiller. 

As  has  been  seen,  the  functioning  of  the  flank  guard 
will  be  guaranteed  by  an  Intelligence  Service,  scouting 
ahead  and  acting  at  a  distance  equal  to  that  of  the  roads 
to  be  reached.  To-day,  then,  the  main  body  of  the 
cavalry  of  the  flank  guard  will  pass  through  Rimling, 
Bettwiller,  Hottwiller,  etc. ;  an  advance  guard  of  one 
battalion  with  a  cavalry  platoon  will  precede  the  column. 

Such  are  the  dispositions  under  the  protection  of 
which  the  main  body  of  our  forces  is  certain  to  be  able 
to  march  without  a  check. 

An  enemy  coming  on  anywhere  would  find  an  inter- 


INTELLECTUAL   DISCIPLINE        115 

vening  force,  a  brigade  capable  of  making  a  vigorous 
stand ;  capable  in  any  case  of  holding  out  and  of  thus 
absorbing  the  enemy's  activity ;  and  this  at  a  consider- 
able distance  from  the  marching  column,  the  freedom  of 
which  is  thus  guaranteed. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  was  no  enemy  in  the  region 
on  August  5th,  1870;  the  Fifth  French  Corps  did  not 
find  a  single  one ;  they  might  have  arrived  at  Bitche  : 

The  head  of  the  column  at  11.30  a.m. ; 
The  rear  at  4.30  p.m. 

The  order  of  the  Field -Marshal  might,  at  the  time  of 
its  reception,  have  found  the  head  of  the  column  (one 
regiment)  still  able  to  march  on — it  had  covered  only 
fifteen  miles — it  might  have  been  pushed  on  to  Engels- 
berg  (four  miles  from  Bitche) ;  but,  besides,  the  Lespart 
division,  which  had  not  marched  at  all  on  that  day, 
might  have  been  pushed  beyond  that  point.  That 
division  might  have  gone  to  Philippsbourg  (nine  miles), 
sending  out  a  flank  guard  of  one  regiment,  one  battery,  one 
squadron  towards  Sturzelbronn,  at  the  Main-du-Prince. 

The  march  would  have  been  resumed  the  day  after, 
6th  of  August,  without  difficulty;  one  road  only  was 
dangerous  in  the  morning,  that  of  Sturzelbronn;  it 
was  held  by  a  force  able  to  hold  on  a  very  long  time, 
having  at  its  disposal  a  distance  of  five  miles  along  which 
to  retreat  through  a  defile  between  mountains  and  forests. 

If  the  march  had  been  resumed  at  6  a.m.  at  Philipps- 
bourg and  at  5a.m.  at  Bitche,  the  head  would  have  reached 
Reichshoffen  (six  miles)  at  8-30,  the  rear  at  1-30  p.m. 

It  would  then  have  been  possible  for  the  Fifth  Army 
Corps  to  arrive  at  Reichshoffen  in  time ;  that  result 
would  have  been  obtained  even  had  the  enemy  inter- 
vened on  the  flank  of  the  road  taken.  The  one  necessary 
condition  was  that  an  appeal  should  be  made  : 

To  mental  activity,  so  that  the  plans  of  the  high 
command  should  be  understood  and  endorsed; 

To  mental  activity,  so  that  physical  means  should  be 
found  in  order  to  carry  out  those  plans ; 

To  mental  activity,  so  that  those  plans  should  be 
carried  out  in  spite  of  the  attempts  made  by  the  enemy 
with  a  view  to  keeping  his  own  freedom  of  action ; 

The  condition,  in  one  word,  was  that  the  course  of 
action  should  fully  comply  with  discipline. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE    SERVICE    OF    SECURITY 

Dragomirow  writes  thus  :  "  The  prmciples  of  the 
art  of  war  are  within  the  reach  of  the  most  common- 
place intelhgence ;  but  this  does  not  mean  to  say  that 
such  an  intelhgence  would  be  able  to  practice  them." 
A  teaching  which  should  confine  itself  to  no  more  than 
explaining  those  principles,  without  troubling  itself 
about  practice,  would  therefore  be  useless. 

With  that  very  object  of  practice  in  view,  we  will 
now  study  in  detail  the  functioning  of  the  flank  guard 
of  the  Fifth  Corps. 

We  have  seen  how  its  forces  had  to  be  divided  into 
a  main  body  and  a  security  of  service,  in  order  to  enable 
the  army  corps  to  reach  Bitche  in  spite  of  the  enemy ; 
also  how  it  was  thus  thought  possible  to  obey,  that  is,  to 
carry  out  a  given  order,  by  counteracting  and  neutral- 
ising the  freely  taken  dispositions  of  the  adversary. 

We  have  equally  seen  by  means  of  what  calculations 
of  time  and  of  co-ordinated  information  the  main  part 
of  the  flank  guard  might  have  managed  to  interpose 
itself,  at  a  suitable  moment,  on  the  junctions  of  the 
dangerous  roads. 

Let  us  discover  in  our  present  study  how,  with  the 
enemy  coming  on,  this  service  of  security  should  func- 
tion, what  tactics,  what  attitude,  it  ought  to  adopt  in 
order  to  fulfil  its  task. 

Let  us  examine  whether  these  measures,  taken  with 
a  view  to  ensuring  security,  which  we  have  deemed 
necessary,  are  in  fact  sufficient. 

To  this  end  I  have  supposed  that  an  enemy  force, 
at  least  one  division  strong,  had  taken  up  its  place,  on 
August  4th,  1870,  near  Alt-Altheim  (three  and  a  half 
miles  from  the  frontier,  seven  from  Bettwiller),  and  had 
set  out  the  next  day  with  the  intention  of  keeping  the 
French  Fifth  Corps  back  in  the  hills,  of  preventing  its 

116 


THE   SERVICE   OF   SECURITY      117 

junction  with  the  forces  in  Alsace.  By  concentrating 
his  means  of  action  near  the  Sauer,  the  adversary 
would  also  be  attempting  to  keep  his  opponent's  forces 
in  a  state  of  dispersion. 

We  have  established  that,  under  those  conditions,  the 
Fifth  French  Army  Corps  of  1870,  had  it  been  attacked 
by  the  enemy,  would  not  have  succeeded  in  reaching 
Bitche,  or  even  in  bringing  to  that  place  a  single  one  of 
its  component  elements. 

Let  us  study  how  that  army  corps,  had  it  been  pro- 
vided with  the  protection  we  have  devised,  might  have 
still  managed  to  arrive  in  time. 

In  order  to  evacuate  Enchenberg,  the  army  corps 
has  to  march  for  : 

-^ — —  =  —  kilometres  ==  9  hours.^ 

4  4 

22 

From  Alt-Altheim  to  Enchenberg,  there  is  —  =  5  hours 

4 

marching ;  were  there  not  on  the  French  side  a  service 
of  security,  an  action  would  therefore  have  taken  place 
certainly  at  Enchenberg. 

The  enemy  division,  the  head  of  which  has  left  Alt- 
Altheim  at  5,  arrives  at  Bettwiller  (12  kilometres)  at  8, 
if  nothing  has  held  it  up.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
flank  guard  has  arrived  at  Rohrbach  at  6.30.  Already 
at  that  moment,  its  cavalry  regiment  is  at  Rimling, 
with  posts  at  Erching,  Guiderkirch  (and  frontier), 
Epping.  The  post  of  Guiderkirch,  soon  driven  back  by 
enemy  squadrons,  is  reinforced  by  the  cavalry  regiment, 
which  impedes  the  march  of  the  enemy  column  towards 
Guiderkirch  and  the  mill  of  Rimling;  it  informs  the 
officer  commanding  the  flank  guard  and  covers  the 
direction  of  Bettwiller. 

The  presence  of  that  cavalry  regiment  compels  the 

enemy,  who  has  no  superior  cavalry,  to  use  his  infantry 

advance  guard  in  order  to  clear  the  road.     He  has  to 

start  manoeuvring.     In  order  to  reach  Bettwiller,  that 

enemy  advance  guard  would  have,  supposing  no  enemy 

12"^ 
impeding  it,  to  march  for  — ^    =  3  hours  (8  a.m.).     But 

as  opposing  cavalry  has  appeared,   some   eight  hours 

'^  This  calculation  assumes  that  a  mass  of  infantry  can  cover  (on 
the  average)  4  kilometres  (2J  miles)  per  hour  at  least. 


118        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

will  be  needed  to  reach  that  point.  What  has  the 
flank  guard  done  in  the  meantime  ? 

Having  started  from  Woelfling  at  4.30,  the  head  of 
the  flank  guard  has  reached  Rohrbach  at  6.30. 

On  arriving,  it  has  covered  the  occupation  of  that 
place  with  a  body  of  troops  (2nd  battalion)  sent  out  to 
hill  376;  it  has  also  secured  the  power  to  act  further, 
to  go  on  marching  eastward,  by  sending  on  an  advance 
guard  (1st  battalion)  to  the  station  of  Rohrbach.  Such 
measures  of  security  would  enable  it  to  stay  a  long  time 
at  Rohrbach  without  danger. 

But,  as  we  have  seen,  Rohrbach  may  be  evacuated  at 
7.30  if  by  that  time  the  enemy  has  not  reached  Bett- 
willer,  a  thing  we  shall  ascertain  from  our  cavalry. 
Moreover,  it  takes  the  brigade  one  hour  to  march  past ; 
if  the  head  arrives  at  6.30,  the  rear  will  pass  through 
the  same  place  at  7.30;  Rohrbach  would  then  be  held 
in  any  case  until  7.30,  even  without  the  column  halting. 
Let  us  suppose,  however,  that,  with  a  view  to  security, 
the  column  should  halt  there  for  half  an  hour. 

It  will  arrive  and  assemble  north  of  the  place  : 

The  head,  having  arrived  at  6.30,  will  start  again 
at  7; 

The  rear,  having  arrived  at  7.30,  will  start  again  at  8. 

This  being  intended,  a  report  from  the  colonel  com- 
manding the  cavalry  regiment  announces,  between  6.45 
and  7,  that  the  enemy  (cavalry  first,  then  infantry)  is 
seen  marching  on  the  road  from  Peppenkumm  to  Guider- 
kirch ;  that  if  he  himself  is  compelled  to  withdraw  with 
his  squadrons,  he  will  retire  towards  Bettwiller.  This 
piece  of  news  confirms  the  necessity  of  barring 
without  delay  the  road  to  Bettwiller,  Petit-Rederching, 
Enchenberg. 

Moreover,  in  proportion  as  time  passes,  the  occupation 
of  Rohrbach  becomes  less  necessary ;  the  evacuation  of 
that  place  may  be  prepared. 

In  view  of  these  two  facts,  the  brigade  is  transferred, 
as  early  as  7,  from  Rohrbach,  800  yards  south-west  of 
the  railway  station,  to  the  main  road  (at  the  junction 
with  the  road  leading  up  to  hill  376);  such  troops  as 
have  just  assembled  march  on  in  close  formation,  such 
as  are  in  column  of  route  keep  to  that  formation;  the 
artillery  on  the  road. 

Protection  is  ensured  by  the  2nd  battalion  kept  on 


THE   SERVICE   OF   SECURITY       119 

hill  376,  and  by  the  1st  battalion  pushed  on  to  Petit- 
Rederching  (occupied  at  7.15);  that  is,  by  two  advance 
guards,  securing  until  further  orders,  the  power  of 
acting  in  either  direction. 

At  7.45,  the  whole  brigade  has  reached  the  point 
aimed  at;  the  2nd  battalion,  on  hill  376,  is  ordered  to 
join  up. 

But,  in  the  meantime,  the  officer  commanding  the 
1st  battalion,  having  arrived  in  advance  guard  at 
Petit-Rederching  at  7.45,  has  thought  out  his  mission. 
What  is  the  problem  he  has  to  solve,  as  an  advance 
guard  of  the  brigade  ?  It  consists  in  preparing  for  the 
brigade  to  go  into  action  against  an  enemy  who  may 
debouch  from  Bettwiller.  What  does  the  brigade  require 
for  such  an  action  ? 

The  Sp ace  necessary  for  the  full  employment  of  its 
forces ; 

The  Time  necessary  for  their  arrival  and  deployment. 

In  order  to  achieve  that  double  task,  he  orders  his 
troops  to  occwpy  the  whole  space  necessary,  and  places 
them  in  points  where  they  may  hold  on  for  the  necessary 
time.  Of  such  points  he  has  here  :  Petit-Rederching, 
liill  349  and  hill  353. 

One  company  is  placed  on  each  of  those  hills.  The 
two  others  establish  themselves  at  Petit-Rederching, 
which  is  at  once  provided  with  defensive  works.  At 
7.30  the  brigade  continues  its  movement,  protected  on 
the  road  to  Petit-Rederching  and  Bettwiller  in  the 
manner  described;  protected  also  on  the  road  from 
Rohrbach  to  Bettwiller  by  the  battalion  on  hill  376, 
which  is  about  to  become  a  rear  guard  and  to  withdraw 
along  the  ridge,  as  soon  as  the  last  element  of  the  main 
body  shall  have  left  the  second  place  of  assembly. 

Here  we  have  again  a  main  body  keeping  for  itself 
the  power  to  act  to  the  right  or  to  the  left  and  manoeu- 
vring under  a  covering  body. 

At  the  same  time  the  cavalry  has  been  ordered  to 
continue  delaying  the  enemy's  march,  reconnoitring  the 
strength  of  its  column,  watching  the  eastern  roads  via 
Hottwiller,  etc. 

The  brigade  arrives  and  assembles  south  of  the  junc- 
tion of  the  roads  leading  to  Petit-Rederching. 

Intelligence  arrives  there  at  the  same  time. 

A  reconnaissance  carried  out  by  officers  has  observed, 


120        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

by    7.30,    an    infantry    and    artillery    column    entering 
Guiderkirch  and  marching  towards  Bettwiller. 

Infantry  have  occupied  Bettwiller  after  8  o'clock; 
a  calculation  of  time  sufliccs  to  settle  the  question  and 
to  make  it  clear  that  after  this  moment  (8  a.m.)  the 
road  to  Bohrbach  is  no  longer  of  any  interest ;  that,  on 
the  contrary,  it  is  imperative  to  bar  at  once  the  road  to 
Petit-Rederching,  and  later  on  the  roads  more  to  the 
east. 

How  may  that  road  he  barred?  How  may  that  enemy 
he  held  hack  ?  Carnot  answers  this  question  in  the 
following  way  : 

"  The  enemy  will-  not  fail  to  detach  a  corps  on  your 
flank  in  order  to  try  and  hold  you  back.  You  must 
station,  with  the  object  of  facing  that  corps,  one  division 
which,  either  by  its  own  power,  or  by  occupying  some 
unassailable  position,  will  either  scatter  him  or  hold  him 
back:' 

We  have,  then,  to  resort  to  power,  failing  which  we 
must  resort  to  position.  The  second  method  will  do 
all  we  need,  for  we  are  not  expected  to  defeat,  but  only 
to  hold,  the  enemy  during  the  whole  time  the  main 
column  occupies  in  marching  past. 

Let  us  calculate  that  time :  The  head  of  the  army 
corps  will  arrive  in  Enchenberg  at  9  a.m. ;  four  hours 
are  necessary  for  it  to  march  past ;  the  rear  will  therefore 
leave  that  place  at  1  p.m. 

From  Enchenberg  to  Petit-Rederching  the  distance  is 
three  miles  and  a  half,  that  is  one  hour  and  a  half's 
march. 

In  order  that  the  enemy  should  be  there  at  1  p.m., 
he  must  have  left  Petit-Rederching  at  11.30.  In  con- 
sequence, he  will  not  be  there  in  time,  if  he  is  kept  until 
11.30  at  Petit-Rederching,  or,  later  on,  points  nearer 
to  Enchenberg.  The  officer  commanding  the  flank 
guard  must,  then,  find  the  means  of  holding  out  at  Petit- 
Rederching  until  11.30,  or  at  Heiligenbronn  until 
12.30.     It  is  now  8  o'clock. 

How  shall  he  manage  so  to  hold  out  ?  If  the  enemy 
is  not  in  force,  the  question  is  not  a  difficult  one  to 
solve.  If  the  enemy  is  superior  in  numbers,  some 
impregnable  position  must  be  resorted  to  (Carnot). 

But  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  impregnable  position, 
for  any  position  the  defence  of  which  is  merely  passive 


THE   SERVICE   OF   SECURITY       121 

is  bound  to  be  carried  at  last  b}^  a  manoeuvring  enemy. 
Similarly,  a  fencer  who  does  but  parry  is  bound  to 
be  touched  sooner  or  later. 

It  is  the  same  with  a  warrior  who  puts  his  entire 
trust  in  his  armour ;  a  chink  will  always  be  found  out 
m  the  long  run. 

However,  failing  an  unassailable  position  (which  does 
not  exist),  there  are,  especially  with  modern  armament, 
numerous  strong  positions  discoverable. 

Owing  to  their  volume  of  fire,  modern  arms  make 
manoeuvring  under  fire  impossible ;  owing  to  their  range, 
they  make  it  necessary  to  take  up  fighting  dispositions 
at  a  great  distance^  to  deploy  very  far  away ;  owing  to 
the  rapidity  of  their  fire,  such  necessities  may  be  enforced 
by  even  relatively  small  numbers. 

Any  occupied  position  unavoidably  delays  the  adver- 
sary, provided  the  position  be  a  good  one.  What  is  a 
good  position  in  the  modern  sense  of  that  word  ?  A 
ground  favourable  to  the  defensive,  which  in  its  turn  is 
composed  of  fire  and  steadiness  ;  it  is  a  site  provided 
to  this  end  with  : 

Points  from  which  one  may  observe  and  fire  at  a 
long  distance; 

Obstacles,  that  is,  "  points  d'appui  "  :  strong  points. 

If  that  twofold  condition  is  fulfilled,  the  enemy  is 
compelled  to  manoeuvre  from  a  distance  until  the  last 
moment  (assault  of  the  obstacles),  to  bring  into  action 
all  his  means,  artillery,  infantry,  that  is,  to  advance 
painfully,  to  lose  his  time  while  he  wishes  to  march  on. 
The  points  to  be  occupied  here  are  hills  349,  353,  Petit- 
Rederching. 

But  such  a  position  will  fall  in  the  end,  after  a  certain 
time  which  may  not  be  sufficient  for  the  army  corps 
to  march  past.  The  necessary  additional  time  will  be 
secured  then  by  occupying  a  second  position.  While 
organising  a  first  position,  we  shall  therefore  seek  a 
second  one  which  we  shall  prepare. 

This  leads  us  to  the  organising  of  action  in  depth,  to 
preparing  a  series  of  successive  struggles  in  every  one 
of  which  decision  will  be  avoided,  and  therefore  only 
part  of  our  forces  will  be  brought  into  action.  And 
here  we  have  the  employment  of  forces  governed  by 
the  special  conditions  in  which  we  find  ourselves. 

Wliat    shall    we    put    in    the    first    position  ?     There 


122        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

should  be  no  ijremature  deployment :  such  a  deployment 
might  be  effected  in  the  wrong  direction,  as  the  enemy 
would  not  have  indicated  yet  on  what  point  he  intended 
attacking;  we  should  waste  the  greater  part  of  our 
forces  if  we  deployed  at  once. 

What  must  be  achieved  is  the  occupation  of  the 
position  by  troops  which  make  it  possible  to  bring 
there  part  or  the  whole  of  the  main  body,  as  may  be 
deemed  convenient,  when  the  right  moment  shall  have 
arrived;  when  the  attack  shall  have  disclosed  what 
point  is  threatened. 

By  what  kind  of  troops  ought  the  occupation  to 
be  effected  ?  By  troops  firing  at  long  range,  for  our 
intention  is  to  compel  the  enemy  to  undertake  a 
manoeuvre  as  distant  as  possible.  We  shall  therefore 
place  in  first  line  a  certain  measure  of  infantry,  but  all 
the  artillery.  In  the  development  of  our  scheme  we 
shall  ultimately  reinforce  the  advance  guard  in  the 
following  manner  : 

1  battalion       f  Northern  limit  of  Petit- 
at  Petit-       J      Reder-ching :  1   com- 

Rederching     |      pany ; 

having  at     [Hill  349 :  1  company; 
battalion    at   the  north-western   corner 
of  the  wood,  having  on    plateau  353  : 

2  companies ; 
battalion    in   reserve    south    of    Petit- 

Rederching. 

Such  a  position  will  not  be  equally  attacked  every- 
where. The  adversary  will,  without  doubt,  try  to 
carry  it  on  the  extremities,  or  at  least  by  one  of  the 
extremities.  A  reserve  is  needed  to  parry  that  attack  : 
the  reserve  of  the  1st  regiment  will  stand  ready  to  sup- 
port the  wing  attacked.  If  it  is  the  right  wing,  then  the 
1st  regiment  will  occupy  the  north-eastern  outskirt  of 
the  wood.  If  it  is  the  left  wing,  it  will  occupy  the 
Tuilerie  and  the  railway  station. 

Artillery  is  ready  to  establish  itself  on  hill  358;  it 
•must  only  show  itself  when  actually  opening  fire  and 
should  endeavour  to  fire  at  as  long  a  range  as  possible 
on  to  the  road  to  Bettwiller,  so  as  to  prevent  its  being 
used  by  the  enem5\ 


1st  regiment 
having  : 


THE   SERVICE   OF   SECURITY       123 


The  remainder  of  the  brigade  is  assembled  south  of 
hill  356. 

The  cavalry  scouts  to  the  east,  where  there  are  still 
some  dangerous  roads  left,  and  remains,  to  this  end,  in 
the  ravine  of  Nonante. 

The  front  of  the  position  is  about  one  mile  wide,  a 
front  which,  for  one  regiment  reinforced  by  artillery, 
is  quite  convenient  under  present  defensive  conditions. 

Once  this  first  position  is  lost,  we  must  have  a  second 
one  that  can  bar  the  road  from  Petit-Rederching  to 
Enchenberg. 

The  railway  station,  hill  356,  the  northern  outskirt 
of  the  wood,  Halbach,  will  constitute  a  second  position, 
with  a  reserve  placed  west  of  Siersthal. 

A  front  of  one  mile  and  a  half  would  obviously  be 
somewhat  long,  if  we  intended  to  resist  effectively  with 
only  one  brigade,  but  the  position  includes  1500  yards 
of  woods  which  can  be  easily  held  with  small  forces. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  necessary  to  hold  Halbach, 
through  which  the  enemy  might  take  the  direct  road  to 
Bitche  or  the  road  to  Enchenberg  via  Siersthal. 

In  the  third  place,  a  frontal  attack  on  the  northern 
outskirt  of  the  wood  would  lead  to  nothing ;  the  enemy 
will  attempt  to  extend  himself  to  the  right  or  to  the  left 
of  the  wood ;  it  is  therefore  possible  to  oppose  to  that 
attack  the  greatest  part  of  the  forces  (the  reserve),  pro- 
vided the  position  has  been  at  first  only  lightly  occupied. 

That  occupation  might  be  accomplished  at  a  con- 
venient time  in  the  following  way  : 

f  Halbach 
2nd  regiment         .  .  ■]   The  Wood 

[  Hill    356; 
1st  Regiment  (leaving  by  the 
railway  station  a   detach-  ' 
ment  of  2  companies)  forms  Hill  356, 
up  again  in  general  reserve!  Halbach, 
west  of   Siersthal,   at   the  1  Siersthal 
junction  of  the  roads  lead- 
ing from  that  place  to 

Artillery  south  of  hill  356; 

Cavalry  still  scouting  to  the  east  on  the  road  to  Hott- 
willer;  but  as  cavalry  forces  would  find  it  difficult  to 
fight  there,  on  account  of  the  woods,  the  main  body  of 


Three  di- 
rections in 
which  it 
may  have 
to    act : 


124        THE    PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

the  regiment  may  be  transferred  to  the  left,  where  there 
is  open  ground. 

As  you  see,  we  have  in  line  :  the  railway  station,  hill 
356,  the  wood,  but  the  whole  of  our  forces  are  not  em- 
ployed on  the  line  any  more  than  they  were  previously 
on  hill  349,  Petit-Rederching,  and  hill  353 ;  for  what  we 
are  aiming  at  is  not — to  repeat  it  once  more — a  decision. 
Such  a  decision  is  unnecessary,  and  it  might  be  beyond 
our  power  to  enforce  it. 

We  are  merely  attempting  to  delay  the  adversary  by 
compelling  him  to  manoeuvre. 

In  what  measure  will  the  forces  attached  to  each  line 
be  used  up  ?  That  depends  on  circumstances.  It  is 
obvious  that  if,  in  presence  of  a  light  occupation  the 
enemy  stops,  assembles,  slows  down,  manoeuvres  for 
a  long  time,  then  the  whole  1st  regiment  need  not  go 
into  action  on  the  first  line ;  its  3rd  battalion  may  then 
be  strong  enough  to  hold  the  railway  station,  hill  356, 
and  the  wood,  when  the  moment  shall  come.  If,  on 
the  contrary,  the  enemy  deploys  important  forces  at 
once  and  conducts  the  attack  quickly,  then  the  whole 
of  the  1st  regiment  will  be  used  up  in  trying  to  delay 
him,  to  make  the  fight  last  for  a  long  time ;  the  2nd 
regiment  will  then  have  to  take  over  the  occupation  of 
the  second  position. 

//  we  make  a  calculation  of  time,  certain  results 
appear  to  be  indisputable. 

Thus  the  enemy  column,  the  head  of  its  advance 
guard  having  arrived  at  Bettwiller  at  8.30,  is  already 
fired  on  by  the  guns  on  hill  353;  it  cannot  advance 
further  save  under  cover. 

Starting  to  manoeuvre,  the  enemy  advance  guard 
captures 

Hill  353  (kleinmiihle)  1     i  •  v,  • . 

Hielling,  ^ I  which  It  occupies; 

as  well  as  Bettwiller,  where  its  reserve  establishes  itself. 
From  there  it  undertakes  a  reconnaissance  which 
discloses  an  extensive  front,  with  artillery;  from  there 
it  will  also  cover  the  arriving  and  assembling  column. 
■  As  a  division  in  column  takes  about  two  hours  to 
march  past,  its  last  element  will  not  have  arrived  before 
10.30.  Until  that  moment,  it  remains  assembled  east 
of  Bettwiller. 


THE   SERVICE   OF   SECURITY       125 

One  may  presume,  therefore,  that  the  line  Petit- 
Rederching' — Hill  353,  even  if  weakly  defended,  will 
not  be  carried  before  11.30. 

The  railway  station  will  be  carried  at  about  12.30. 

If  the  enemy,  while  continuing  to  manoeuvre  with 
his  right,  advances  on  the  road  Petit-Rederching— 
Enchenberg  (which  will  be  made  clear  by  his  attacking 
the  railway  station  and  hill  356)  the  regiment  in  reserve 
(1st  of  the  brigade)  will  deploy  and  occupy  :  Heiligen- 
bronner-Wald,  Heiligenbronn  Farm,  and  the  southern 
corner  of  the  wood.  The  artillery  is  on  hill  372,  a 
position  behind  which  the  2nd  regiment  assembles  (for 
instance,  south  of  hill  372). 

The  distance,  however,  between  Bettwiller  and  that 
position  is  three  and  a  half  miles ;  once  the  enemy  has 
deployed,  he  must  spend  more  than  two  hours  in 
covering  it.  The  attack  before  Heiligenbronn  can 
only  take  place  after  1  p.m. ;  by  that  time  the  army 
corps  has  gone  beyond  Enchenberg;  the  flank  guard 
may  give  way  and  withdraw  on  Siersthal. 

If  the  enemy,  after  carrying  Petit-Rederching  and 
hill  353,  undertakes  to  attack  Halbach,  instead  of 
continuing  his  movement  by  the  road  to  Petit-Reder- 
ching, he  will  fall  into  an  angle  of  woods  in  which  he 
cannot  utilise  his  numerical  superiority;  his  march  is 
necessarily  delayed  by  the  broken  nature  of  the  region. 
The  1st  regiment  reinforces  that  point,  sends  there 
about  one  battalion,  and  itself  proceeds  to  the  east  of 
hill  377,  passing  through  Siersthal,  where  it  leaves  a 
garrison.     Artillery  comes  up  to  the  east  of  hill  377. 

In  that  place,  the  action  may  last  for  a  very  long  time. 

As  night  falls  the  brigade  may  withdraw  towards 
the  brick-field,  hill  416  and  Fremdenberg  Farm. 

Such  a  detailed  instance  clearly  shows  how  the  flank 
guards  of  large  units  should  operate  :  their  tactics 
consist  in  constantly  manoeuvring  in  order  to  proceed 
from  one  road  to  the  other,  in  order  to  fight  while 
retreating,  etc. ;  such  mobile  troops  aim  at  occupying 
fixed  points  and  utilise  such  points  once  occupied. 
This  is  what  must  be  understood  by  the  term  :  fixed 
fiank  guards. 

The  woody  region  we  found  here  favoured  the  direct 
defence  of  the  roads  by  which  the  enemy  was  coming. 
Under  less  advantageous  conditions,  on  open  ground. 


126        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

he  might,  by  making  a  demonstration  on  one  road, 
seize  the  other  one  and  forestall  us  there,  without 
dividing  his  forces. 

He  must  be  held  up  all  the  same ;  the  defensive  being 
in  this  case  no  longer  possible,  the  only  way  out  would 
be  to  attack. 

The  case  would  be  similar  if  the  enem}^,  marching 
by  night,  had  reached  either  Rohrbach,  for  instance,  or 
Petit-Rederching,  before  the  flank  guard  arrived  there. 
How  should  he  be  held  in  that  case  ?     By  attack. 

This  shows  that  a  mission  of  protection  does  not  neces- 
sarily imply  a  defensive  attitude ;  it  will  be  often  better 
performed  by  an  offensive.  A  mission  to  be  performed 
and  the  tactics  it  may  use  are  two  perfectly  different 
things.  The  tactics  to  be  resorted  to  must  be  deduced 
from  the  examination  of  the  goal  and  of  surrounding 
circumstances. 

An  historical  instance  will  demonstrate  this  clearly, 
namely,  that  of  the  Kettler  brigade  before  Garibaldi's 
army.     (See  Sketch  No.  4.) 

In  the  evening  of  January  20th,  1871,  the  Southern 
German  Army  had  reached  : 

Second  Corps — Advance  guard        .       Dole ; 
Main  body     .  .       Gray ; 

Supply  columns      .       Thil-Chatel. 

The  Seventh  Corps,  more  to  the  north,  had  crossed  the 
Saone. 

A  flank  guard  (half  of  the  4th  division)  was  at 
Essertenne. 

The  same  day  (January  20th)  the  Kettler  brigade  of 
the  Second  Army  Corps  arrived  at  Turcey  and  Saint- 
Seine.  It  had  previously  been  kept  in  the  rear  in  order  to 
cover  the  railway,  Chaumont — Chatillon — Montbard, 
which  fed  the  Second  Army,  and  also  in  order  to  cover  the 
march  of  the  supply  columns  of  the  Second  Corps.  While 
at  Saint-Seine — FAbbaye,  the  Officer  Commanding  re- 
ceived the  order  to  seize  Dijon  or  rather  to  immobilize 
the  French  forces  at  Dijon. 

What  was  this  problem  of  Dijon  which  a  brigade  of 
4000  rifles  and  two  batteries  had  to  solve  ?  At  Dijon, 
the  army  of  the  Vosgcs  under  Garibaldi  had  been  joined 


THE   SERVICE   OF   SECURITY       127 

by  the  Pelissier  Division.  The  whole  number  came  to 
from  30,000  to  50,000  men. 

Tliese  numbers  were  considered  very  doubtful  at 
German  general  headquarters,  owing  to  the  complete 
inactivity  of  those  troops,  which  had  not  only  failed  to 
impede  the  march  of  the  Southern  Army  across  the 
Langres  plateau,  but  had  allowed  the  heads  of  the 
German  columns  to  seize  the  bridges  on  the  Saone 
without  having  to  fight  for  them  seriously.  In  spite 
of  this,  information  had  reached  German  general  head- 
quarters, on  January  18th  and  19th,  that  some  siege 
artillery  and  important  reinforcements  had  arrived  in 
Dijon,  thus  providing  Garibaldi  with  new  means  of 
action  which  ^enabled  him  to  impede  the  deployment  of 
the  Southern  Army  as  it  debouched  from  the  Cote  d'Or, 
as  well  as  to  hamper  all  the  offensive  manoeuvres  which 
that  army  intended  to  undertake  in  the  Saone  Valley. 

While  maintaining  his  plan  of  acting  with  all  his 
forces  against  the  main  enemy  army,  that  of  General 
Bourbaki,  General  von  Manteuffel  was  therefore  under 
the  obligation  of  guardmg  himself  against  a  concen- 
tration of  the  importance  of  that  at  Dijon,  and  to 
provide  against  a  possible  attack. 

He  did  so  on  the  20th  by  keeping  half  the  4th  division 
in  flank  guard  at  Essertenne ;  in  order  to  recover  later 
the  free  use  of  that  force,  he  entrusted  that  task  after 
the  21st  to  the  Kettler  brigade,  which  had  been  sent  to 
that  end  to  Saint-Seine  and  Turcey. 

That  brigade  lacked  the  following  units  :  two  com- 
panies left  at  Montbard,  to  guard  the  railway;  one 
battalion  and  one  squadron  which,  after  escorting  the 
supply  columns  of  the  Second  Corps  in  the  Cote  d'Or, 
founcl  themselves  at  Is-sur-Tille  on  January  20th. 

The  troops  available  in  that  brigade  at  that  date  are 
then  : 

At  Is-sur-Tille,  the  Conta    f  1  squadron 

detachment  [  1  battalion  (of  the  61st) 


At  Saint-Seme  I'Abbaye, 
the  Kettler  detachment 


f  1 

4 


squadron 


1^  battalion    (21st) 

1  battalion  (61st) 

2  batteries 


At  Turcey,  the  Kroseck      f  f  ^^Xlion  (^Ist) 
aetacnment  y  ^  battalion  (61st) 


128        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

What  happened  at  Dijon  ? 

Garibaldi  had  allowed  the  Southern  Army  to  cross  the 
Langres  plateau  without  trying  to  impede  it. 

On  the  19th,  while  that  army  crossed  the  Saone,  he 
set  the  army  of  the  Vosges  in  movement,  leaving  General 
Pelissier  the  charge  of  holding  Dijon.  He  brought  his 
troops,  in  three  columns,  to  four  miles  north  of  Dijon, 
and  halted  on  a  hill  near  Messigny,  wherefrom  he  saw 
the  flank  guard  of  the  German  Second  Corps  (half  the  4th 
division)  marching  past.  If  he  had  only  pushed  on  as 
far  as  Thil-Chatel,  he  would  have  met  the  rear  of  the 
column  of  the  Second  Army  Corps. 

Even  on  the  20th,  he  might  still  have  managed  to 
prevent  the  supply  column  of  that  army  corps  from 
passing.  Instead  of  acting,  he  confined  himself  to 
stationing  his  forces  around  Dijon  again. 

In  acting  thus,  he  left  open  not  only  all  the  roads  of 
the  Cote  d'Or,  but  also  the  crossing  of  the  Saone. 

As  for  Dijon,  the  town  had  been  fortified,  but  the 
Germans  had  only  vague  information  of  it. 

Talant  and  Fontaine-les-Dijon  had  been  strongly 
organised  and  armed  with  heavy  guns.  Several  12  cm. 
guns  command  the  road  to  Saint-Seine  and  the  road  to 
Langres.  The  villages  of  La  Filotte,  St.  Martin,  and  La 
Boudronnee  had  been  defensively  organised  in  the  same 
way  and  connected  with  each  other.  The  village  of 
St.  Apollinaire,  on  the  road  to  Gray,  had  been  joined  up 
with  the  Avorks  on  the  southern  face  undertaken  by  the 
Germans  and  resumed  by  the  French.  In  order  to 
defend  these  positions,  the  Government  of  National 
Defence  had  organised  the  Pelissier  Division;  they 
intended  using  the  army  of  the  Vosges  in  field  operations. 
Unfortunately  that  arm}^  was  still  at  Dijon  and  little 
inclined  to  leave  it.  In  any  case,  it  was  against  the 
possibility  of  an  attack  from  such  a  quarter  that  General 
von  Manteuffel  guarded  himself  when  ordering  General 
von  Kettler  to  march  on  Dijon. 

How  will  the  latter  fulfil  his  mission,  namely,  to 
immobilise  the  army  of  the  Vosges  at  Dijon,  or  at  any 
rate  to  prevent  it  from  interfering  with  the  events  which 
are  about  to  take  place  first  on  the  Saone  and  later  on 
the  Ognon? 

He  must  as  soon  as  possible  lay  hands  on  the  enemy, 
and  therefore   attack  him.     There   is  no  time   left  for 


THE   SERVICE   OF   SECURITY       129 

effecting  a  junction  between  the  divided  parts  of  his 
command.  From  Is-sur-Tille  to  Turcey  the  distance 
is  nearly  twenty-four  miles ;  it  is  still  a  twelve -mile 
march  if  the  space  is  divided  between  the  two  bodies, 
each  marching  to  meet  the  other ;  this  means  one  whole 
day  lost.  The  only  thing  to  do  is  to  march  on  the 
enemy,  and  to  march  as  quickly  as  possible.  He  is  not 
seeking  some  glorious  decision.  Such  a  decision  will  be 
secured  on  the  Ognon.  He  merely  wants  to  immobilise 
the  adversary. 

We  see  then,  on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  three  columns 
the  total  of  which  does  not  include  more  than  : 

5 J  battalions; 
2  squadrons ; 
2  batteries ; 

marching  on  Dijon,  namely  : 

Centre:  from  Saint-Seine  on  Diion,    oi  ?:  4.1.  v    ' 
XT  , ,  1  ,  ■'     N  2A  battalions 

Kettler  column  |  2  batteries 

Right :  from  Turcey  on  Dijon,/  |  squadron 
Major  Kjoseck  \  2  battalions. 

Left :  from  Is-sur-Tille  on  Dijon,/  1  squadron 
Major  Conta  \  1  battalion. 

The  central  column  encounters  some  French  partisans 
on  leaving  Saint-Seine,  and  further  at  the  Val-Suzon; 
it  arrives  at  1.30  at  Changey  Farm,  where  it  is  received 
by  artillery  fire  from  Talant  and  Fontaine. 

The  1st  battalion  occupies  the  heights  right  and  left 
of  the  road ;  the  two  batteries,  thus  protected,  establish 
themselves  on  hill  390.  Daix  is  attacked,  and  easily 
taken  and  occupied. 

Here  we  have  an  advance  gua,rd  going  into  action, 
its  task  being  to  prepare  for  the  main  body  doing  the 
same,  and  having  therefore  : 

(1)  To  reconnoitre  the  enemy; 

(2)  To  protect  the  preparatory  moves  made  by  the 
main  body  (arriving,  assembling,  deploying); 

(3)  To  lay  hands  on  the  adversary. 

The  reconnaissance,  here,  has  been  already  effected. 
The  enemy  has  shown  his  masses  on  the  slopes  of  Talant 
and  Fontaine.  The  two  latter  operations  remain  to  be 
done.  In  order  to  protect,  on  a  large  front  and  with 
small  numbers,  "  points  d'appui  "  must  be  found,  that 

K 


130        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

is,  points  where  one  may  last,  where  want  of  numbers 
may  be  compensated  for  by  the  value  of  the  obstacle 
or  by  efficiency  of  fire.  Such  are,  here,  Daix,  and  the 
two  spurs  on  either  side  of  the  road.  Once  the  command- 
ing and  supporting  points  have  been  occupied  by  the 
infantry  advance  guard,  the  occupation  will  be  reinforced 
by  the  advance  guard's  artillery.  The  battery  which 
follows  the  advance  guard  takes  up  its  position. 

The  third  operation — namely  to  lay  hands  on  the  ad- 
versary— consisted  in  immobilising  the  enemy  by  threat- 
ening to  attack;  the  available  infantry  was  scarce, 
the  ground  in  front  was  well  under  fire  from  enemy  guns ; 
therefore  infantry  was  little  used,  while  artillery  was 
resorted  to  because  it  is  capable  of  holding  out  as 
long  as  it  is  supplied  with  ammunition.  Moreover,  the 
Prussian  field-piece  was  superior  to  the  French  gun  : 
that  superiority  was  utilised;  the  battery  of  the  main 
body  came  up  and  reinforced  the  artillery  of  the  ad- 
vance guard.  The  main  body  of  the  infantry  did  not 
come  under  fire.  The  French,  in  the  meantime,  seeing 
the  cautious  attitude  of  their  opponents,  started  attack- 
ing (at  4  o'clock)  on  Daix.  They  failed.  They  tried  to 
manoeuvre  and  to  attack  Daix  in  flank.  The  strength 
of  that  point  rendered  all  their  efforts  useless. 

The  Kroseck  column  (right)  only  arrived  at  that 
moment,  though  it  had  met  with  no  difficulty  on  the 
way.  It  carried  Plombieres.  Connection  was  estab- 
lished with  it.  General  von  Kettler  then  decided  to 
attack.  What  was  he  going  to  attack?  One  point  : 
Talant.  Why  that  point  rather  than  another  ?  Because 
it  is  on  this  that  he  can  act  with  most  forces ;  because 
the  slopes  of  that  valley  provide,  more  especially  for 
Major  Kroseck's  troops,  relatively  covered  approaches. 
The  attack  is  prepared  by  the  fire  of  the  two  available 
batteries.  The  Kroseck  column  (two  battalions)  and 
one  battalion  of  the  central  column  are  hurled  on  Talant. 

The  attack  conquers  the  whole  ground  up  to  the  foot 
of  Talant ;  it  fails  before  the  village.  It  is  6  o'clock, 
darkness  has  fallen.  The  attacking  forces  are  compelled 
to  stop.  But  in  order  to  emphasise  a  success  which  has 
not  been  secured,  in  order  to  immobilise  the  adversary, 
the  latter  is  now  held  under  the  threat  of  a  constantly 
impending    attack;     General    von    Kettler   orders    the 


THE   SERVICE   OF   SECURITY      131 

attacking  troops  to  spend  the  night  at  the  foot  of  Talant, 
a  few  hundred  j^ards  from  the  position. 

All  this  took  place  on  January  21st.  It  was  very 
cold. 

No  connection  had  been  established  with  the  detach- 
ment from  Is-sur-Tille ;  it  was  imperative  to  guard  the 
column  in  that  direction  against  the  enemy's  under- 
takings :  one  battalion  was  detached  to  Hauteville. 
The  remainder  of  the  column  stood  to  arms  in  front  of 
the  enemy. 

As  for  the  column  from  Is-sur-Tille,  it  had  not  managed 
to  carry  Vantoux,  nor  to  get  itself  in  communication 
with  General  Kettler.  It  was  threatened  from  all  sides. 
It  withdrew  to  Savigny-le-Sec. 

In  spite  of  the  pluck  which  had  been  the  dom'nant 
feature  of  the  undertaking,  in  spite  of  all  the  energy 
displa3"ed  during  its  execution,  the  day  had  been  only 
partly  successful. 

The  attack  on  Talant  had  been  a  costly  affair  :  the 
brigade  had  lost  19  officers  and  322  men. 

The  61st  regiment,  which  had  borne  most  of  those 
casualties,  still  keeps  in  its  records  that  old  Burgundian 
saying  :    "  Qui  voit  Talant,  n'est  pas  dedans^ 

Night  in  the  open  finished  the  brigade.  There  was 
neither  wood  nor  fodder.  The  only  food  available  was 
some  bread,  biscuit  and  bacon.  It  began  to  snow  towards 
the  end  of  the  night.  General  von  Kettler  bivouacked 
near  Changey  Farm;  the  building  was  thronged  with 
wounded;  the  general  spent  the  night  on  the  road, 
protected  only  by  his  two  horses  from  the  wind  that 
blew  across  the  plateau. 

The  enemy  had  displayed  considerable  forces,  they 
had  resisted  everywhere.  The  enemy  would  claim  a 
victory,  that  was  certain,  but  let  them  obtain  another 
victory  of  that  kind  and  it  would  be  for  them  the  begin- 
ning of  final  disaster.  The  end  aimed  at  by  the  Kettler 
brigade  would  have  been  reached. 

Moreover,  the  effect  of  the  fight  had  already  been 
felt  at  Dijon.  Fearing  another  attack,  the  City  Council 
came  and  asked  that  the  town  should  be  spared  the 
hardships  of  a  bombardment. 

In  any  case,  the  Kettler  brigade  was  the  following  day 
in  a  state  which  compelled  it  to  take  some  rest  in  order 
to  refresh  itself,  to  feed  the  men,  a  thing  which  was 


132        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF    WAR 

becoming  difficult  in  a  poor  country  looted  by  the 
Garihaldians. 

The  general  had  also  to  try  and  save  from  destruction, 
or  at  least  from  isolation,  the  Conta  detachment. 
Finally,  ammunition  was  beginning  to  run  low.  An 
ammunition  section  was  sent  for. 

The  brigade,  therefore,  is  resting  on  the  22nd.  But 
food  is  lacking  everywhere.  The  French  try  without 
result  to  attack  Plombieres.^ 

On  the  23rd,  General  von  Kettler  decides,  in  order  to 
find  some  wealthier  or  less  ruined  villages,  to  proceed 
with  his  brigade,  by  a  movement  in  flank,  from  the  hills 
down  into  the  plain. 

The  movement  is  made  from  Hauteville  via  Ahuy  on 
Valmy  Farm;  the  brigade  is  assembled  at  11.30  a.m. 
after  joining  the  Conta  column.     News  arrives  that : 

(1)  Bellefond  and  Ruffey,  occupied  by  the  enemy 
the  day  before,  have  been  evacuated ; 

(2)  The  whole  flanking  movement  of  that  morning 
has  been  in  no  way  impeded  by  the  enemy,  in  spite  of 
the  short  distance  at  which  it  has  been  made  ; 

(3)  Peasants  and  prisoners  say,  beside,  that  many 
troops  have  started  for  Auxonne. 

General  von  Kettler  does  not  waver.  His  brigade  is 
in  a  very  poor  state ;  the  position  at  Dijon  is  of  the 
strongest.  There  has  been  a  first  failure ;  he  may  expect 
a  second  one,  but  no  wavering  is  possible.  The  enemy 
manoeuvres,  threatens  to  disappear ;  he  must  be  detained 
and  therefore  attacked.  He  will  be  attacked.  In  order 
to  attack,  the  first  thing  is  to  have  a  clear  view  of  the 
situation,  to  know  where  the  enemy  is  and  what  he  is 
holding;  to  determine  what  point  must  be  attacked  by 
the  main  body;  for  it  is  important  not  to  rush  blindly 
on  that  main  body  no  matter  how  and  where. 

^  Plombieres  is  occupied  by  one  section  (small  outpost)  of  German 
pioneers  who  have  posted  themselves  at  the  eastern  issue  of  the 
village.  That  section  is  soon  very  seriously  threatened  by  the  French, 
who  march  at  the  same  time  on  the  southern  issue.  The  lieutenant 
decides  to  withdraw  his  section  to  the  rear.  That  retreating  move- 
ment is  made  very  difficult  by  the  hail  of  bullets  sweeping  the  main 
street  of  the  village.  The  lieutenant  does  not  hesitate.  He  compels 
the  inhabitants  to  leave  their  houses,  and  makes  of  them  a  living  barri- 
cade in  front  of  which  the  French  cease  firing,  and  under  the  shelter 
of  which  the  Prussian  section  escapes.  Is  not  this  a  purely  objective 
solution  of  the  question  :  security  before  everything  ?  Let  the  reader 
meditate  this. 


THE   SERVICE   OF   SECURITY       133 

That  reconnoitring  mission  is  the  main  task  of  the 
advance  guard,  and  has  always  to  be  fulfilled  with  a 
minimum  of  forces.  One  battalion  of  the  21st  is  ordered 
at  1.30  to  clear  the  heights  north  of  Pouilly  of  the  bands 
of  partisans  posted  there.  Those  bands  are  successfully 
driven  back.  The  assembled  brigade  advances  behind. 
At  the  same  time,  the  cavalry  patrols  which  surround 
and  protect  the  flanks  of  the  advance  guard  report 
that  considerable  enemy  forces  are  rallying  from  Varois 
and  Saint  Apollinaire  and  marching  in  the  direction  of 
Ruffey. 

The  scouting  parties,  which  up  to  then  had  adequately 
covered  the  flanks  of  the  attack,  are  no  longer  capable  of 
holding  up  the  coming  enemy.  A  resistance,  sufficiently 
serious  to  be  able  to  last,  has  to  be  organised  :  one 
battalion  and  a  half  and  one  squadron  are  sent  to  Epirey. 

While  Epirey  is  being  occupied,  one  company  of  the 
main  bodj^^  is  sent  to  Ruffey.  While  action  is  prepared, 
protection  is  organised ;  such  is  the  constant  preoccupa- 
tion of  a  commander  :  the  attack,  once  launched,  must 
not  be  surprised  ;  it  must  have  the  time  to  carry  out  its 
purpose,  or,  at  least,  to  turn  round,  and  this  under  favour- 
able conditions.  That  security  service,  covering  the 
attacking  body,  is  the  advance  guards'  second  task. 
What  does  the  advance  guard  do  to  fulfil  this  second 
mission  ?  It  holds  the  "  points  d'appui,"  the  occupa- 
tion of  which  will  protect  the  main  body  from  the  enemy 
attacks ;  it  thus  makes  it  easier  for  that  main  body  to 
go  into  action.  Such  points  are  here  :  Ruffey,  Epirey, 
and  Pouilly. 

It  is  soon  found  that  the  enemy  does  not  undertake 
anything  serious  in  the  direction  of  Epirey.  The 
battalion  which  occupies  that  village  is  therefore  recalled, 
two  companies  only  are  left  there,  in  order  to  do  what  has 
to  be  done  with  a  minimum  of  force. 

Meanwhile,  the  battalion  marching  directly  on  Pouilly 
makes  substantial  progress;  that  village  is  now  about 
to  be  attacked.  In  order  to  be  sure  of  succeeding,  the 
battalion  coming  from  Epirey  is  made  to  take  a  part  in 
that  operation.  Of  course,  the  attack  on  Pouilly  is 
prepared  by  artillery — namely,  the  two  batteries  of  the 
brigade  which  advance  to  short  range  from  that  place. 

Here  we  see  a  full  application  of  the  principle  of 
economy  of  forces. 


134        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

In  order  to  reconnoitre  Pouilly,  troops  go  into  action 
in  that  direction.  The  enemy  is  reported  to  be  near 
Varois  and  St.  Apolhnaire;  security  is  ensured  by 
occupjang  Epirey.  The  Epirey  affair  being  settled, 
the  attack  on  Pouilly  is  then  proceeded  with,  but  not 
before.  This  enables  the  commanding  officer,  by  keeping 
one  battalion  which  will  move  from  one  point  to  the 
other,  to  have  : 

Six  companies  at  Epirey,  in  case  the  enemy  should 
attack ; 

Eight  companies  at  Pouilly,  when  that  place  comes  to 
be  attacked. 

Here  comes  in  again  the  art  of  always  and  before  all 
securing  numbers  by  manoeuvring;  this  must  be  done 
without  giving  up  anything,  by  laying  hands  on  the 
"  points  d'appui,"  the  strength  of  which  will  enable  the 
small  occupying  numbers  to  fulfil  their  mission  and  to 
hold  on. 

The  same  applies  to  attacking  :  it  must  be  conducted 
as  far  as  possible  not  against  a  line  or  a  front,  but  against 
one  point;  I  may  add,  against  a  point  which  ought  to 
be  not  one  taken  at  random,  but  in  general  a  salient  or 
a  wing,  because  the  attacking  force  may  in  that  case 
make  the  most  advantageous,  that  is  the  most  com- 
plete, use  of  the  numerical  superiority,  of  the  numbers, 
it  possesses. 

By  acting  in  this  way,  it  encircles  its  adversary. 
Being  more  extensive  than  the  line  enveloped,  the 
enveloping  line  can  deploy  more  rifles,  more  guns  than 
the  adversary.  On  such  an  extensive  enveloping  line, 
the  attacking  force  discovers,  moreover,  the  space  and 
the  ground  for  approach,  for  manoeuvre  under  cover, 
and  finally  for  hurling  its  mass  forward. 

It  thus  secures  the  means  of  utilising  in  a  superior 
way  the  two  arguments  it  is  using  :    fire  and  shock. 

Once  one  point  of  the  resisting  line  has  been  carried, 
that  line  falls  easily. 

Under  the  pressure  of  the  two  battalions,  which  have 
been  preceded  by  a  powerful  fire  and  which  have  been 
able  to  manoeuvre  and  to  advance  under  cover,  because 
they  had  a  large  space  of  ground  at  their  disposal, 
Pouilly  is  taken,  in  spite  of  the  somewhat  vigorous 
resistance  of  the  chateau. 

The  main  line  of  resistance,  behind  Pouilly,  consists 


THE   SERVICE   OF   SECURITY       135 

first  in  the  factory,  a  large  square  building,  with  a  yard 
enclosed  by  walls; 

Next  in  La  Filotte  and  St.  Martin,  both  of  which  are 
fortified,  surrounded  by  deep  trenches  connected  with 
each  other  and  occupied  by  important  forces. 

The  battalions  which  have  carried  Pouilly  and  the 
two  brigades'  batteries  which  have  followed  the  attacking 
force  until  about  400  yards  from  the  outskirts  of  the 
village,  now  attempt  to  debouch  from  that  place.  They 
are  immediately  held  up  by  French  artillery  which  has 
reappeared  east  of  the  road  to  Langres. 

General  von  Kettler  orders  two  battalions  of  the  main 
bod}'  to  advance.  The  advance  guard  does  not  suffice  any 
longer,  the  main  body  must  be  resorted  to.  The  advance 
guard  has  been  exhausted  by  the  effort  made;  a  new 
undertaking  is  now  beginning,  for  which  fresh  troops  are 
required. 

As  for  the  troops  which  have  just  attacked,  they 
assemble,  reorganise  themselves,  pass  back  to  the  main 
bod3^  Part  of  them  begin,  however,  by  ensuring  the 
occupation  of  Pouilly,  a  starting-point  for  another  attack. 
Thus  the  attack  will  proceed.  Any  progress  achieved  is 
made  final  by  effectively  laying  hands  on  the  point 
carried,  by  protecting  it  from  any  further  dispute,  by 
making  possession  definitely  safe. 

The  attack  progresses  step  by  step  from  result  to  result, 
casting  anchor  from  time  to  time  as  it  advances  over 
a  sea  fruitful  in  surprises. 

They  now  attack  the  factory. 

One  battalion  of  the  61st  deploys  between  the  Val- 
Suzon  and  the  road; 

One  other  of  the  same  regiment  follows  the  valley 
itself.  The  latter  drives  back  the  enemy  parties  estab- 
lished between  La  Filotte  and  the  factory;  it  protects 
itself  with  one  platoon  against  Fontaine. 

It  has  two  companies  in  first  line.  The  company 
on  the  left  utilises  the  railway-cutting.  Both  reach  in 
the  end  the  sand  quarry,  200  yards  north-west  of  the 
factory.  Further  advance  is  rendered  impossible  by 
the  fire  from  the  factory  and  from  St.  Martin. 

Both  companies  then  establish  themselves  face  to 
St.  Martin.  Another  company  is  sent  for  from  the 
second  line. 

The  factory  is  again  attacked  :   another  failure ;  for 


136        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

the  factory  is  closed  from  all  sides  and  artillery  has  not 
been  able  to  prepare  the  attack  :  night  has  fallen,  the 
attack  has  failed  after  enormous  losses,  leaving  a  flag  in 
the  hands  of  the  adversary. 

They  decide  to  retreat.  The  second  battalion,  which 
has  carried  out  the  attack  through  the  valley  and  the 
units  of  which  are  mixed  up  and  astray,  extricates  itself 
with  diflficulty. 

However,  in  order  to  keep  the  enemy  in  position,  the 
brigade  assembles  south  of  Pouilly  ;  it  remains  there 
until  8  p.m.  At  that  moment,  it  withdraws  on  Vantoux 
and  Asnieres.  It  has  lost  a  further  16  officers  and  362 
men. 

By  disclosing  the  occupation  of  Talant  and  Fontaine 
and  the  serious  resistance  of  the  enemy,  the  fight  had 
shown  that  the  French  still  had,  in  the  evening  of  the 
23rd,  all  their  forces  in  Dijon  and  its  neighbourhood. 
The  result  desired  had  been  attained  by  that  date.  On 
the  following  days.  General  von  Kettler  remained  before, 
and  at  a  short  distance  from,  Dijon. 

Many  tactical  lessons  might  be  drawn  from  these 
fights  around  Dijon.  In  connection  with  what  interests 
us  more  especially  in  the  present  study,  namely,  security, 
they  show  w^ell  by  what  kind  of  offensive  tactics  the 
Kettler  brigade  had  to  fulfil  its  protective  mission.  We 
have  seen  up  to  what  point  the  commanding  officer 
carried  out  his  mission. 

The  result,  as  is  well  known,  was  the  great  success  of 
the  Southern  German  Army. 

As  for  Garibaldi,  the  repeated  attacks  of  January  21st 
and  23rd  induced  him  to  believe  that  he  had  before  him 
important  German  forces.  He  remained  on  a  cautious 
defensive  :  he  praised  his  own  successes  in  the  most 
eulogistic  terms. 

The  result  was  the  disastrous  defeat  of  the  Eastern 
French  Army. 

Error  is  human,  we  may  be  told ;   it  is  not  a  crime. 

The  crime  does  not  lie  in  that,  but  in  the  fact  that 
Garibaldi,  after  being  ordered  to  join  the  Eastern  Army, 
had  not  done  so.  He  never  thought  of  carrying  out 
his  orders.  His  conduct  was  dictated  by  his  own 
personal  views,  by  his  craving  for  personal  success. 

No  material  impossibihty  prevented  him  from  obeying, 


THE   SERVICE   OF   SECURITY       137 

had  he  attempted  to  do  so :  the  Pelissier  Division 
remaining  at  Dijon  would  have  sufficed  to  absorb 
General  von  Kettler's  activity;  the  army  of  the  Vosges 
might  freely  have  joined  the  Eastern  Army. 

Garibaldi  and  General  de  Failly,  although  their  mili- 
tary origins  were  very  different,  reached  the  same  result, 
disaster,  by  following  the  same  ways :  mental  indiscipline, 
neglect  of  military  duty,  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  term. 

In  either  case  no  difficulty  whatever  prevented  them 
from  performing  that  duty;  but  they  would  have  had 
first  to  perceive  that  duty;  they  needed  a  sense  of 
discipline.  The  error,  the  crime,  might  have  been 
avoided ;  the  disaster  prevented ;  everything  obtained — 
simply  by  acting  according  to  orders. 

There  is  still  another  lesson  of  a  higher  nature  to  be 
dra^^Ti  from  this  study  : 

In  a  time  such  as  ours  when  people  believe  they  can 
do  without  an  ideal,  cast  away  what  they  call  abstract 
ideas,  live  on  realism,  rationalism,  positivism,  reduce 
everything  to  knowledge  or  to  the  use  of  more  or  less 
ingenious  and  casual  devices — let  us  acknowledge  it 
here — in  such  a  time  there  is  only  one  means  of 
avoiding  error,  crime,  disaster,  of  determining  the  con- 
duct to  be  followed  on  a  given  occasion — but  a  safe 
means  it  is,  and  a  fruitful  one  :  this  is  the  exclusive 
devotion  to  two  abstract  notions  in  the  field  of  ethics  : 
duty  and  discipline;  such  a  devotion,  if  it  is 
to  lead  to  happy  results,  further  implies  besides,  as  the 
example  of  General  von  Kettler  shows  us:  kn  owl  edge 
and   reasoning. 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE    ADVANCE    GUARD 

When  our  brigade  in  flank  guard  halted,  on  the 
evening  of  August  4th,  at  Woelfling,  in  order  to  cover 
the  army  corps  billeted  at  Kalhausen,  Achen,  Etting, 
etc.,  it  covered  itself  with  a  number  of  outposts.  At 
what  object  did  it  aim  in  sending  out  these  outposts  ? 
It  aimed  at  the  power  of  resting  sheltered  from  the 
enemy's  attack.  To  this  end,  the  outposts  were  expected 
to  act  as  follows  : 

If  the  enemy  came  on,  to  keep  him  at  a  distance. 

If  he  attacked  in  force,  to  hold  him,  even  then,  for 
such  time  as  would  be  needed  by  the  brigade  to  evacu- 
ate conveniently  such  billets  as  should  have  become 
unsafe  and  to  prepare  for  action. 

To  be  able  to  rest,  and  to  leave  billets  under  shelter 
from  possible  enemy  blows,  this  is  the  very  meaning 
of  the  word  security ;  such  a  material  security  is  indis- 
pensable to  any  force  if  it  proposes  to  rest,  to  maintain 
its  strength,  to  keep  its  spirit  and  its  confidence  in  its 
commanders. 

Now  what  did  the  army  corps  ask  of  the  brigade  ?' 

During  the  night  from  the  4th  to  the  5th  and  during 
the  day  of  the  5th,  the  brigade  was  expected  : 

(1)  To  shelter  from  enemy  blows  the  army  corps, 
whether  billeted  or  marching,  and,  obviously,  to  ensure 
material  security. 

(2)  But  it  was  also  expected,  should  the  enemy  come 
on,  to  hold  him  for  such  a  length  of  time  and  at  such  a 
distance  as  would  enable  the  army  corps  to  continue 
its  march  on  Bitche,  in  order  to  act  in  compliance  with 
orders  received  :  that  is,  the  brigade  must  afford  the 
corps  tactical  security. 

That  notion  of  security,  which  we  express  by  means 
of  a  single  word,  divides  itself,  then,  into  : 

138 


THE   ADVANCE    GUARD  139 

(1)  Material  security,  which  makes  it  possible  to  avoid 
enemy  blows  when  one  does  not  desire  to  strike  back 
or  cannot  do  so ;  this  is  the  means  of  feeling  secure  in 
the  midst  of  danger,  of  halting  and  marching  under 
shelter. 

(2)  Tactical  security,  which  makes  it  possible  to  go 
on  carrying  out  a  programme,  an  order  received,  in  spite 
of  chance  unfavourable  circumstances  produced  by  war ; 
in  spite  of  the  unknown,  of  measures  taken  by  the 
enemy  of  his  own  free-will ;  also  to  act  securely  and  with 
certainty,  whatever  the  enemy  may  do,  by  safeguarding 
one's  own  freedom  of  action. 

IMaterial  surprise  means  losing  material  security;  we 
have,  in  case  of  such  surprise,  the  enemy  freely  firing 
into  our  billets,  our  bivouacs,  or  our  marching  columns. 

Tactical  surprise  means  endangering  tactical  security, 
losing  freedom  of  action.  This  would  have  been  the 
case  with  the  Fifth  Corps  in  1870,  more  especially  with 
the  Lespart  division,  had  the  enemy  come  on  during  the 
days  of  the  5th  or  6th  of  August.  The  marching  forces 
would  have  had  to  risk  a  battle  on  the  very  road  they 
were  following.  Instead  of  continuing  their  movement, 
they  would  have  had  to  fight;  they  would  never  have 
arrived. 

The  same  army  corps  was  materially  and  tactically 
surprised  at  Beaumont,  on  August  30th. 

Materially :  because,  for  lack  of  outposts,  the  enemy 
could  fire  without  difficulty  on  troops  at  their  bivouac, 
then  busy  assembling,  and  therefore  unable  to  return 
the  fire. 

Tactically :  because,  for  want  of  the  organisation  of 
a  system  of  cover  at  a  distance,  that  corps  had  to  fight 
on  the  road  it  had  to  follow ;  it  had  to  give  up  marching 
towards  the  Meuse,  which  it  had  been  ordered  to  cross. 

This  argument  shows  what  must  be  understood  by 
the  word  security.  Security  implies  the  possibility  of 
carrying  out  securely,  safely,  or  rather  surely,  numerous 
and  distinct  schemes,  each  of  which  must  have  been 
well  defined  beforehand  in  every  particular  case,  so  that 
the  ser^dce  of  security,  which  is  connected  with  those 
schemes,  should  completely  fulfil  its  purpose. 

From  what  we  have  already  seen  may  be  deduced  a 
number  of  corollaries  : 


140        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF    WAR 

(1)  The  organ  which  guarantees  the  tactical  security 
of  a  large  unit  (of  an  army  corps  in  the  case  under 
consideration)  is  the  advance  guard,  meaning  by  this 
general  term  a  detachment  placed  on  the  flank,  in  front 
or  in  the  rear  of  the  main  body ;  such  a  detachment  to 
utilise  in  any  case  its  own  resisting  power  for  the  benefit 
of  the  main  body,  in  order  to  enable  that  body  to  carry 
out  the  operation  prescribed  and  to  comply  with  the 
orders  received.  Further,  as  that  operation,  those 
orders,  are  constantly  changing,  it  may  be  at  once 
concluded  that  the  manner  of  acting  of  the  advance 
guard,  the  tactics  it  will  have  to  resort  to,  will  have  to 
be  determined  in  each  particular  case  by  the  nature 
of  the  operation  to  be  protected  as  well  as  by  the 
circumstances  (time,  space,  ground)  surrounding  the 
advance  guard  as  it  moves  on. 

(2)  The  advance  guard  protects  itself  with  its  own 
material  service  of  security  (the  outposts),  which, 
after  having  been  more  or  less  reinforced  by  troops 
detached  from  the  main  body  (occupying  Singling,  in 
the  instance  given  above),  will  then  be  sufficient  to 
guarantee  the  material  security  of  the  army  corps. 

(3)  In  any  case,  and  whatever  the  situation  con- 
sidered may  be,  we  have  seen,  in  the  case  of  Rohrbach, 
that  security  is  based  on  two  elements,  two  mathematical 
quantities  :  time  and  space ;  also  that  it  contains  a 
third  element  :    the  resisting  power  of  the  troops. 

In  the  case  considered,  the  advance  guard  had  to 
provide  the  marching  army  corps,  for  the  whole  time 
its  march  was  taking  place,  with  a  zone  of  at  least 
3000  yards,  which  should  be  proof  against  the  enemy 
along  the  whole  length  of  the  column  or  rather  during 
the  time  the  column  was  marching  past  a  certain  point, 
that  is,  in  this  case,  for  four  hours.  Such  was  the 
problem  of  security  it  had  to  solve  for  the  benefit  of 
the  army  corps. 

Now,  the  officer  commanding  that  advance  guard 
needed  a  certain  time  in  order  to  think,  to  give  out 
orders,  to  have  those  orders  transmitted  and  carried 
out;  he  needed  also  a  certain  space  in  order  to  bring 
his'  troops  to  such  and  such  road  junctions  before  the 
enemy  should  arrive ;  in  order  to  deploy  them,  to  send 
them  into  action,  and  to  manoeuvre  to  the  rear  if  he 
were  thrown  back.     Another  problem  of  security  had 


THE   ADVANCE    GUARD  141 

therefore  to  be  solved  in  order  to  ensure  the  working 
of  the  advance  guard's  main  body. 

In  the  one  case  as  in  the  other,  once  these  conditions 
of  time  and  space  had  been  ensured  by  the  troops 
detailed  for  security,  that  is,  by  the  advance  guard,  the 
problem  would  be  solved.^ 

(4)  Whatever  the  hypothesis,  so  far  as  space  is  con- 
cerned, the  following  principle  is  both  absolute  and 
elementary  :  a  force  must  always  be  master  of  the 
ground  surrounding  it  up  to  the  extreme  range  of  its 
arms,  if  it  wishes  to  avoid  being  outflanked,  enveloped, 
encircled,  exposed  to  the  havoc  wrought  by  modern 
arms,  destroyed  before  being  able  to  fight.  That  space 
which  ought  to  be  protected  from  the  blows  and  observa- 
tions of  the  enemy  is  what  we  call  the  zone  of  manoeuvre. 

In  any  case,  the  kind  of  security  we  have  hitherto 
considered — a  security  ensuring  that  freedom  of  action 
which  we  must  keep  in  order  to  carry  out  the  orders 
given  us  and  to  go  where  we  have  been  told  to  go — 
only  enabled  us  to  shun  the  enemy.  The  theory  of  war 
admits,  however,  of  only  one  argument  :  battle.  The 
enemy  must  be  beaten,  otherwise  nothing  is  done.  Let 
us,  then,  consider  now  how  forces  ought  to  be  used  in 
view  of  the  battle  and  during  the  course  of  the  battle. 
Must  security  be  considered  here  also  ?     And,  if  so,  what 

^  Using  mathematical  language,  we  might  say  :  security  S,  necessary 
to  a  main  body,  involves  a  certain  time  T,  a  certain  distance  D  ;  it  is 
ensured  by  the  resisting  power  P  of  the  security-force,  which  possesses 
a  well-determined  numerical  strength  : 

S^f{T,D,P). 

In  this  equation,  time  T  and  distance  D  being  definite  data,  the 
officer  commanding  the  security-force  has  no  other  variable  at  his 
disposal  than  the  resisting  power  P  of  his  troops. 

He  must,  then,  naturally  tend  to  increase  P. 

In  order  to  do  this,  he  applies  the  principle  of  the  economy  of 
forces;  he  organises  his  troops  into  a  system  of  forces. 

He  stiU.  further  increases  P  (resisting  power  or  faculty  of  holding 
out  against  the  enemy),  without  allowing  himself  to  be  destroyed, 
by  lengthening  the  distance  along  which  his  troops  may  manoeuvre 
while  retreating.  Therefore,  the  weaker  the  force  which  has  to  provide 
for  security  S,  the  longer  must  be  the  distance  by  which  it  gives  cover 
and  so  fulfils  its  protective  mission,  thus  compensating  inadequacy  of 
numbers  by  a  greater  facility  for  manoeuvring  to  the  rear. 

To  achieve  security,  on  a  given  day,  consists,  then,  in  first  setting 
up,  at  a  distance  to  be  determined  more  particularly  by  the  means 
of  resistance  supplied  by  the  ground,  a  protective  system  capable  of 
lasting  for  a  time  T  and  of  continuously  guaranteeing  a  distance  D. 


142        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

function  are  we  to  expect  of  it  ?  To  what  extent  and 
how  is  security  to  provide  that  function  ?  We  have 
at  the  outset  of  our  problem  troops  already  assembled 
for  battle ;  they  are  not  forces  still  to  be  grouped,  they 
are  forces  ready  to  be  applied.  The  hammer  is  con- 
structed :  our  business  is  to  strike.  True  enough ;  but 
the  hammer  is  not  yet  in  hand.  Our  mass  constantly 
loses  its  form  of  assembly  in  order  to  march  forward, 
and  marching  is  necessary  up  to  the  last  moment :  the 
march  of  approach. 

Besides,  the  point  to  be  struck  must  be  indicated  to 
the  mass,  therefore  it  must  be  known.  Such  a  point  is 
not  a  casual  one ;  it  will  be  either  a  salient  on  the  enemy 
line,  or  a  wing,  or  a  flank;  therefore  the  point  must 
be  determined ;  we  have  first  to  seek  it,  then  reach  it. 

For  either  of  these  two  reasons,  any  action  of  our 
forces  would  be  utterly  uncertain  that  should  be  under- 
taken without  first  complying  with  two  conditions  : 

(1)  The  objective  to  be  struck  must  have  been  deter- 
mined. 

(2)  The  forces  must  have  been  taken  in  hand  and 
arrayed  in  front  of  that  objective. 

So  long  as  this  has  not  been  effectively  done,  freedom 
of  action  must  be  kept  in  its  entirety,  the  troops  must 
be  protected  from  the  adversary's  undertakings,  for 
they  are  not  in  a  position  to  meet  him  successfully. 

As  soon  as  we  enter  the  battle-field,  then,  at  the 
moment  of  action,  we  are  compelled  to  solve  the  same 
constant  difficulties  of  warfare,  namely  : 

To  determine  where  and  hozv  we  have  to  act,  where 
and  how  we  have  to  strike. 

Once  that  question  has  been  settled,  we  must  keep 
the  means  and  facility  of  striking  even  in  presence  of 
the  enemy. 

Security  is  therefore  indispensable,  for  it  alone 
provides  :  ( a)  the  possibility  of  avoiding  surprises,  that 
is,  of  feeling  secure;  (b)  the  possibility  of  seeing  clearly, 
of  reaching  the  result  in  spite  of  the  enemy,  that  is,  of 
acting  securely. 

Let  us  return  to  our  instance  of  the  Fifth  Corps, 
marching  on  August  6th,  1870. 

Owing  to  the  dispositions  we  have  taken,  it  has 
managed  to  keep  a  good  pace.  The  enemy  has  not 
shown  himself  on  the  road ;  there  has  been,  in  fact,  no 


THE   ADVANCE    GUARD  143 

difficulty  whatever ;  but  even  if  the  enemy  had  shown 
himself,  he  would  not  have  stopped  the  movement,  he 
would  not  have  prevented  the  column  from  continuing 
to  march.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  army  corps  has 
arrived  on  the  battle-field  in  time.  With  the  formation 
adopted,  since  the  head  of  the  column  would  have 
appeared  in  Reischoffen  at  9  o'clock,  the  rear  would 
have  been  there  by  1  p.m. 

Shall  we  now  throw  these  forces  into  the  thick  of  the 
battle  as  they  arrive  and,  so  to  speak,  drop  by  drop? 
Obviously  not.  This  would  mean  squandering  them 
without  any  serious  effect.  Let  us  recall,  moreover, 
our  principle  of  the  economy  of  forces.  We  cannot  be 
victorious  everywhere  :  it  will  suffice  for  us  if  we  are 
victorious  on  one  point.  We  must  fight  everywhere 
else  with  a  minimum  of  forces  in  order  to  be  over- 
whelming on  that  point.  We  must  economise  every- 
where else,  in  order  to  be  able  to  spend,  regardless  of 
loss,  on  the  point  where  we  desire  to  secure  a  decision ; 
the  mass  must  be  applied  there,  and  therefore  be  made 
and  reserved  beforehand. 

The  Fifth  Corps,  which  has  hitherto  been  carefully 
spared,  will  have  first  to  mass  itself,  then  to  post  itself, 
after  gathering  information,  facing  the  point  of  attack  ; 
finally  to  deploy  there  ;  it  cannot  do  all  this  unless  it  is 
covered,  for  a  force  cannot  mass  itself,  manoeuvre,  deploy, 
under  enemy  fire,  any  more  than  it  could  bivouac  while 
receiving  enemy  blows;  commonplace  security  con- 
sists in  facing  your  enemy's  blows  only  when  you  can 
hit  back;  art  consists  in  then  hitting  back  more  vigor- 
ously than  you  have  been  hit  yourself.  The  army  corps 
will  open  the  attack  after  deploying;  but  it  will  still 
have  to  cover  itself  on  its  threatened  flank,  in  order  to 
avoid  being  surprised,  for  surprise  brings  any  attack 
to  a  sudden  close. 

As  all  preparations  previous  to  attack  must  be  made 
under  shelter,  there  must  be  some  protective  force. 
That  force  is  the  advance  guard. 

It  has  already  proved  necessary,  while  the  corps  was 
marching,  in  order  to  remove  obstacles  on  the  road; 
the  advance  guard  again  proves  necessary  when  going 
into  action. 

Another  remark  must  be  made  so  far  as  FrOeschwiller 
is  concerned  :  the  Fifth  Corps,  on  its  arrival,  found  a 


144        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

known  situation,  a  position  already  held.  The  enemy 
had  shown  his  forces,  his  gambit,  his  intentions;  he 
was  held  up  on  certain  points. 

As  you  see,  the  advance  guard  of  the  Fifth  Corps  (the 
necessity  of  which  has  been  shown),  though  its  mission 
would  still  have  been  important,  would  have  had  here 
to  fulfil  only  part  of  the  task  which  generally  devolves 
on  an  advance  guard.  As  it  came  up  to  join  the  main 
body  it  would  have  found  the  battle  already  raging  for 
a  long  time ;  at  the  moment  it  arrived  on  the  ground, 
the  situation  would  have  been  known,  the  enemy 
would  have  been  reconnoitred. 

Quite  different  would  have  been  on  that  same  day  the 
task  of  any  rationally  organised  advance  guard  of  the 
First  Corps.     It  would  have  had,  early  in  the  day  : 

(1)  To  inform  the  command  of  the  adversary's 
movements. 

(2)  To  cover  the  dispositions  by  which  the  officer 
commanding  the  First  Corps  intended  to  meet  those 
movements. 

Again,  the  task  of  the  Douai  division,  advance  guard 
at  Wissemburg  of  the  army  of  Alsace,  would  have  been 
a  quite  different  one  two  days  before.  It  would  have 
had  : 

(1)  To  reconnoitre  the  German  forces  entering  Alsace. 

(2)  To  cover  the  concentration  of  the  French  forces 
which  had  to  fight  them. 

Its  tactics  ought  therefore  to  have  consisted  : 

(1)  In  engaging  until  the  enemy  should  have  displayed 
numbers  superior  to  its  own. 

(2)  In  manoeuvring  afterwards  to  the  rear,  retreating 
on  Reischoffen,  in  order  to  hold  the  enemy  in  that 
direction  during  the  whole  time  necessary  for  the 
intended  concentration  of  the  main  forces.  Let  us 
remember  the  case  of  Voltri  ! 

We  may  deduce  from  what  has  just  been  said  that 
to  bring  one's  forces  to  the  battle-field  is  not  all;  that 
such  security  as  has  enabled  us,  by  safeguarding  our 
freedom  of  action,  to  bring  them  there,  has  still  to  be 
completed  by  such  security  as  will  give  us  the  free 
disposal  of  those  forces  now  they  have  arrived,  and 
enable  us  to  employ  them  where  we  should,  and  when 
and  how  we  desire.  This  new  form  of  security  must 
therefore  : 


THE   ADVANCE    GUARD  145 

(1)  Supply  information  as  to  what  point  or  points 
ought  to  be  struck. 

(2)  Guarantee  the  possibility  of  bringing  and  deploying 
the  main  body  face  to  face  with  the  selected  objectives. 

(3)  Cover  the  main  body  during  all  preparatory 
operations. 

The  unknown  is  the  governing  condition  of  war. 

Everybody  is  familiar  with  this  principle  (so  you 
might  think),  and  being  familiar  with  it  will  distrust 
the  unknown  and  master  it ;  the  unknown  will  no  longer 
exist. 

This  is  not  true  in  the  least.  All  armies  have  lived 
and  marched  amidst  the  unknown. 

It  was  from  the  sous-prefet  of  Wissembourg  that 
Marshal  de  MacMahon  heard  of  the  approach  of  the 
Prussians  at  the  beginning  of  August  1870.  Until  that 
moment  he  ignored  their  numbers,  their  points  of  con- 
centration, and  the  whole  measure  of  their  preparation. 

But  the  Third  German  Army,  which  was  entering 
Alsace,  knew  no  more. 

On  August  16th,  1870,  on  the  17th,  on  the  18th  up 
to  noon,  German  general  headquarters  were  equally 
uninformed.  These  armies,  it  may  be  said,  were  badly 
commanded.  But  was  not  the  same  condition  of 
ignorance  constantly  true  of  Napoleon's  Army  ?  Let  us 
remember  the  days  before  Jena — ^more  particularly  the 
eve  of  that  battle. 

The  best  commanded  armies  have  marched,  have 
manoeuvred,  amidst  the  unknown.  It  was  unavoidable. 
They  have,  however,  got  the  better  of  that  dangerous 
situation,  they  have  come  out  of  it  victoriously,  by 
resorting  to  security,  which  enabled  them  to  live  without 
suffering  damage  in  an  atmosphere  full  of  dangers. 

It  was  behind  the  advance  guard  (Fifth  Corps)  of 
Marshal  Lannes,  after  it  had  come  by  mere  chance 
upon  von  Hohenlohe's  army  on  October  13th,  that  the 
whole  French  army  came  up  and  concentrated,  and 
therefore  found  itself  on  the  14th  in  a  favourable  posture 
for  battle. 

Again,  it  was  security  which  enabled  General  von 
Kettler  to  hold  on  with  five  thin  battalions  in  front 
of  Garibaldi's  50,000  men,  without  having  to  fear  a 
surprise. 


146        THE    PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

To  return  to  our  theory,  how  can  we  master  that 
unavoidable  unknown,  how  shall  we  manage  to  see 
through  the  thick  fog  which  always  surrounds  the 
situations  and  actions  of  the  enemy?  By  utilising  the 
advance  guard. 

When  one  moves  at  night,  without  light,  in  one's  own 
house,  what  does  one  do  ?  Does  one  not  (though  it  is  a 
ground  one  knows  well)  extend  one's  arm  in  front  of 
one  so  as  to  avoid  knocking  one's  head  against  the  wall  ? 
The  extended  arm  is  nothing  but  an  advance  guard. 

The  arm  keeps  its  suppleness  while  it  advances  and 
only  stiffens  more  or  less  when  it  meets  an  obstacle, 
in  order  to  perform  its  duty  without  risk,  to  open  a 
door,  etc. ;  in  the  same  way,  the  advance  guard  can 
advance  and  go  into  action  without  risking  destruction, 
provided  it  uses  suppleness  and  strength,  manoeuvring 
power,  resisting  power. 

Moreover,  the  unknown  disappeared  in  the  past  from 
the  moment  the  battle-field  was  entered. 

In  Napoleon's  time,  fighting  dispositions  were  taken 
at  a  very  short  distance,  in  presence  of  an  enemy  one 
could  easily  see,  the  power  and  situation  of  whom  could 
be  easily  measured.  Later,  in  proportion  as  the  range 
and  power  of  arms  increased,  distances  increased  too ; 
troops  had  to  look  for  shelter,  to  adopt  a  more  and 
more  dispersed  order.  Still,  the  smoke  produced  by 
powder  enabled  the  general  to  reconnoitre,  at  least 
partly,  the  first  dispositions  of  the  enemy.  The  latter 
disclosed  by  his  fire  the  positions  he  was  occupying. 
Smokeless  powder  has  changed  the  picture  and  made  the 
unknown  both  complete  and  lasting.  Going  into  action 
reminds  one  of  a  struggle  between  two  blind  men, 
between  two  adversaries  who  perpetually  seek  each 
other  but  cannot  see.  Shall  our  new  method,  then, 
consist  in  rushing  straight  on,  or  to  the  right,  or  to  the 
left,  at  random?  Shall  we  allow  the  enemy  to  throw 
his  arms  round  our  body,  to  grasp  us  completely, 
without  our  retaining  the  possibility  of  first  grasping 
him  ourselves,  and  of  striking  hard  ?  Obviously  not. 
In  order  to  conquer  that  unknown  which  follows  us 
until  the  very  point  of  going  into  action,  there  is  only 
one  means,  which  consists  in  looking  out  until  the 
last  moment,  even  on  the  battle-field,  for  information; 
there  is  only  one  way  :    extending  the  arm  before  one, 


THE   ADVANCE   GUARD  14T 

utilising  the  advance  guard,  which  keeps  searching  for, 
and  supplying,  information  even  on  the  battle-field. 

To  inform,  and,  therefore,  to  reconnoitre^  this  is  the 
first  and  constant  duty  of  the  advance  guard. 

On  what  should  it  give  information  ?  On  the  main 
body  of  the  enemy  forces. 

At  Pouilly,  the  Kettler  brigade  found  itself  before 
parties  of.  francs -tireurs  who  obscured  the  field  of  view; 
it  was  necessary  to  try  and  see  beyond  them.  An 
advance  guard  was  sent  out.  It  scattered  those 
parties,  started  reconnoitring,  then  attacked  the  village 
of  Pouilly. 

It  found  the  main  line  of  resistance  of  the  enemy 
behind  that  place ;  its  mission  had  then  come  to  an  end. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  enemy,  with  his  reconnais- 
sances, with  his  detachments  of  all  kinds,  is  everywhere. 
Still,  his  main  body  is  only  to  be  found  on  one  point, 
in  a  certain  region.  It  is  the  main  body  we  must  strike, 
it  is  against  the  main  body  we  must  guard  ourselves,  it 
is  the  main  body  therefore  on  which  we  must  have 
information.  We  must  know  where  that  main  body 
actually  is;  therefore,  we  must  break  through  the 
security  service  which  obviously  covers  it.  Our  organ 
of  information  has  therefore  to  be  endowed  with  force, 
to  possess  a  breaking  power.  But  even  this  does  not 
suffice ;  we  must  know  what  the  main  body  is,  what  it  is 
worth.  The  advance  guard  must,  then,  in  order  to 
compel  the  main  body  of  the  adversary  to  make  itself 
known,  oblige  it  to  deploy,  but  that  task  presupposes 
attack,  that  is,  full  forces  in  artillery  and  infantry. 

The  reconnoitring  mission  of  the  advance  guard  must 
be  pushed  up  to  that  point — full  information  on  the 
main  enemy  body  :  that  mission  comes  to  an  end  when 
this  first  point,  information  about  the  enemy's  main 
body,  has  been  secured. 

There  is,  however,  another  circumstance  which 
impedes  our  manceuvre,  namely,  dispersion. 

Troops  arrive  in  a  marching  column,  or  even  in  several 
marching  columns  :  it  takes  an  army  corps,  thirteen  or 
fourteen  miles  long,  five  or  six  hours  to  march  past  a 
given  point  or  to  make  the  rear  come  up  with  the  head 
of  the  column;  for  these  five  or  six  hours,  the  army 
corps  only  disposes  of  part  of  its  forces.    Still  the  officer 


148        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

commanding  the  army  corps  cannot  think  of  pouring 
his  forces  drop  by  drop  into  action,  even  if  he  is  aware 
of  the  direction  to  be  taken ;  he  must  therefore  first 
manage  to  assemble,  then  to  deploy  and  array  his  troops 
facing  their  objective. 

Under  different  circumstances,  another  mode  of 
assembling  has  to  be  resorted  to. 

The  army  of  Alsace  in  1870  had  to  concentrate  its 
First,  Fifth,  Seventh  Corps  before  risking  a  battle;  its 
advance  guard,  the  Douai  division,  might  enable  it 
to  do  so. 

It  was  the  same  case  at  Jena,  at  Montenotte. 

In  either  case,  the  preparatory  operation,  which 
may  last  a  long  time,  must  be  covered;  otherwise  it 
will  be  endangered.  This  implies  security,  which  it  is 
the  business  of  the  advance  guard  to  supply.  The  latter 
must  enable  all  the  fighting  troops  to  fall  into  line  in 
spite  of  the  enemy's  presence. 

To  cover  the  forces,  first  while  assembling,  then  while 
being  put  into  action,  such  is  the  second  mission 
devolving  on  the  advance  guard. 

That  mission  implies,  above  all,  the  power  of  lasting 
out  for  a  certain  time ;  the  advance  guard  must  resist 
with  weak  forces  on  a  wide  front.  How  can  this  be 
done? 

By  means  of  an  unassailable  position,  according  to 
Carnot. 

By  manoeuvring,  provided  the  ground  is  wide  enough. 

A  position  allowing  for  this  result  is,  in  the  modern 
sense  of  the  word  (as  we  have  seen),  one  which  provides 
a  number  of  "  points  d'appui,"  and  of  points  with  an 
extensive  observation  and  range  making  it  possible  to 
employ  various  kinds  of  fire. 

The  tactics  of  our  advance  guard  should  consist  in 
making  quickly  for  those  points,  in  order  to  open  fire 
at  long-range  and  thus  postpone  the  decision. 

Thus  the  Kettler  brigade  arrives  before  Talant  and 
throws  its  advance  guard  companies  on  the  two  spurs 
north  and  south  of  the  road,  then  on  Daix ;  by  immedi- 
ately taking  up  these  defensive  positions  it  protects  the 
main  column  and  the  Turcy  column  (the  main  body  of  the 
forces)  as  they  arrive,  and  occupies  a  position  strong 
enough  to  be  able  to  hold  up,  until  further  orders, 
with    few   troops    (one    battalion,    two    batteries,    two 


THE   ADVANCE    GUARD  149 

companies),  an  attack    made  by  very  superior    forces 
{the  several  brigades  of  Garibaldi). 

Thus,  again,  the  advance  guard  of  the  Prussian 
Guard,  on  August  18th,  moves  rapidly  on  Saint- Ail,  then 
attacks  Ste  Marie -aux-Chenes.  So  doing,  it  occupies 
and  conquers  a  number  of  "  points  d'appui  "  which 
ensure  the  possession  of  the  ground  needed  by  the  main 
body. 

What  is  the  ground  so  needed  ?  What  is  the  space 
necessary  to  the  main  body  ? 

The  ground  on  which  to  assemble  and  take  one's 
forces  in  hand  must  obviously  be  protected;  at  the 
same  time  it  is  also  necessary  to  prepare  the  setting  of 
these  forces  into  action.  Therefore  protection  must 
at  least  extend,  so  far  as  the  width  of  the  front  is  con- 
cerned, over  the  space  necessary  for  the  main  body  to 
deploy.  The  ground  to  be  occupied  by  any  advance 
guard  may  therefore  at  a  maximum  be  equal  to  that 
front  of  deployment. 

A  divisional  advance  guard  consisting  of  one  regiment 
may  thus  have  to  extend  itself  over  1500,  1800,  2000 
yards,  or  even  over  the  whole  space  needed  by  the 
division.  The  regiment  can  do  so  without  risk,  by 
utilising  ground  under  the  conditions  described  above. 

This  does  not  clash  with  the  limits  to  a  width  of 
front  as  they  are  prescribed  by  the  regulations.  For 
the  advance  guard  has  not  to  fight,  that  is,  to  accomplish 
the  act  of  force  designed  to  upset  the  adversary;  it 
has  not  therefore  to  take  up  any  formation  of  combat. 

Its  aim  is  very  different :  it  consists  in  reconnoitring 
the  enemy,  and  holding  against  him  only  over  a  certain 
limited  space,  during  a  certain  limited  time. 

\^Tien  we  come  to  study  battle,  we  shall  see  what 
fronts  ought  to  be  given  to  the  troops  in  order  to  attain 
the  result  desired,  that  is,  the  overthrow  of  the  adver- 
sary. The  result  we  aim  at  in  our  present  study  of  the 
role  of  an  advance  guard  is  quite  other,  and  it  determines 
the  means  we  should  employ.  The  fronts  of  combat- 
prescribed  by  regulation  do  not  concern  the  deployment 
of  an  advance  guard  battalion,  any  more  than  they  do 
the  dispositions  taken  by  that  battalion  when  it  is 
dispersed  on  outposts.  (See  on  a  later  page  the 
deployment  of  Marshal  Lannes's  advance  guard  at 
Saalfeld.) 


150        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

The  ground  to  be  covered  in  depth  may  also  be  a 
large  one. 

The  main  body  must  in  any  case  be  provided  with  a 
zone  of  manoeuvre,  but  it  is  also  necessary  to  hold  safely 
all  the  issues  which  the  main  body  must  utilise  in  order 
to  deploy. 

To  hold  these  issues  safely  means  enabling  troops  to 
perform  under  good  cover  the  double  operation  of 
arrival  and  deployment.  The  advance  guard  must 
hold  the  keys  of  the  avenues  of  approach  whereby 
arrival  is  effected  or  debouching  from  which  deployment 
is  made.     And  these  keys  are  : 

(1)  The  "  points  d'appui  "  where  an  enemy  marching 
on  such  avenues  may  be  held  up  before  he  reaches  them. 

(2)  The  commanding  points  whence  the  adversary 
might  act  either  by  firing  on  those  avenues,  or  on  the 
deployment  ground  in  front  of  them. 

Thus  the  German  advance  guards  of  the  Second  Army 
establish  themselves,  on  August  3rd,  1870,  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Lauter,  because  the  army  behind  them  has 
to  cross  the  river  on  the  following  day  :  this  is  tactical 
security. 

Thus  again  the  Francois  brigade  of  the  Kamecke 
division  arrives  at  Sarrebruck  on  August  6th.  The 
bridges  are  untouched,  the  brigade  immediately  seizes 
them.  In  this  way  it  secures  for  the  army  corps  the 
material  means  of  crossing  the  Sarre.  But  this  is  still 
no  more  than  bare  occupation ;  possession  must  be 
secured,  that  is  the  power  to  make  use  of  the  bridges. 
The  advance  guard  can  only  secure  that  power  by 
seizing  the  heights  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Sarre.  Nothing 
can  be  done  as  long  as  one  does  not  hold  the  heights; 
the  advance  guard  marches  on  them;  it  so  marched 
and  reached  them  for  the  sake  of  obtaining  tactical 
security. 

But  there  remains  a  further  point.  So  long  as  we  have 
not  beaten  or  at  least  attacked  the  enemy,  he  keeps  his 
freedom  of  action ;  he  remains  free  to  alter  his  situation 
or  to  shun  the  manoeuvre  we  are  preparing  against  him. 

The  two  first  results  attained  by  the  advance  guard  : 

The  reconnoitring  of  the  enemy : 

The  covering  of  our  own  forces,- — these  would  not  be  of 
the  slightest  use  to  us  if  the  advance  guard  did  no  more. 


THE   ADVANCE    GUARD  151 

The  reconnoitred  enemy  might  at  the  last  m.oment 
alter  his  dispositions,  or,  if  need  be,  steal  away.  The 
manoeuvre  we  had  carefully  prepared  and  covered 
would  be  void  from  the  very  moment  we  began  to  carry 
it  out. 

Let  us  recall  the  morning  of  August  6th,  at  Woerth. 
The  French  were  no  longer  seen  from  the  Prussian  camp, 
as  they  had  been  the  night  before.  A  reconnaissance 
was  ordered  to  find  out  whether  things  were  in  the  same 
state  as  on  the  preceding  day.  That  reconnaissance  made 
it  known  that  the  French  were  still  in  force  on  the  Sarre, 
but  that  they  seemed  to  be  retiring;  movements  of 
trains  were  heard  at  Niederbronn  railway  station  which 
confirmed  the  idea  of  a  retreat.  The  advance  guard 
attacked.  It  is  indeed  of  the  highest  importance  that 
at  the  time  of  going  into  action  the  enemy  should  not 
be  free  to  do  what  he  likes  and  to  avoid  the  shock 
which  we  have  prepared. 

The  reconnaissance  must  therefore  be  followed  by 
an  attack,  made  by  the  advance  guard  with  the  object 
of  fixing  the  adversary,  more  especially  if,  in  the  course 
of  the  reconnaissance,  the  enemy  has  been  found  to  be 
manoeuvring. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  retreat  of  the  First  French 
Corps  on  August  5th  would  have  enabled  it  to  join, 
before  the  battle,  the  Fifth  and  Seventh  Corps ;  a  junction 
which,  as  a  fact,  only  took  place  much  later,  at  the  Camp 
de  Chalons,  after  two  of  these  army  corps  had  been 
considerably  reduced  in  numbers  by  fighting,  while 
the  third  had  largely  lost  its  moral. 

Again  at  Spickeren,  on  the  same  day  :  General  von 
Francois,  after  carrying  the  heights  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Sarre,  attacked  the  Rotherberg,  because  he  thought 
the  enemy  was  retreating.  He  had  to  hold  him,  for  you 
cannot  strike  an  adversary  who  is  stealing  away  from 
you,  3^ou  cannot  manoeuvre  against  a  moving  enemy. 
You  have  first  to  nail  him  to  the  ground;  then  only 
will  the  manoeuvre  you  have  prepared  serve  its  purpose ; 
then  only  will  that  manoeuvre  be  a  rational  one,  and 
correspond  to  the  enemy's  actual  situation. 

You  cannot  strike  with  your  fist  an  enemy  who  is 
running  away  in  order  to  shun  the  blow.  You  must 
first  take  him  by  the  collar  to  compel  him  to  receive  the 
blow. 


152        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Taking  the  enemy  by  the  collar  is  the  function  of  the 
advance  guard. 

Those  three  unavoidable  conditions  of  war :  the 
unknown,  dispersion,  freedom  of  the  enemy,  gave  rise 
to  the  advance  guard  and  determine  its  threefold  task, 
which  is  : 

(1)  To  inform,  and  therefore  to  reconnoitre  up  to  the 
moment  the  main  body  goes  into  action. 

(2)  To  cover  the  gathering  of  the  main  body  and  to 
prepare  its  entrance  on  the  field. 

(3)  To  fix  the  adversary  one  intends  attacking. 
These  characteristic  features  of  the  advance  guard 

must  never  be  lost  sight  of  when  we  take  our  dispositions. 
We  have  to  give  each  the  importance  which  attaches 
to  it  according  to  circumstances.  That  measure  of  im- 
portance attaching  to  each  function  cannot  be  deter- 
mined here.  It  varies  from  one  situation  to  the  other. 
The  proper  way  of  handling  an  advance  guard  natur- 
ally results  from  this  threefold  task  : 

I.  There  must  be  an  offensive — 

(1)  In  order  to  reconnoitre ;  that  is,  in  order  to  peer 
through  the  service  of  security  established  on  his  side 
by  the  adversary,  and  to  reach  his  main  body  and  compel 
it  to  show  itself. 

(2)  In  order  to  conquer  the  ground  necessary  to  the 
protective  mission  of  the  advance  guard. 

(3)  In  order  to  conquer  the  ground  necessary  to  its 
own  preparatory  mission,  as  well  as  the  space  needed 
by  the  main  body  for  going  into  action;  room  for 
approach,  and  room  of  deployment. 

That  offensive  must,  however,  be  methodically  con- 
ducted. 

II.  Then  there  must  be  a  defensive,  after  one  has 
finished  scouting ;  after  one  holds  the  ground  necessary 
to  the  protection  and  preparation  of  the  main  body's 
action,  and  after  one  has  nothing  left  to  do  but  to  keep 
it.  Thus  the  advance  guard  of  the  Kettler  brigade, 
once  it  had  arrived  and  established  itself  on  the  heights 
east  of  Changey  Farm  at  Daix,  stood  fast. 

So  regarded,  the  tactics  of  the  advance  guard  make  an 
appeal  to  the  resisting  power  of  a  force,  and  to  its  ability 
to  last  out.  They  utilise  to  this  end  everything  which 
may  further   these   two   distinct   properties,    positions, 


THE   ADVANCE   GUARD  153 

"  points  d'appiii,"  long-range  fire,  manoeuvring  to  the 
rear,  in  retreat. 

III.  Lastly  comes  an  offensive  again,  in  order  to 
immobilise  an  adversary  who  might  otherwise  get  away 
or  manoeuvre. 

How  can  these  three  tasks,  it  may  be  asked,  be 
performed  simultaneously,  since  they  may  require 
different  means  of  execution?  How  can  offensive  and 
defensive  be  simultaneously  resorted  to  ?  Attack  must 
obviously  come  first,  but  one  must  always  preserve  the 
power  to  resort  to  an  efficient  defensive  should  the 
necessity  arise. 

While  we  make  a  methodical  offensive  with  part  of 
our  forces,  we  should  devote  the  rest  to  occupying  and 
organising  the  "  points  d'appui  "  in  the  rear;  we  should, 
of  course,  be  careful  to  advance  that  line  of  resistance  in 
proportion  as  our  offensive  progresses. 

This  short  analysis  gives  one  a  glimpse  of  the  various 
shapes  and  aspects  the  combat  of  the  advance  guard 
can  assume,  according  to  the  development  and  diffi- 
culties of  each  of  the  three  problems  that  have  to  be 
solved,  according  also  to  the  particular  circumstances 
of  time,  space,  site,  and  enemy  in  each  case. 

There  is  no  one  form,  no  one  type  of  combat  for  the 
advance  guard;  there  is  no  one  formula  summing  it 
up  as  a  whole. 

The  same  applies  to  the  composition  of  the  advance 
guard. 

This  composition  is  determined  by  the  threefold 
mission  an  advance  guard  has  to  fulfil : 

In  order  to  reconnoitre,  you  obviously  need  cavalry; 
but  infantry  and  artillery  are  equally  needed  in  order 
to  overcome  the  first  resistance  of  the  enemy,  to  reach 
his  main  body,  and  to  compel  the  latter  to  deploy. 

In  order  to  cover  and  to  last  out,  firing  troops,  more- 
over troops  firing  at  a  long  range,  are,  as  we  have  seen, 
indispensable;  they  must  be  capable  of  resistance,  of 
holding  their  ground  strongly :  hence  the  need  of 
infantry  and  artillery. 

In  order  to  fix  the  enemy,  the  offensive  must  obviously 
be  resorted  to  and  must  be  carried  far  enough  to 
threaten  the  adversary  at  close  quarters,  otherwise  he 
may  escape  :   the  more  need  for  infantry. 

We  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  advance  guard  must 


154         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF    WAR 

be  composed  of  all  three  arms,  if  it  is  to  become  that 
organ  of  information,  of  protection,  and  of  preparation, 
which  we  desire. 

To  this  advance  guard  of  the  three  arms  has  been 
frequently  opposed  the  theory  of  an  advance  guard  of 
cavalry  alone. 

We  have  already  seen  that,  even  from  the  point  of 
view  of  intelligence,  that  arm,  if  used  alone,  is  insufficient. 
Its  imperfection  becomes  still  more  obvious  when  the 
two  other  functions  of  an  advance  guard,  (1)  protection 
and  preparation,  (2)  seizing  the  adversary,  are  taken 
into  account. 

Cavalry,  which  is  essentially  an  arm  of  shock,  of 
immediate  decision,  does  not  in  the  least  fulfil  the 
condition  of  tenacity  we  require. 

Again,  it  guarantees  space  but  imperfectly,  because  it 
does  not  hold  the  ground ;   it  does  not  occupy  the  soil. 

Reinforced  by  artillery,  it  presents  a  greater  force  of 
action  and  resistance ;  still,  it  finds  it  difficult  to  conquer 
and  to  possess. 

Besides,  even  if  only  partially  beaten,  cavalry  runs 
a  great  risk  of  losing  its  artillery.  The  latter  cannot  act 
efficiently  unless  it  is  guarded  solidly  by  a  force  in  fairly 
close  touch  with  it.     It  has  to  be  supported  by  infantry. 

The  advance  guard,  then,  needs  all  three  arms.  As 
it  acts  independently,  it  must  also  be  under  a  single 
commander. 

This  conception  of  the  advance  guard,  which  we  have 
attempted  to  base  on  abstract  reasoning,  is  one  of  the 
characteristic  features  of  Napoleon's  tactics.  We  shall 
see  this  later  on. 

Napoleon  wrote  : 

"  An  army  must  be  ready  every  day,  every  night  and 
at  every  hour,  to  oppose  all  the  resistance  of  which  it  is 
capable ;  this  requires  that  all  the  various  divisions  of 
the  army  be  constantly  in  position  to  help,  support, 
and  mutually  protect  each  other ;  that,  whenever  troops 
are  camping,  halting  or  marching,  they  should  adopt 
such  advantageous  dispositions  as  are  required  on  the 
battle-field  itself :  namely,  that  the  flanks  be  supported 
and  that  all  missile  weapons  shall  be  available  under  the 
most  favourable  conditions.  In  order  to  comply  with 
those    conditions,    it   is   necessary,    when   marching   in 


THE   ADVANCE    GUARD  155 

column,  to  provide  advance  guards  and  flanking  parties 
who  should  scout  ahead  and  to  the  right  and  to  the 
left,  far  enough  off  on  all  sides  to  allow  the  main  body 
to  deploy  and  take  up  its  position. 

"  The  Austrian  tacticians  have  constantly  violated 
those  principles,  and  have  based  their  plans  on  uncertain 
reports,  reports  which,  moreover,  even  if  they  had  been 
true  at  the  time  of  framing  the  plans,  ceased  to  be  true 
on  the  morrow  or  the  day  after  the  morrow;  that  is, 
at  the  moment  when  the  plans  had  to  be  carried  out." 

Two  things,  therefore,  were  necessary  in  the  Emperor's 
opinion  ; 

(1)  Troops  must  be  constantly  able  to  oppose  to  the 
enemy  the  whole  power  they  are  capable  of;  they  must 
organise  their  forces  with  that  object  in  every  situation  : 
even  while  marching  or  bivouacking  or  when  billeted. 

(2)  It  is  necessary,  at  the  moment  of  going  into  action 
and  of  framing  a  plan,  to  do  it  only  after  having  received 
reports  which  are  certain  and  true  at  that  moment.  It 
is  therefore  necessary  to  organise  an  intelligence  service 
capable  of  supplying  such  reports. 

How  can  those  two  necessary  things  be  done  ? 

I.  "  An  army  must  be  constantly  ready  to  oppose  all 
the  resistance  it  is  capable  of." 

Now,  it  is  impossible  to  keep  all  the  forces  of  an  army, 
or  even  of  an  army  corps,  or  even  of  a  division,  in  a  state 
which  shall  allow  for  the  use  of  all  its  means,  missile 
weapons  and  others,  when  the  troops  are  halting;  it 
is  even  less  possible  to  do  so  when  they  are  on  the  march. 
You  cannot  halt  or  march  in  combat  formation.  How 
can  the  necessity  clearly  pointed  out  by  Napoleon  be 
reconciled  with  the  radical  incompatibilities  thus  dis- 
covered in  practice,  if  it  be  not  through  utilising  that 
property  in  troops  which  is  both  original  and  fostered 
by  training,  namely,  resisting  power?  It  is  this  which 
enables  a  certain  fraction,  the  advance  guard,  specially 
organised  and  arranged  with  that  object,  to  receive  the 
enemy  and  to  hold  him  up  during  the  time  necessary 
for  the  main  body  to  take  up  its  combat  formation. 

Moreover,  the  whole  effort  which  a  force  can  and 
must  exert  in  order  to  master  the  enemy  cannot  be 
produced  in  one  single  moment.  The  commander  of 
an  army  corps  who  disposes  of  eight  infantry  regiments 


156        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

will  not  send  them  into  action  all  at  once ;  even  should 
they  all  be  available,  assembled  and  to  hand.  Unity  of 
time  does  not  mean  unity  of  moment.  When  we  come 
to  studying  the  battle,  the  act  of  force,  we  shall  see  that 
this  act  of  war  divides  itself  into  a  series  of  operations, 
a  succession  of  efforts  tending  : 

(1)  Some  to  enlighten  the  command. 

(2)  Others  to  absorb,  to  wear  out,  the  enemy's 
activities. 

(3)  Others,  again,  to  overthrow,  by  means  of  a  violent 
shock,  the  balance  between  the  pressure  of  the  assailant 
and  the  resistance  of  the  defender. 

Any  sound  utilisation  of  forces,  even  should  it  aim 
at  a  complete  decision,  implies  the  notion  of  a  progres- 
sion, a  succession  in  the  act  of  consuming  such  forces. 
Those  which  have  gone  first  into  action  must  have  pro- 
duced their  own  effect  before  others  can  utilise  that 
effect.  Such  a  notion  of  succession,  I  say  again,  is  not 
contrary  to  unity  of  time ;  some  period  must  necessarily 
be  set  in  order  to  allow  troops  and  arms  to  produce  the 
whole  effect  of  which  they  are  capable. 

Thus,  to  quote  but  one  instance,  we  shall  see  in  the 
attack  upon  a  place  : 

Artillery  : 

(1)  Silencing  the  enemy  batteries  which  defend  its 
approaches. 

(2)  Preparing  the  attack  by  firing  on  the  objective 
so  as  to  make  it  untenable. 

(3)  Following  up  the  attack. 
Infantry  : 

(1)  Reconnoitring  points  occupied  by  the  enemy. 

(2)  Investing  the  position,  keeping  it  under  a  powerful 
fire. 

(3)  Assaulting  the  position. 

All  of  which  successive  operations  are  necessary  in 
order  to  achieve  the  best  possible  use  of  forces,  and  do 
not  require  till  the  last  moment  the  simultaneous  action 
of  all  these  forces. 

We  now  have  discovered  the  combination  of  elements 
we  require. 

The  solution  of  the  problem  results  from  : 

(1)  The  fact  that  it  is  impossible  to  keep  all  troops 
constantly  ready  to  fight. 

(2)  The  fact  that  it  is  sufficient  to  keep,  at  first,  only 


THE   ADVANCE    GUARD  15T 

part  of  our  forces  in  a  position  to  go  immediately  into 
action. 

Those  forces,  be  they  marching  or  even  in  action,  will 
have  constantl^^  to  be  divided  into  two  parts  : 

The  7nain  body  and  the  advance  guard ;  an  advance 
guard  strong  enough  to  meet  the  first  requirements 
and  guaranteeing  for  the  main  body  the  possibility  of 
convenient  approach,  both  in  time  and  place,  so  as  to 
exert  all  the  power  of  which  the  force  is  capable. 

II.  Napoleon  has,  however,  stated  a  second  thing 
to  be  necessary ;  namely,  that  plans  should  be  based  on 
reports  which  should  be  certain  and  true  at  the  moment 
of  going  into  action.  ..."  To  this  end,"  he  says,  "  it 
is  necessary  to  provide  scouting  advance  guards,  and 
scouts  and  flanking  parties." 

Independently  from  the  task  assigned  above  to  the 
advance  guard — constantly  keeping  the  covered  troop 
in  a  state  of  readiness  for  action — there  is,  then,  a  second 
task  : 

Reconnoitring  the  situation  by  means  of : 

(1)  Certain  reports,  which  must  go  beyond  the  external 
limit  of  the  enemy's  security  service  and  bear  on  his 
main  body. 

(2)  Reports  t7'ue  up  to  the  last  moment,  a  condition 
implying  that  the  organ  of  intelligence,  that  is,  the 
advance  guard,  should  keep  in  touch  with  the  enemy, 
once  he  has  been  reached,  until  the  very  last  hour. 

From  this  twofold  necessity,  that  of  always  keeping 
troops  in  a  state  of  readiness  for  fighting,  and  that  of 
reconnoitring  the  situation  in  a  certain  and  positive  way 
until  the  moment  when  the  plan  is  settled,  results  again 
the  advance  guard  with  its  threefold  mission  : 

To  inform. 

To  protect. 

To  come  up  to,  and  keep  in  touch  with,  the  enemy. 

We  might  also  say  that  the  advance  guard  is  necessary 
until  the  moment  comes  when  the  main  body  goes  into 
action,  that  is,  until  the  main  body  has  actually  deployed 
and  begun  to  act  upon  the  enemy. 

We  insist  on  this  point  because  people  willingly 
acknowledge,  in  practice,  an  advance  guard  to  be  neces- 
sary in  front  of  a  marching  column ;  they  are  less  pre- 
pared to  acknowledge  that  necessity  where  an  assembled 


158         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

force  is  concerned ;  they  deny  it  altogether  concerning  a 
deployed  force. 

This  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  any  force,  merely  because 
it  has  assembled  and  deployed,  has  the  right  : 

To  pass  from  one  surprise  to  another,  to  manoeuvre 
in  the  midst  of  danger,  to  fall  unexpectedly  under  that 
hail  of  deadly  projectiles  which  modern  infantry  can 
pour  out  from  a  distance  of  2000  yards,  and  artillery 
from  4000  yards ;  a  fire  which  is  bound  to  demoralise 
any  formation  (especially  assemblies  of  troops).  And 
all  this  will  take  place  unless  the  danger  has  been 
previously  ascertained  by  an  advance  guard,  and  unless 
that  organ  has  been  kept  in  being  and  at  work  up  to 
the  last  moment. 

It  is  also  as  much  as  to  say  that  one  may  base  one's 
plan  of  action  on  reports  of  an  uncertain  nature,  or 
which,  even  had  they  been  true  at  the  moment  of 
deployment,  have  ceased  to  be  so  at  the  moment  of 
attack  :  that  is,  a  long  time  after  deployment,  given  the 
long  distance  at  which  deployment  must  nowadays  be 
effected. 

We  therefore  conclude  a  second  time  that,  in  front  of 
any  troop  not  in  action,  an  advance  guard  (of  changeable 
shape  and  use)  is  constantly  necessary  in  the  direction 
of  the  enemy;  an  advance  guard  which  should  always 
be  ready  to  handle  the  enemy,  to  receive  him  if  he  comes 
on;  again  an  advance  guard  which  should  never  lose 
sight  of  the  enemy,  but  should  compel  him  to  show  what 
he  is,  what  he  wants;  which  should  thus  enable  the 
commander  to  avoid  fighting,  if  he  does  not  intend  fight- 
ing or  has  received  orders  contrary  to  that  effect ;  which 
should  enable  him  to  risk  a  battle  under  favourable 
conditions,  that  is,  after  reflecting  and  conveniently 
distributing  his  troops  with  full  knowledge  of  the 
case. 

Which  should  guarantee  the  commander's  freedom  of 
action,  his  power  to  march,  to  go  where  he  chooses,  to 
assemble. 

Which  should,  moreover,  guarantee  the  free  use  of 
all  forces,  that  is,  the  possibility  of  using  them  according 
to  a  plan  based  on  well-ascertained  facts,  and  in  spite 
of  the  enemy. 

When  should  the  plan  of  action  be  made?  At  the 
moment  when  execution  can  begin  and  after  receiving 


THE   ADVANCE    GUARD  159 

the   latest   reports.     Let   us   remember   how  Napoleon 
blamed  Alvinzi : 

"  What  ought  Alvinzi  to  have  done  ?  To  have 
marched  in  one  single  mass,  not  to  have  taken  any  dis- 
positions for  attacking  the  Joubert  division,  until  the 
morning  and  after  reconnoitring  it.  As  a  matter  of 
principle,  no  detachment  "  (we  should  say  to-day  :  *'  no 
deployment "),  "  should  be  made  on  the  eve  of  an 
attack ;  for  the  state  of  affairs  may  change  during  the 
night,  either  owing  to  retreating  movements  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy,  or  owing  to  strong  reinforcements  coming 
up  and  enabling  hiin  to  take  the  offensive  and  to  turn 
our  own  premature  dispositions  into  disaster." 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD 

(See  Sketch  No.  5) 

To  what  acts  does  this  theoretical  function  of  an 
advance  guard,  as  defined  above,  actually  lead  in  a 
specific  case  and  under  particular  circumstances?  We 
shall  find  an  example  in  the  battle  of  Nachod. 

On  June  22nd,  1866,  an  order  reached  the  General 
Headquarters  of  the  First  and  Second  Prussian  Armies, 
at  Joerlitz  and  at  Neisse,  to  enter  Bohemia  and  aim  at 
effecting  a  junction  in  the  direction  of  Gitschin. 

To  the  Second  Army  belong  the  First,  Fifth,  Sixth 
Corps  and  the  Guard.  The  army  commander  took  his 
dispositions  in  view  of  entering  Bohemia  on  June  27th, 
by  three  roads  leading  to  Trantenau,  Eipel,  and  Nachod 
respectively.  On  June  28th  the  march  was  to  be  resumed 
beyond  the  Elbe  via  Arnau  and  Gradlitz. 

The  Fifth  Corps  (Steinmetz),  on  the  left,  was  to  operate 
by  the  Nachod  road,  upon  which  the  Seventh  Corps  was 
to  follow  later  on. 

The  First  Corps,  on  the  right,  was  to  operate  by  the 
road  to  Trantenau,  whilst  the  Guard  was  to  advance, 
in  the  centre,  by  the  Eipel  road,  ready  to  support 
either  of  the  wings,  according  to  circumstances. 

In  the  afternoon  of  June  26th  the  Fifth  Corps  had  : 

Its  main  body  assembled  in  bivouacs,  west  of  Reinerz, 
astride  the  road  leading  to  Nachod. 

Its  advance  guard  at  Lewin — the  head  of  that  advance 
guard  at  Gellenau; 

Its  reserves,  packs  and  convoys  at  Riickerts  and 
beyond. 

It  was  ready  to  undertake  the  invasion  ordered  for 
the  27th. 

According  to  the  time-table  drawn  up  by  the  army 
commander,  it  had,  on  that  day  of  the  27th,  to  reach 

160 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  161 

Nachod  with  its  main  body,  Wysokow  with  its  advance 
guard. 

Conforming  himself  to  the  intentions  of  the  high 
command,  the  army  corps  commander  prescribed  the 
advance  guard  to  push  on  its  outposts,  during  the 
evening  of  the  26th,  as  far  as  the  Mettau,  which  forms 
the  frontier.  He  had  heard  that  an  enemy  army  corps 
had  arrived  at  Opocno  and  was  spreading  north  of 
that  town;  that  enemy  columns  were  also  assembling 
near  Skalitz;  that  the  Nachod  pass  was  weakly 
held. 

In  consequence  of  these  dispositions,  the  advance 
guard  commander.  General  von  Loewenfeld,  arrived  on 
the  Mettau  in  the  evening  of  the  26th,  with  the  head 
of  the  advance  guard;  he  found  the  bridges  cut,  the 
customs  house  and  its  approaches  weakly  held  by 
some  Austrian  detachments ;  he  easily  got  the  better  of 
the  latter. 

He  then  decided  to  extend  his  reconnaissance,  to 
march  on  Nachod  with  his  first  troops  and  to  occupy 
with  his  outposts  the  heights  commanding  that  place 
west  of  the  Mettau. 

Meanwhile,  the  destroyed  bridges  on  the  Mettau  at 
Schlaney  had  been  repaired  and  enabled  the  head  ^  of 
the  Prussian  advance  guard  to  cross  the  river. 

The  Austrians  had  occupied  Nachod  with  a  weak 
detachment :  a  half-company  of  infantry,  two  squadrons 
of  cuirassiers,  and  two  guns.  This  detachment  withdrew 
"\\dthout  offering  any  serious  resistance,  but  it  informed 
by  telegraph  General  Benedeck,  at  Josephstadt,  at 
8.30  of  what  was  happening. 

A  short  time  after,  the  head  of  the  Prussian  advance 
guard  had  occupied  : 

Nachod,  with  its  two  Jager  battalions  which  estab- 
lished outposts  far  ahead  on  the  road  to  Skalitz ; 

The  heights  north  and  south  of  the  road  (in  a  line 
with  Nachod)  with  both  half -battalions  of  the  3rd  and 
37th,  each  guarding  itself  by  a  few  posts ; 

The  remainder  of  the  head  of  the  advance  guard 
(2nd  and  37th  and  both  squadrons)  was  bivouacking 
somewhat  in  the  rear  on  the  road; 

^  Two  companies  of  the  5th  Jager  battaKon;  two  battalions  (2nd, 
3rd)  of  the  37th ;  two  squadrons  of  the  4th  Dragoons ;  one  battery  oi 
four. 

M 


162        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

The  advance  guard's  main  body  ^  had  proceeded  as 
far  as  the  Mettau  and  established  itself,  for  the  night, 
south  of  the  road,  in  a  line  with  Schlaney,  the  1st 
battalion  of  the  37th  at  the  bridge. 

The  Seventh  Corps,  on  its  part,  had  received  on  June 
24th,  while  in  bivouac  by  Koppernig,  the  order  to  place 
at  the  disposal  of  General  Steinmetz,  commanding  the 
Fifth  Army  Corps,  the  22nd  Infantry  brigade,  two  bat- 
teries, and  the  8th  Dragoons.  This  detachment,  under 
General  Hoffmann,  did  not,  as  a  fact,  join  the  Fifth  Corps 
until  the  28th ;  that  is,  on  the  battle-field  itself.  It  did  not 
take  any  part  in  the  battle  of  the  27th,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  8th  Dragoons,  which,  by  two  forced  marches, 
reached  Reinerz  bivouac  in  the  night  of  the  26th-27th, 
and  formed  with  the  1st  Uhlans  and  a  horse  battery  of 
the  Fifth  Corps  a  brigade  under  General  von  Wniick. 

In  the  evening  of  June  26th,  then,  the  Fifth  Corps  was 
distributed  as  follows  : 

Head  of  the  advance  guard  at  Nachod ; 

Main  body  of  the  advance  guard  on  a  line  with  Schlaney 
(one  battalion,  one  squadron  at  the  bridge); 

Main  body  of  the  army  corps  assembled  at  Reinerz; 

Reserves  at  Riickerts;  packs  and  convoys  further 
back; 

Hoffmann  detachment  about  to  join  the  army  corps. 

On  the  Austrian  side,  as  is  well  known,  the  Northern 
Army,  after  concentrating  in  Moravia  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  fortified  town  of  Olmiitz,  had  been  set  in 
movement  in  the  middle  of  June  in  order  to  proceed  to 
Bohemia,  towards  the  position  Josephstadt — Miletin. 
In  order  to  cover  that  movement.  General  Benedeck 
decided,  on  the  night  of  the  26th-27th,  to  send,  on 
June  27th,  the  Fifth  and  Tenth  Corps  towards  the 
avenues  of  approach — Nachod  and  Trantenau.^ 

So  far  as  the  Sixth  Corps  was  concerned,  the  com- 
mander-in-chief ordered  it,  on  the  night  of  the  26th-27th, 
"  to  start  on  the  27th  from  Opocno  in  direction  of  Skalitz, 
where  the  army  corps  shall  take  up  a  position,  while 
sending  an  advance  guard  on  to  Nachod. 

^  1st  battalion  of  the  37th;  three  battalions  of  the  58th;  two  com- 
panies of  the  5th  Jager  battalion ;  three  squadrons  of  the  4th  Dragoons ; 
one  battery  of  four  pieces;  two  companies  of  pioneers. 

2  See  the  detail  and  circumstances  of  that  order  on  p.  169. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  168 

"  This  disposition  is  intended  to  cover  the  move- 
ment of  concentration  of  the  army  that  is  taking  place 
in  the  surroundings  of  Josephstadt." 

What  was  the  situation  of  tlie  Sixth  Corps  when  that 
order  readied  it  ?  It  was  lying,  on  the  26th,  north  of 
Opocno  in  the  following  order  : 

Jonack  brigade  ^  withl 


1  regiment  of  Uh- 
lans (the  10th)  at 
Kronitz  and  Waly 
covered  at 


r\u   •  T,       u    fl  Jager  battalion 
Ohnishow  by-v'         *=    ■, 

*^  (1  squadron 

ri  battalion  of  the 

Spie  by  I      20th  Regiment. 

[6   platoons. 

He stweck  brigade  at  Dobeuschkaau  j   Prowoz 

Perlitz  covered  at  \  Domaschin 

Rozenzweig  brigade  at  1   p  Vi 

Waldstatten  brigade  at  <    p         T?  h     *t 

Artillery  reserve  (5  batteries)  at  \    q    v. 

General  headquarters  at  Opocno. 

On  the  evening  of  the  26th  the  Jonack  and  Hestweck 
brigades  had  scarcely  settled  down  in  their  billets  and 
inadequately  covered  themselves,  when  they  received 
an  alarm  and  took  arms  at  the  approach  of  some  Prussian 
cavalry  detachments,  which  had  come  out  on  requisi- 
tion, and  which  had  debouched  by  the  Giesshiibel  road. 
It  was  already  late  when  they  returned  to  their  posts. 

The  contrasting  distribution  on  the  ground  of  each  of 
these  two  opposing  army  corps,  Fifth  Prussian  and  Sixth 
Austrian,  shows  better  than  any  words  could  do  how 
each  side  understood  war,  how  each  side  made  war. 

On  the  Prussian  side,  we  see  : 

An  army  corps  assembled,  astride  of  the  road  it  is 
to  follow,  its  reserves  behind  it  on  the  same  road;  it 
is  ready  to  act  with  all  its  means;  its  commander  is 
with  the  troops,  effectively  commanding;  here  we 
have  a  true  combination  of  a  force  and  a  will.  More- 
over, after  Steinmetz  shall  have  moved  his  army  corps, 

(\  Jager  battalion. 
^  Each  Austrian  brigade  included,  as  is  known-]  2  infantry  regiments. 

1 1  battery  of  8  guns. 


164 


THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 


he  will  have  effected  a  junction  with  the  advance  guard ; 
he  will  be  on  the  27th,  at  8  a.m.,  at  Nachod. 

An  advance  guard  is  already  holding  the  road  far 
ahead,  on  the  Mettau,  ensuring  the  tactical  security  of 
that  corps,  clearing  the  road  for  it ;  so  deeply  conscious 
of  its  mission  that,  as  early  as  in  the  evening  of  the 
26th,  it  has  got  up  as  far  as  Nachod. 

Early  on  the  27th,  a  flank  guard  will  be  sent  to  Gies- 
shiibel  in  order  to  protect  the  movement.     Giesshiibel 


77 

^  Qwsdel'Av-O. 
UldelUv-O  yi 


SITUATION  DU5!C0RPSPRUSSIEN 
ET  DU etCORPS  AUTRICHIEN  LE  26  JUIN  AU  SOIR 


lies  in  Austrian  territory;  by  occupying  it  on  August 
26th,  the  offensive  scheme  which  had  just  been  framed 
would  have  been  disclosed.  It  was  none  the  less  occu- 
pied in  order  to  protect  the  movement  of  the  army 
corps  once  that  movement  had  begun. 

Such  dispositions  clearly  show  what  sense  of  action 
inspires  to  the  highest  degree  the  commander  of  the 
army  corps  and  the  commander  of  the  advance  guard. 
They  are  both  securing,  by  means  of  that  advance 
guard  (preparation),  of  that  flank  guard  (protection) 
the  possibility  of  carrying  out  the  single  action  which 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  165 

will  be  undertaken  with  all  forces  well  in  hand  and  in 
the  same  direction. 

Their  idea  is  to  act  with  everything  on  one  point; 
they  are  free  to  do  it,  owing  to  security;  they  will 
attain  a  decision  owing  to  the  economy  of  forces  which 
has  been  achieved  in  apportioning  those  forces  through- 
out the  column. 

On  the  Austrian  side  : 

The  army  corps  has  deployed  on  a  front  of  more 
than  six  miles,  which  enables  it  to  get  housing,  to  live, 
and  to  march  comfortably.  It  is  a  situation  which 
does  well  enough  so  long  as  no  enemy  is  present,  but 
it  little  corresponds  to  the  necessities  of  war.  Besides, 
the  army  corps  is  distributed  in  five  distinct  elements : 
four  brigades  and  an  artillery  reserve. 

Suppose,  then,  the  enemy  (who  in  war  is  always  the 
prime  objective  of  all  combinations)  should  disclose  his 
presence,  the  Sixth  Corps  would  not  be  in  a  position 
to  act  owing  : 

(1)  In  the  first  place,  to  its  being  scattered  :  it 
ought  to  be  possible  for  the  Austrian  forces  to  join 
up,  but  no  time  is  left  for  that;  there  is  no  service  of 
security  which  might  provide  the  two  or  three  quiet 
hours  required  for  concentration  on  the  front  of  more 
than  six  miles  which  has  been  taken  up. 

(2)  In  the  second  place,  to  the  parcelling  out  of 
troops.  Instead  of  opposing  an  army  corps  obeying 
one  will,  a  bundle  of  forces  acting  all  in  the  same  direc- 
tion, we  have  four  distinct  brigades  which  will  neces- 
sarily work  each  in  a  state  of  isolation,  each  on  its  own 
account.  On  the  top  of  a  dispersion  of  forces,  we  get 
a  dispersion  of  effort. 

The  army  corps  commander  is  at  Opocno,  far  away 
from  his  own  troops.  It  was,  of  course,  a  place  most 
convenient  for  working;  for  writing  out  orders.  But 
the  instrument  which  is  to  carry  out  these  orders  is 
far  from  his  hand.  It  will  either  not  carry  them  out 
at  all,  or  carry  them  out  badly. 

The  high  command  perceives  only  the  subjective 
part  of  its  task  :  securing  the  means  of  keeping  and 
leading  an  army.  It  has  completely  lost  sight  of 
the  object  to  which  that  army  is  devoted  :  fighting. 
Nothing  is  being  prepared  in  order  to  undertake  and 
carry  on  fighting  under  good  conditions.     The  notion 


166        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

of  war,  the  sense  of  action,  have  disappeared;  they 
have  been  replaced  by  mere  staff  work,  though  staffs 
have  always  been  incapable  of  creating,  of  themselves 
alone,  such  a  thing  as  victory. 

In  spite  of  all,  in  spite  of  this  complete  misappreci- 
ation  of  war,  the  Austrians  were  to  have  the  luck  at 
the  beginning  of  the  day  of  the  27th,  to  meet  with 
particularly  favourable  circumstances.  There  are  other 
things  in  war  than  principles;  there  is  time,  places, 
distances,  ground,  chance  which  cannot  be  mastered. 
The  Austrians  ended  all  the  same  in  being  beaten. 
You  cannot  violate  principles  with  impunity;  fortune 
tires  out,  mind  soon  vindicates  its  rights  over  matter 
and  chance. 

I  say  "  favourable  circumstances."  If  we  consider 
the  first  hours  of  the  day  of  the  27th,  the  Sixth  Austrian 
Army  Corps  could  quickly  reach  its  objective,  the  road 
from  Nachod  to  Skalitz,  by  marching  on  a  wide  front 
and  using  three  of  four  roads  of  which  one  only,  it  is 
true,  that  on  the  right,  was  a  highway.  The  length  of 
the  march  would  be  from  six  to  nine  miles  for  the  in- 
fantry brigades  and  eleven  miles  for  the  artillery  reserve. 
Starting  at  3  a.m.,  as  had  been  ordered,  the  infantry 
might  arrive  by  7,  artillery  by  9  or  10  (in  view  of  the 
bad  state  of  the  roads),  provided  no  enemy  should  be 
met  with  on  the  way.  A  cavalry  division  was  available 
for  the  protection  of  the  march. 

On  the  Prussian  side,  to  reach  Nachod,  the  main 
body  of  the  army  corps  had  to  cover  eleven  or  twelve 
miles,  the  reserves  thirteen;  and  this  on  one  single 
road,  along  an  almost  continuously  narrow  way. 

They  have,  of  course,  an  advance  guard  at  Nachod, 
but  it  will  have  no  more  than  its  own  unaided  strength 
until  11  or  noon.  It  may  have  to  fight  the  Austrian 
army  corps  from  as  early  as  7,  under  circumstances 
which  would  then  become  critical,  both  (1)  for  that 
advance  guard,  isolated  for  such  a  long  time;  and 
(2)  for  the  army  corps  behind  it,  which  has  only  one 
issue  by  which  to  debouch  (Nachod),  and  is  in  danger 
of  losing  it.  The  task  prescribed  to  each  one  of  these 
two  opposing  army  corps  gave  the  Austrians  an 
advantage. 

The    commander  of   the  Fifth  Prussian  Corps  could 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  167 

only  have  one  end  in  view  :  to  open  the  outlet  through 
the  mountains,  that  is,  to  take  and  keep  the  keys  of 
that  outlet  and  then  to  deploy  his  corps  in  front  of  it, 
on  the  plateau  of  Wysokow  and  Wenzelsberg.  This 
result,  if  the  enemy  did  come  on  in  order  to  oppose  it, 
could  only  be  obtained  by  a  strenuous  offensive.  It  was, 
however,  very  difficult  indeed  to  organise  an  offensive, 
in  view  of  the  nature  of  the  available  ground. 

The  commander  of  the  Sixth  Austrian  Corps  could 
interpret  his  mission  in  one  of  two  ways,  as  he  had  been 
urged  either  to  take  up  a  position  near  Skalitz,  or,  if 
the  enemy  would  come  on,  to  attack  with  the  utmost 
energy.  In  both  cases  the  result  could  be  easily 
attained.  Should  he  decide  to  take  up  a  position  near 
Skalitz,  he  would  find  near  Kleny  ground  with  extensive 
observation,  allowing  for  the  advantageous  use  of  the 
three  arms,  as  will  be  shown  later  on. 

He  could  reach  that  position  on  the  27th  without  any 
material  difficulty,  owing  to  the  short  distances  in- 
volved ;  and  without  any  tactical  difficulty,  provided  he 
took  the  most  elementary  precautions.  For  the  Prussian 
enemy  needed  the  whole  day  before  he  could  bring  up 
to  Nachod  a  force  equivalent  to  an  army  corps.  Once 
that  position  should  have  been  reached,  the  Austrian 
commander  had  the  time  to  occupy  and  organise  it  in 
the  evening  of  the  27th  and  the  morning  of  the  28th, 
Still,  in  order  to  do  this,  he  had  first  to  set  up  a  scheme 
and  to  try  and  carry  it  out. 

Should  he,  on  the  contrary,  resort  to  an  offensive,  he 
would  dispose  of  ground  favourable  to  manoeuvring; 
he  could  array  on  that  ground  a  whole  army  corps 
which  would  have  freedom  of  movement,  and  which 
would  find  itself  under  excellent  conditions  for  fighting 
forces  echeloned  along  a  long  road  with  only  one  outlet 
(Nachod)  whereby  to  debouch.  Even  so,  in  order  to 
reach  that  result,  it  was  necessary  to  envisage  this 
offensive,  to  prepare  it,  and,  the  opportunity  arising, 
to  carry  out  its  rational  realisation. 

A  comparison  between  the  times  at  which,  by  mere 
chance,  the  movements  began,  shows  that  even  from 
that  point  of  view  fortune  was  markedly  in  favour  of 
the  Austrian  commander. 

No  result  could  be  secured,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the 
Prussian  corps,  until  it  should  have  taken  firm  posses- 


168         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

sion  of  the  plateau  west  of  Nachod,  a  plateau  marked 
by  Wenzelsberg,  Wysokow,  and  the  heights  of  Nachod. 
Any  enemy  holdmg  these  points  might  obviously 
endanger  everything  :  entrance  on  the  battle-field,  de- 
ployment of  the  army  corps.  But  these  indispensable 
"  points  d'appui  "  could  only  be  reached  by  the  Prus- 
sians from  a  distance  of  fourteen  miles  and  a  half. 

As  for  the  Austrians,  if  they  did  adopt  the  idea  of  an 
offensive  with  a  view  to  throwing  the  Prussians  back 
on  to  the  road  by  which  they  came,  Wenzelsberg  and 
Wyzokow  had  to  be  taken  as  first  objectives  so  as  to 
be  made  the  "  points  d'appui  "  and  the  starting-points 
for  all  their  actions  to  that  effect.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
they  kept  to  carrying  out  the  defensive  plan  which 
consisted  in  taking  up  a  position  near  Kleny,  while 
retaining  the  possibility  of  acting  later  on  against  the 
outlet  of  Nachod,  it  was  still  the  possession  of  Wysokow 
and  Wenzelsberg  which  they  had  above  all  to  secure. 
These  points  were  not  more  than  seven  and  a  half  miles 
distant  from  both  the  Jonack  and  the  Hestweck  brigades, 
which  could,  besides,  be  supported  without  delay  and 
might  therefore  exert  themselves  thoroughly  without 
regard  to  losses. 

It  was  seven  and  a  half  miles  as  against  fourteen  and 
a  half.  Had  the  Prussians  and  the  Austrians  set  out 
at  the  same  hour,  the  Austrians  would,  then,  be  fighting 
for  three  or  four  hours  with  an  indisputable  numerical 
superiority.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Prussian 
dispositions,  taken  for  the  27th,  were  two  hours  behind 
the  Austrian  dispositions.  The  first  (the  Prussians) 
had  orders  to  start  at  5  a.m.,  the  Austrians  at  3.  This 
meant  a  total  handicap  of  five  or  six  hours  in  favour  of 
the  Austrian  brigades,  an  indisputable  advantage  they 
might  well  utilise  against  the  Prussian  corps.  They 
would,  during  all  that  time,  be  faced  by  nothing  but  a 
weak  advance  guard  at  Nachod  of  six  battalions  and 
a  half.  Moreover,  they  had  one  cavalry  division  at 
their  disposal. 

Such  were  the  exceptionally  difficult  circumstances 
(they  could  have  been  partly  foreseen,  this  is  why  we 
are  laying  stress  on  them  in  the  course  of  the  present 
study)  under  which  the  Prussian  general  had  to  make 
his  column  debouch  from  a  long  road  and  deploy  from 
its  point  of  issue  at  Nachod. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  169 

The  task  of  his  advance  guard  would  consist  in  pro- 
tecting those  operations.  A  very  heavy  task  indeed, 
when  we  consider  the  numerical  superiority  the  advance 
guard  would  have  to  contend  against  and  the  length  of 
time  during  which  it  would  have  to  resist. 

How  did  the  advance  guard  manage  to  achieve  that 
task?     This  is  what  we  shall  now  examine. 


The  Evening  of  June  26th  at  both  General 
Headquarters 

On  the  Prussian  side,  as  we  already  know,  the  advance 
guard  of  General  von  Loewenfeld  had  proceeded  on 
its  own  initiative  from  the  Mettau  to  Nachod.  This 
was,  as  we  shall  see  by  and  by,  a  mistake,  a  rash  act 
which  Steinmetz  ought  not  to  have  allowed;  for  it 
might  endanger  first  the  advance  guard,  then  the 
movement  of  the  army  corps,  which  was  a  more  serious 
tiling. 

Steinmetz  also  gave  out  his  orders  for  the  27th. 
Those  orders  proceeded  quite  naturally  from  the  idea 
which  could  already  be  perceived  in  the  echeloning 
of  the  26th.     They  ran  as  follows  : 

"  The  army  corps  will  march  on  Nachod  and  advance 
further  in  a  westerly  direction.  Everybody  will  leave 
cantonments  and  bivouacs  at  5 ;  three  ammunition 
columns  will  follow  the  reserves  without  intervals; 
other  ammunition  columns,  as  well  as  the  bridging 
companies,  will  follow  as  far  as  west  of  Reinerz,  where 
they  will  await  further  orders. 

"Baggage  will  be  packed  at  Lewin;  field  hospitals 
at  Lewin ;  convoys  west  of  Riickerts. 

"  The  Hoffmann  detachment  will  send,  in  the  evening 
of  the  26th,  the  dragoon  regiment  (No.  8)  to  the  army 
corps's  main  body,  where  they  shall  form,  together 
with  the  horse  battery  from  the  artiUery  reserve  and 
the  1st  Ulilans,  a  brigade  under  General  von  Wniick. 
With  the  rest  of  his  detachment.  General  Hoffmann 
will  cover  the  left  flank  of  the  army  corps,  more  par- 
ticularly in  the  direction  of  Giesshiibel,  and  will  expect 
further  orders  at  Lewin." 

On  the  Austrian  side.  General  Raming  was  already 
giving  out  orders  in  compliance  with  preceding  instrue- 


170        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

tions  from  General  Benedeck  (which  ordered  the  Sixth 
Corps  to  proceed  to  Joscphstadt)  when  at  1.30  a.m. 
he  received  a  new  order  dated  from  Josephstadt,  8  p.m., 
ordering  the  march  to  Nachod. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  they  had  heard  at  Austrian 
General  Headquarters  of  the  march  of  the  First  Prussian 
Corps  during  the  26th  towards  Trautenau;  also  of 
columns  approaching  Braunau;  of  a  large  mass  assem- 
bling at  Reinerz  and  Lewin,  presumably  to  march  the 
day  after  on  Nachod.  They  had  concluded  from  this 
intelligence  that  the  Second  Prussian  Army  would  soon 
enter  Bohemia. 

Benedeck  persisted  in  proceeding  with  his  scheme  of 
concentration  on  the  Jaromer-Miletin  position,  without 
attempting  to  manceuvre  against  the  Prussians  when 
they  should  debouch  from  the  mountains.  He  therefore 
gave  the  following  orders  at  8  p.m.  : 

"  From  the  latest  reports  I  have  received,  it  appears 
that  strong  enemy  detachments  are  advancing  on 
Polie,  Trautenau  and  Starkenbach.  In  consequence,  I 
order  as  follows  : 

"  The  Sixth  Corps  will  leave  Opocno  on  the  27th  instant, 
at  3  a.m.,  and  will  take  position  at  Skalitz.  An  advance 
guard  will  be  pushed  ahead  on  Nachod.  The  1st 
cavalry  division  will  be  placed  under  the  commander 
of  that  corps.  Cavalry  will  be  careful  to  scout  far 
ahead,  by  means  of  strong  patrols  in  front  and  on  the 
flanks  of  the  columns. 

"  The  Tenth  Corps  will  start  to-morrow,  27th  instant, 
at  8  a.m.  after  the  first  meal.  It  will  leave  its  heavy 
baggage  near  the  fortress  (Josephstadt)  and  will  take 
up  its  position  at  Trautenau.  An  advance  guard  will 
be  sent  ahead.  The  2nd  Dragoon  regiment  will  be 
attached  to  that  corps.  Cavalry  detachments  will 
maintain  liaison  between  the  Tenth  Corps  and  the  Sixth, 
placed  on  its  right,  and  will  cover  the  left  flank  to- 
wards Arnau  and  Hohenelbe.  The  brigade  detached  at 
Praussnitz-Kaile  will  join  up  with  the  corps  when  the 
latter  shall  be  marching  past. 

"  The  Eighth  Corps  will  proceed  to-morrow  to  Tynist, 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Josephstadt,  and  will  occupy  the 
position  left  by  the  Tenth  Corps.  The  Third  Corps  will 
leave  Koniggratz  to-morrow  and  will  establish  itself  on 
the  left  of  the  Fourth  Corps.     An  advanced  brigade  will 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  171 

scout  on  the  roads  towards  Jicin  and  Neu-Paka.  The 
Second  Corps  and  the  2nd  Hght  cavalry  division  will  pro- 
ceed, on  the  27th  instant,  from  Lenftenberg  to  Lolnitz, 
so  as  to  arrive  on  the  28th  via  Opocno  to  Josephstadt, 
and  will  camp,  in  compliance  with  instructions  pre- 
viously received,  at  Neu-Plas  and  at  Jasena  respectively. 
The  2nd  light  cavalry  division  will  relieve  the  posts 
established  by  the  1st  reserve  cavalry  division  at  Opocno, 
Dochkabrus  and  Neustadt. 

"  The  Fourth  Corps  will  remain  in  its  present  position. 
It  will  detach  one  brigade  between  Arnau  and  Falgendorf 
(north-west  of  Neu-Paka)  so  as  to  protect  the  railway. 
The  Third  and  Fourth  Corps  must  protect  the  left  flank 
of  the  army  by  means  of  cavalry  patrols  sent  out  far 
ahead.  The  2nd  reserve  cavalry  division  will  proceed 
on  the  28th  from  Holitz  to  Josephstadt,  and  will  camp 
on  the  heights  of  Smiritz,  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Elbe.  The  3rd  reserve  cavalry  division  will  leave 
Wamberg  on  the  27th,  arrive  at  Hobenbruck  the  same 
day,  and  the  day  after  (28th)  at  a  point  abreast  of 
Smiritz,  on  the  bank  of  the  Elbe,  where  it  will  camp. 

"  The  object  of  this  distribution  is  to  cover  the  concen- 
tration of  the  army  near  Josephstadt  now  being  proceeded 
with.  This  must  not  prevent  us  from  energetically  march- 
ing on  the  enemy,  should  the  opportunity  arise,  without, 
however,  pursuing  the  enemy  too  far.'" 

If  we  were  to  discuss  that  order,  we  would  find  in  it 
the  same  features  we  have  noticed  in  the  arrangement 
of  the  Sixth  Corps  on  the  evening  of  the  26th.  It  lacks 
military  spirit,  and  therefore  military  insight.  We 
have  here  not  an  army  working  in  order  to  act  against 
the  enemy  with  harmony  and  strength,  but  a  great 
number  of  army  corps,  of  cavalry  divisions,  moving 
on  a  given  ground  as  if  they  were  lifeless  beings,  pawns 
on  a  chessboard;  nowhere  (save  at  the  end  of  the 
order)  does  the  directing  thought  of  the  high  command 
declare  itself  so  as  to  make  known  the  result  which 
shall  be  not  only  defined  and  guaranteed  but  actually 
secured  by  the  carrying  out  of  that  order.  The  object 
of  that  distribution  is  to  cover  the  concentration,  now  being 
proceeded  with,  of  the  army  near  Josephstadt.  Suppose, 
however,  that  the  order  thus  minutely  drawn  up, 
cannot  be  fully  carried  out,  owing  to  the  enemy's 
actions — a    dominant  factor    which    obviously    has    to 


172        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

be  taken  into  account  in  war — what  can  then  direct  the 
performers  ?  On  the  other  hand,  the  arms  and  legs 
of  all  those  performers  have  been  carefully  tied  up  by 
determining  the  means  to  be  resorted  to,  by  enumerating 
childish  recommendations.  Suppose  the  enemy  comes 
on,  suppose  the  prescribed  means  will  not  meet  cir- 
cumstances (and  so  it  always  happens),  they  must  then 
either  disobey  or  allow  themselves  to  be  beaten,  two 
solutions  which  both  lead  to  disaster. 

That  evil  does  not  escape  the  attention  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief. He  hopes  to  lessen  it  by  adding  in 
the  end  of  his  order  : 

"  This  must  not  prevent  us  from  energetically  marching 
on  the  enemy,  should  the  opportunity  arise,  without, 
however,  pursuing  the  enemy  too  far.^' 

This  only  makes  things  worse  by  wantonly  throwing 
his  subordinates'  minds  into  uneasiness  and  confusion 
by  telling  them  at  one  and  the  same  time  :  "  Go  back 
and  go  ahead.  Take  position  .  .  .  and  still  march  on." 
As  if,  in  order  to  march  energetically  on  the  enemy, 
it  were  not  necessary  to  look  out  for  the  enemy,  to 
look  out  for  opportunities  !  The  most  disastrous  con- 
sequences will  result  from  this  fashion  of  commanding. 
It  will  always  be  so  whenever  the  commander-in-chief, 
being  unequal  to  his  own  task  owing  to  a  deficiency 
in  clear-sightedness  or  will,  tries  to  take  the  place  of  his 
subordinates,  to  think  and  decide  for  them;  in  order 
to  think  straight  and  to  decide  rightly,  it  would  be 
necessary  for  him  to  see  through  their  eyes,  to  look  at 
things  from  the  place  in  which  they  actually  stand,  to 
be  everywhere  at  the  same  moment. 

To  command,  in  the  sense  implied  by  the  extension  of 
modern  battle,  can  only  consist,  for  the  commander-in- 
chief,  in  clearly  determining  the  result  to  be  aimed  at, 
the  general  function  ascribed  to  each  subordinate  unit 
in  the  operation  undertaken  by  the  whole  of  the  forces ; 
at  the  same  time  such  a  determination  must  leave  the 
subordinate  chief  entirely  free  to  choose  the  means 
which  have  to  be  used  in  order  to  reach,  in  any  par- 
ticular case,  the  result  demanded,  and  that  in  spite  of 
adverse  circumstances  which  cannot  be  foreseen  in 
advance. 

It  follows  therefrom  that  the  army  commander, 
after  he  had  imparted  to  the  commander  of  the  Sixth 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  173 

Corps  at  Opocno  all  information  concerning  the  enemy 
which  might  be  of  interest  to  him,  and  after  he  had  let 
him  know  the  movements  of  the  army,  would  have 
done  well  to  confine  himself  to  the  following  order  : 

"  In  view  of  covering  the  concentration  which  is 
being  proceeded  with  at  Josephstadt,  you  must  proceed 
to  Skalitz,  wherefrom  you  will  hold  the  roads  to  Nachod 
and  Kosteletz.  The  reserve  cavalry  divisions  will  be 
at  your  disposal." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  General  Benedeck's  order  leaves 
Josephstadt  at  9  p.m.  At  8.50  the  news,  confirmed 
several  times  during  the  night,  comes  from  Nachod 
that  the  enemy  has  carried  and  occupied  that  place. 
This  piece  of  information,  which  would  have  been  of 
the  highest  interest  to  the  commander  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
is  not  communicated  to  him.  Raming  will  start  the 
day  after,  ignoring  the  presence  of  important  enemy 
forces  seven  miles  from  his  first-line  troops.  How 
could  Ms  disposition  correspond  to  the  reality  of 
things  ? 

It  was  only  at  1.30  a.m.  at  Opocno,  that  the  com- 
mander-in-cliief's  order  dated  8  p.m.  was  received,  in 
spite  of  the  short  distance  (nine  to  ten  miles)  which  that 
order  had  to  cover.  The  corps  commander  immediately 
altered  his  original  dispositions  and  gave,  at  2.30  a.m., 
the  following  order  : 

"  The  Hestweck  brigade  will  march  by  Bestwing, 
Spie,  Neustadt,  Wrchowin  on  Wysokow,  where  it  will 
face  east;  the  Jonack  brigade  will  march  by  Spie, 
Neustadt,  Wrchowin,  Schonow,  and  Prowodow  on 
Kleny. 

"  The  Tosenzweig  brigade  will  march  on  Bohuslawitz 
by  Cemcic,  Krein,  Nahoran,  Lhota,  and  Spita  towards 
Skalitz,  and  will  take  position  north  of  that  place  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Aupa,  facing  east. 

"  The  Waldstatten  brigade  will  march  by  Ro hemic, 
Slavetin,  Rostock,  Nauzin,  and  Jessenitz  towards  Spita 
and  Skalitz,  where  it  will  take  up  its  position  facing 
east. 

"  The  Hestweck  brigade  will  break  up  at  3  o'clock; 
the  Jonack  brigade  at  3.30 ;  the  two  others  at  3.  Only 
the  light  baggage  will  be  taken.  Heavy  baggage  to 
be  directed  on  Opocno." 

The  artillery  reserve  was  to  proceed  towards  Kilow, 


174        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

marching  behind  the  Waldstiitten  column ;  the  corps 
hospital  company  was  to  proceed  on  Xajezd,  the  am- 
bulance on  Schweinshadel,  the  convoys  on  Josephstadt. 
Owing  to  the  great  distance  between  the  headquarters 
at  Opocno  and  the  cantonments  occupied  by  the  brigades, 
the  order  arrived  late.  Certain  troops  only  received  it 
after  the  moment  when  execution  ought  already  to 
have  begun. 

As  has  been  seen,  General  Raming  did  not  decide 
either  to  take  up  a  position  with  his  army  corps  in  order 
to  stop  the  enemy,  should  the  latter  debouch  from  the 
mountains,  or  to  throw  him  back  by  an  offensive,  should 
the  opportunity  arise. 

He  did  not  define  either  of  these  results  to  be  aimed 
at.  He  even  put  himself  in  such  a  situation  as  to  be 
unable  to  attain  either  of  them  in  case  his  decision 
should  become  clear  to  him  while  he  was  on  the  way. 

Even  if  the  enemy  did  not  impede  his  movement,  he 
would  further  find  himself,  by  the  end  of  the  day,  in 
a  very  risky  situation,  with 

One  brigade  at  Wisokow ; 

One  brigade  at  Kleny; 

One  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Aupa,  north  of  Skalitz ; 

One  between  Spila  and  Kalitz ; 

Artillery  reserve  at  Kikow. 

Each  of  these  brigades,  moreover,  was  to  take  posi- 
tion on  the  ground  ascribed  to  it,  face  to  the  east :  an 
arrangement  which  could  only  end  in  four  successive 
and  distinct  brigade  combats,  if  one  takes  into  account 
the  distances  (four  miles  from  Wysokow  to  Skalitz,  two 
and  a  half  from  Wysokow  to  Kleny)  as  well  as  the 
obstacles,  such  as  the  Aupa  separating  the  brigades 
from  each  other.  This  was  an  arrangement  which,  in 
any  case,  made  it  impossible  to  start  a  combined  action 
of  all  the  forces  of  the  army  corps  at  any  moment, 
either  in  order  to  manoeuvre  and  attack,  or  in  order 
to  resist  and  then  counter-attack. 

Suppose,  however,  the  enemy  should  come  on  while 
the  corps  was  still  marching  on  Skalitz,  the  same  im- 
possibilities would  arise  :  it  would  be  in  no  way  possible 
to  oppose  the  enemy  with  a  whole  army  corps,  but 
only  with  four  brigades  and  an  artillery  reserve,  acting 
separately,  without  mentioning  all  the  other  elements 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  175 

of  the  fighting  train  which  were  also  scattered  along 
their  own  itineraries. 

A  complete  lack  of  objective  spirit  here  again  charac- 
terises this  order  of  General  Raming's.  No  mention  is 
made  in  it  either  of  the  enemy  or  of  tactical  operations. 
How  could  there,  then,  be  an  adaptation  of  the  means 
to  the  end,  or  an  orientation  of  forces  in  the  direction 
of  that  end  ?  Is  it  not  to  be  expected  that  those  means 
and  forces  will  be  lost  in  a  complete  impotence  ? 

The  order  leads  to  some  further  interesting  remarks  : 
(1)  Information  coming  from  General  Headquarters 


did  show  that  the  enemy  was  ready  to  attack;  the 
enemy  was  more  specially  reported  to  be  near  Lewin 
and  Reinerz.  The  alarm  given  to  the  Jonack  and 
Hestweck  brigades  on  the  evening  of  the  26th  con- 
firmed such  a  forecast.  The  right  .column  of  the  Aus- 
trian arrangement,  being  more  exposed  to  attack, 
ought  to  have  been  abundantly  provided  with  cavalry 
and  artillery.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  lacked  cavalry; 
the  available  cavalry  regiment  was  marching  with  the 
Jonack  brigade,  which  had  been  endowed  with  it  up 
to  then  in  order  to  perform  the  mission  of  an  advance 
giiard ;  doubtless  want  of  time  prevented  the  ascribing 
to  that  regiment  of  a  new  and  more  rational  duty. 


176        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Again,  the  Hestweck  brigade  has  only  one  battery 
at  its  disposal,  which  is  insufficient;  the  other  brigades 
have  one  too  :  it  is  more  than  they  need. 

(2)  The  left-hand  column  is  followed  by  the  whole 
artillery  reserve.  The  latter  is  not  wanted  there  at  all ; 
that  is  obvious.  Suppose  it  should  be  necessary  to 
remove  that  artillery  in  order  to  send  it  elsewhere,  the 
movement  could  not  but  take  a  very  long  time,  and 
that  artillery  would  arrive  very  late. 

(3)  Again,  we  find  here  the  characteristic  faults  of  the 
mathematical,  inelastic  order,  resulting  from  a  fixed  and 
symmetrical  apportionment  of  means.  The  threatened 
wing  is  always  too  weak ;  the  one  that  is  not  threatened 
is  always  too  strong.  Moreover,  the  main  body  of  forces 
is  not  free  to  act  where  one  wishes  and  as  one  wishes. 
There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  main  body  in  reserve,  nor  is 
there  any  security  service  covering  it. 

If,  then,  the  enemy  comes  on,  action  cannot  be  avoided. 
Moreover,  the  action,  once  engaged,  cannot  be  directed ; 
for  the  forces,  in  consequence  of  their  distribution 
through  space,  will  all  go  into  action  simultaneously. 
In  order  to  conduct  an  action,  it  is  necessary  to  create 
reserves,  to  prepare  a  manoeuvre,  to  conceal  it,  to  carry 
it  out.  The  thing  is  impossible  here  if  the  adversary 
attacks ;  the  four  brigades  will  almost  immediately  be 
all  of  them  in  the  thick  of  the  fight.  It  will  no  longer 
be  possible  to  dispose  of  them,  to  handle  them  at 
will. 

(4)  Even  before  the  army  corps  could  come  in  touch 
with  the  adversary,  its  distribution  made  any  sort  of 
manoeuvre  very  difficult,  in  view  of  its  extensive  front 
(6  to  7  miles),  a  change  of  direction  by  the  heads  of 
the  columns  would  be  a  very  long  operation ;  a  change 
of  direction  by  the  flank  impossible;  no  depth  was 
available  for  manoeuvre. 

Let  us  to-day  take  up  the  question  on  our  own 
account ;  let  us  suppose  ourselves  to  be  at  Opocno  and 
to  have  received  an  order  which,  after  imparting  to  us 
the  information  to  hand,  orders  us,  in  order  to  protect 
the  concentration  of  the  army  at  Josephstadt,  to 
bring  the  army  corps  to  Skalitz,  from  which  place 
it  will  have  to  guard  the  roads  to  Nachod  and  to 
Kosteletz. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  177 

What  is  the  problem  ?  We  have  to  go  to  SkaHtz,  but 
with  what  object  ? 

1.  If  the  enemy  is  not  met  on  the  way,  the  object  is 
to  take  up,  near  that  place,  a  position  from  which  to  act 
on  all  the  dangerous  roads.  Once  those  dispositions  shall 
have  been  taken,  should  the  enemy  then  come  on  from 
Nachod  (for  instance),  the  army  corps  must  prevent  him 
from  debouching  out  of  the  pass ;  if  need  be,  it  must, 
by  means  of  a  vigorous  offensive,  throw  him  back  into 
the  pass.  With  a  view  to  this  contingency,  the  army 
corps  must  secure  the  possession  of  the  plateau  which 
commands  the  Nachod  pass.  An  advance  guard  will  be 
sent  in  that  direction  towards  Wysokow.  For  similar 
reasons,  a  second  one  will  be  sent  in  a  northern  direction 
to  keep  us  informed  of  enemy  movements,  to  hold  all 
the  issues  through  which  he  may  come  on  :  such  are  the 
tactics  to  be  adopted,  once  we  are  arrived  on  the  spot. 

2.  If  the  army  corps  previously  meets,  while  on  the 
march,  the  enemy  debouching  from  Nachod,  there  must 
be  no  hesitation ;  the  enemy  must  be  attacked.  He 
must  be  thrown  back  into  the  pass,  an  operation  which 
will  also  guarantee  the  occupation  (to  be  carried  out 
later  on)  of  the  Skalitz  position.  Our  army  corps  must, 
then,  march  in  a  formation  that  will  allow  it  to  look  out 
for  battle  and  undertake  action  with  all  its  forces, 
instead  of  being  drawn  into  it  piecemeal. 

3.  In  either  case,  the  retreating  enemy  must  not  be 
followed  beyond  Nachod. 

4.  If  we  do  not  succeed  in  throwing  the  enemy  back 
into  the  pass,  our  army  corps  must  nevertheless  attempt 
to  reach  the  Skalitz  position;  to  this  end,  it  will 
manoeuvre. 

Such  being  the  terms  of  the  problem,  the  tactical 
conditions,  how  shall  the  movement  be  organised  ? 

Four  roads  are  available,  that  is  obvious.  Shall  we 
use  them  all  ? 

One  division  marching  separately  on  a  road  has  a 
length  of  about  15  kilometres  (9  miles).  A  second  divi- 
sion following  the  first  one  is  no  more  than  9  kilometres 
(5J  miles)  long. 

If  the  divisions  march  by  themselves  on  two  roads 
separated  by  a  distance  d,  they  can  only  be  assembled 
on  a  point  a  on  the  first  road  within  the  time  necessary 
for  the  last  element  of  the  second  division  to  arrive,  that 


178 


THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 


is,  to  cover  15  kilometres  +  d.  If  botli  divisions  march 
one  behind  the  other,  the  time  necessary  for  assembUng  is 
that  which  is  wanted  for  covering  15  +  9  =  24  kilo- 
metres (15  miles).  According,  therefore,  to  whether  d 
is  greater  or  less  than  9  kilometres  shall  we  determine 
whether  we  must  use  one  road  or  two. 

If  a  given  corps  is  subdivided  into  four  brigades,  on 
four  roads,  the  time  necessary  for  assembling  is  the  time 
wanted  for  covering 


if  then 


8  +  d  +  d'  +  d"; 


I5k 


rdr 


I5H 


9i 


d-d 


7a8k 


d-{-  d'  -\-  d"  is  greater  than  24-8,  that  is,  16  kilometres, 

the  use  of  four  roads  would  result  in  a 
material  loss  of  time. 

Other  reasons,  however,  to  wit,  tactical 
reasons,  strictly  limit  the  number  of 
itineraries  to  be  used. 

While  on  the  march  to  Skalitz  we  must 
be  ready  to  receive  the  enemy,  should  he 
come  on,  and  even  to  attack  him  under 
favourable  conditions,  with  a  main  body  of 
forces ;  a  body  which  must  be  capable  of 
manoeuvring  ^p  to  the  last  moment ;  which 
must  therefore  be  assembled ;  which  must 
be  capable  of  altering  the  distribution,  and 
arranging  the  economy,  of  its  own  forces, 
of  pushing  them  ahead  while  concealing 
them ;  which,  in  order  to  meet  those  con- 
ditions, must  be  organised  in  depth. 

For  these  various  reasons,  we  will  only  use  two  roads. 
That  of  Dobruschka,  Neustadt,  Wzchowin,  and  that  of 
Pohor,  Bohuslanitz,  Cerncie,  Nahoran,  Lhota.  The 
average  distance  between  those  two  roads  is  but  4  or 
5  kilometres  (2|  to  3|  miles). 

The  main  body  of  the  army  corps  will  march  by  those 
two  roads.  In  order  to  retain  its  freedom  of  action  and 
the  free  disposal  of  forces  we  have  just  seen  to  be  neces- 
sary, it  will  be  provided  with  a  tactical  advance  guard  :  on 
what  side  ?  On  the  enemy's  side,  that  is,  on  the  right- 
hand  road.  Of  what  element  should  that  advance  guard 
be  composed  ?  Of  troops  capable  of  keeping  the  main 
body  informed  and  covered  for  a  long  time;    of  seizing 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  179 

the  enemy.  Hence  a  need  of  cavalry  :  the  available 
cavalry  regiment  will  be  attached  to  it ;  of  infantry  : 
one  brigade  (1st  brigade) ;  of  artillery  :  the  two  groups 
actually  to  hand  at  their  present  establishment.  Behind 
this  advance  guard,  the  main  body  will  go  forward, 
marching  by  both  roads.  On  the  right-hand  road  :  the 
remainder  of  the  1st  division,  the  corps  artillery  :  the 
latter  so  placed  as  to  be  able  to  reinforce  the  advance 
guard  quickly  with  an  arm  which,  once  it  is  in  action, 
will  allow  the  commander  to  distribute  freely  later  on 
the  forces  of  his  main  bod}!^,  according  to  a  plan  which 
can  only  be  arranged  at  the  very  last  hour. 

On  the  left-hand  road :  the  remainder  of  the  army  corps 
that  is  the  second  division ;    covered 
by  an  advance  guard  to  give  physical 
or    material    security :    one    infantry 
regiment,  with  some  artillery  and  the  ^'^t 

divisional  squadron.  ji  ^i 


■^3 


Now  the  Prussian  dispositions,  on 
their  side,  were  not  tactically  safe  :  ^y 

1.  Sending  the  advance  guard  as  far 
as  the  frontier,  at  a  short  day's  march    "S    ! 
from  Reinerz,  was  obviously  not  with-    \^¥\  ^ . .  A!^^  ^  J;^ 
out  danger,  but  was  justified  by  the    <5    *  ~ 
general  situation  and  also  by  the  nature  ,g.     i 
of  the  ground  which  made  it  necessary    "^  g\ 
to  dispose  the  troops  in  echelon.  i  , 

2.  Pushing     that     advance     guard  * 

further  on,  as  far  as  Nachod,  as  did  General  von  Loewen- 
feld  on  the  evening  of  the  26th,  was  a  piece  of  foolhardi- 
ness  involving  serious  risks.  It  would  be  difficult  to  ask 
an  advance  guard,  six  battalions,  four  squadrons,  twelve 
guns  strong,  to  resist  for  five  or  six  hours,  in  front  of  a 
pass,  on  the  space  necessary  to  the  deployment  of  the 
army  corps  behind  it,  in  the  presence  of  far  superior 
forces. 

The  presence  of  such  superior  forces  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Nachod  was  known.  They  knew  that  an 
Austrian  army  corps  had  been  concentrated  on  the  26th 
at  Opocno ;  they  knew  that  other  columns  were  assem- 
bling at  Skalitz.  Therefore  they  must  expect  to  be 
violently  attacked  on  the  27th  when  debouching  in 
direction  of  Opocno  or  Skalitz.     They  could  not  hope 


180        THE    PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

to  debouch  and  deploy  in  the  presence  of  those  superior 
forces,  save  by  taking  special  dispositions  which  would 
allow  them  to  master  the  difficult  situation  in  which 
they  would  find  themselves.  Those  dispositions  ought 
to  have  consisted  : 

1.  In  reducing  the  distance  between  the  advance 
guard  and  the  main  body,  so  that  the  latter  should  be 
able  to  support  the  advance  guard  as  soon  as  possible. 

2.  In  increasing  the  artillery  of  the  advance  guard. 

3.  In  marching  in  a  formation  as  dense  as  possible, 
so  as  to  shorten  the  duration  of  the  crisis. 

4.  In  undertaking  the  march  so  as  to  appear  at  Nachod 
early  on  the  27th.  Instead  of  starting  at  5  a.m.,  they 
ought  to  have  started  at  3. 

Objection  may  be  raised  to  so  cautious  an  arrangement. 
It  may  be  said  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this  foolhardy 
leap  forward  of  the  evening  of  the  26th  made  the 
Prussian  corps  master  of  the  bridge  and  of  the  crossing 
of  the  Mettau.  The  advantage  was  not  such  as  to  out- 
weigh the  risks  of  the  undertaking ;  for,  given  the  weak 
occupation  of  the  bridge,  the  small  importance  of  the 
river  (both  of  which  were  known),  it  would  have  sufficed 
to  send  on  the  pioneer  battalion,  during  the  night,  to 
carry  the  enemy  posts,  to  start  repairing  the  bridge  and 
organising  new  crossings  near  it,  so  that  the  main  body 
should  carry  out  its  march  without  being  detained. 

But  that  rash  act  was  also  full  of  inconvenience.  The 
entrance  of  the  Second  Army  into  Bohemia  Avas  to  be 
effected  on  several  points  simultaneously  and  by  surprise. 
Every  army  corps  ought  to  have  complied  with  this 
capital  feature  of  the  operation.  The  Fifth  Corps  was 
betraying  the  secret  when,  on  the  evening  of  the  26th, 
it  sent  its  advance  guard  on  to  Nachod. 

The  Austrian  command  heard  by  telegraph,  in  the 
evening  of  the  26th,  the  news  that  a  Prussian  advance 
guard  had  crossed  the  frontier;  it  thus  had  the  time 
needed  for  taking  such  counter-dispositions  as  would 
impede  the  intended  operation. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Austrian  commander-in-chief 
received  at  8.50  at  Josephstadt,  a  report  to  the  effect 
that  the  post  of  Nachod  had  been  attacked  by  very 
superior  forces  and  had  in  consequence  withdrawn  on 
Skalitz.  It  could  not  be  expected  that  he  would  not 
take  any  special  decision  on  hearing  such  news.     At  the 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  181 

moment  this  ill-timed  warning  was  given  to  the  Austrian 
command,  the  want  of  resolution  it  actually  showed 
could  not  have  been  foreseen. 

The  study  of  the  campaign  of  1806,  which  contained 
a  similar  case,  is  most  instructive  :  we  there  see  Napoleon 
proceed  in  an  entirel}^  different  manner  in  order  to  take 
the  passes  through  the  mountains  by  surprise,  and  to 
prevent  the  enemy  from  arriving  and  defending  the 
threatened  points  in  time.  Thus,  on  the  evening  of  the 
25th,  Napoleon,  had  he  been  in  command  of  the  Prussian 
body,  would  have  still  kept  his  troops  echeloned  in 
depth,  at  the  distance  of  one  long  march  from  the 
frontier,  so  as  to  leave  his  opponent  ignorant  of  which 
pass  he  intended  using. 

On  the  26th,  he  would  have  arrayed  his  army  corps  on 
the  frontier  after  a  long  march;  the  head  of  the  Fifth 
Corps  would  have  reached  Schlaney;  the  same  corps 
would  have  closed  up  on  that  head  and  adopted,  from 
Schlaney  to  Lewin,  the  closest  possible  formation,  so 
as  to  form  what  the  Emperor  called  the  "  war  mass." 

On  the  27th,  the  head  of  the  army  corps,  after  starting 
at  3  a.m.,  would  have  reached  Nachod  at  4  (it  is  less 
than  two  miles  from  Schlaney  to  Nachod).  The  rear 
of  the  army  corps  would  have  entered  that  place  two 
or  three  hours  later. 

What  could  the  Austrian  command  have  done  then, 
even  if  it  had  been  endowed  with  activity  and  decision  ? 

No  decision  can  be  taken  on  the  25th.  The  enemy's 
schemes  have  not  been  disclosed.  On  the  evening  of  the 
26th,  these  schemes  are  becoming  clear  everywhere; 
the  Austrian  command  resolves  on  a  number  of  measures 
in  order  to  counteract  those  schemes. 

On  the  27th,  those  measures  are  carried  out,  too  late, 
however,  to  enable  Austrian  forces  to  reach  Nachod 
before  their  adversary. 

Such  is  the  distance  between  the  master  and  the 
disciple. 

Napoleon  has  been  at  the  pains  of  himself  describing 
his  manner  of  proceeding.  Sending  orders  to  Marshal 
Lannes,  commanding  the  Fifth  Corps,  one  of  the  corps 
on  advance  guard  in  October  1806,  he  writes  : 

"  On  the  7th,  you  will  canton  between  Hassfurt  and 
Coburg  (approach  march). 

"  On  the  8th,  you  will  enter  Coburg  (which  corresponds 


182         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

to  Nachod  in  our  case),  so  as  to  arrive  there  with  the 
whole  of  your  army  corps,  and  so  that  an  hour  before 
your  grenadiers  enter,  nobody  in  Coburg  should  suspect 
hostilities  to  have  begun :  having  arrived  at  Coburg  on 
the  8th,  you  will  take  position  ahead  of  that  town  and 
arrange  everything  so  as  to  be  at  Grafenthal  on  the 
10th,  when  you  must  hold  yourself  ready  to  lend  us 
your  support." 

Again,  to  Marshal  Soult  : 

"  The  Emperor  orders  that  you  take  measures  to 
enter  Baireuth  on  the  8th  at  as  early  an  hour  as  possible. 
You  will  enter  there  in  mass,  so  that,  one  hour  after  the 
first  of  your  hussars  arrive,  your  whole  army  corps 
should  be  at  Baireuth  and  be  able  to  advance  a  few 
leagues  further  on.  .  .  ." 

Development  of  the  Action  from  3  o'clock  to  8.30 

(See  Sketch  A) 

On  June  27th,  1866,  the  Fifth  Prussian  Corps  left 
its  bivouacs  and  cantonments  at  5  o'clock  for  Nachod. 
The  advance  guard,  which  was  well  ahead,  only  began 
its  march  at  6. 

At  8,  the  head  of  the  advance  guard  (two  battalions 
[2nd  and  3rd  of  the  37th],  two  Jager  companies,  two 
squadrons  of  the  4th  Dragoons,  one  battery)  found  itself 
at  Branka,  ahead  of  Nachod. 

It  sent  out  (to  reconnoitre  without  delay,  along  the 
road  to  Newstadt)  one  squadron  of  dragoons  and  half 
a  company  of  Jager ;  on  the  broken  and  wooded  ground 
north  of  Branka,  towards  Kramolna,  where  some  enemy 
cavalry  had  been  seen,  one  company  of  Jager ;  on  the 
road  to  Skalitz,  one  squadron  supported  by  one  battalion 
(the  3rd  of  the  37th,  which  was  incomplete  for  the  time 
being,  owing  to  half  the  Bojan  battalion  being  late), 
which  were  to  occupy  Wysokow. 

Steinmetz  arrived  at  Nachod  about  8 ;  he  received 
there  a  report  that  the  advance  guard  had  debouched 
without  meeting  the  enemy.  Thinking  that  the  day 
would  be  passed  without  encountering  any  difficulties, 
he  informed  the  2nd  division  of  the  Guard  that  he  did 
not  think  he  ought  to  ask  for  the  assistance  they  had 
offered  him  at  Kronow. 

The    commander   of   the   advance   guard   was   busy 


\e'Foch  -  Des  Principes  de  la  guarre 


uis   A 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  183 

organising  his  outposts  when  he  received  from  the 
squadron  on  ahead  along  the  road  to  Neustadt  the  news 
(at  8.30)  that  the  enemy  was  approaching.  When  the 
squadron  had  arrived  on  the  plateau,  they  had  seen 
strong  columns  of  all  arms  marching  on  the  road  to 
Neustadt  and  in  the  direction  of  Skalitz.  These  latter 
had  already  reached  Schonow,  Prowodow,  Domkow. 
The  scouts,  Prussian  dragoons,  had  been  received  by  a 
violent  fire  on  approaching  these  columns. 

The  commander  of  the  advance  guard  then  ordered  the 
commander  of  the  head  of  the  advance  guard  to  proceed 
to  the  Wenzelsberg  plateau,  in  order  to  check  the  enemy 
at  the  road  junction  with  the  help  of  all  available  troops 
remaining  (2nd  of  the  37th,  half -company  of  Jager, 
one  battery).  At  the  same  time  he  sent  to  the  main 
body  of  the  advance  guard  at  Altstadt  the  order  to 
advance  towards  the  Wenzelsberg  plateau  by  the  height 
of  Branka  which  lies  south  of  the  road  junction. 

Let  us  follow  the  advance  guard  in  the  development 
of  its  mission,  and  let  us  see  what  becomes  of  our  three 
terms  : 

Reconnoitring :  the  Austrians  not  being  seriously 
covered,  the  Prussian  dragoons  have  easily  discovered 
two  columns  to  be  on  the  march,  one  towards  Domkow, 
the  other  towards  Wysokow.  This  is  more  than  is 
needed  for  taking  a  decision.  The  reconnaissance  is  for 
the  time  at  an  end. 

Laying  hold  of  the  enemy,  fixing  him,  while  one  pre- 
pares to  strike ;  this  cannot  be  thought  of  here,  the 
manoeuvre  is  far  from  being  ready  to  execute.  The 
army  corps  is  still  on  its  way ;  the  head  of  its  column  will 
not  arrive  till  noon. 

Covering  the  point  of  debouching  for  the  arrival,  for 
assembly,  and,  finally,  for  the  entry  into  action  of  the 
army  corps,  becomes  an  important  and  pressing  matter ; 
it  is  8.30  a.m.,  the  advance  guard  will  have  to  perform 
that  heavy  covering  task  unaided  for  nearly  four  hours. 
This  function  is  first  ascribed  to  the  27th  Prussian  regi- 
ment. That  regiment  had  not  fired  a  shot  since  1815. 
It  had  not  taken  any  part  in  the  affray  at  Schleswig- 
Holstein  in  1864.  A  fifty  years  peace-training  was  about 
to  be  applied  here  against  the  Austrian  army  which 
has  fought  recently  (in  1859).  We  shall  soon  find,  on 
one  side,  men  who  know  war  without  having  made  it, 


184        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

the  Prussians ;   on  the  other,  men  who  have  not  under- 
stood war  even  after  waging  it. 

The  Prussian  commander  meets  the  first  enemy  threat 
by  making  the  following  distribution  : 

1  squad.,  |  batt.,  I  co.  of  Jager  on  the  road  from  Skalitz 

to  Wysokow. 
I     ,,  marching  towards  the  same  point. 

1  ,,  ^    ,,  on  the  road  to  Neustadt. 

1     „  1  battery  marching  on  Wenzels- 

berg. 
1    „  at  Kramolna. 

2  squad.,  2  batt.,  2  co.,  1  battery. 

The  remainder  of  the  advance  guard  (three  squadrons, 
three  and  a  half  battalions,  two  companies,  one  battery) 
arrives  from  Altstadt  on  the  plateau. 

A  very  sound  distribution  indeed. 

Everything  was  sent  on  to  the  plateau  (less  the  half- 
battalion  kept  at  Altstadt),  because  the  point  of  de- 
bouching must  be  covered ;  the  entry  into  action  of  the 
army  corps  must  be  prepared  at  all  cost. 

Covering  implies  holding  all  the  points  whereupon  the 
enemy  might  fire  on  the  point  of  debouching,  and  also 
the  whole  ground  needed  by  the  army  corps  for  going 
into  action,  in  width  as  well  as  in  depth. 

The  advance  guard,  therefore,  extended  itself  at  once 
over  a  front  two  and  a  half  miles  wide,  for  local  cir- 
cumstances made  this  necessary.  The  danger  thus 
created  for  the  advance  guard  was  very  great,  but  this 
peril  of  loss  did  not  much  matter,  provided  it  could 
only  last  out  during  the  time  necessary  for  the  army 
corps  to  arrive — that  is,  until  noon. 

Such  was  the  idea  of  the  commander  of  the  advance 
guard,  wherefrom  we  shall  see  derived  the  special  brigade 
action  he  was  about  to  initiate;  it  is  by  resorting  to 
tactics  and  necessarily  to  tactics  in  detail  (seeing  his 
extreme  dispersion)  that  he  was  about  to  try  and  last 
out  in  that  situation.  We  shall  see  how,  on  the  opposite 
side,  the  Hestweck  brigade — advance  guard,  de  facto, 
of  the  Austrian  corps — misappreciated  its  mission  of  an 
advance  guard,  embarked  purely  and  simply  upon  a 
mere  diagrammatical  brigade  action  which,  having  been 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  185 

little  thought  out  at  its  inception,  could  not  be  carried 
out  in  a  rational  way,  and  lacked  all  manner  of  leader- 
ship as  well  as  of  logical  tactics. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  Austrians. 

The  Hestweck  column,  having  started  at  3.30,  twice 
crossed  (at  Spie  and  at  Wzchowin)  the  Jonack  column, 
a  thing  which  suspended  and  delayed  its  march.  It  came 
into  contact  with  the  enemy  at  7.30  with  its  advance 
guard  (25th  Jager  battalion  and  two  guns).  At  that 
moment : 

The  Jonack 'column  was  marching  on  Domkow;  the 
Rosenzweig  column  was  marching  on  Lhota ;  the  Wald- 
statten  column  was  marching  on  Skalitz,  where  it  was 
to  assemble.  Meanwhile,  General  Raming,  coming  to 
Skalitz,  then  to  Kleny,  found  there  the  commander  of 
the  1st  cavalry  division,  who  told  him  that  his  outposts 
had  been  driven  back  from  Wysokow.  He  ordered  in 
consequence  : 

The     Hestweck    brigade    to     continue    marching    on 

Wysokow ; 
The  Jonack  brigade  Jon  Kleny,  while  sending  out 

The  Rosenzweig  brigade    \     1  battalion  on  Wysokow. 
The  Corps  artillery  f       ci    tj. 

The  Waldstatten  brigade  {^^  ^^^^'^^'  "^  "^'^"^^- 

fSolms  brigade  at  Kleny. 
The  cavalry  division  -^  Schindlocher  brigade  at  Dolan 

I     (3  or  4  miles  from  Kleny). 

In  so  doing,  General  Raming  was  deciding  to  adopt 
the  second  interpretation  of  General  Benedeck's  order, 
as,  by  these  dispositions,  he  was  bringing  all  his  troops 
up  nearer  to  the  pass.  But,  when  thus  passing  to  the 
offensive,  he  ought  to  have  secured  the  means  :  1st,  of 
carrying  out  that  offensive  towards  Nachod  and  Wen- 
zelsberg;  2nd,  of  carrying  it  out  securely  and  quickly, 
for  he  might  have  had  to  act  in  other  directions  as  well. 

Nevertheless,  the  dispositions  he  had  taken,  however 
imperfect,  made  the  situation  of  the  Prussian  advance 
guard  more  perilous.  For,  in  the  first  place,  the  head 
of  the  advance  guard  (two  battalions,  one  battery,  one 
squadron)  would  have  to  fight  the  Hestweck  brigade 
consisting  of  seven  battalions  and  one  battery  of  eight. 
In  the  second  place,  the  whole  advance  guard  (seven 


186         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

battalions,  two  batteries,  four  squadrons)  would  have 
to  fight  two  and  even  three  Austrian  brigades. 

Before  seeing  how  that  advance  guard  will  act,  let  us 
examine  the  ground. 


Position  on  the  Wenzelsberg  Plateau 

The  road  to  Neustadt  follows  a  hollow,  the  Branka- 
Schlucht,  then  the  western  outskirts  of  Branka  forest, 
which  occupies  the  highest  part  of  the  plateau.  That 
forest  is  bounded  to  the  east  by  steep  and  cragged  slopes 
which  fall  on  to  the  Mettau.  The  summit  of  the  plateau 
rises,  with  the  road  following  it,  then  runs  east  of  the 
road,  which  though  no  longer  at  the  greatest  height, 
still  forms,  with  the  edge  of  the  forest,  a  powerful  line 
of  resistance.  There  lies  the  last  "  point  d'appui  "  for 
troops  fighting  face  to  the  west.  One  cannot,  however, 
use  there  any  large  numbers  of  cavalry  or  artillery,  on 
account  of  the  woods  and  of  the  steep  slopes  which  fall 
down  to  the  Mettau, 

The  Wenzelsberg  plateau  commands  the  whole  ground 
to  the  east,  more  particularly  the  heights  of  Kleny. 
Observation  is,  however,  hindered  by  the  woods  which 
stand  half-way  down  the  slope,  in  the  direction  of 
Prowodow  and  Schonow  as  well  as  in  that  of  Neustadt 
and  Wzchowin.  Any  assailant  coming  from  those  direc- 
tions could  find,  among  those  numerous  woods  and 
hollows,  protection  and  shelter  from  both  the  observa- 
tion and  the  fire  of  the  defence ;  cover  which,  on  the  day 
of  the  fight,  was  increased  by  the  advanced  growth  of 
the  crops. 

Thus  the  line  of  defence  of  the  Wenzelsberg  plateau  for 
a  force  facing  westwards  does  not  lie  on  the  ridge,  hut  half- 
way down  U.  It  may  be  drawn  by  the  western  out- 
skirts of  Wysokow,  the  south-western  outskirts  of  the 
small  wood  (Waldchen),  the  evangelical  church  of  Wen- 
zelsberg, the  forester's  house  and  the  patches  of  wood 
which  surround  it  to  the  east,  and  so  to  the  south  as  far 
as  Sochors. 

From  that  line  there  falls  a  slope  of  from  five  to  ten 
degrees,  entirely  uncovered,  and  allowing  a  very  power- 
ful artillery  and  infantry  fire  to  develop.  This  line  of 
defence  is  also  high  enough  to  command  the  heights 
of   Kleny.     Its   development   is   on   a  front   of  about 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  187 

4000  yards.  It  makes  a  good  defensive  position  for  an 
army  corps.  How  should  an  army  corps  occupy  it  to 
this  end  ? 

The  distribution  of  forces  would  involve  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  villages  with  infantry  reinforced  by  a  few 
batteries ;  the  assembly  of  some  cavalry  and  artillery 
between Wysokow  and  the  wood  to  the  south  (Waldchen), 
and  the  assembly  of  the  whole  of  the  reserve  infantry 
on  the  plateau  east  of  that  wood — an  infantry  detach- 
ment, with  some  artillery,  being  established  on  the 
plateau  north  of  Wysokow. 

The  disadvantage  of  the  position  arises  from  its  lack 
of  depth;  hence  a  difficulty  in  moving  artillery  and 
cavalry  to  the  rear.  In  spite  of  that,  it  is  easy  to  see 
that  once  the  position  had  been  occupied  in  the  manner 
just  described,  it  could  not  be  easily  outflanked  by  its 
left,  in  view  of  the  woody  nature  of  the  ground  there ; 
also  that,  in  case  it  should  be  manoeuvred  by  its  right, 
by  an  attack  aiming  directly  at  Nachod,  one  would  still 
have  the  time,  thanks  to  the  detachment  holding  the 
plateau  north  of  Wysokow,  to  take  counter-measures  so 
as  to  stop  the  enveloping  movement;  which,  in  any 
case,  would  take  a  long  time  to  carry  out. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  find,  ahead  of  the  front,  the 
villages  of  Prowodow  and  Schonow,  behind  which  the 
adversary  may  assemble  and  dispose  his  troops;  and 
where,  in  case  of  a  check,  he  can  find  a  rallying  position. 

The  rivulet  which  flows  from  Wysokow  to  the  north- 
west of  Prowodow  may  be  entirely  overlooked ;  it  is 
provided  with  numerous  crossings;  it  is  nowhere  an 
obstacle  :  the  meadows  along  its  banks  are  dry  and  hard. 

Given  that  ground,  what  part  was  it  about  to  play? 
What  should  we  expect  to  happen  there  on  the  27th  ? 

In  view  of  their  situation  and  overwhelming  supe- 
riority, the  Austrians  obviously  must  (and  could)  seize 
as  soon  as  possible  the  line  of  defence  mentioned  above, 
in  which  case  the  fate  of  the  Fifth  Prussian  Corps 
would  have  been  already  half  settled.  Its  situation 
would  in  any  case  have  become  very  difficult,  for  the 
Austrians,  starting  from  those  villages,  had  every  oppor- 
tunity for  driving  back  such  Prussians  as  had  reached 
the  road  to  Neustadt.  The  objectives  to  be  aimed  at  to 
this  end  were  Branka  wood  and  Branka  height.     The 


188         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Prussians  had,  on  the  contrary,  to  try  and  occupy 
the  position  of  Wenzelsberg  and  the  surrounding  woods, 
to  organise  there  a  first  line  of  resistance,  the  second  line 
being  formed  by  the  Branka  hollow  and  the  western 
outskirts  of  Branka  wood. 

A  few  remarks  must  be  made  here  on  the  limits  of  the 
aid  which  that  second  line  would  afford. 

On  the  front  Branka-Schlucht,  Branka  wood,  infantry 
only  could  be  used ;  the  ground  to  the  east  being  im- 
practicable to  artillery;  the  view  was,  moreover,  very 
limited.  On  the  left  wing,  artillery  would  find  it  diffi- 
cult to  move  and  to  withdraw.  On  the  right  wing, 
south  of  Wysokow,  artillery  might  well  find  a  few  posi- 
tions, but  it  would  soon  be  exposed  to  fire  from  the  small 
wood  (Waldchen). 

2.  On  that  front,the  efficiency  of  fire  might  very  easily 
extend  up  to  500  yards.  Available  cover  was  poor ;  the 
roadside  ditches  were  not  worth  mentioning,  the  woods 
were  either  spinney  or  underwood.  Only  a  few  big 
trees  could  supply  any  protection. 

3.  Retreating  from  the  position  would  be  difficult 
because  of  the  steep  slopes  and  thick  undergrowth. 
The  retreat  from  Nachod  might  be  cut  off  by  an  enemy 
marching  on  Altstadt.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was 
behind  that  position  hill  1113,  which  it  might  be  useful 
for  the  Austrians  to  carry,  for  they  could  fire  from  there 
on  the  whole  road  from  Altstadt  to  Nachod. 

After  having  thus  briefly  studied  these  two  main 
positions,  let  us  return  to  examining  more  carefully  the 
"points  d'appui"  which  form  the  first  one,  so  as  to  try 
and  understand,  later  on,  the  events  which  took  place 
there. 

The  wood  north  of  Wenzelsberg  {Waldchen,  on  the 
German  maps)  is  300  yards  long  on  its  north-western 
outskirts  and  from  1300  to  1400  yards  deep.  This  wood 
consists  in  young  spinney  timber,  and  irregularly  cut 
undergrowth,  with  clearings;  the  whole  being  cut  up 
by  green  ways,  would  parcel  out  the  fight  on  the  same 
framework.  It  is  fenced  on  its  north-eastern  and  south- 
eastern outskirts  by  a  high  hedge-bank  like  those  one 
sees  in  Brittany. 

The  interior  contained  deep  gullies,  the  dry  beds  of 
streams.     The  most  important  of  these  gullies  runs  near 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  189 

the  northern  edge  of  the  wood.  The  action  was  to  show 
its  tactical  importance.  This  gully  is,  almost  from  its 
origin,  30  to  45  feet  deep,  and  about  as  wide,  with  very 
steep  sides.  It  creates  an  obstacle  for  infantry  move- 
ments. That  part  of  the  ravine  which  touches  the  out- 
skirts of  the  wood  provides  a  good  shelter  for  infantry, 
which  can  find  there  an  excellent  field  of  fire  over  the 
slope  before  them,  facing  the  Skalitz  road.  The  south- 
western edge  of  the  wood  is  straggling  and  not  clearly 
determined. 

Wenzelsherg  possesses,  at  its  two  north-eastern  and 
south-western  ends,  two  solid  buildings,  the  evangelical 
chapel  and  the  church  of  Wenzelsberg. 

The  evangelical  chapel  provides  a  very  good  "  point 
d'appui"  facing  Meierhof,  with  a  good  glacis  towards 
that  village,  which  it  dominates  by  about  150  feet.  The 
whole  position  includes  the  chapel  and  its  surrounding 
walls.  It  has,  however,  alongside  of  it  two  hollow  roads 
which  supply  excellent  cover  for  an  approaching  assailant. 
It  is  a  position  easy  to  fortify  with  field  tools. 

From  this  point,  to  the  right  and  to  the  left,  run 
a  number  of  orchards  which  border  Wenzelsberg;  a 
poor  village,  with  small  houses,  more  especially  in  the 
southern  part.  Houses  become  more  numerous  in  the 
northern  part,  also  better  grouped  and  more  important ; 
the  gardens  provide  good  observation. 

The  church  of  Wenzelsberg  is  a  strong  building,  with- 
out any  opening  on  Branka,  with  an  opening  on  Wenzels- 
berg, a  few  windows  right  and  left.  In  order  to  turn  it 
into  a  good  redoubt,  a  few  improvements  were  wanted, 
in  the  church  itself  and  in  the  main  wall. 

Between  Wenzelsberg  and  the  forester's  house,  one 
also  finds  a  great  ravine  which  is  in  itself  an  absolute 
obstacle  for  artillery,  cavalry  and  infantry  marching  under 
fire.  It  is  more  practicable  at  its  two  extremities.  It 
pro\ddes  an  opening  and  a  means  of  approach  for  small 
detachments. 

The  forester's  house  is  a  strong  house,  but  without  a 
surrounding  wall,  little  fit  for  defensive  purposes,  easy 
to  approach  owing  to  the  shelter  an  assailant  would  find 
up  to  the  very  entrance  of  the  house. 

The  small  triangular  wood,  east  of  the  evangelical 
church,  has  no  tactical  value.  It  has  no  observation. 
It  is  a  miass  of  young  thickets. 


190        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

The  patches  of  wood  on  the  slope  of  the  plateau,  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Wenzelsberg,  of  the  forester's 
house,  of  Sochors,  include  a  number  of  high-stemmed 
pines  and  other  trees,  favourable  in  general  to  the  de- 
fensive, but  little  favourable  to  any  movements  save 
those  of  quite  small  forces. 

To  sum  up,  the  Waldchen,  the  church  of  Wenzelsberg, 
the  surrounding  woods  supply  good  "points  d'appui" 
against  an  adversary  coming  from  Branka ;  the  efficiency 
of  the  fire  for  which  they  allow  is  limited,  however,  as 
the  marching  assailant  is  partly  concealed  from  the 
defender  by  the  Branka  heights  and  woods.  On  the 
other  hand,  to  debouch  from  these  Branka  heights  and 
woods  remains  for  the  enemy  a  problematical  matter.  It 
is  difficult  for  him  to  follow  up  his  attack  with  artillery 
or  cavalry. 

Against  an  adversary  coming  from  south-west  of 
Prowodow,  of  Schonow,  the  places  occupied  by  the 
defenders  allow  for  a  large  use  of  fire ;  they  form  a  com- 
manding position;  those  advantages  are  countered  by 
the  lack  of  continuous  hedges  or  wood-lines,  by  the  cover, 
and  the  sheltered  approaches  the  assailant  finds  in  the 
small  woods  and  in  the  ravines  in  front.  The  strongest 
"point  d'appui"  for  defence  is  the  evangelical  church. 


The  Action  of  the  Van  of  the  Prussian  Advance 
Guard  against  the  Hestweck  Brigade  :  the 
Entry  into  Action  of  the  Main  Body  of  the 
Prussian  Advance  Guard  (8.30,  10.30  a.m.) 

(See  Sketches  B  and  C.) 

It  was  at  Wrchowin  that  General  Hestweck  received 
from  his  Uhlans  the  first  report  that  Prussian  troops 
were  on  the  Wenzelsberg  plateau.  He  thought  it 
possible  to  deduce  from  this  piece  of  intelligence  that 
the  enemy  had  established  himself  on  the  plateau  facing 
the  south.  He  decided,  in  consequence,  to  oppose  him 
with  one  battalion  (3rd  of  the  Gorizutti  regiment)  and 
one  infantry  company  (of  the  Kellner  regiment),  while 
he,  with  the  remainder  of  his  forces,  should  continue 
his  march  on  Schonow  and  from  there  against  the 
enemy's  flank. 

This  detachment,  formed  on  the  road  to  Neustadt, 


fJi^}  Foch.-  Des  Prmcipes  de  la  guerre. 


Crojuis  B 


Situation 
avant  10!" da  matin. 


Joo'    '    '    '  Ir 


"^Xil 


".•Jirt  •JTii  Pi£R=iT'  l:.  - 


,«rrnnh.-  Pes  Prmcipes  de  la  guerre. 


uis  C 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  191 

easily  drove  back  the  Prussian  dragoons  over  covered 
and  difficult  ground.  Between  8  and  8.30  the  brigade 
arrived  at  Schonow. 

The  head  of  the  advance  guard,  including  the  25th 
Jager  battalion  and  two  guns,  then  advanced  from 
Meierhof  towards  the  evangelical  church  at  Wenzels- 
berg,  occupied  the  churchyard  with  two  divisions, 
deployed  one  division  as  skirmishers  in  the  orchards 
and  gardens  ahead,  placed  its  two  guns  south  of  the 
church,  wherefrom  they  immediately  started  firing  at 
the  head  of  the  Prussian  advance  guard. 

Meanwhile,  the  brigade  took  up  north-east  of  Meierhof 
the  following  battle-formation  : 

1st  line  :  three  columns  of  division  at  deplojnuent 
distance  (1st,   2nd  Kellner  battalions). 

2nd  line  :  one  battalion  in  company  columns  (3rd  of 
the  Kellner  regiment). 

3rd  Ime  :  two  battalions  in  company  columns  (1st, 
2nd  Gorizutti  battalions). 

The  battery  deployed  on  the  right  of  the  first  line 
and  opened  fire  at  once  against  the  Prussian  artillery. 
The  3rd  Gorizutti  battalion  had  come  nearer,  and  was 
occupjang  at  that  moment  a  tiny  wood  on  the  right  of 
the  battery  near  the  forester's  house. 

At  about  8.30,  the  deplojnnent  having  been  com- 
pleted, a  short  rest  was  taken;  they  began  the  attack 
between  8.45  and  9. 

On  the  Prussian  side,  at  about  the  same  time,  one 
battalion  (2nd  of  the  37th)  half  a  Jager  company  and 
one  battery  could  be  seen  hasting  up  the  road  to  Neu- 
stadt,  then  taking  the  direction  of  Wenzelsberg  and 
deploying  the  two  half-battalions  (Schimonski,  Braunn) 
in  the  free  space  between  the  Waldchen  and  the  wood 
east  of  Wenzelsberg. 

The  battery  took  its  place  between  the  two  half- 
battalions,  in  order  to  cover  the  flanks.  They  had 
also  sent  out  the  half  company  of  Jager  into  the  Wald- 
chen, and  skirmishers  into  the  wood  east  of  Wenzelsberg. 

On  the  road  to  Neustadt,  the  three  dragoon  squadrons 
which  had  rapidly  come  up  from  the  main  body  of  the 
advance  guard,  had  arrived  in  support  of  the  repulsed 
squadron.  As  the  Austrians  had  taken  possession  of 
the  close  ground  half-way  down  the  slope,  the  cavalry 
could   not   efficiently   act  to   the  left  of  the  Prussian 


192         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

attack  :  they  went  back  behind  the  right  wing,  but 
within  supporting  distance. 

A  httle  before  9  the  Austrian  brigade  advanced  up 
the  slope,  on  both  sides  of  the  evangelical  church,  with 
a  weak  line  of  skirmishers  in  front;  it  was  received  by 
a  well-aimed  fire  from  the  Prussian  skirmishers  fairly 
sheltered  by  the  corn-fields,  the  woods  and  a  small 
hillock  east  of  Wenzelsberg.  It  was  compelled  to  stop 
and  to  throw  itself  back  into  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
evangelical  church.  The  Prussian  batteries  had  at  the 
same  time  inflicted  such  serious  losses  on  the  right  wing 
of  the  Austrian  brigade,  that  the  latter  was  obliged  to 
retire  to  Schonow,  1500  yards  behind;  the  two  Austrian 
guns  established  near  the  evangelical  church  were 
equally  compelled  by  Prussian  infantry  fire  to  withdraw 
on  Meierhof. 

At  9.15,  General  Hestweck  gave  the  order  to  push 
the  2nd  line  battalion  (3rd  of  the  KeUner  regiment) 
forward,  so  that  it  should  extend  the  right  wing  of  the 
1st  line,  while  the  3rd  line  was  ordered  to  come  up 
nearer  the  1st. 

The  attack  was  then  carried  out :  on  the  left  wing, 
by  two  battalions  (2nd  KeUner  and  25th  Jager  bat- 
talion), which,  by  utilising  the  gardens  east  of  the  village 
streets  as  shelters,  marched  against  the  church  of  Wen- 
zelsberg; on  the  right  wing,  by  two  battalions  (1st, 
3rd  Kellner),  which  marched  against  the  wood  east  of 
Wenzelsberg ;  supported  by  the  3rd  Gorizutti  battalion, 
which  marched  northward  from  the  forester's  house, 
in  the  direction  of  the  same  wood,  forming  a  sort  of 
echelon  in  the  rear  and  to  the  right. 

The  Prussian  battalion  received  the  attacking  enemy 
brigade  at  500  yards  by  a  well-aimed  and  very  efficient 
fire.  The  fire  was  delivered  in  small  volleys  from  the 
supporting  elements  which  came  running  up  in  line  on 
to  the  height.  At  the  same  time,  a  rapid  and  flanking 
fire  came  from  the  Waldchen  and  surrounding  woods. 

The  Austrian  columns  stopped,  wavered,  but  soon 
marched  on  again.  The  Prussian  half  battalions,  how- 
ever, advanced  also  and  delivered  at  very  close  range 
such  a  powerful  volley  fire  that  the  Austrian  masses 
turned  about,  completely  broken. 

What  had  happened  ?  The  two  battalions  of  the 
left  wing  of  the  1st  Austrian  line  (the  Jager  battalion 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  193 

and  the  2nd  of  the  Kellner  regiments)  had  reached 
without  difhculty  the  churchyard  of  Wenzelsberg  and 
the  northern  outskirts  of  Wenzelsberg  village; 
leaving  part  of  their  forces  to  occupy  those  points, 
they  at.tenij)ted  several  times,  with  a  portion  of  the 
Jagers  and  one  of  the  2nd  Kellner  battalion,  to  attack 
the  Waldchen.  They  were,  however,  repulsed  by  the 
fire  from  the  Prussian  Jagers,  who  had,  moreover, 
just  received  reinforcement.  Sowce  of  these  detach- 
ments sustained  heavy  losses  during  that  attempt. 

Both  battalions  of  the  Austrian  right  wing  had  been 
held  up  by  small  forces,  mainly  on  account  of  the  large 
ravine  they  had  had  to  cross.  Ver}''  much  disorganised 
by  the  crossing  of  that  obstacle,  they  none  the  less 
advanced  up  to  a  distance  of  about  120  yards  from  the 
wood  east  of  Wenzelsberg,  where  they  were  brought 
to  a  sudden  stop  by  the  powerful  Prussian  infantry 
fire.  They  sought  shelter,  in  a  state  of  disorder,  within 
the  ravine. 

At  the  moment  when  the  2nd  battalion  of  the  37th 
was  receiving  the  Austrian  1st  line  in  this  fashion,  the 
3rd  Gorizutti  battalion,  a  refused  echelon  of  the  Aus- 
trian first  line,  was  joining  in  the  attack.  It  debouched 
from  the  patches  of  wood  near  the  forester's  house  and 
crossed  the  upper  end  of  the  ravine.  The  half- battalion 
of  the  Prussian  left  wing  (Braunn)  faced  to  the  left 
and  attacked  in  and  between  the  patches  of  wood, 
whence  the  Austrians  were  debouching,  while  at  the 
same  time  two  half-battalions  of  the  main  body  of  the 
Prussian  advance  guard  (Vogelsang  of  the  1st  of  the 
37th,  and  Pfug  of  the  1st  of  the  58th)  deployed,  starting 
from  the  Neustadt  road  in  the  direction  of  the  Bracez 
gap,  and  ran  up  in  support  of  the  counter-attack  then 
already  undertaken. 

The  Austrian  battalion  was  thrown  back  and  slowly 
withdrawn,  under  fire,  on  to  Schonow.  It  was  followed 
in  that  direction  as  far  as  Sochors  by  the  half-battalion 
of  the  1st  of  the  58th.  The  other  half-battalion  of  the 
main  body  of  the  Prussian  advance  guard  (Vogelsang 
of  the  1st  of  the  37th)  occupied  the  patches  of  wood 
east  of  the  forester's  house,  and  the  half-battalion  of 
the  head  (Braunn  of  the  2nd  of  the  37th)  again  resumed 
its  position  near  the  Schimonski  half-battalion. 

There  then  occurred  an  mterval  in  the  action  during 


194        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

which  the  Austrians  confined  themselves  to  firing 
from  Wenzelsberg  and  Wenzelsberg  church.  The 
battery  of  the  Jonack  brigade  west  of  Prowodow  took 
part  in  this  fire,  and  General  Hestweck  formed  his 
2nd  line  in  view  of  another  attack. 

On  the  Prussian  side,  the  2nd  battery  of  the  advance 
guard  joined  the  1st  one.  Little  by  little  the  battalions 
of  the  advance  guard  had  arrived  on  the  plateau. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  attack  by  the  Austrian  2nd 
line  had  been  made  when  two  half- battalions  of  the 
main  body  of  the  Prussian  advance  guard  (Winterfeld 
of  the  1st  of  the  27th  and  Schreiner  of  the  1st  of  the 
28th)  had  already  come  up  in  support,  in  the  Waldchen, 
of  the  half-company  of  Jager  there  established,  and  had 
reached  the  outskirts  of  that  wood,  while  the  two  other 
half-battalions,  as  has  been  seen  (Vogelsang  of  the 
1st  of  the  37th,  Pfug  of  the  1st  of  the  58th),  were  making 
for  the  patches  of  wood  and  the  forester's  house. 

The  two  battalions  of  the  Austrian  right  (1st  and  2nd 
of  the  Gorizutti  regiment)  hurled  themselves  back  into 
the  ravine,  whence  they  kept  up,  by  fire  alone,  a 
struggle  which  remained  undecided,  while  the  fact 
that  the  Austrian  left  had  seized  Wenzelsberg  might 
still  bear  important  consequences.  The  3rd  Kellner 
battalion  and  a  few  Jager  companies  which  had  pro- 
ceeded as  far  as  the  ravine  appear  to  have  debouched 
on  the  forester's  house. 

The  position  of  the  Austrians  in  the  ravine  and 
around  the  forester's  house  was  being  taken  in  reverse 
by  the  Prussians  from  Sochors  and  was  already  very 
critical,  when  yet  another  two  half-battalions  (Wer- 
necke  and  Gronefeld  of  the  2nd  of  the  58th)  arrived  at 
Sochors. 

An  attempt  made  by  the  3rd  Kellner  battalion, 
starting  from  the  forester's  house,  to  capture  Sochors, 
failed  so  completely  that  the  half-battalion  (Wernecke 
of  the  2nd  of  the  58th)  at  once  retook  the  forester's 
house  and  the  small  patches  of  wood.  The  other  half- 
battalion  (Gronefeld  of  the  2nd  of  the  58th)  advanced 
within  the  woods  south-east  of  Sochors. 

The  2nd  line  of  the  Austrian  brigade  could  no  longer 
remain  in  the  dry  bed  of  the  brook.  It  withdrew  on 
Schonow,  where  General  Hestweck  assembled  his  troops. 
Only    the    25th    battalion   and   half   the    2nd    Kellner 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  195 


battalion  continued  to  occupy  Wenzelsberg  church  and 
Wenzelsberg. 

While  it  was  supporting  these  attacks  the  Prussian 
advance  guard  called  back  all  useless  detachments. 
Thus  : 

(1)  The  Jager  company  sent  to  Kramolna  joined  at 
Wysokow  the  half- battalion  established  there. 

(2)  The  Bojan  half- battalion  of  the  3rd  of  the  37th, 
which  had  supplied  the  outposts  at  Nachod  and  had 
arrived  late  for  that  reason,  was  placed  in  reserve  at 
the  outskirts  of  Branka  wood,  north  of  Waldchen. 

(3)  The  two  Jager  companies  of  the  main  body  were 
set  near  Bracez,  where  they  held  the  road  to  Neustadt. 

The  distribution  of  the  Prussian  forces  at  this 
moment  was  therefore  the  following  : 

At  Wysokow :  half  a  battalion  (Kurowski  of  the 
3rd  of  the  37th),  with  one  Jager  company. 


Wenzelsbergj       q^^^°^' 


in  the 
Waldchen 

by 


to  the 
south  by 


'I CO.  of  Jager; 

I  the  1st  of  the 
58th. 

^  the  1st  of  the 
37th. 
ri  the  1st  of  the 
37th 

I  the  1st  of  the 
58th 

2nd      of      the 
58th 

I  F.  of  the  58th 
which  held 
the  forester's 
house  and 
surrounding 
patches  of 
wood. 


Two  Jager  companies  held  the  woods  on  the  road  to 
Neustadt;  half  the  F.  of  the  58th  (Suchodoletz),  re- 
mained at  Altstadt  in  order  to  guard  the  road  and 
organise  a  line  of  retreat.  In  reserve,  behind  the 
Waldchen,  were  the  Bojan  half-battalion  of  the  3rd 
of  the  37th  and  cavalry. 

At  the  south-east  corner  of  the  Waldchen,  the  two 


196         THE    PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

batteries  of  the  Prussian  advance  guard  were  firing 
on  the  Austrian  artillery,  which  stood  west  of  Schonow 
and  Prowodow,  as  well  as  on  the  infantry  masses 
which  were  observed  in  the  neighbourhood  of  those 
places. 

As  the  cavalry  of  the  advance  guard  (4th  Dragoons) 
had  had  no  opportunity  for  intervening,  it  remained 
under  the  fire  of  Austrian  shells  between  the  Waldchen 
and  the  road  to  Neustadt. 

This  first  act  of  the  day  suggests  a  few  remarks. 
The  very  brilliant  results  of  the  Prussian  tactics  were 
undoubtedly  due  to  technical  superiority  in  fire  and 
to  an  entirely  sound  utilisation  of  troops. 

First  of  all  we  have  :  one  battalion,  one  battery, 
four  squadrons,  holding  their  own  against  one  brigade 
(seven  battalions)  and  eight  guns. 

How  did  the  battalion  proceed  ? 

It  would  have  been  simple  and  logical  for  them  to 
hold  their  own  against  a  superior  attack  by  relying 
for  protection  and  resistance  on  the  terrain,  by  occupy- 
ing Wenzelsberg  church,  Wenzelsberg  village  and  some 
interesting  groups  of  houses.  Such  cautious  tactics 
would  have  proved  disadvantageous  in  so  far  as  they 
would  have  parcelled  out  the  forces  and  made  leader- 
ship, more  particularly  from  the  standpoint  of  fire,  very 
difficult.  They  would  have  led  to  less  satisfactory 
results  than  the  tactics  of  movement  in  the  open, 
which  permitted  the  development  of  all  the  firing 
power  the  troops  possessed.  The  enemy  was  thus 
received  by  a  line  lying  in  the  open ;  but  as  so  disposed 
a  situation  is  liable  to  be  outflanked,  the  Prussians 
covered  themselves  by  occupying  the  woods  on  both 
wings.  A  great  help  was  derived  from  the  advanced 
state  of  the  crops,  which  concealed  the  strength  and 
position  of  the  Prussian  troops. 

Again,  after  throwing  back  the  adversary,  the  Prussian 
did  not  pursue  him.  Pursuing  on  the  close  ground 
they  had  in  front  of  them  would  have  disorganised 
their  troops  and  allowed  the  enemy  to  reconsider  the 
results  obtained. 

It  equally  behoves  us  to  point  out  how  the  bold  piece 
of  tactics  effected  by  the  2nd  battalion  of  the  37th  had 
been  facilitated  by  troops  arriving  independently,  on 
its  right  in  the  Waldchen,  and  on  its  left  towards  Bracez, 


J 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  197 

then  in  the  woods  surrounding  Sochors.  All  the  com- 
manders of  those  small  units,  though  little  informed  and 
deprived  of  orders,  knew  how  to  initiate  undertakings 
by  which  they  intervened  happily  in  the  action. 

The  front  of  combat  which  was  taken  up  at  the  end 
of  this  first  act  of  the  struggle  was  obviously  a  con- 
siderable one  in  view  of  the  troops  available  (one 
brigade,  one  battery,  one  cavalry  regiment). 

Its  length  from  Sochors  to  the  southern  outskirt  of 
the  Wiildchen  was  2500  yards.  It  was  3700  yards 
from  Sochors  to  the  southern  outskirt  of  Wysokow. 
Moreover,  the  half-battalions  were  mixed  up  with  each 
other;  regiments  existed  no  longer;  the  officers  scarcely 
managed  to  reorganise  the  half-battalions  on  the 
ground.  The  whole  reserve  available  was  but  one 
half-battalion. 

None  the  less  circumstances  explain  and  vindicate 
the  dispositions  taken. 

If  the  whole  ground  had  not  been  held,  the  army  corps 
would  not  have  fomid,  on  arriving,  the  space  necessary 
for  its  deployment.  Besides,  by  thus  acting,  the  enemy 
was  deceived  as  to  the  Prussian  brigade's  weakness. 

Artillery  goes  into  action  from  the  start  of  the  affair, 
the  1st  battery  begins  fighting  at  the  same  time  as  the 
battalion.  vVhen  it  finds  that  its  position  is  endangered 
by  the  Austrian  infantry  fire,  it  withdraws  and  takes 
up  another  position,  where  it  is  joined  by  the  2nd 
battery  of  the  advance  guard;  both  batteries  fight  on 
there  without  respite,  thus  increasing  the  steadiness  and 
the  power  of  the  infantry.  Cavalry,  since  it  cannot 
immediately  act,  remains  near  by,  as  a  permanent 
threat  to  the  enemy. 


The  Use  of  Fiee  in  this  Action 

The  first  attempt  of  the  Austrians  was  stopped  by 
the  fire  from  the  first  Prussian  line  reinforced  by  its 
supports. 

They  again  attacked.  The  attacking  body  con- 
sisted, this  time,  of  certain  columns  in  the  1st  line, 
three  battalions  in  close  formation  on  the  2nd  line, 
plus  one  battalion  attacking  in  flank.  The  Prussian 
battalion  was  not  disturbed   by  this  imposing  order. 


198        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

The  firing  line  proceeded  entirely  according  to  regula- 
tions, by  means  of  skirmishing  fire  and  short  volleys; 
the  flanking  troops  resorted  to  rapid  fire. 

As  the  enemy  continued  to  advance,  the  battalion 
marched  on  him  and  fired  by  command,  at  a  range  of 
only  150  yards,  with  an  obvious  effect.  The  danger 
to  the  Prussians  was  not,  however,  entirely  removed 
by  this  brilliant  success.  An  enemy  battalion  appeared 
on  the  flank  of  the  Prussian  battalion.  The  half-bat- 
talion on  the  left  turned  to  the  left,  in  good  and  close 
order;  then  assumed  the  offensive  and  compelled  the 
Austrians  to  retreat. 

It  is  clear  that  the  Prussian  battalion  had  aimed  at 
success  and  secured  success  by  means  of  fire ;  every- 
thing else  :  occupation  of  the  "  point  d'appuis  "  of 
Wenzelsberg,  etc.,  cover,  utilisation  of  the  pursuit, 
had  been  sacrificed  to  the  idea  of  giving  fire  all  its 
efficiency,  by  keeping  to  this  end  and  up  to  the  last 
moment  the  whole  force  grouped  and  well  in  hand.^ 
The  battalion  had  further  utilised  : 

(1)  The  weakness  of  the  Austrian  formations  it  had 
under  observation. 

(2)  The  cover  provided  by  the  crops. 

(3)  Of  course,  the  superiority  of  armament,  and  the 
best  use  to  be  made  of  it  by  means  of  the  formation 
in  line. 

(4)  But  even  more,  a  strict  discipline,  in  close  forma- 
tion, of  the  troops  in  action,  which  had  made  it  possible 
for  the  commanding  officer  to  direct  the  fire  effectively 
up  to  the  last  moment. 

We  clearly  discover  here  the  principles  and  tendencies 
of  the  Prussian  school  in  the  matter  of  fire  :  fire  has 
become  with  them  a  power  of  the  first  order;  it  must 

^  The  tactics  of  the  2nd  of  the  37th  Prussian  regiment  receiving 
in  the  open  the  attack  of  a  brigade  would  not  work  nowadays.  In  the 
presence  of  a  serious  adversary,  armed  with  good  rifles  and  knowing 
how  to  use  them,  one  would  have  to  rely  on  the  "  point  d'appuis  " 
(Wenzelsberg,  its  two  churches,  the  surroimding  woods),  and  occupy  and 
methodically  organise  them.  But  even  so  the  distribution  of  troops 
would  have  to  bo  partly  directed  by  the  idea  of  making  it  always 
possible  to  direct  their  fire  effectively.  On  those  points  which  com- 
mand a  wide  view  and  allow  for  efficient  fire,  the  force  could  not  be 
subdivided  beyond  the  platoon,  so  that  fire  should  always  be  in  the 
hands  of  an  officer.  That  theory  and  that  practice  were  later  more 
particularly  applied  by  the  Prussian  troops  in  the  churchyard  of 
Beaune-Ia-Rolaade  in  1870. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  199 

be  fully  utilised,  and  to  this  end  it  must  remain  at  the 
disposal  of  the  chief,  who  must  himself  be  well  trained. 
Mastership  in  fire,  superiority  of  fire,  will  be  secured, 
of  course,  by  means  of  armament,  but  also  and  even 
more  by  the  manner  of  using  armament ;  which  implies 
that  the  men  have  thoroughly  practised  field-fire  and 
constantly  remain  under  the  order  of  an  enlightened 
commander. 

The  above  instance  shows  what  must  be  understood 
by  the  word  enlightened.  It  means  a  commander 
possessing  a  theory  of  fire,  knowing  its  effects,  knowing 
what  means  allow  us  to  secure  those  effects;^  it  also 
means  a  commander  who  then  knows  when  to  use 
skirmishing  fire,  mdividual  fire,  rapid  fire,  volley  fire,  fire 
along  the  line,  etc. ;  he  must  also  know  from  experience 
in  what  measure  and  for  how  long  a  time  his  men  are 
capable  of  supplying  the  result  demanded,  of  keeping 
their  self-control,  of  obeying;  after  what  length  of 
time  nervous  tension  and  physical  fatigue  will  have  to 
be  taken  into  account;  how  the  men  may  then  be 
pulled  up.  He  must  also  know  that  fire  cannot  by  itself 
secure  a  decision;  he  must,  therefore,  combine  firing 
and  marching,  a  combination  dependent  on  the  main- 
tenance of  discipline ;  he  puts  a  stop  to  firing  in  order 
to  march  on  the  enemy,  only  to  resume  firing  in  a  still 
more  effective  fashion  and  to  complete  by  bullets  the 
disturbing  effect  caused  by  his  march. 

That  desire  to  develop  the  whole  power  of  fire  is 
always  found  in  the  Prussian  infantry  of  1870,  although 
as  opposed  to  the  French  rifle,  their  armament  was 
then  distinctly  inferior ;  their  tactics  on  the  battle-field 
were  entirely  directed  by  that  preoccupation. 

They  tried  above  all  to  reach  a  position  wherefrom 
to  invest  the  enemy,  to  crush  him  by  fire,  while  the 

^  For  instance  :  suppose  100  average  riflemen  each  firing  10  bullets 
at  an  objective  of  a  determined  nature  and  size,  from  a  given  distance 
can  put  200  bullets  into  the  target;  in  war,  assuming  that  20  biillets 
will  hit  the  target  out  of  1000  shots,  the  effect  produced  on  the 
adversary  will  prove  amply  sufficient ;  one  has  therefore  to  fire  1000 
bullets  on  the  objective  as  quickly  as  possible. 

Number  of  bullets,  range,  nature  of  fire  :  these  are  the  elements  of 
the  problem  a  commander  has  to  solve  on  each  particular  occasion. 

In  order  that  the  men  should  correctly  carry  out  such  a  pro- 
gramme, previous  training  is  needed  as  well  as  the  habit  of  discipline 
in  action. 


200        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

real  attack  was  prepared  behind  that  position  so  as 
to  utihse  and  develop,  when  advancing,  the  superiority 
acquired. 

Thp  position  is  reached  by  small,  scattered  units  in 
the  best  possible  way,  more  particularly  by  utilising 
all  covered  approaches  which  the  ground  provides;  the 
essential  object  being  to  arrive  on  the  spot  without 
suffering  from  the  destructive  effect  of  the  enemy's 
arms. 

Once  the  position  has  been  reached,  they  open  an 
action  of  fire  alone,  the  direction  of  which  they  organise 
and  keep  up  for  the  longest  time  possible,  with  a  view 
to  developing  this  sort  of  action  to  the  highest  possible 
degree.  Firing  lasts  as  long  as  is  necessary  for  prepar- 
ing the  attack,  a  preparation  which  implies  producing 
certain  effects  on  the  adversary  as  well  as  managing 
to  bring  up  at  a  favourable  distance  the  echelons 
which  have  to  carry  out  the  attack.  The  officer 
directing  the  fire  takes  that  necessary  length  of  time 
into  consideration  and  regulates  his  action  accordingly. 

Finally,  the  attack,  once  started,  is  mainly  carried 
out  by  the  echelons  in  the  rear,  which  reinforce  and 
stimulate  the  firing  echelons. 

The  same  care  ^  for  effectively  directing  fire  in 
action  is  found  nowadays  to  prevail  in  certain  German 
manoeuvres.  The  procedure  of  a  body  of  infantry 
may  be  quoted  as  an  instance  among  others. 

We  find  here  first  a  very  thin  and  discontinuous 
line.  Behind,  at  a  distance  of  about  300  yards,  a  few 
supports  corresponding  to  the  intervals  within  the  line. 
Three  or  four  companies  in  all  are  deployed  on  the 
whole  front.  The  remainder  of  the  division  follows 
behind  in  irregular  and  almost  undistinguishable  lines. 
The  echelons  (usually  companies  in  line  on  two  ranks) 
follow  each  other  at  a  distance  of  about  500  yards, 
separated,  moreover,  by  changing  intervals. 

At  about  800  yards  from  the  enemy,  the  line  opens 
fire  and  is  immediately  reinforced  by  its  supports,  the 

^  "  Another  phenomenon  of  some  importance  has  again  been  ob- 
served since  the  war  of  1870.  What  I  mean  is  that  new  principle 
obtaining  among  the  infantry,  a  jmnciple  according  to  which  infantry 
is  careful  to  submit  its  fire  to  a  more  exacting  discipline  than  in  the 
past,  also  to  accept  a  scientific  direction  in  spite  of  the  dispersed  order 
which  itaelf  characterises  its  modern  mode  of  action." — Von  der  Goltz, 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  201 

intervention  of  which  produces  one,  two,  or  three  bounds 
forward. 

At  600  yards,  the  line  is  formed  by  men  in  close 
alignment  as  a  result  of  the  entry  into  line  of  other 
companies;  a  long  interval  of  time  then  passes  for 
preparing  the  attack.  The  fire  develops  and  reaches 
an  extreme  violence;  the  dispositions  of  march  are 
condensed  into  dispositions  of  attack. 

The  attack  is  launched,  etc. 

So  far  as  the  study  of  fire  (which  we  are  following  for 
the  moment)  is  concerned,  what  do  these  dispositions 
show  ? 

They  disclose  first  of  all  a  theory :  up  to  800  yards, 
fire  produces  but  a  weak  effect,  and  must  therefore  be 
resorted  to  as  little  as  possible ;  at  800  yards  it  becomes 
decisive;  an  undisputable  superiority  must  then  be 
secured.  Their  practice  follows  from  this  theory  :  the 
dispersion  and  dropping  out  on  the  way  of  men  and 
cartridges  must  be  carefully  avoided  up  to  800  yards. 
From  that  moment  on,  expenditure  must  be  lavish,  a 
large  number  of  rifles  being  thrown  together  into  line  • 
on  the  other  hand,  riflemen  must  be  commanded,  brought 
up  in  companies,  or  at  least  in  whole  platoons,  with  a 
complete  set  of  cartridges. 

Such  tactics  are  capable  of  ensuring  the  efficiency, 
duration  and  violence  of  fire  required,  owing  to  a  con- 
stant direction  given  by  a  commander  previously  taught 
in  training  camps  to  practise  the  technique  of  fire  and 
owing  to  a  direction  received  by  men  previously  exer- 
cised in  these  same  training  camps  to  practising  the 
mechanism  of  fire  in  war. 

Thus  do  exercises  carried  out  in  peace  time  (training 
camps,  grand  manoeuvres,  etc.)  prepare  troops  in  the 
highest  degree  for  performing  on  the  battle-field  the 
act  of  fighting  by  fire. 

Fire  has,  indeed,  become  an  unavoidable  phase  of 
that  action  through  force  called  attack.  You  can  no 
longer  assault  an  untouched  adversary,  as  one  often 
did  in  the  old  days,  by  merely  appealing  to  energy. ^ 

^  An  action  with  the  arms  in  use  to-day  confirms  and  reinforces 
the  accuracy  of  Napoleon's  saying :  "The  firearm  is  everything;  the 
rest  is  nothing." 

As,  a  matter  of  fact,  modem  rifles  produce  important  effects  up  to 
1500  yards;  guns  at  a  distance  three  times  greater.     The  "hail  of 


202        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

The  strongest  moral  qualities  in  troops  melt  away 
under  the  effects  of  modern  arms  if  the  enemy  is  per- 
mitted to  let  loose  his  whole  power.  The  attack  is 
unavoidably  held  up  if  the  critical  question,  the  superi- 
ority in  fire,  is  not  settled  at  a  sufficient  range.  For 
such  a  superiority  alone  deprives  the  enemy  of  part 
of  his  means,  shatters  his  moral,  reduces  his  numbers, 
uses  up  his  cartridges,  flattens  him  out  on  the  ground, 
renders  him  incapable  of  making  a  sound  and  complete 
use  of  his  arms. 

As,  however,  combat  by  fire  has  become  an  unavoid- 
able necessity,  it  must  obviously  be  prepared,  organised, 
in  time  of  peace;  otherwise  it  will  be  impossible  to 
carry  it  out  in  war.  It  will  also  be  necessary  to  deter- 
mine what  results  must  be  aimed  at  by  fire,  and  what 
processes  will  allow  us  to  reach  those  results;  how 
firing  in  action  must  be  commanded;  what  troops  can 
effect  in  that  regard. 

Firing  must  have  its  place  marked  out  in  the  scheme 
of  infantry  action.  What  is  that  place  ?  This  is  what 
we  are  about  to  examine. 

We  may  note  down  at  once  that  this  new  infantry 
action  cannot  be  a  mere  processional  and  uniform 
development  of  the  two  means  infantry  has  at  its 
disposal  :  march  and  fire ;  and  this  from  a  distance  of 
1200  yards  until  the  enemy  is  reached.  An  infantry 
commander  cannot  think  of  conducting  the  necessary 
and  decisive  action  by  fire  with  men  more  or  less  left 
to  themselves  from  1200  yards  on;  nor  can  he  think 
of  launching  an  assault  with  those  same  men.  His 
formations  from  1200  yards  on,  the  expenditure  he 
makes  of  his  forces,  must  aim  at  preparing  the  first 

bullets  "  sometimes  becomes  no  metaphor  but  a  reality.  We  have 
nothing  but  numerous  swarms  of  skirmishers  lying  on  the  ground, 
forming  a  continuous  line,  altogether  preventing  the  enemy  from 
advancing,  equally  incapable,  on  the  other  hand,  of  putting  the  enemy 
to  flight  by  the  mere  effect  of  fire. 

If,  then,  the  assault,  attack  with  the  bayonet— in  the  powerful  sense 
of  Souvarow's  phrase  :  "  The  bullet  is  crazy,  the  bayonet  alone  is 
intelligent  " — always  reappears  as  a  supreme  and  necessary  argument 
in  order  to  complete  the  adversary's  demoralisation  by  threatening  to 
board  him  as  if  he  were  a  vessel,  also  in  order  to  create  fear,  which 
puts  the  enemy  to  flight,  it  nevertheless  remains  undeniable  that 
superiority  of  fire  is  an  advantage  one  ought  to  secure ;  first,  in  order 
to  reduce  him,  to  make  it  easier  to  assault  him;  and  secondly,  in 
order  to  reach  the  moral  level  which  is  required  for  the  assault. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  203 

act,  namel}^  fire  action,  and  reserve  the  possibility  of 
performing  it,  just  as  they  reserve  the  later  preparation 
and  performance  of  the  attack  by  cold  steel. 

We  thus  find  that  infantry  action,  having  been  more 
or  less  transformed  under  the  influence  of  modern 
arms,  subdivides  itself  into  : 

(1)  Obviously  one  period  of  marching,  as  far  as 
about  800  yards  in  order  to  reach  the  fire  position 
(that  is  the  distance  which  allows  of  a  fire  of  a  sure 
efficiency,  or  the  nearest  position  which  may  be  reached 
mider  cover),  during  which  the  force  does  little  harm 
to  the  enemy,  but  suffers  a  serious  harm  unless  it  evades 
it  by  resorting  to  : 

{a)  Formation;  a  weak  protection  in  the  presence  of 
modern  armament.  The  less  vulnerable  formations  are 
still  much  too  rislcy  to  make  marching  possible. 

(&)  Firing  very  little;  such  fire,  in  spite  of  its  slight 
efficacity,  to  be  capable  of  maintaining  a  certain  con- 
fusion among  the  enemy,  of  partly  paralysing  his 
means  of  action. 

(c)  Ground,  and  such  sheltered  approaches  as  the 
ground  may  contain.  There  lies  the  only  really  effi- 
cient means  of  advancing  in  spite  of  the  enemy's  fire, 
for  the  enemy  then  ceases  to  see.  From  that  method 
may  be  deduced  the  formation  or  formations  to  be 
adopted.  Such  a  formation  must  enable  the  men  to 
utilise  well-reconnoitred  approaches;  moreover,  in  view 
of  undertaking  the  fire  action  at  an  early  stage,  such  a 
formation  must  avoid  scattering  the  troops,  disorganising 
them,  allowing  them  to  use  up  their  cartridges ;  it  must 
transform  them  into  a  well-commanded  and  well- supplied 
firing  rnachine. 

(2)  A  second  period  of  fire-action  :  the  object  being 
to  secure  superiority  as  soon  as  it  can  be  effectively 
secured  and  kept,  that  is,  from  about  800  to  600  yards. 
Such  an  achievement  requires  new  faculties  on  the 
part  of  the  rank  and  file  and  of  the  commander. 

Rank  and  File :  must  be  capable  of  undertaking, 
keeping  up  for  ten,  fifteen,  twenty,  thirty  minutes  and 
sometimes  more  an  efficient,  increasingly  violent,  con- 
stantly mastered  and  directed  fire. 

The  Commander :  must  be  aware  of  the  results 
aimed  at,  of  the  technical  means  of  attaining  them 
(nature  of  fire,  number  of  cartridges,  etc.),  also  of  the 


204        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

practical  means  of  directing  troops  in  action,  of  em- 
ploying them;  of  enabling  such  troops  to  last  out  and 
produce  an  effect,  and  this  in  spite  of  physical  fatigue, 
of  nervous  excitement,  of  confusion,  etc.,  all  of  which 
are  disturbing  factors  which  cannot  be  suppressed, 
and  must  therefore  be  taken  into  consideration,  as  they 
partly  determine  the  manner  of  employing  troops. 

(3)  A  period  of  attack  which  we  shall  study  later  on. 

From  the  necessity  of  modern  fire-action  has  resulted 
the  obligation  of  setting  up  training  camps  which  alone 
make  it  possible  to  study  the  conduct  of  troops  in  action 
{fire  in  war),  and  to  -give  the  rank  and  file  a  thorough  and 
practical  fire-training. 

How  THE  Same  Attack  would  be  carried  out 

To-day 

(See  Sketches  E  and  F.) 

In  any  case,  the  tactics  of  the  2nd  battalion  of  the 
37th  would  not  do  to-day.  In  the  presence  of  a  serious 
adversary,  it  would  be  necessary,  as  has  been  stated 
above,  to  run  up  to  the  "  points  d'appui  "  and  occupy 
them  if  the  enemy  was  not  there  already. 

In  case  the  enemy  should  occupy  them,  they  ought 
to  be  attacked  ^  without  delay,  successively,  of  course. 
Then  they  should  be  organised  in  the  order  in  which 
they  are  seized. 

Let  us  return  to  the  attack.  How  should  it  be  pro- 
ceeded with,  in  order  to  assault  the  Prussian  advance 
guard  as  it  was  established  on  June  27th,  1866?  How 
could  it  put  in  practice,  on  the  ground  leading  to 
Wenzelsberg,  the  theory  of  fire  and  march  described 
above  ? 

Let  us  assume  that  troops  are  ready  and  assembled 
at  Schonow.  What  is  the  object?  The  object  is  to 
drive  the  enemy  from  the  position  he  occupies  and  to 
take  his  place.  In  order  to  do  this,  we  must  go  there, 
and  take  therefore  both  a  direction  and  an  approach 
leading  thither.  It  would  not  do  to  take  any  direction  or 
any  approach  at  random,  for  if  we  are  content  to  march 
straight  on  the  enemy,  without  cover,  we  shall  break 

^  We  shall  here  do  well  to  recall  the  attack  on  Daix  during  the 
Dijon  battle,  the  attack  on  Habonville  at  Saint-Privat,  etc. 


^AVoch.  -  Des  Prmcipes  de  la  guerre 


Croquis  E,. 


]S(t*»Foch.-  Des  Pnncipes  de  la  guerre. 


Cro^uis  F 


Engagement  hypothet/gue 
de  la  f" Brigade. 


^-ry 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  205 

down  under  a  fire  from  which  nothing  will  protect  us,  and 
we  shall  then  either  not  assault  at  all  or  assault  badly. 

A  first  thing  is  therefore  necessary  :  to  look  out  for 
a  niunber  of  ways  which  shall  enable  us  to  advance 
under  shelter  from  that  fire  :  defiladed  ways,  sheltered 
approaches.  We  so  march  for  the  longest  possible  time, 
up  to  the  moment  when,  being  in  position  to  use  our 
arms  too,  we  shall  be  able  to  treat  with  the  adversary 
at  least  on  a  footing  of  equality. 

Sheltered  approaches  and  ground  are  always  to  be 
found,  or  almost  always,  when  they  are  thoroughly 
sought.  In  the  present  case,  the  ground  south  of 
Wenzelsberg  contains  the  hollow  roads  leading  to  the 
evangelical  church,  then  the  orchards,  then  the  village, 
then  the  large,  easily  reachable  ravine  south-east  of 
the  village. 

In  those  various  shelters  we  may,  by  using  various 
processes,  slip  on  in  small,  single  columns,  which  should 
adapt  themselves  to  the  ground ;  and  we  shall  thus 
assemble  and  accumulate  important  and  untouched  forces. 

We  see  here  what  becomes  oiformatiom  and  formalism. 
They  vanish  because  they  do  not  guarantee  anything 
of  themselves.  Once  the  result  wanted  has  been 
determined — namely,  an  approach  as  near  to  the  enemy 
as  possible  under  shelter  from  his  fire — regulations 
supply  the  means,  changing  according  to  circumstances, 
of  attaining  that  result :  we  have  the  column  by  sec- 
tions, the  column  by  companies,  the  double  column, 
the  columns  by  the  flank  of  subdivisions,  etc. ;  the  use 
of  these  must  be  determined  in  each  case  with  reference 
to  the  point  to  be  reached.  So  long,  however,  as  the 
troops  are  progressing  in  this  fashion,  they  are  not 
able  to  fight,  to  receive  the  enemy  properly  if  he  comes 
on.     They  must,  therefore,  be  guarded  from  the  enemy. 

Hence  the  preliminary  occupation  of  the  "  points 
d'appui  "  covering  our  plans  for  assembly.  These  are, 
here,  Wenzelsberg,  the  triangular  wood,  the  forester's 
house,  Sochors.  Thus  does  the  advance  guard  in 
action  make  secure  and  develop  as  far  as  possible 
the  preparation  of  the  attack. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  we  may  see  here  the  1st  battalion 
in  advance  guard  occupying  at  once  Wenzelsberg  and 
the  triangular  wood;  the  2nd  battalion  holding  the 
forester's  house,  Sochors,  the  woods  near  by;   in  the 


206         THE    PRINCIPLES    OF    WAR 

rear,  the  brigade  ^  bringing  its  1st  regiment  into  the 
ravines  of  Wenzelsberg  and  up  to  the  forester's  house; 
its  2nd  regiment  assembhng  north  of  the  Meier  farm, 
and  throwing  one  company  into  the  wood  west  of 
Wenzelsberg  in  order  to  keep  the  power  of  acting  in 
that  direction,  if  necessary. 

After  we  have  thus  prepared  and  assembled  the 
attacking  forces  within  the  approaches  provided  by 
the  ground,  nothing  is  done  if  we  do  not  assault  the 
enemy  in  order  to  overthrow  him.  How  should  this 
second  phase  of  the  operation  be  undertaken  ?  We  have 
to  march  on  the  enemy,  but  the  ground  no  longer  sup- 
plies us  with  the  means  of  advancing  without  facing  his 
blows.  We  must  resort  to  our  arms  in  order  to  over- 
come the  difficulties  of  the  approach;  we  must  use 
them  to  this  end  under  conditions  of  numbers,  of  time, 
and  of  space,  which  will  enable  us  to  produce  on  the 
adversary  a  greater  effect  (physical  and  moral)  than 
he  will  produce  on  us.  Henceforth  it  is  by  fire  that  we 
must  protect  our  advance.  The  force  will  deploy  within 
the  zone  of  approach  and  occupy  with  numerous  rifles 
all  the  points  wherefrom  it  is  possible  to  fire  on  the 
objective  ;  the  end  of  this  operation  produces  the  main 
firing  position ;  we  shall,  moreover,  give  our  fire  all 
the  development  possible  so  as  to  create  a  superiority 
in  our  favour. 

We  have  seen  above  how  fire-action  should  be  organ- 
ised :  we  should  have  a  line  formed  of  grouped  units, 
as  little  intermixed  as  possible,  discipline  being  guaran- 
teed by  their  interior  organisation  alone,  not  their 
proximity.  When  under  fire,  the  man  in  the  rank  and 
file  obeys  the  voice  of  the  ofiicers  he  knows  :  company- 
commanders,  section-commanders.  The  line  soon  turns 
into  separate  sets  of  individuals  who  cannot  be  carried 
forward  unless  they  are  led  individually  and  are  known 
by  name  to  their  commanders. 

The  objective  of  the  attack  must,  however,  be  deter- 
mined beforehand.  Taking  the  same  things  into  con- 
sideration, namely,  the  space  to  be  covered  under  enemy 
fire  and  the  superior  efficiency  which  has  to  be  produced 
and  maintained  on  the  selected  point  of  attack,  we 
are  led  to  the  following  conclusion :  the  first  objective 

^  We  suppose  here  the  brigade  to  include  eight  battalions,  reinforced 
with  artillery  and  cavalry. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  207 

selected  must  be  that  point  occupied  by  the  enemy 
which  is  nearest  to  us  and  on  which  we  may  apply  a 
numerical  superiority,  which  should  guarantee  superior 
efficiency.  In  the  present  case,  we  ought  to  start  from 
the  triangular  wood  and  from  the  northern  part  of  the 
ravine  so  as  to  attack  the  wood  east  of  Wenzelsberg  : 
an  objective  close  at  hand,  and,  moreover,  weakly  held ; 
a  salient,  easy  to  envelop  and  assault  with  superior 
nimibers  using  fire  alone  at  first. 

The  3rd  battalion  (covered  by  the  1st  battalion  in 
advance  guard,  which  leaves  it  more  or  less  entirely 
to  the  2nd  regiment  to  occupy  Wenzelsberg)  spreads 
into  the  northern  part  of  the  ravine  and  starts  a  fire- 
action  from  those  points. 

It  prepares  at  the  same  time  to  carry  the  wood; 
therefore  to  march  Avhile  maintaining  a  superiority  of 
fire.  Its  formation  will  be  a  dense  line — in  any  case, 
a  line  in  close  order.  Once  the  wood  has  been  reached, 
as  it  may  take  some  time  to  secure  a  decision  inside 
of  it,  that  decision  is  sought  simultaneously  by  a  force 
manoeuvring  outside  the  edges  of  the  wood,  a  force 
which  has  been  specially  organised  for  that  purpose,  an 
echelon  which  starts  by  more  or  less  outflanking  the 
wood. 

Penetrating  into  the  wood  and  carrying  it  (in  view 
of  the  extension  of  the  wood  to  be  assaulted,  and  of 
the  distance  to  be  covered  before  assaulting)  is  a  task 
which  may  be  performed  by  the  3rd  battalion ;  it  will 
debouch  from  the  northern  part  of  the  ravine,  after 
being  organised  so  as  to  {a)  strike  first  the  salient 
aimed  at,  an  operation  which  will  very  likely  involve 
two  companies  in  line,  with  a  third  in  support  in  the 
rear ;  and  (&)  out-manoeuvre  the  outskirts  of  the  wood 
and  break,  if  need  be,  the  resistance  inside  the  wood; 
an  operation  which  will  require  the  4th  company  to 
be  in  reserve,  forming  an  outflanking  echelon  on  the 
right.  That  attack  should  be  supported  on  the  front 
by  the  1st  battalion  in  advance  guard,  which  should 
operate  with  certain  of  its  forces  by  the  northern 
outskirt  of  the  triangular  wood  and  in  any  case  keep 
the  wood  engaged. 

The  attack  may  nevertheless  prove  powerless,  and  be 
held  up  before  having  been  sufficiently  pushed  forward  : 
the    4th    battalion    then    advances    as    a    regimental 


208        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

reserve  inside  the  ravine,  so  as  to  be  ready  to  intervene 
either  in  order  to  reinforce  the  exhausted  assailants,  or 
in  order  to  carry  the  attack  further  once  it  has  been 
pressed  home. 

But  again,  in  order  that  the  attack  may  be  successful, 
it  must  be  protected  from  any  enemy  surprise,  counter- 
attacks or  violent  fire,  mainly  on  its  external  flank. 
That  mission  should  devolve  upon  the  2nd  battalion 
(previously  in  advance  guard),  which,  in  order  to  fulfil 
it,  occupies  the  northern  outskirts  of  the  wood  north- 
east of  the  forester's  house  (one  company),  next  the 
northern  end  of  the  ravine,  lastly,  the  small  wood  touch- 
ing it  (one  company),  and  thus  flanks  the  attack  by 
constantly  advancing,  without  ceasing  to  occupy  "  points 
d'appui  "  in  the  rear. 

In  consequence  of  this  effort,  the  1st  regiment  has 
to  proceed  to  the  north  of  the  forester's  house,  ready 
to  act  all  together,  though  it  only  sends  one  battalion 
into  action  against  the  selected  objective.^ 

Once  the  wood  east  of  Wenzelsberg  shall  have  been 
carried  in  this  way,  the  possession  of  it  must  be  made 
secure  by  establishing  along  the  northern  outskirts  an 
orderly  force,  under  the  protection  of  which  the  more 
or  less  disconnected  units  which  have  just  made  the 
assault  will  reorganise  themselves;  a  new  objective  will 
then  be  selected  and  attacked  in  the  same  way,  by  using 
the  most  convenient  direction  and  making  a  special  dis- 
tribution of  forces  answering  to  the  new  case.  It  is  into 
such  a  series  of  successive  actions  that  combat  trans- 
forms itself  as  a  consequence  of  modern  armament : 
the  attacking  force  tries  to  advance  to  the  right  when 
it  can  no  longer  advance  straight  ahead;  it  tries  to 
manoeuvre  by  a  wing  when  the  other  wing  is  held  up; 
always  keeping  its  freedom  of  manoeuvre  by  means  of 
preliminary  measures  of  security;  always  securing  on 
the  point  of  attack  the  possibility,   provided  by  the 

^  One  here  sees  what  becomes  of  the  formation  at  the  moment  of 
attacking;  a  distribution  of  forces  is  then  made  in  comphance  with 
the  principles  explained  above,  and  according  to  what  is  required  by 
the  objective  and  by  local  conditions.  If  we  now  look  back  at  the 
Austrian  dispositions,  their  faulty  nature  becomes  obvious.  The 
Austrians  thought  they  would  secure  speed  by  cohesion;  they  only 
secured  rigidity;  the  latter  prevented  their  utilising  the  broken 
ground ;  their  march  met  with  notlimg  but  obstacles.  Moreover,  this 
arrangement  of  theirs  entirely  overlooked  action  by  fire. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  209 

ground,  of  applying  the  numerical  superiority  which  has 
itself  been  secured  by  the  art  of  "  creating  numbers." 

In  order  to  be  sure  of  carrying  the  wood,  our  point  of 
attack,  we  shall  apply  there  all  the  forces  we  can  assemble 
— all  the  rifles  available.  That  is  obvious,  but  we  must 
also  apply  all  the  guns  available.  We  shall  ask  the 
artillery  to  frepare  the  attack,  and  therefore  to  place 
itself  in  such  a  position  as  to  he  able  to  see.  But  the  enemy 
artiller}^  may  in  its  turn  observe  our  batteries,  hamper 
their  action  and  drive  them  awa}^;  our  artillery  must 
therefore  either  take  up  a  position  from  which  it  can 
see  without  being  see7i,  or  it  must  gain  the  uppcrhand 
over  the  enemy  artillery.  To  this  end  it  must  possess 
superiority  in  numbers. 

Had  the  Wenzelsberg  wood  been  conquered,  it  would 
have  become  impossible  for  the  Prussian  advance  guard 
to  hold  the  plateau.  The  attack  on  the  second  position 
would  have  then  been  proceeded  with. 

After  what  has  now  been  said,  it  is  possible  to  define 
the  features  of  an  operation  : 

First  comes  the  idea  of  a  certain  action.  This  is 
derived  either  from  the  function  assigned  to  our  force,  or 
from  the  strategical  situation  as  we  know  it.  The  idea 
here  was  to  attack.  Once  the  idea  of  an  attack  had  been 
adopted,  the  direction  had  to  be  determined.  The  attack 
had  then  to  be  prepared,  earned  out,  and  protected. 

We  have  seen  that  the  direction  must  be  that  deter- 
mined by  the  most  favourable  ground,  that  is,  in  the  first 
place,  the  most  sheltered  one ;  next,  that  over  which  we 
can  use  our  rifles  and  guns  together,  and  in  considerable 
numbers,  against  a  common  objective. 

As  for  the  three  terms  :  ^^repara^ioji,  execution,  protec- 
tion, Ave  have  seen  what  they  imply. 

In  any  case,  one  offensive  action  only  must  be  under- 
taken at  a  given  moment,  and  not  more  than  one  ;  there- 
fore, there  must  be  one  objective  only ;  all  the  forces 
devoted  to  that  operation,  infantry,  artillery,  cavalry, 
engineering  corps,  must  send  out  only  such  detachments 
as  are  strictly  necessary  for  covering,  preparing,  ensuring 
the  operation,  that  is,  for  constantly  guaranteeing  the 
main  body.     We  demand 

Freedom  of  action. 
Free  disposal  of  forces. 
Strict  economy  of  forces. 


210        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Moreover,  as  a  result  of  this  last  principle,  such 
numbers  must  always  be  attached  to  the  attack  as  will 
guarantee  an  indisputable  local  superiority ;  a  minimum 
of  forces  must,  on  the  contrary,  be  devoted  to  parrying, 
to  security,  which  only  aims  at  a  negative  result,  to  wit, 
protection. 

The  Infantry  Action 
(See  Sketch  D.) 

However  unfavourable  the  situation  might  be  (about 
10.30  a.m.),  Steinmetz  ordered  General  von  Loewenfeld 
to  hold  the  position.  The  main  bodj;^,  more  particularly 
the  artillery  reserve,  was  ordered  to  march  forward  more 
rapidly.  But  the  troops  of  the  Prussian  advance  guard 
were  exhausted  in  every  way ;  their  situation  was  very 
anxious. 

On  the  Austrian  side,  the  Jonack  brigade  had  arrived ; 
it  had  fallen  in  south  of  Domkow,  and  was  about  to 
advance  in  order  to  attack  the  right  flank  of  the  position. 

At  about  9.30,  that  brigade  moved  on  :  the  Wasa 
regiment  in  the  first  line ;  the  "  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  "  ^ 
regiment  in  the  second  line;  the  Clam-Jallas  Uhlan 
regiment  in  the  third  line,  under  the  protection  of  its 
own  battery  established  east  of  Domkow,  towards  the 
northern  entrance  of  Schonow.  The  two  Prussian 
batteries  opened  fire  on  these  troops  at  an  opening  range 
of  2300  yards. 

The  brigade  advanced  with  its  band  leading  it,  and 
reached  a  position  north  of  Schonow  at  about  10,  or 
10.15.  The  14th  Jager  battalion,  which  had  till  then 
covered  its  march  against  the  enemy,  arriving  from  the 
region  of  Giesshiibel,  placed  itself  on  the  right. 

At  the  same  time  the  Rosenzweig  brigade  fell  in,  face 
to  Prowodow,  and  then  proceeded  to  the  east  of  that 
place,  keeping  its  advance  guard  (17th  Jager  battalion) 
on  the  heights  between  the  Kleny  road  and  Wenzelsberg. 

At  about  the  same  hour  (9.45)  the  Waldstatten  brigade 
received  orders  to  proceed  from  Skalitz  to  Wysokow. 

At  10.30  the  Jonack  brigade  opened  its  attack,  while 
the  Hestweck  brigade  was  retreating  on  its  right,  and 
while,  on  its  left,  five  squadrons  of  cuirassiers  were 
standing  on  the  Skalitz  road,  at  the  foot  of  the  heights 

^  An  Austrian  unit  so  named. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  211 

there.  The  brigade  went  forward  in  the  formation  we 
have  ah-eady  described  : 

The  Wasa  regiment  in  the  first  Hne,  its  three  battalions 
on  the  same  alignment,  in  columns  by  divisions;  the 
14th  battalion  marching  in  the  same  formation  on 
the  right  of  that  first  line ;  the  regiment  "  Crown  Prince 
of  Prussia  "  in  second  line,  in  the  same  fonnation.  The 
brigade  went  towards  Wenzelsberg;  as  it  marched  by 
the  same  route  as  the  Hestweck  brigade,  it  was  soon 
delayed  by  the  flood  of  fugitives  from  that  brigade; 
part  of  the  first  Ime  was  even  carried  away.  As  this 
Jonack  brigade  was  covered  neither  to  the  right  nor  to 
the  left,  it  was  soon  attacked  by  small  parties  of  Prus- 
sian infantry  who,  after  debouching  from  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  the  forester's  house  and  of  Sochors,  fired 
at  the  flanks  of  the  assailants. 

Spontaneously,  the  14th  Jager  battalion,  then  the  3rd 
Wasa,  the  1st  Wasa,  and  the  3rd  of  the  "  Crown  Prince 
of  Prussia"  faced  to  the  right  in  order  to  meet  that 
attack,  then  stood  motionless  at  the  foot  of  the  ravines 
surrounding  Sochors.  The  attack  continued,  but  now 
with  only  three  battalions. 

It  was  with  such  reduced  forces — but  without 
seriously  encountering  the  enemy — that  the  brigade 
arrived  at  the  Wenzelsberg  chapel.  It  undertook  from 
that  point  of  departure  an  action  on  the  Waldchen, 
which  was  joined  by  the  25th  battalion  and  the  2nd 
battalion  of  the  Kellner  regiment  (which  had  previously 
held  the  northern  outskirts  of  Wenzelsberg),  as  well  as 
by  the  17th  Jager,  the  advance  guard  of  the  Rosenzweig 
brigade. 

Under  the  pressure  of  this  enveloping  attack  from 
six  Austrian  battalions,  the  Prussians  lost  the  southern 
part  of  the  Waldchen. 

Meanwhile  the  Rosenzweig  brigade  had  started  with 
the  Gondrecourt  regiment  in  first  line ;  and  the  Deutsch- 
meister  regiment,  making  for  the  western  edge  of  the 
wood,  in  second  line. 

As  General  Jonack  was  asking  for  reinforcements, 
the  1st  and  2nd  Gondrecourt  battalions  supported  the 
left  of  the  Jonack  brigade.  Thus  eight  Austrian  bat- 
talions (17th  Jager,  1st  and  2nd  Gondrecourt,  1st  and 
2nd  "  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,"  2nd  Wasa,  25th  Jager 
and  2nd  Kellner)  came  up  and  struck  that  weak  outer 


212        THE    PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

edge  of  the  Waldchen  wood,  carried  it  and  carried  the 
wood  itself,  which  is  of  an  average  width  of  300-400 
yards  and  of  a  length  of  1300-1400  yards.  They  were 
bound  to  lose  themselves  in  it  without  securing  any 
important  result. 

The  remainder  of  the  Rosenzweig  brigade  (2nd  Gondre- 
court  battalion  and  Deutschmeister  regiment)  reached, 
a  short  time  later,  the  south-western  edge  of  the  wood, 
where  the  brigade  battery  was  also  coming  up.  These 
battalions,  marching  in  the  direction  of  Wenzelsberg 
church,  struck  against  the  2nd  battalion  of  the  Prussian 
37th.  The  latter  received  them  with  a  very  violent 
fire,  which  stopped  not  only  the  skirmishers  but  the 
2nd  and  3rd  battalions  as  well.  It  was,  however,  out- 
flanked in  its  turn  by  the  1st  Deutschmeister  and  by 
detachments  debouching  from  the  Waldchen. 

It  then  withdrew  without  delay  on  the  Branka-Wald, 
facing  round  more  than  once  and  delivering  volley-fires ; 
it  was  received  and  protected  in  its  retirement  by  one 
half-battalion  (Bojan  of  the  3rd  of  the  37th),  which 
attempted  to  counter-attack;  and  one  half-battalion 
(Suchodoletz  of  the  58th  rifles),  which  had  coiTie  up  from 
Altstadt  and  had  established  itself  at  the  western  out- 
skirt  of  the  Branka-Wald. 

The  Prussian  artillery  and  cavalry  could  not  hold  on 
further.     They  withdrew  behind  the  Branka-Schlucht. 

The  retreating  movement  of  the  centre  determined 
the  same  movement  among  the  detachments  at  the 
forester's  house  and  at  Sochors;  they  slowly  withdrew 
towards  the  Branka-Wald.  No  attack  had  been  made 
on  Wysokow.  The  whole  Prussian  advance  guard  was 
in  action,  and  was  beaten ;  but  the  hour  was  nearly 
noon.     It  had  only  to  hold  out  for  a  short  while  longer. 

The  infantry  being  disorganised,  cavalry  was  called 
upon  to  continue  the  fight. 

The  assailant  had  availed  himself  of  his  success  to 
overrun  the  approaches  to  the  Neustadt  road ;  he  must 
be  stopped  at  any  price. 

The  Cavalry  Action  (11.30  a.m.  and  12) 

The  ground  between  Wysokow  and  the  Waldchen 
contains  a  road  lined  with  trees  which,  going  from 
Wysokow  to  the  Branka-Wald,  follows  the  ridge  of  the 


M^  Foch.-  Des  Prmcipes  de  la  guerre. 


CroquisD 


Engagements 
entre  11^72  etmi'di. 


J i_— » — 1^ — I  — —      ■  y- 


^X,f 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  213 

slopes,  at  the  foot  of  which  are  meadows.  These  slopes 
are  cut  by  hollow  roads  and  ditches,  and  are  covered 
with  crops  and  a  few  small  woods. 

Meanwhile,  the  Wniick  brigade,  hastily  called  up,  has 
gone  through  Nachod  (10.30).  It  reaches  the  Neustadt 
road  and  takes  up  a  sheltered  assembly  position  behind 
the  ridge.  It  has  formed  in  lines  of  column  by  squadrons, 
1st  Ulilans  on  the  right,  8th  Dragoons  on  the  left.  One 
platoon  of  dragoons  patrols  ahead.  One  squadron  of 
dragoons  is  scouting  beyond  Wysokow;  it  soon  with- 
draws before  the  superior  forces  of  the  Austrian  cavalry. 
This  is  the  moment  when  the  Prussians  are  thrown 
back  from  the  Waldchen.  The  battery  of  the  Wniick 
brigade  takes  up  a  position  near  the  Neustadt  road. 

Opposite  that  place,  the  Solms  cavalry  brigade  holds 
the  front  of  the  meadows  west  of  Wysokow;  it  is  near 
the  bridge  of  the  road. 

The  battery  of  that  brigade  attempts  at  first  to 
take  position  between  Wysokow  and  Kleny  and  to 
cover  the  ground  with  shells.  It  then  advances  as 
far  as  the  farm- steadings  at  Wysokow  without  suc- 
ceeding in  taking  up  a  position.  It  does  not  produce 
any  effect  whatever. 

General  Raming  orders  General  Solms,  after  the 
17th  Jager  battalion  has  entered  Waldchen,  to  advance 
on  the  plateau  so  as  to  cover  the  left  flank  of  the  Aus- 
trian infantry.  It  was  about  11.30  when  the  squadron 
of  Prussian  dragoons  (2nd  of  the  4th  Dragoons)  was 
withdrawing  before  the  Austrian  cavalry  and  send- 
ing in  the  news  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  advance  to 
the  Prussian  infantry  at  Wysokow  (Kurowski's  half- 
battalion  of  the  3rd  of  the  37th)  and  to  General  von 
Wniick.  At  the  same  time.  General  Solms  learnt 
from  his  patrols  the  presence  of  a  regiment  of  Prussian 
Uhlans  on  the  plateau. 

The  Austrian  cavalry,  with  the  railway  on  its  left, 
has  its  squadrons  of  cuirassiers  presented  as  follows  at 
the  outset  of  its  attack  : 

First  of  all  the  5th  squadron  of  the  Archduke 
Ferdinand  regiment,  advances  alongside  of  Wysokow, 
debouches  from  the  steadings,  faces  to  the  right  and 
charges ;  then  General  von  Wniick  orders  the  regiment 
of  Uhlans  to  advance  at  once  and  deploy  at  a  trot; 
the  1st  squadron  of  Uhlans  attacks  on  the  front;  the 


214        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

2nd  squadron  of  Uhlans  attacks  in  flank,  followed  by- 
three  platoons  of  the  3rd  squadron. 

The  encounter  takes  place  at  the  southern  outskirts 
of  Wysokow  and  near  the  eastern  exit  of  the  village. 

The  2nd  squadron  of  (enemy)  Hessen  cuirassiers 
sees  the  affair,  hurries  forward,  and  throws  itself  into 
the  fray,  when  the  2nd  squadron  of  the  4th  Prussian 
Dragoons  arrives  and  attacks  in  its  turn,  debouching 
from  the  eastern  exit  of  Wysokow.  In  all,  two  squad- 
rons of  Austrian  cuirassiers  are  now  opposed  to  three 
and  three-quarters  Prussian  squadrons. 

The  fight  was  a  very  confused  one.  In  spite  of 
their  numerical  inferiority,  the  Austrian  cuirassiers 
fought    vigorously;    at   each   repulse,    they    fell    back 


2  f  Esc"."  Hesse 

S^Esc^CArcfi.  Ferdinand 


\ 


■2  Esc  0.1^ '/2' 
Arcft'  Ferdinand 


Esc°."Hessff 

again  into  line  and  attacked  again.  But  here  a  certain 
incident  took  place. 

Having  heard  from  the  2nd  squadron  of  the  4th 
Dragoons  that  enemy  cavalry  was  approaching,  the 
Kurowski  half-battalion  (of  the  3rd  of  the  37th)  had 
advanced  towards  the  eastern  part  of  Wysokow  and 
went  quickly  up  the  slope  south  of  the  village;  the 
half-company  of  Jagers,  which  was  at  that  moment 
occupying  the  middle  of  the  village  proceeded  at  once 
to  its  southern  outsldrts. 

The  Kurowski  half-battalion  had  not  completed  its 
operation  when  the  Austrian  charge  was  launched. 
The  Prussian  half-battalion  ran  up  to  the  ridge,  for  it 
as  yet  could  see  nothing.  There  it  formed  square,  and 
with  its  head  and  left  face  fired  on  the  mass  of  the 
Austrian  cuirassiers  as  they  attempted  to  reform  on 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  215 

the  foot  of  the  slope.  The  latter  turned  on  their  new 
adversary.  They  were  routed  and  repulsed.  They 
next  came  under  the  fire  of  the  half-company  of  Jager 
and  retreated  for  good  and  all. 

The  decision  in  this  cavalry  action  was  undeniably 
due  to  the  intervention  of  the  Prussian  infantry,  who 
had  had  the  wit  not  to  miss  a  good  opportunity.  It 
was  a  fine  triumph  of  solidarity  between  different 
arms,  of  the  initiative  of  commanders  of  small  units; 
a  brilliant  manifestation  of  the  warlike  activity  that 
can  permeate  an  army  which  military  science  vivifies 
and  inspires. 

General  von  Wniick,  ignoring  the  presence  of  Prus- 
sian infantry  at  Wysokow,  believed  the  village  to  be 
occupied  by  enemy  infantry.  He  gave  the  signal  for 
assembly.     He  did  not  carry  out  a  pursuit. 

At  the  same  time,  however,  a  combat  was  taking 
place  near  the  Waldchen. 

The  two  and  a  half  Hessen  squadrons  placed,  as  we 
have  seen,  on  the  right  on  the  Austrian  line,  followed 
in  echelon,  advancing  through  the  depression  of  ground 
which  lies  west  of  the  Waldchen  and  rises  towards 
the  north-east.  The  commander  of  the  4th  squadron 
of  Uhlans  had  scarcely  noticed  this  movement,  when 
the  Austrian  squadrons  suddenly  deployed  at  full 
gallop  and  charged.  The  captain  faced  the  attack 
with  his  squadron  and  two  platoons  of  the  3rd  squadron 
by  a  half -turn  to  the  left. 

The  encounter  took  place  near  the  north-eastern 
edge  of  the  Waldchen. 

The  Prussian  Uhlans  were  enveloped  by  the  Austrian 
cuirassiers ;  being  hard  pressed,  they  could  not  use 
their  lances.  Part  of  them  were  thrown  back  at  once 
on  the  Neustadt  road. 

The  situation  of  the  Prussian  Uhlans  was  already 
critical  when  the  3rd  squadron  of  Hessen  cuirassiers, 
which,  having  been  attached  to  the  Rosenzweig  brigade, 
had  placed  itself  behind  the  Waldchen,  intervened  in 
its  turn.  It  went  along  the  outskirts  of  the  wood 
and  threw  itself  on  the  flank  of  the  Prussian  Uhlans. 

General  von  Wniick  rode  over  to  the  8th  Dragoons, 
which  then  advanced  towards  the  north-eastern  edge 
of  the  Waldchen  and  attacked  the  Hessen  cuirassiers, 
neglecting  altogether  the  fire  from  the  wood. 


216        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

The  1st  and  2nd  squadrons  attacked  in  front,  the 
3rd  and  4th  outflanked  and  enveloped  tlie  right  of 
the  Austrians.  A  second  melee  ensued;  the  Prussians 
prevailed  owing  to  their  enveloping  movement  and 
numerical  superiority  (five  and  a  half  squadrons  against 
three  and  a  half).  The  Austrian  cuirassiers  withdrew 
slowly.  The  Prussian  Uiilans  came  back  behind  the 
ridge. 

Owing  to  the  heat  of  action  inside  the  Waldchen, 
the  Austrian  infantry  were  not  aware  of  the  cavalry 
action  which  was  taking  place  within  their  reach;  they 
did  not  intervene;  they  did  not  show  the  happy  initi- 
ative displayed  by  the  Prussian  infantry  at  Wysokow. 

General  von  Wniick  had  not  a  single  reserve  left. 
He  knew  that  the  Waldchen  was  occupied  by  the 
enemy.  He  also  believed  Wysokow  to  be  in  enemy 
possession.  He  feared  lest  he  should  come  against 
fresh  and  numerous  enemy  forces.  At  the  moment 
when  he  had  appeared  on  the  battle-field,  the  fight  was 
raging  on  the  whole  front;  the  main  body  of  his  army 
corps  was  approaching.  He  cautiously  decided  to 
assemble  his  brigade  and  to  abandon  the  pursuit. 

Such,  at  least,  are  the  reasons  which  he  himself  put 
forward  later  on  (while  claiming  victory)  in  order  to 
justify  his  timid  conduct. 

The  Solms  brigade  was  assembling  west  of  Wysokow ; 
it  withdrew  later  on  in  the  direction  of  Kleny;  it  was 
not  to  reappear  on  that  day. 

The  Prussian  brigade  resumed  its  original  position. 
Later  on,  the  fire  from  the  Austrian  artillery  compelled 
it  to  withdraw  behind  Branka. 


Attack  by  the  Austrian  Infantry  on  the  Branka 
Wood-Neustadt  Road  Position  (Noon) 

At  about  the  moment  when  the  cavalry  actions  we 
have  just  been  studying  were  taking  place,  the  Austrian 
infantry  was  attempting  to  debouch  from  the  Waldchen 
in  order  to  attack  the  Branka  wood  and  the  road  to 
Neustadt. 

The  enemy's  fire  easily  succeeded  at  first  in  breaking 
up  these  desultory  efforts.  Moreover,  the  Prussian 
half-battalions,  Bojan    (of  the   3rd  of  the    37th)    and 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  217 

Suchodoletz  (of  the  F.  of  the  58th),  which  had  hitherto 
been  kept  in  reserve,  salHed  forth  froin  the  outskirts 
of  the  Branka  wood  and  enveloped  with  a  circle  of 
powerful  fire  the  two  Austrian  battalions  (1st,  2nd 
of  "Crown  Prince  of  Prussia")  which  had  succeeded 
in  debouching  from  the  north-eastern  corner  of  the 
Waldchen,  as  well  as  the  17th  Jager.  As  that  fire 
proved  insufficient,  both  Prussian  battalions  made  a 
bound  forward  of  350  paces,  and  twice  delivered  a 
volley  at  a  range  of  350  yards.  At  the  same  time, 
General  von  Wniick  ordered  the  8th  Dragoons  to 
hold  up  the  infantry  debouching  from  the  Waldchen. 
Hence  resulted  a  series  of  cavalry  attacks  against  the 
Austrian  Jagers  and  against  the  battalions  of  the 
"  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia"  regiment. 

Those  companies  of  the  Austrian  17th  Jager  bat- 
talion which  were  not  in  action  immediately  withdrew 
into  the  Waldchen.  The  others  formed  square  in 
order  to  resist  the  cavalry  charges,  but  they  suffered 
considerable  losses  at  the  hands  of  the  Prussian  half- 
battalions  (Bojan  and  Suchodoletz).  Being  compelled 
to  deploy  in  order  to  resist,  they  were  charged  and 
soon  thrown  back  into  the  wood. 

The  two  battalions  (1st  and  2nd)  of  the  "  Crown 
Prince  of  Prussia"  regiment  and  the  fractions  of  the 
25th  battalion  and  of  the  2nd  Kellner,  which  tried  to 
support  them,  met  with  the  same  fate.     A  flag  was  lost. 

The  Bojan  half -battalion  (of  the  3rd  of  the  37th) 
availed  itself  of  this  success  to  throw  itself  into  the 
Waldchen ;  it  was  at  once  supported  by  the  first  troops 
of  the  main  body  of  the  army  corps  which  had  arrived 
at  last  (half -battalion  of  the  F.  of  the  44th),  and  had 
already  intervened  in  the  action  against  the  Austrian 
17th  Jager. 

During  this  fight  the  Rosenzweig  brigade  had  sent 
its  reserves  into  action  (1st  and  2nd  battalions  of  the 
Gondrecourt  regiment)  through  the  region  south  of 
the  Waldchen,  against  the  position  on  the  road  to 
Neustadt.  The  repeated  attempts  of  the  Prussian 
cavalry,  generally  confined  to  making  an  advance 
menacing  that  road,  compelled  these  battalions  also 
to  form  square.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  they  suffered  little 
from  the  cavalry  action;  they  broke  down,  however, 
under  the  direct  fire  from  the  outskirts  of  the  Branka 


218         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

wood,  as  well  as  under  the  flanking  fire  coming  from 
all  sides.  The  same  thing  happened  to  the  battery  of 
the  Rosenzweig  brigade,  which  had  tried  to  take  up  a 
position  in  front  of  the  Branka-Wald. 

At  12.30  the  space  between  the  road  to  Neustadt, 
the  Waldchen  and  Wenzelsberg,  were  being  evacuated 
by  the  Austrian  infantry.  The  attack  on  the  left  wing, 
carried  out  by  the  Jonack  and  Rosenzweig  brigade, 
and  supported  by  part  of  the  Hestweck  brigade,  had 
failed.  All  the  progress  of  the  Austrians  had  been 
stopped  before  the  second  position  by  the  combined 
action  of  enemy  infantry  and  cavalry.  No  attempt 
had  been  made  against  either  the  right  wing  or  the 
left  wing  of  the  Prussian  advance  guard. 

The  critical  phase  for  the  Prussian  Army  Corps  had 
come  to  an  end.  The  battalions  of  the  main  body 
were  beginning  to  deploy  on  the  plateau.  The  Aus- 
trians had  no  more  fresh  troops  at  their  disposal  save 
the  Waldstatten  brigade,  the  artillery  reserve  and  the 
Schindlocker  cavalry  brigade.  These  troops,  however, 
could  still  come  into  action.  A  vigorous  counterstroke 
might  still  throw  back  the  head  of  the  Prussian  Fifth 
Corps  on  to  the  pass.  But  it  was  little  likely  that, 
where  three  Austrian  brigades  had  failed  before  a  weak 
advance  guard,  one  brigade  and  a  few  demoralised 
troops,  would  succeed  in  reversing  the  situation. 


Remarks  on  this  Phase  of  the  Battle  from  10.30 

TO  Noon 

Concerning  that  part  of  the  battle  conducted  by 
General  von  Raming  a  certain  number  of  remarks  are 
called  for  : 

{a)  At  the  moment  when  that  General  took  over  the 
direction  of  the  affair,  the  Hestweck  brigade  was  beaten, 
the  Jonack  brigade  was  about  to  come  into  action. 
The  Rosenzweig  brigade  had  nearly  reached  the  battle- 
field. The  Waldstatten  brigade  and  the  artillery 
reserves  were  still  in  the  rear  at  Skalitz. 

Such  a  dispersion  of  the  means  of  action  was  ob- 
viously adverse  to  strong  action.  It  would  be  still 
worse  to  aggravate  the  evil.  As  all  the  forces  could 
strike  together,  the  worst  policy  would  be  to  launch 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  219 

them  piece  by  piece  into  action.     Moreover,   General 
von  Raming  could  not  ignore  what  had  just  happened  : 

The  Hestweck  brigade  had  suffered  heavy  losses  and 
was  in  full  retreat;  the  enemy  had  discovered  him- 
self on  a  front  of  3000  yards;  the  Austrian  artillery 
had  proved  inferior;  and  the  Prussian  cavalry  had 
discovered  several  squadrons. 

How,  then,  should  he  attempt  to  initiate  with  one 
brigade  a  new  action  against  an  enemy  whose  spirit 
had  just  been  enhanced  ?  He  should  not  have  under- 
taken to  fight  again,  save  with  all  his  forces  acting 
together. 

To  utilise  the  remains  of  the  Hestweck  brigade,  to 
throw  in  the  Jonack  and  Rosenzweig  together,  to  build 
up  a  reserve  with  the  Waldstatten  brigade  summoned 
as  quickly  as  possible  by  the  Skalitz  road  :  such  were, 
on  the  whole,  the  dispositions  he  ought  to  have  taken. 

How  must  the  troops  be  made  to  attack  ?  He  had 
just  seen  the  results  of  a  fight  conducted  on  one  front, 
without  manoeuvring.  A  wing  manoeuvre  had  ob- 
viously to  be  organised  at  the  same  time  as  a  frontal 
attack. 

On  which  wing  was  it  best  to  act  ?  On  the  most 
advantageous  one — namely,  that  one  which  should  first 
of  all  allow  the  attack  to  develop  to  the  best  advan- 
tage, and  which  afterwards  should  ensure  the  most 
decisive  result.  Those  two  conditions  were  to  be 
found  in  the  direction  of  Wysokow-Altstadt.  This  is  clear 
when  one  examines  the  map  and  studies  the  ground. 

There  was  ground  practicable  for  all  arms  in  the 
region  north-east  of  the  Waldchen.  There  was  no 
other  obstacle  than  Wysokow.  A  great  number  of 
ways  of  access  enabled  the  attacking  party  to  approach 
that  village  and  the  region  to  the  north  of  it. 

As  for  the  final  result :  an  attack  by  the  north  of 
Wysokow,  over  the  interval  Wysokow-Altstadt,  would 
take  the  enemy  front  in  reverse,  foil  all  the  attempts 
of  the  adversary,  however  successful  at  first,  on  the 
Wenzelsberg  plateau,  and  definitely  bottle  up  the 
Nachod  pass. 

On  that  basis,  the  plan  might  have  consisted  in  : 
Entrusting  the  Hestweck  brigade  with  the  task  of 
occupying  Wenzelsberg  and  the  villages  more  to  the 
south ;  pushing  on  the  Jonack  and  Rosenzweig  brigades 


220        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

over  the  interval  Waldchen-Wysokow  and  north  of 
Wysokow;  preparing  that  attack  with  all  artillery 
available;  protecting  it  to  the  north  by  a  main  body 
of  cavalry;  and  bringing  up  the  Waldstatten  brigade 
in  reserve  at  Kleny. 

In  any  case,  the  attack  had  to  avoid  the  Wenzels- 
berg  region,  which,  being  woody,  and  broken  up,  would 
compel  the  attacking  force  to  parcel  itself  out,  to  sub- 
divide itself  into  powerless  and  necessarily  disconnected 
efforts;  a  region  where  numerical  superiority  would 
not  be  able  to  assert  itself. 

In  order  to  justify  his  attack  across  the  Wenzelsberg 
plateau.  General  von  Raming  has  alleged  that  he  did 
not  know  whether  the  Prussian  attack  was  directed 
against  the  road  to  Neustadt,  or  against  Skalitz,  or 
the  Wenzelsberg  road;  as  if  any  manoeuvre  should 
consist  in  simply  countering  the  attempts  of  the  enemy  ! 

Every  manoeuvre  must  be  the  development  of  a 
scheme ;  it  must  aim  at  a  goal.  The  goal  was,  in  this 
case,  to  bottle  up  the  Nachod  pass.  Therefore  the 
Austrians  ought  to  have  taken  the  direction  that  would 
have  led  to  this  end  in  the  easiest  and  most  secure 
way,  and  only  to  have  arranged  all  their  attacking 
dispositions  in  the  light  of,  and  consequent  upon, 
that  end. 

(b)  The  Jonack  brigade  went  into  action  without 
reconnoitring  the  position  and  situation  of  the  enemy. 
It  presented,  a  thin  line  of  skirmishers,  followed  by 
battalions  in  close  order,  unable  to  manoeuvre;  it 
advanced  over  the  very  ground  where  the  fugitives 
from  the  Hestweck  brigade  were  flowing  back.  It 
was  not  guarded  on  its  right  flank.  It  left  its  cavalry 
in  the  rear;  its  artillery  supported  it  only  from  a  very 
great  distance.  The  ends  of  its  line  were  more  or  less 
carried  away  by  the  fugitives.  In  order  to  parry  a 
counter-attack,  about  four  battalions  took  a  diver- 
gent direction.  Numerical  superiority  vanished.  Not  a 
single  shot  was  fired;  out  of  seven  battalions,  three 
only  henceforth  take  part  in  the  attack. 

(c)  One  has  also  to  notice  the  way  in  which  the  25th 
Jager  battalion  joined  the  Kellner  battalion  in  attacking 
the  Waldchen;  for  by  deserting  Wenzelsberg,  the  only 
"  point  d'appui  "  available,  that  battalion  exposed  the 
village  to  being  taken  by  enemy,   had  the  latter  not 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  221 

been    prevented    from    doing    this    by    his    temporary 
numerical  inferiority. 

(d)  In  the  attack  on  the  second  position,  there  is 
neither  a  superior  direction,  nor  unity  and  harmony; 
there  was  not  one  united  striking  force.  How  could  it 
be  otherwise  ?  Eight  battalions  attempt  to  debouch 
from  the  eastern  outskirts  of  the  Waldchen.  That 
edge  of  the  wood  is  not  400  yards  long.  More  to  the 
south,  the  reserve  comes  up  by  mere  chance,  in  compact 
mass  formation,  in  front  of  the  Neustadt  road.  No 
scheme  directs  that  reserve ;  it  acts  blindly  and  without 
liaison.  Had  it  been  better  conducted,  the  Austrian 
attack  would  have  succeeded. 

AVliat  would  have  been  the  results  on  later  general 
operations  ? 

The  Fifth  Prussian  Corps  would  not  have  managed 
to  debouch  from  Nachod  if  it  had  been  definitely  thrown 
back.  If  one  observes  that,  on  the  same  day,  the 
First  Corps  suffered  a  severe  check  at  Trautenau,  the 
entrance  into  Bohemia  would  have  been  rendered 
impossible  to  the  Second  Army.  What  would  then 
have  become  of  General  von  Moltke's  plan  ?  Let  us 
acknowledge  once  more  that  strategy,  however  brilliant 
it  may  be,  is  at  the  mercy  of  tactics. 

(e)  As  far  as  the  cavalry  action  south  of  Wysokow 
is  concerned,  both  parties  have  claimed  victory.  Both 
may  be  right,  if  that  action  be  only  considered  in  itself. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Austrian  cavalry  was  proved 
to  possess  dash,  manceuvring  efficiency,  undeniable  pro- 
fessional value.  But  they  were  not  commanded.  The 
Prussian  cavalry  were  niore  cautious,  less  well  trained  : 
they  had  the  same  pluck,  the  same  quickness,  the  same 
versatility  in  manoeuvring.  But  they  were  commanded. 
They  showed  tactical  ability.  If  we  only  consider  the 
result^  it  was  they  who  obtained  the  victory.  Two 
cavalry  forces  do  not  fight  in  order  to  find  out  which  is 
the  best  of  the  two.  There  is  always  a  general  situation 
to  be  considered,  a  tactical  goal  to  be  reached.  For 
the  Austrian  cavalry,  as  well  as  for  the  Austrian  infantry, 
the  object  here  was  to  reach  the  approaches  of  the 
Nachod  pass.  They  failed  to  do  so.  For  the  Prussian 
cavalry,  as  well  as  for  the  Prussian  infantry,  the  object 
was  to  protect  that  issue.     They  secured  that  result. 

Among  other  mistakes,   the   Austrian   cavalry  were 


222        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

faulty  in  omitting  to  scout,  to  protect  themselves  in  the 
direction  of  Wysokow;  hence  a  decisive  surprise.  The 
general  use  made  of  cavalry  by  both  parties  leads  to 
a  similar  remark.  General  Steinmetz  had  his  whole 
cavalry  (about  twelve  squadrons)  on  the  battle-field. 
The  Austrian  commander,  who  had  more  than  thirty 
squadrons  at  his  disposal,  only  managed  to  send  five 
into  action.  He  had  numbers  on  his  side ;  yet  it  was 
by  numbers  that  his  cavalry  were  beaten. 


The  Arrival  of  the  Main  Body  of  the  Prussian 
Fifth  Corps  and  the  Austrian  Waldstatten 
Brigade 

(See  Sketch  G.) 

The  Fifth  Army  Corps  had  left  its  bivouac  at  Reinerz 
at  5  a.m. ;  it  had  halted  near  Gellenau  at  8,  had  resumed 
its  march  at  9,  and  had  received  at  that  moment  a  new 
order  to  hasten  in  the  direction  of  Nachod. 

There  was  nothing  peculiar  in  this  marching  order, 
save  that  the  artillery  had  been  distributed  by  batteries 
all  along  the  column. 

The  bridges  on  the  Mettau  had  been  repaired  and 
two  others  had  been  built;  they  had  all  three  to  be 
passed  with  care,  which  markedly  delayed  the  march 
of  the  column. 

General  von  Kirchbach,  commanding  the  10th 
division,  had  forestalled  the  column  on  the  field  of 
action;  he  had  foimd  his  way,  and  had  witnessed  the 
loss  of  the  Waldchen  and  the  cavalry  action. 

As  soon  as  his  troops  arrived  he  ordered  the  general 
commanding  the  19th  brigade  to  retake  and  occupy 
the  Waldchen,  while  himself  he  proceeded  to  Wysokow, 
which  the  commander  of  the  army  corps  had  ordered 
him  to  occupy.  In  consequence  of  this  decision  one 
half- battalion  of  the  F.  of  the  46th  was  soon  seen  march- 
ing on  the  Waldchen  at  the  moment  when  the  8th 
Dragoons  was  charging  and  when  the  Bojan  half- 
battalion  was  again  beginning  to  attack.  It  was 
followed  by  the  2nd  of  the  46th,  which,  with  the  Bojan 
half-battalion,  penetrated  into  the  Waldchen,  from 
which  they  drove  the  Austrians  out. 

The   remainder   of   the    46th   advanced,    under   the 


M?rroch.-  Pes  Prmcipes  de  la  guerre. 


Croquis  iQ 


NACHOa    .A%^ 


Situation 
vers  Midi  72. 


i»^v 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  223 

protection  of  these  troops,  behind  the  Waldchen, 
while  the  general  commanding  the  division  directed 
the  remainder  of  the  19th  brigade,  that  is,  almost  the 
whole  of  the  6th  regiment,  on  to  Wysokow. 

His  first  idea  was  to  bring  up  the  20th  brigade  to 
that  point  (Wysokow).  He  feared,  however,  lest  he 
should  not  have  the  time  to  do  it ;  concentrating  on  his 
most  urgent  task,  he  sent  there  nothing  more  than  the 
6th  regiment.  In  the  Waldchen,  the  Prussians  reached 
the  southern  outskirts  and  carried  Wenzelsberg  church. 

The  retreating  movement  soon  extended  to  the 
Austrian  centre  and  the  right,  although  the  latter  had 
not  been  attacked  by  the  Prussians. 

After  half  an  hour's  fighting,  the  Rosenzweig  and 
Jonack  brigades  left  the  ground  of  the  Waldchen,  at 
Sochors,  which  had  been  so  hard  to  conquer. 

Wliile  that  action  was  taking  place  (at  about  noon) 
around  the  villages  on  the  western  slope  of  the  plateau, 
and  while  the  crisis  was  ending  in  favour  of  the  Prussians, 
the  Waldstiitten  brigade  arrived  on  the  Austrian  side 
and  fell  into  line  astride  of  the  Skalitz  road. 

At  the  same  time,  the  Austrian  artillery  reserve, 
with  two  batteries  of  eight  on  the  south,  three  batteries 
of  four  north  of  the  road,  was  coming  into  action;  it 
opened  a  very  efficient  fire,  with  its  forty  guns,  against 
the  plateau;  it  made  it  very  difficult  for  the  Prussian 
batteries,  arriving  one  after  the  other,  to  take  position, 
and  for  the  enemy  infantry  to  advance.  The  Wniick 
cavalry  brigade  was  compelled  by  this  fire  to  withdraw 
as  far  back  as  500  yards  east  of  Wysokow,  near  the  road. 
Moreover,  also  owing  to  this  fire,  it  became  possible  for 
the  retreating  Austrian  infantry  to  rally  and  assemble 
at  ease  near  Prowodow  and  Schonow. 

After  having  left  its  position  by  the  Wenzelsberg 
church,  the  battery  of  the  Rosenzweig  brigade  reappeared 
on  the  heights  north  of  Domkow. 

When  General  von  Raming  saw  from  his  position 
ahead  of  Kleny,  on  the  main  road,  the  retreating  move- 
ment of  the  Jonack  and  Rosenzweig  brigades,  as  well 
as  the  Prussians  arriving  on  the  western  outskirts  of  the 
Waldchen,  he  ordered  the  battalions  of  the  Waldstatten 
brigade  nearest  to  the  road  (2nd  of  the  Hartmann 
regiment  and  3rd  of  the  Franck  regiment)  to  attack  that 
edge  of  the  wood. 


224        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

The  2nd  Hartmann  marched  on  the  north-western 
end  of  this  edge,  providing  a  rather  dense  line  of  skir- 
mishers, which  was  followed  by  a  line  of  columns;  it 
was  supported  in  second  line  by  the  3rd  Franck  battalion. 

The  Prussian  half-battalion  which  occupied  that  part 
of  the  edge  of  the  wood,  received  the  2nd  Hartmann 
battalion  with  a  violent  fire,  threw  back  the  skirmishing 
line  on  to  the  columns  behind  it,  and  also  repulsed  these 
in  their  turn.  Not  content  with  this,  it  advanced  into 
the  ravine  which  leads  to  Prowodow  and  resumed  its 
violent  fire  against  the  3rd  Franck  battalion,  which  was 
still  advancing.  The  same  result  followed.  All  the 
neighbouring  Prussian  companies  entered  the  action 
successively.  The  whole  Prussian  line  soon  reached  the 
hollow  of  Schonow  and  of  Prowodow,  where  it  halted, 
by  order,  it  is  said,  of  the  brigade  commander. 

While  the  19th  infantry  brigade  was  coming  up,  the 
Prussian  artillery  of  the  main  body  was  trying  to  un- 
limber  between  Wysokow  and  the  Waldchen,  being 
partly  protected  by  the  Wniick  brigade.  This  attempt 
broke  down  before  the  powerful  action  of  the  forty 
Austrian  guns. 

At  about  noon,  a  first  battery  made  its  appearance, 
then  withdrew;  fifteen  minutes  later,  a  second  one 
met  with  the  same  fate ;  three-quarters  of  an  hour 
later,  a  third.  Two  others  arrived  later  on  and  suc- 
ceeded in  establishing  and  maintaining  themselves, 
but  only  near  Wenzelsberg  church. 

The  success  of  the  Prussian  artillery  went  no  further 
than  this  establisliment  of  the  two  last  batteries,  though 
the  three  first  batteries  ended,  much  later,  in  establish- 
ing themselves  between  Wysokow  and  the  Waldchen 
after  the  Austrian  artillery  had  been  removed  for  use 
elsewhere. 

Envelopment  of  the  Pb,ussian  Right  Wing  by  the 
Main  Body  of  the  Austrian  Waldstatten 
Brigade;  the  20th  Prussian  Brigade  comes 
into  Action 

(See  Sketch  H.) 

At  1  o'clock,  General  von  Raming  ordered  General 
Waldstatten  to  attack  Wysokow.  The  latter  had 
advanced  along  the  road  with  the  main  body  of  his 


vtiToch.-  Des  Pnncipes  de  la  guerre. 


Croquis  H 


Attaque  de  Wisokow 
par  la  Brig'^'Waldstatten 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  225 

brigade  (before  the  attack  made  on  the  Waldchen  by 
two  of  his  battalions),  and  had  then  turned  to  the  left 
so  that  he  arrived  at  1.30  on  the  low  ground  between 
Starkoc  and  W^'sokow. 

By  order  of  General  von  Raming,  three  batteries 
of  the  artillery  reserve  made  for  the  height  north  of 
Wysokow,  in  support  of  the  Waldstatten  brigade,  while 
the  11th  Cuirassiers  advanced  in  the  direction  of  the 
same  height  in  order  to  envelop  the  Prussian  right. 

The  village  of  Wysokow  is  built  on  a  length  of  2000 
yards,  along  the  road  from  Branka  to  Skalitz.  It  is 
drawn  out  in  a  rather  steep  ravine,  with  rugged  sides, 
the  southern  side  commanding  the  northern  one.  The 
two  ends  of  the  village  contain  a  greater  number  of 
houses  than  the  middle. 

The  ground  south  of  Wysokow  is  entirely  different 
from  the  ground  in  the  north.  The  Wysokow  plateau 
here  commands  the  whole  country,  takes  the  Wenzelsberg 
plateau  in  flank,  and  holds  Nachod  and  Altstadt  under 
its  fire.  It  is  easily  defensible  against  attack  from  the 
east. 

The  importance  of  the  Wysokow  plateau  on  the  day 
of  the  fight  had  escaped  the  attention  of  the  Austrian 
General  Staff;  an  astonishing  thing — because,  from 
the  east  of  Kleny  (where  the  staff  was),  the  view  is 
most  striking. 

If  the  object  was  to  prevent  troops  from  debouching 
from  Nachod,  then  the  heights  south  of  the  road  or  the 
heights  north  of  it  ought  to  have  been  seized.  The 
northern  heights  were  preferable,  because  by  them  one 
arrives  more  quickly  on  to  the  Nachod  road  and  one 
commands  Wenzelsberg. 

In  any  case.  General  von  Raming's  order  was  that 
Wysokow  must  be  attacked  and  the  Prussian  right 
wmg  enveloped.  General  Waldstatten  disposed  for 
this  attack  of  four  infantry  battalions  (6th  Jager,  1st 
Hartmann,  1st  and  2nd  Franck),  of  the  brigade  battery, 
of  three  batteries  of  four  from  the  artillery  reserve,  and 
of  one  regiment  of  cuirassiers. 

First  of  all  the  brigade  battery  arrived  on  the  Wysokow 

height,    protected    by   a   Jager    detachment;   then    an 

enemy   battery  from  the   artillery  reserve   established 

itself  on  the  Wysokow  plateau,  and  later  on  another  one 

near  the  road  ;  finally,  the  remaining  half  of  one  battery 

'I 


226         THE    PRINCIPLES    OF    WAR 

took  up  a  position  on  the  hillock  near  the  railway;  the 
regiment  of  cuirassiers  fell  into  line  on  the  right  of  the 
battery  and  a  half. 

On  the  Prussian  side,  General  von  Kirchbach  had 
observed  the  Austrians  moving  in  a  northerly  direction ; 
he  perceived  the  danger  menacing  Wysokow.  He  under- 
stood that  the  two  battalions  occupying  the  village  had 
not  the  strength  to  hold  it.  He  called  the  20th  brigade 
up  to  that  point. 

This  brigade  had  been  considerably  delayed  while 
crossing  the  bridges  over  the  Mettau;  it  had  arrived 
too  late  on  the  plateau ;  it  had  been  sent  to  the  rear  of 
the  Waldchen  in  order  to  form  a  reserve.  Moreover, 
two  of  its  battalions  had  been  kept  in  reserve  at  Altstadt 
by  a  definite  order  of  the  Crown  Prince,  and  a  third 
battalion  was  following  the  batteries  congested  at  the 
crossing  of  the  Mettau,  so  that  the  brigade  brought  on, 
at  first,  only  three  battalions  (1st,  2nd  of  the  52nd, 
F.  of  the  47th).  It  was  while  they  were  in  that  con- 
dition that  the  same  brigade  was  recalled  from  its 
march  on  the  Waldchen,  and  ordered  to  proceed  to 
Wysokow;  it  arrived  there  too  late  to  meet  the  first 
undertakings  of  the  attack. 

This  attack  was  carried  out  at  about  2  o'clock ;  when 
it  struck  the  Prussian  troops  they  were  distributed  as 
follows  : 

At  the  western  end  of  Wysokow,  one  and  a  half 
companies  of  Jager,  two  companies  and  a  half  of  the 
6th ;  in  all  the  equivalent  of  one  battalion ;  in  the  middle 
of  the  village,  about  one  battalion  was  holding  the  road 
and  the  Wysokow  height ;  at  the  eastern  end,  half  a 
battalion.  A  battery  of  four  tried  to  take  position  north 
of  the  village ;  it  did  not  manage  to  hold  on  there  for 
more  than  half  an  hour. 

The  Austrian  attack  developed  against  the  western 
end  and  the  middle  of  the  village.  The  1st  division  of 
the  6th  Jager  battalion  utilised  the  deep  cutting  leading 
to  the  north  of  the  Wysokow  height  and  advanced  against 
the  north-western  outskirts ;  a  few  detachments  arrived 
in  the  village  itself  as  a  result  of  having  been  able  to 
march  under  cover. 

The  2nd  and  3rd  divisions  of  the  Austrian  6th  Jager 
battalion  deployed  and  attacked  more  to  the  north, 
enveloping    the    Prussian    right.     At    that    moment, 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  227 

General  Waldstatten  ordered  his  three  other  battaHons 
(1st  Hartmann,  1st  and  2nd  Franck)  to  advance,  partly 
against  that  part  of  the  village  which  had  already  been 
overrun,  partly  more  to  the  east. 

The  Prussian  situation  was  most  critical.  Fortunately 
General  von  Wittich,  commander  of  the  20th  brigade, 
arrived  and  immediately  sent  for  the  three  battalions 
mentioned  above  (1st,  2nd  of  the  52nd,  F.  of  the  47th). 

The  general  commanding  the  division  ordered  him 
to  cross  Wysokow,  to  make  for  the  heights  on  the  north, 
to  form  there  and  attack  the  enemy  so  as  to  throw  him 
back.  He  was  informed  at  the  same  time  that  the 
Wniick  cavalry  brigade  would  cover  his  right  flank. 
One  battalion  (1st  of  the  52nd)  was,  however,  devoted  to 
remforcing  the  body  occupying  Wysokow. 

There  remained  then,  for  counter-attack,  two  battalions 
covered  by  the  Wniick  brigade.  The  ground  on  the 
plateau  was  unfavourable  to  infantry  and  even  more  so 
to  cavalry. 

Captain  Hoenisch,  divisional  adjutant,  who  has  been 
sent  to  reconnoitre  that  ground  and  to  direct  the  cavalry 
had  found  (and  reported  to  General  Wniick)  that  it 
would  be  difficult  to  overtake  the  enemy  battery  on 
the  height  north  of  Wysokow  by  surprise.  In  order  to 
meet  this  difficulty,  the  3rd  and  4th  squadron  of  the 
1st  Uhlans  were  detached  and  tried  to  reach  the  left 
flank  of  the  enemy  by  defilading  behind  a  rise  of  ground. 
Then,  as  they  found  that  the  regiment  of  Austrian 
cuirassiers  was  withdrawing,  leaving  only  two  platoons 
to  support  the  battery,  and  also  that  the  Austrian  gun- 
ners were  limbering  up  their  guns,  they  attacked  and 
charged  both  the  supporting  platoons  which  had  been 
left  by  the  cuirassiers.  The  Austrian  cuirassiers  took 
to  their  heels,  the  Uhlans  captured  three  guns,  six  limbers 
and  three  ammunition  wagons. 

While  this  manoeuvre  was  in  preparation,  the  counter- 
attack supplied  by  the  two  battalions  advanced  on  two 
lines  :  F.  of  the  47th  in  the  first  line ;  and  the  2nd  of 
the  52nd  in  the  second  line.  They  marched  to  the 
west,  reposing  on  the  northern  outskirts  of  the  village, 
and  struck  the  Austrian  attacking  columns  on  the  left 
flank.  As,  however,  the  counter-attack  was  immediately 
tlireatened  and  taken  in  flank  by  the  Austrian  cavalry 
and  artillery  on  the  Wysokow  plateau,  the  two  half- 


228        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

battalions  on  the  right,  while  continuing  to  advance, 
faced  to  the  right  with  their  wing  companies.  The 
Austrian  cavalry  did  not  attack.  The  companies  then 
directed  their  fire  against  the  Austrian  artillery  (one 
battery  and  a  half).  At  the  same  time  the  latter 
received  the  fire  of  the  Prussian  guns.  Moreover,  the 
Austrian  regiment  of  cuirassiers  was  withdrawing  at 
that  moment  by  order  of  its  divisional  commander, 
leaving,  as  we  have  seen,  only  two  platoons  in  support 
of  the  artillery.  The  batteries  then  judged  that  they 
could  not  hold  further ;  they  were  just  limbering  up, 
when  the  3rd  and  4th  squadrons  of  Prussian  Uhlans 
suddenly  appeared  and  charged  with  five  of  their  platoons 
the  two  platoons  of  Austrian  cuirassiers  and  with  the 
three  others,  the  batteries;  the  two  battalions,  which 
were  continuing  the  attack,  had  thrown  the  Austrian 
brigade  battery,  established  on  Wysokow  height,  into 
complete  disorder  by  their  fire.  They  put  twenty-eight 
horses  and  fourteen  men  out  of  action,  and  only  allowed 
the  gunners  to  remove  three  guns  and  five  limbers. 

Although  the  Prussian  counter-attack  had  been  com- 
pelled to  weaken  itself  in  view  of  these  actions  on  its 
flank,  its  effect  on  the  Austrian  attack  was  a  decisive 
one.  The  latter  was  thrown  back  in  the  most  complete 
disorder.  Those  of  the  Austrian  fractions  which  had 
penetrated  into  the  village  were  still  holding  on  at  the 
western  end.  But  the  counter-attack,  continuing  its 
enveloping  movement,  succeeded  in  taking  them  in 
reverse,  while,  on  their  striking  front,  they  came  up 
against  the  defenders  of  Wysokow ;  disorder  and  retreat 
set  in  everywhere.  The  Austrians  had  definitely  failed 
in  their  last  effort. 

General  von  Wittich  ordered  his  battalion  to  assemble 
and  pile  arms  on  the  hill,  while  the  Wniick  brigade, 
supported  by  the  lately  arrived  last  battalion  of  the 
52nd  (F.  of  the  52nd)  carried  out  the  pursuit  by  order 
of  General  von  Kirchbach. 

The  troops  which  had  performed  the  assault  were 
immediately  collected  and  taken  again  in  hand;  it 
was  Si.  fresh  force  (F.  of  the  52nd)  which  went  into  action 
with  the  cavalry  on  a  new  undertaking,  to  wit,  the 
pursuit. 

The  King's  Grenadiers,  the  last  regiment  of  the  army 
corps,  arrived  at  that  moment. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  229 

As  for  the  Prussian  artillery,  it  had  at  last  brought 
into  line  the  greater  part  of  its  guns  and  somewhat 
reduced  the  power  of  the  enemy  guns.  After  successive 
and  inefficient  efforts  it  was  only  when  the  reserve 
artillery  had  come  up  that  all  the  batteries,  acting 
simultaneously,  could  take  up  their  positions,  and  even 
then,  not  without  difficulty.  To  mention  but  one 
instance  :  the  battery  marching  at  the  head  of  the 
artillery  reserve  had  lost  sixteen  men  and  eighteen 
horses  before  it  could  unlimber. 

The  Fifth  Prussian  Corps  bivouacked  on  the  ground 
of  the  action ;  by  evening,  its  outposts  extended  from 
Kramolna  to  Wysokow  and  from  there  to  the  road  to 
Neustadt  (one  post  at  Stackoc). 

f  225  officers 
The  Fifth  Austrian  Corps  had  lost  \  7275  men  (including 

[      2500  prisoners). 

A  few  remarks  remain  to  be  made  on  the  conclusion 
of  that  day. 

1.  The  Prussian  cavalry  stayed  in  action  right  up 
to  the  end.  After  breaking  the  attempts  made  by  the 
enemy  in  order  to  debouch  from  the  wood,  they  attacked 
the  enemy  artillery,  captured  three  guns,  and  afterwards 
carried  out  the  pursuit.  Although  their  professional 
value  was  inferior  to  that  of  the  Austrian  cavalry,  they 
knew  how  to  fulfil  their  mission  in  the  battle,  how  to  act 
in  compliance  with  the  advance  guard's  tactics;  above 
all,  they  were  handled  by  a  commander  who  utilised 
them  to  the  utmost  right  up  to  the  end. 

2.  The  Austrian  artillery  had  also  proved  very  superior 
to  the  Prussian  artillery  in  armament,  in  tactics  and  in 
training;  they  were,  in  consequence,  superior  in  their 
fire.  They  inflicted  on  the  successively  arriving  Prussian 
batteries  losses  which  prevented  the  latter  from  keeping 
up  the  struggle.  In  spite  of  that,  the  Prussians  con- 
quered at  the  end  of  the  day.  Artillery  action  is  not, 
then,  any  more  than  cavalry  action,  of  such  a  decisive 
value  as  to  settle  finally  the  result  of  a  battle. 

In  the  future  we  shall  frequently  see  artillery  action 
remain  indecisive,  on  account  of  the  range  and  of  the 
difficulty  of  observation  with  smokeless  powder.  Should 
we  check  our  attack,  for  that  reason,  until  our  artillery 
has  secured  an  undisputable  superiority  ?   Obviously  not. 


230        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

3.  The  actions  around  Wysokow  show  what  con- 
ditions of  ground  are  required  for  attack.  The  Austrian 
attack  penetrated  into  the  village  because  it  was  strongly 
supported  by  artillery,  that  is  undeniable ;  but  also,  and 
above  all,  because  it  had  at  its  disposal  covered  avenues 
of  approach,  defiladed  ways  of  access,  which  brought  the 
attacking  forces  under  shelter  from  enemy  fire  up  to 
300  or  400  yards  from  their  objective.  A  sound  attacking 
direction  is  one  which  provides  covered  approaches  for 
infantry,  and  which  makes  it  possible  to  use  both  arms 
(artillery  and  infantry)  against  a  common  objective,  with 
that  full  development  of  the  means  of  action  which  is 
derived  from  numerical  superiority.  The  attack  finally 
failed  because  it  was  not  guarded.  It  will  always  be 
so.  Any  force  that  starts  attacking  must  cover  itself 
in  all  directions  by  which  the  enemy  may  come  on.  The 
troops  entrusted  with  that  function  must  occupy,  on 
the  flank  of  the  attack,  the  points  whence  a  surprise 
fire  might  be  delivered,  as  well  as  locate  and  receive 
the  counter-attack  which  is  bound  to  take  place. 

4.  The  defence  of  any  place  consists,  as  we  have  seen, 
in  parrying  the  attack  by  means  of  the  resistance 
supplied  by  the  organised  and  occupied  "  points  d'appui," 
and  in  thrusting  by  means  of  counter-attack  in  order  to 
finish  off  the  adversary.  To  give  up  counter-attacking 
would  be  equivalent  to  returning  to  that  passive  de- 
fensive which  excludes  decision  and  always  ends  in 
disaster. 

Counterstrokes  starting  from  a  "point  d'appui"  cannot 
find  an  outlet  within  the  circle  of  fire  which  surrounds 
the  position  and  makes  its  approaches  impassable. 

In  order  that  the  counter-attack  may  strike  home,  it 
is  further  necessary  that  it  should  be  guarded,  as  has 
been  prescribed  for  the  attack ;  otherwise  it  is  liable  to 
be  surprised,  and  therefore  delayed. 

For  instance :  the  two  half-battalions  of  the  47th 
and  52nd  were  compelled  to  face  the  Austrian  artillery 
(one  battery  and  a  half)  and  cavalry  (11th  Cuirassiers). 

5.  The  distribution  of  troops  devoted  to  the  defence 
of  a  place  includes  a  garrison,  an  occupying  force, 
numerically  as  weak  as  possible ;  a  reserve  as  strong  as 
possible,  designed  for  counter-attacking  and  for  providing 
itself,  at  the  moment  it  goes  into  action,  with  a  security- 
service  which  will  guard  it  from  any  possible  surprise. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  AT  NACHOD  231 

The  occupying  numbers  may  be  calculated  on  the 
following  basis  :  at  the  moment  when  the  enemy  reaches 
the  outskirts  of  the  village,  we  oppose  him  with  one 
rifle  per  yard  to  make  resistance  serious  and  adequate. 
The  enemy  can  generally  assault  only  one  side,  the 
outskirts  of  the  village.  It  is  only  after  measuring  that 
part  of  the  outskirts  and  organising  a  central  redoubt, 
that  the  numbers  of  the  force  attached  to  the  direct 
defence  of  the  village  must  be  fixed.  At  Wysokow,  the 
force  devoted  to  this  task  was  the  equivalent  of  three 
battalions. 

This  calculation  must  never  lead  to  our  devoting  to 
the  occupation  of  the  "  point  d'appui  "  the  whole  force 
available,  however  weak  that  force  may  be;  part  of  it 
must  always  be  kept  in  reserve  for  the  counter-attack. 

6.  With  modern  arms,  of  which  we  have  seen  the  full 
power  on  the  ground  of  Nachod,  the  Austrians  suffered 
their  heaviest  losses  when  they  retreated  after  an  un- 
successful attack,  or  when  they  abandoned  a  position 
they  had  lost.  It  was  less  costly  to  them  either  to 
advance  in  attack  or  to  keep  on  the  defensive.  Hence 
the  two  principles  which  command  modern  tactics  : 
any  attack  once  undertaken  must  he  carried  home  ;  defence 
must  he  supported  with  the  utmost  energy ;  those  are  the 
most  economical  policies.  These  principles  must  prevail 
in  practice  ;  they  make  it,  moreover,  absolutely  impera- 
tive for  the  directing  mind,  the  commander,  to  know, 
to  foresee  and  to  solve  the  difficulties  which  the  attack 
is  bound  to  meet;  not  to  undertake  any  attack  that 
cannot  be  carried  home,  that  cannot  be  organised  and 
brought  up  under  cover,  prepared,  supported,  guarded  up 
to  the  last  moment. 

7.  The  2nd  battalion  of  Prussian  37th  which  had 
stood  its  ground  alone  against  a  large  part  of  the 
Austrian  efforts  had  particularly  checked  these  efforts 
by  its  fire  during  the  whole  morning.  It  fired  32,000 
cartridges.  This  meant  an  average  of  thirty-two  car- 
tridges per  man.  We  see,  then,  that  considerable  results 
may  be  secured  by  consuming  a  relatively  small  and 
easily  provided  quantity  of  ammunition,  provided  the 
fire  is  well  directed. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

STRATEGICAL   SURPRISE 

We  have  found  that  the  notion  of  security  rules 
tactics  in  a  sovereign  way;  we  have  seen  that  it  com- 
mands in  an  undeniable  manner  the  conduct  of  troops, 
either  when  a  manoeuvre  has  to  be  informed  by  scouting, 
or  guarded,  or  when  the  means  of  action  have  to  be 
prepared  and  assembled,  or  again  when  those  means 
have  to  be  applied  on  a  reconnoitred  objective.  The 
same  notion  reappears  in  the  forefront  of  the  considera- 
tions on  which  strategical  dispositions  must  be  based. 

Where  there  is  no  strategical  security,  there  is  strategical 
surprise  ;  that  is,  a  possibility  for  the  enemy  to  attack 
us  while  we  are  not  in  a  position  to  receive  him  under 
good  conditions;  a  possibility  for  him  to  prevent  our 
insufficiently  protected  assembly  from  taking  place. 
Further,  our  forces  as  they  go  into  action,  go  astray, 
imperil  themselves  by  taking  wrong  directions,  owing 
to  lack  of  reconnoitring,  of  information,  and  owing  to 
imperfectly  understanding  the  notion  of  security ;  an 
idea  which  implies  the  art  of  acting  not  only  securely 
but  also  surely,  that  is,  ^with.  full  knowledge  of  the  case. 

We  shall  establish  this  point  with  more  precision  by 
studying  an  historical  instance. 

The  Strategical  Surprise  of  the  16th  of 
August,  1870  ^ 

On  August  15th,  1870,  were  found,  on  the  German 
side  (composing  the  First  Army),  the  First  Corps  at  Cour- 
celles-Chaussy ;  the  Seventh  Corps  between  Pange  and 
the  Courcelles  railway  station ;  and  the  Eighth  Corps  at 
Omy. 

^  This  instance,  which  will  be  completely  studied  later  on,  is  con- 
sidered here  only  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  causes  of  the  errors 
which  formed  its  dominant  feature. 

232 


STRATEGICAL   SURPRISE  233 

In  the  morning  of  the  same  day,  the  Second  Army  was 
continuing  its  march  in  the  direction  of  the  Moselle. 
The  Third  Corps  was  to  reach  the  Seille  at  Cheminot ;  the 
Twelfth  Corps  was  to  reach  it  at  Nomeny;  the  Ninth 
Corps  was  to  remain  at  Peltre ;  the  Tenth  was  to  arrive 
at  Pont-a-Mousson,  whence  it  was  to  send  detachments 
northwards  into  the  Moselle  valley  and  on  to  the 
plateau  to  the  west ;  the  Guard  was  assembling  at  Dieu- 
louard,  and  the  Fourth  Corps  marching  on  Custines, 
on  the  Moselle,  with  its  advance  guard  marching  on 
Marbache. 

After  the  news  had  arrived  of  the  battle  of  Borny, 
fought  in  the  evening  of  the  i4th,  these  dispositions 
were  somewhat  altered — at  about  7  a.m.  :  the  Third 
Army  Corps  was  ordered  to  stop  immediately;  the 
Twelfth  to  take  up  a  position  between  Soigne  and  Delme ; 
both  corps  to  be  ready  to  support  and  receive  the  Ninth 
Army  Corps  which  had  been  maintained  at  Peltre,  in 
case  the  French  should  take  the  offensive  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Moselle. 

The  march  was  resumed  later,  on  the  receipt  of  a 
telegram  sent  by  General  von  Moltke  from  the  hill  near 
Flaville  at  11  a.m.,  which  telegram  ran  as  follows  : 

"  The  French  have  been  completely  thrown  back  on 
Metz  and  it  is  likely  that  they  are  by  now  in  full  retreat 
on  Verdun.  The  three  corps  on  the  right  (Third,  Ninth, 
and  Twelfth)  are  placed  henceforth  at  the  disposal  of 
the  commander-in-chief.  The  Twelfth  is  already  on  its 
way  to  Nomeny." 

Finally,  in  the  evening,  the  Second  Army  was  dis- 
tributed as  follows  : 

{5th  division,  Noveant;  advance 
guard,  Gorze. 
6th  division,  Champey. 
rp     4.U  A  n  fPont-a-Mousson,  19th  division  at 

Tenth  Army  Corps      |     Thiaucourt. 

Twelfth  Army  Corps      Nomeny. 
Ninth  Army  Corps  Verny. 

pi  /Dieulouard,    advance    guard    at 

I     Quatre -Vents. 

Fourth  Army  Corps     ^y^'u^^i^he^^^'"''^     ^""^'"^      ^* 
Second  Army  Corps       Han-sur-Nied. 


234        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

-Tk-   .  .     ^  .     \  Puxieux        j-in  touch  with  the  French. 
Division  at       c  4. 

l^Suzemont    j 

Ouard  Cavalrv  [Dragoons  brigade,  Thiaucourt 

VjUdlLl   \^cl\ ally     I  /~i     •  •  i      •         j         "r>  '  i_ 

■pw-   .  •  -^  -[  Cuirassiers  brigade,  Bernecourt. 

uivision  [uhlans  brigade,  Menil-la-Tour. 

This  distribution  answered  to  the  views  of  the  German 
Staff  who,  since  the  battle  of  Spickeren,  did  not  think 
they  would  meet  the  French  army  again  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Moselle. 

The  pursuit  of  the  French  had  hitherto  been  entrusted 
to  the  First  Army.  The  German  Staff  had  confined  itself 
to  condensing  (more  particularly  in  the  morning  of  the 
15th)  the  right  of  the  Second  Army  so  that  it  should 
support,  if  need  be,  the  First  Army,  at  a  moment  when 
the  enemy  had  seemed  to  intend  making  a  stand. 

The  marching  disposition  of  the  Second  Army,  having 
a  front  of  16|  to  17^  miles,  and  a  still  greater  depth,  and 
thus  requiring  at  least  one  day  for  concentration,  was 
a  formation  presupposing  a  state  of  complete  repose, 
which  formation  would  do  well  enough  so  long  as  the 
enemy  should  abstain  from  acting  upon  it  in  any  way — 
a  condition  which  was  not  quite  certain. 

Therefore  General  von  Moltke  determined,  as  early  as 
on  the  14th,  to  get  a  clearer  view  of  the  situation.  In 
order  to  be  informed  with  complete  certainty  concerning 
the  situation  of  the  enemy,  he  ordered  the  Second  Army, 
by  an  order  of  that  day,  to  send  its  whole  cavalry  on 
the  left  bank  of  theMoselle  towards  the  lines  of  communi- 
cation of  the  enemy  between  Metz  and  Verdun,  and  to 
support  that  cavalry,  in  the  direction  of  Gorze  and 
Thiaucourt,  with  the  corps  which  should  be  the  first  to 
cross  the  Moselle. 

In  execution  of  this  order,  the  5th  cavalry  division 
had  reached,  on  the  15th,  the  neighbourhood  of  Xonville 
and  Puxieux,  and  the  Tenth  Corps  had  advanced  one  of 
its  infantry  divisions  to  Thiaucourt.  Instead,  however, 
of  sending  out  the  whole  cavalry,  the  Second  Army  had 
only  devoted  the  5th  division  to  the  reconnaissance 
prescribed;  the  6th  was  still,  on  the  15th,  at  Coin-sur- 
Seille;  it  was,  moreover,  to  fall  in  with  the  Third  Corps 
on  the  16th;  the  Guards  division  was  scattered  over 
the  front,  Thiaucourt — Beniecourt — Menil-la-Tour,  which 


STRATEGICAL   SURPRISE  235 

made  it  unable  to  act  in  any  way,  more  particularly 
against  the  roads  between  Metz  and  Verdun,  which  were 
still  at  some  distance ;  the  Saxon  division  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps  remained  with  its  army  corps. 

The  First  Army,  on  the  evening  of  the  14th,  had  just 
fought  a  hard  and  long  battle.  After  having  opened  in 
an  entirely  miforeseen  manner,  that  battle  had  been 
conducted  in  a  completely  unpremeditated  way  by  the 
Germans.  It  might  have  been  disastrous  for  them,  as 
General  von  Moltke  has  acknowledged  since,  if  the 
French,  who  had  the  means  to  do  it,  had  thought  of 
vigorously  throwing  back  the  heads  of  the  German 
columns  which  were  closing  on  them  from  too  short  a 
distance. 

On  the  15th  of  August,  at  11  a.m.  General  von  Moltke 
wires  to  the  commander  of  the  Second  Army  : 

"  The  French  have  been  completely  thrown  back  on 
Metz  and  it  is  likely  that  they  are  hy  now  in  full  retreat 
on  Verdun.  ..." 

Frederick  Charles,  on  his  side,  has  made  a  comment 
on  the  actual  facts.  The  General  Staff's  historical 
records  run  thus  : 

"  From  information  transmitted  by  General  Head- 
quarters during  the  day  of  the  15th,  as  well  as  from 
various  reports,  more  particularly  those  of  the  Third 
Corps,  the  commander  of  the  Second  Army  had  been 
brought  to  the  conclusion  that  the  French  army  was  in 
full  and  hasty  retreat  in  the  direction  of  the  Meuse,  and 
that  it  was  therefore  urgent  to  follow  it  without  delay. 

"  A  telegram  sent  as  early  as  11  a.m.  on  the  15th  had 
imparted  that  appreciation  to  General  Headquarters 
as  well  as  a  scheme  which  consisted  in  crossing  the 
Moselle,  on  the  16th,  with  the  army's  main  body.  As 
no  order  to  the  contrary  had  come  to  reverse  that  de- 
cision. Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  fixed,  at  7  p.m.,  the 
following  dispositions  for  the  16th. 

"  Pont-a-Mousson,  August  15th,  7  p.m. 

"  In  the  evening  of  yesterday,  fractions  of  the  First 
Army  attacked  the  enemy  near  Metz  and  forced  him 
back  into  the  town.  The  French  army  has  begun  re- 
treating towards  the  Meuse.     From  to-morrow  onwards, 


236        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

the  Second  Army  will  follow  the  adversary  in  the  direction 
of  that  river. 

"  The  Third  Corps  will  cross  the  Moselle  below  Pont-a- 
Mousson  in  order  to  reach,  via  Gorze  and  Noveant,  the 
main  road  from  Metz  to  Verdun,  either  at  Mars-la-Tour 
or  at  Vionville ;  its  headquarters  must  arrange  to  be  at 
Mars-la-Tour. 

"  The  6th  cavalry  division  may  go  ahead  via  Preny 
and  Thiaucourt  so  as  to  proceed  from  Pagny  to  the  road 
above  mentioned. 

"  The  Tenth  Corps  which,  preceded  by  the  5th  cavalry 
division,  is  marching  from  to-day  on  Thiaucourt,  will 
go  on  to-morrow  towards  the  Verdun  road  about  as 
far  as  Saint-Hilaire  and  Maizeray,  and  will  recall,  as 
quickly  as  possible,  the  fractions  still  in  the  rear  at 
Pont-a-Mousson  and  in  the  Moselle  Valley. 

"  The  Twelfth  Corps  after  leaving  Nomeny  will  gather 
at  Pont-a-Mousson  and  throw  an  advance  guard  beyond 
that  place  as  far  as  Regmeville-en-Haye. 

"  Its  cavalry  division  will  advance  as  far  as  the  Meuse. 

"  The  Guard  will  have  an  advance  guard  at  Rambu- 
court,  main  body  and  headquarters  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Bernecourt. 

"  The  Fourth  Corps  will  push  on  its  advance  guard  to 
Jaillon,  headquarters  at  Saizerais. 

"  An  attempt  will  be  made  to  establish  connection,  in 
the  direction  of  Nancy,  with  the  Third  Army. 

"  The  Ninth  Corps  will  proceed  to  Sillegny,  cross  the 
Moselle  at  Noveant  the  day  after  to-morrow,  by  the 
bridge  thrown  across  by  the  Third  Corps,  and  follow 
that  corps  towards  Gorze. 

"  The  Second  Corps  will  bring  the  head  of  its  column 
up  to  Buchy. 

"  The  cavalry  divisions  which  are  preceding  the  army 
must,  in  proportion  as  they  advance,  reconnoitre  the 
debouching  points  and  the  crossings  of  the  Meuse  from 
the  standpoint  of  their  being  utilised  later  on  by  the 
Tenth,  Third  and  Ninth  Corps  at  Dieuze  and  Genicourt ; 
by  the  Twelfth  at  Bannoncourt;  by  the  Guard,  the 
Fourth  and  the  Second  at  Saint-Mihiel,  Pont-sur-Meuse, 
Commercy." 

Meanwhile  the  following  instructions  had  reached  the 
commanders  of  the   First  and    Second  Army  coming 


STRATEGICAL   SURPRISE  237 

from  General  Headquarters  and  dated  from  Herny, 
6.30  p.m. : 

"  So  long  as  the  strength  of  the  enemy  forces  left  at 
Metz  have  not  been  ascertained,  the  First  Army  will  keep, 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Courcelles,  a  corps  which  will 
have  to  be  relieved  as  quickly  as  possible  by  the  troops 
coming  from  Sarrelouis,  under  General  von  Kummer. 
The  two  other  corps  of  the  First  Army  will  take  position, 
on  the  16th,  on  the  line  Arry-Pommerieux,  between  the 
Seille  and  the  Moselle.  A  bridge  will  be  immediately 
established  over  that  river,  if  the  Third  Corps  has  not 
already  done  so.  Information  concerning  the  move- 
ments of  the  Second  Army  during  the  day  of  the  15th  is 
expected  shortly ;  as  for  new  dispositions  to  be  taken,  the 
following  considerations  will  have  to  be  taken  as  a 
general  basis  : 

"  The  success  secured  in  the  evening  of  yesterday  by 
the  First  and  Seventh  Corps,  as  well  as  by  fractions  of 
the  8th  division,  has  taken  place  under  conditions  such 
as  to  exclude  any  idea  of  carrying  it  further.  It  is  only 
by  means  of  a  vigorous  offensive  on  the  part  of  the  Second 
Army  against  the  roads  from  Metz  to  Verdun,  via  Fresnes 
and  Etain,  that  the  fruits  of  that  victory  may  be  attained. 
The  commander-in-chief  of  the  Second  Army  remains 
in  charge  of  that  operation  which  he  must  conduct 
according  to  his  own  inspiration  and  with  all  the  means 
at  his  disposal. 

"  The  Third  Army  has  reached  to-day,  with  the  head 
of  its  column,  the  line  Nancy — Dombasle — Bayon;  its 
cavalry  is  scouting  over  the  country  in  the  direction  of 
Toul  and  to  the  south. 

"  The  (General  Headquarters  of  His  Majesty  will  be 
established  to-morrow,  from  5  p.m.,  at  Pont-a-Mousson." 

We  shall  see  later  on  what  results  those  decisions  were 
to  lead  to.  In  order,  however,  to  discuss  them  in  a 
sound  manner,  it  is  also  necessary  to  examine  the  basis 
on  which  they  are  founded  as  well  as  the  operations  they 
are  to  involve. 

First  information  coming  from  General  von  Moltke, 
August  15th,  11  a.m.  ;  "  The  French  have  been  com- 
pletely thrown  back  on  Metz.  ..." 

On  August  15th,  at  11  a.m.,  the  French  columns  had 
indeed  been  seen  to  retreat  on  the  whole  front  towards 


238        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Metz.  To  state,  however,  that  the  French  had  been 
thrown  back  was  to  go  further  than  the  actual  facts, 
and  therefore  to  misread  their  real  import.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  in  the  battle  on  the  14th,  the  Germans  only  sent 
into  action  portions  of  three  army  corps,  namely  the 
whole  of  the  First  Corps,  the  13th  division  of  the  Seventh, 
and  the  18th  division  of  the  Ninth  (very  weak  fractions) ; 
in  all  the  equivalent  of  only  three  divisions. 

The  fight  had  lasted  for  five  hours,  from  3  to  8  p.m. 
No  spoils  whatever  had  been  brought  back ;  only  a  few 
prisoners  had  been  captured  ;  no  ground  had  been  seized. 

Under  those  conditions  and  after  such  weak  tactical 
results,  it  was  not  possible  to  consider  the  French  com- 
pletely thrown  back  on  Metz,  or  their  main  forces  beaten. 
If  they  did  retire,  it  was  because  they  had  received  an 
order  to  that  effect,  not  because  they  were  compelled 
to  do  so.  The  results  of  the  14th  might  be  considerable 
from  a  strategical  point  of  view,  they  were  as  good  as 
naught  from  a  tactical  point  of  view.  When  the  French 
army  should  be  met  again  later  on,  it  ought  to  be 
expected  not  as  a  beaten  army,  but  as  a  force  in  full 
possession  of  its  physical  and  moral  means  of  action. 

As  a  sequence  to  this  forced  interpretation  of  facts, 
von  Moltke  added  :  ''^  It  is  likely  that  by  now  (15th) 
the  French  are  in  full  retreat  on  Verdun." 

As  that  likelihood  (as  conceived  at  General  Head- 
quarters) did  not  lead  to  taking  any  practical  measure 
other  than  handing  over  again  to  the  commander  of 
the  army  the  three  corps  which  had  been  previously  im- 
mobilised, it  did  not  seem  to  be  in  danger  of  bringing 
about  any  unpleasant  consequences. 

But  what  had  been  a  mere  possibility,  a  mere  likeliness, 
as  imparted  to  General  Headquarters  at  Pont-a-Mousson, 
soon  became  a  certainty  under  the  influence  of  reports 
received  more  particularly  by  the  Third  Army  Corps,  as 
the  Historical  Records  state  them.  The  commander 
of  the  Second  Army  came  at  this  stage  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  French  army  was  in  full  and  hasty  retreat 
towards  the  Meuse. 

These  actual  reports  received  by  the  Third  Corps  still 
mentioned  nothing  but  some  French  movements  from 
Metz  to  Longueville,  places  still  far  from  the  Meuse. 

As  for  the  5th  cavalry  division,  it  might  have  supplied 
information  of  a  capital  importance,  had  it  been  con- 


STRATEGICAL   SURPRISE  239 

suited ;  it  would  have  certainly  reported  that  the  roads 
to  Mars-la-Tour  and  Conflans  were  free  of  the  French, 
save  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Vionville,  where  some 
cavalry  bivouacs  had  been  seen. 

This  conclusion  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles  contains, 
then,  all  the  characteristic  features  of  a  preconceived 
idea;  the  prince  accepts  von  Moltke's  hypothesis  with 
such  eagerness  that  he  leaves  out  all  the  doubtful  parts 
it  may  contain. 

In  order  to  feel  safer,  however,  he  imparts  this  view 
at  11  a.m.  to  General  Headquarters.  The  Chief  of  Staff, 
a  man  given  to  careful  choice,  naturally  reserved  when 
not  in  possession  of  known  facts,  did  not  reply  during 
the  whole  day.  He  knew  what  the  hypothesis  :  ^^  It  is 
likely  that  the  French  are  by  now  in  full  retreat  on  Verdun  " 
was  worth.  Another  supposition,  equally  well  founded, 
might  be  substituted  for  it,  namely  that  of  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  :  "  The  French  army  is  in  full  and  hasty 
retreat  towards  the  Meuse."  He  therefore  allowed  the 
commander  of  the  Second  Army  to  act  from  his  own 
conclusion  and  to  march  to  the  Meuse,  and  he  only 
intervened  at  6.30  p.m.  in  order  to  state  : 

Second  information,  dated  from  Herny,  15th  August, 
6.30  p.m. 

"...  The  success  secured  on  the  14th  by  the  First 
Army  has  taken  place  under  conditions  such  as  to  exclude 
any  idea  of  carrying  it  further.  It  is  only  by  means  of  a 
vigorous  defensive  on  the  part  of  the  Second  Army  against 
the  roads  from  Metz  to  Verdun,  that  the  fruits  of  victory 
may  be  attained.  The  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Second  Army  remains  in  charge  of  conducting  that  oper- 
ation according  to  his  own  inspiration  and  with  all  means 
at  his  disposal.'^ 

We  shall  still  emphasise  several  points  in  their  order  : 

1.  They  speak  of  utilising  a  victory  ;  they  know  well 
or  ought  to  know  that  it  is  nothing  of  the  sort. 

2.  The  fruits  of  victory  can  be  reaped  by  making  a 
vigorous  offensive  against  the  roads  from  Metz  to 
Verdun. 

That  objective  is  already  a  more  sober  one  than  the 
Meuse  objective,  because  von  Moltke,  being  nearer  the 
sources  of  accurate  information  (Bomy),  well  perceives 
that  nothing  must  be  exaggerated. 


240        THE    PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

He  thinks  that  that  objective  may  be  attained  by  the 
Second  Army.  Still,  he  knows  well  that  this  army,  in 
view  of  its  distribution,  will  not  be  there  in  its  entirety ; 
that  it  cannot  bring  there,  on  the  16th,  all  its  forces;  it 
needs  at  least  twenty-four  hours  for  concentration  even 
if  it  does  not  advance,  but,  if  it  is  to  cross  the  Moselle 
as  well,  it  will  need  more  than  forty-eight  hours  in  order 
to  bring  up  its  furthest  corps  (on  the  18th,  one  of  them, 
the  Fourth,  was  still  missing).  As  a  result  of  his  solution, 
then,  he  was  about  to  send  against  the  French  army  (the 
spirit  of  which  had  as  a  fact  been  raised  by  the  resistance 
of  the  14th),  which  is  assembled  and  in  good  condition, 
only  one  army  out  of  his  three,  namely  the  Second,  and 
further,  this  Second  Army  will  on  arrival  be  greatly 
reduced,  owing  to  its  previous  dispersion. 

Von  Moltke  indeed  perceived  his  combination  to  be 
inadequate,  as  it  lacked  a  foundation  and  involved  the 
use  of  a  number  of  means  the  weakness  of  which  did  not 
escape  his  attention ;  therefore  he  concluded  by  writing  : 

"  The  commander  of  the  Second  Army  remains  in 
charge  of  this  operation  according  to  his  own  inspiration 
and  with  all  the  means  at  his  disposal.''^ 

Inspiration  is  thus  resorted  to ;  it  cannot  be  otherwise. 
Failing  positive  intelligence,  von  Moltke  has  based  his 
whole  combination  on  supposition.  He  is  the  first  to 
ask  :    what  are  these  suppositions  worth  ? 

Failing  definite  knowledge  founded  on  security  which 
alone  makes  it  possible  to  act  surely,  the  only  thing  one 
can  rely  on  is  a  more  or  less  happy  inspiration. 

Von  Moltke  does  not  believe  in  his  own  inspiration 
any  more  than  in  that  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles.  It 
is  to  give  some  sort  of  hint  that  he  imparts  to  the  latter 
his  own  view;  but  he  is  aware  that  he  cannot  impose 
either  his  view  or  the  prince's.  He  thus  leaves  the 
commander  of  the  Second  Army  free  to  act  according  to 
his  own  inspiration  (which  is  as  well  founded  as  his  own), 
and  to  develop  any  manoeuvres  he  likes,  with  all  the 
means  at  his  disposal,  in  spite  of  the  known  impossibility 
of  a  part  of  the  forces  of  the  Second  Army  acting  on  the 
16th  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle.  After  opening  the 
door  to  error,  he,  in  effect,  gives  over  the  command. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  order  of  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  dated  from  Pont-a-Mousson,  7  p.m. 

The  commander  of  the  Second  Army  will  follow  his 


STRATEGICAL   SURPRISE  241 

inspiration,  as  he  has  been  asked  to  do  so,  and  because 
his  way  of  interpreting  facts  has  not  been  criticised. 
Inspiration  thus  continues  to  be  the  foundation  of 
German  strategical  combinations. 

In  proportion  as  we  get  further  away  from  the  sources 
of  accurate  information,  von  Moltke's  supposition  be- 
comes a  more  substantial  reality,  as  we  have  seen ;  and 
what  is  more,  very  solid  reality. 

"  The  French  army  is  in  full  retreat  towards  the  Meuse." 
In  the  presence  of  such  a  situation,  a  strong  offensive 
against  the  roads  from  Metz  to  Verdun  becomes  ground- 
less. A  strong  offensive  is  useless  against  an  array 
beaten  and  in  full  retreat.  By  aiming  at  the  roads  from 
Metz  to  Verdun,  the  objective  would  be  missed.  The 
army  must  advance  rapidly  to  the  Meuse.  Thus  we 
arrive  at  the  phrase  :  "  From  to-morrow,  the  Second 
Army  will  follow  the  adversary  in  the  direction  of  that 
river.  .  .  ." 

As  we  have  already  seen,  if  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
had  tried  to  verify  his  supposition  by  applying  for  infor- 
mation to  the  cavalry  troops  (5th  division)  established 
on  the  roads  leading  to  Verdun  and  to  the  Meuse,  the 
5th  division  would  have  answered  that,  on  the  15th, 
there  was  no  French  column  on  the  roads,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  one  cavalry  division  at  Rezonville,  that  therefore, 
the  French  army  could  not  be  there  before  the  16th  at 
the  earliest;  that  it  would  take  the  columns  of  that 
army  more  than  a  day  to  march  past  a  given  point, 
Mars-la-Tour  for  instance,  since  that  army  consisted 
of  five  corps  (Second,  Third,  Fourth,  Sixth,  Guard)  and 
there  were  only  two  roads  available.  But  the  prince, 
basing  his  decision  merely  on  his  own  inspiration  and 
leaving  aside  intelligence  which  would  have  supplied 
truth,  equally  leaves  aside  calculation  and  reasoning  and 
works  with  his  imagination  alone.  Therefore  he  aims 
at  the  Meuse.  As,  besides,  the  French  army  is  supposed 
to  he  beaten  and  as  the  Meuse  is  far  away,  he  organises 
a  race,  so  as  to  catch  the  enemy  columns  there.  The 
army  is  to  remain  scattered,  so  that  it  can  advance 
quickly  :  ^  this  is  his  only  thought. 

The  already  inadequate  combination  of  von  Moltke, 
which    consists   in    attacking   the    actually   untouched 

^  i.  e.  without  the  loss  of  time  required  for  assembly. 

E 


242         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

French  army  with  only  one,  and  that  an  incomplete 
one,  of  his  three  armies,  becomes  still  weaker  when 
handled  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles.  For  the  latter, 
instead  of  thinking  of  attacking,  organises  a  pursuit; 
instead  of  an  army  seeking  battle,  he  presents  a  scattered 
army  :  an  entirely  unfavourable  distribution  of  forces 
for  fighting  a  French  army  which  has  suffered  no  sub- 
stantial check  and  the  spirit  of  which  has  been  enhanced 
by  its  victorious  resistance  on  the  14th. 

Moreover,  as  this  view  (which  is  justified  by  nothing) 
and  the  manoeuvres  which  will  be  derived  from  it,  are 
contrary  to  von  Moltke's  view  (which,  though  not,  of 
course,  imposed,  has  still  been  very  clearly  expressed  : 
"It  is  only  by  means  of  a  vigorous  offensive,"  etc.), 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  will  attempt  simultaneously 
to  march  to  the  Meuse  and  to  assume  the  offensive 
against  the  roads  from  Metz  to  Verdun,  thus  daring  to 
aim  at  two  objectives  at  the  same  time.  The  dispersion 
of  forces  which  was  already  involved  by  undertaking 
the  pursuit  will  become  still  worse. 

Nothing  will  be  left  either  of  a  solution  or  of  a  combina- 
tion of  forces.  Thus,  by  aiming  at  two  objectives  so 
entirely  different,  and  so  distant  from  each  other,  the 
order  on  August  15th  ends  in  utilising  the  network  of 
roads  to  the  utmost  and  in  determining  an  unlimited 
dispersion  of  forces,  along  the  front  as  well  as  in  depth. 

As  for  the  cavalry  divisions  preceding  the  columns, 
they  are,  according  to  the  order,  neither  to  look  out  for 
the  enemy  in  order  to  lead  those  columns  in  his  direction, 
nor  to  find  the  enemy  so  as  to  report  the  imminence  of 
danger.  Their  mission  is  simply  to  reconnoitre  the  issues 
towards,  and  crossings  of,  the  Meuse,  That  state  of 
mind  has  become  fixed. 

On  the  15th,  decisions  of  the  utmost  gravity  have  been 
taken  on  inspiration  and  without  information;  the 
army  has  been  scattered  to  the  extreme  without  keep- 
ing, by  means  of  a  security-system,  the  possibility  of 
concentration  if  the  need  for  it  should  arise. 

On  the  16th,  inspiration  and  error  still  prevail.  The 
commander-in-chief  continues  his  attempt  to  base  on  a 
lack  of  any  intelligence  or  protection  the  very  directions 
given  to  the  columns  in  order  to  reach  the  enemy;  as 
well  as  to  rely  on  chance  for  securing  the  time  and  space 
necessary  to  concentrating  his  army,  in  case  the  enemy 


STRATEGICAL   SURPRISE  243 

whose  strength  is  no  longer  regarded  should  suddenly 
reappear. 

The  uncertainty  of  the  blows  contemplated  is  only 
equalled,  here,  by  the  insecurity  in  which  the  army  is 
indulging  as  though  of  set  purpose. 

The  notion  of  security,  which  enables  one  to  master 
the  unkno^vn,  and  the  risk  of  being  surprised  (which  are 
both  constant  in  war)  are  entirely  ignored  by  the  strategy 
of  the  Staff  of  the  Second  Army ;  Moltke  had  perceived 
their  importance  when  ordering,  on  the  14th,  the  whole 
cavalry  of  the  Second  Army  to  be  sent  to  the  left  bank 
of  the  Moselle,  and  to  be  supported  with  infantry.  He 
had  not,  however,  believed  in  their  absolute  necessity. 

In  consequence  of  those  orders,  and  on  the  supposition 
that  the  enemy  would  not  attack,  the  Second  German 
Army  was,  on  the  16th  of  August  at  night,  to  be  distri- 
buted as  follows  (See  Map  No.  7) : 

Third  Corps    .  .  Vionviile — Mars-la-Tour. 

Tenth  Corps  .  .  Saint  Hilaire — Maizeray. 

Twelfth  Corps  .  Pont-a-Mousson. 

Guard    .          .  .  Bernecourt. 

Fourth  Corps.  .  Saizerais. 

Ninth  Corps    .  .  Sillegny. 

Second  Corps.  .  Buchy. 

As  for  the  two  other  armies,  First  and  Third,  neither 
of  them  was  in  a  position  to  support  the  Second  Army 
for  several  days. 

Such  a  distribution  would  have  permitted  no  more  than 
the  pursuit  of  a  beaten  enemy,  concerning  the  retreat  of 
which  positive  information  had  been  available ;  these 
conditions  not  being  fulfilled  there  was  risk  of  the  greatest 
possible  dangers.  If,  indeed,  the  enemy  did  come  on, 
either  in  order  to  take  the  offensive,  or  merely  to  under- 
take a  retreat  about  which  no  precise  information  was 
available,  the  Germans  had  deliberately  placed  them- 
selves in  a  position  where  they  would  not  be  able  to 
receive  him ;  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  assemble  their 
forces,  be  it  those  of  even  a  single  army,  before  a  severe 
check  should  take  place.     Surprise  would  be  complete. 

WTierefrom,  then,  did  such  a  dangerous  mistake  on 
the  part  of  the  German  generals  arise,  if  not  from  ignor- 
ing the  notion  of  strategical  security  ?     Is  it  not  a  fact 


244        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

that  both  of  them  thought  they  could  set  up  their 
strategical  combination  without  being  in  full  possession 
of  well-ascertained  facts  ?  And  as  far  as  the  information 
they  had  to  hand,  about  the  affair  of  August  14th,  was 
concerned,  did  they  not,  consciously  (Moltke)  or  uncon- 
sciously (Frederick  Charles),  alter  or  at  least  exaggerate 
its  meaning  and  import  ? 

Once  it  had  thus  arisen  from  the  one  original  cause, 
the  error  naturally  took  two  different  shapes,  according 
to  the  varying  temperament  of  the  two  men. 

Once  the  power  of  reflection  resulting  from  study  and 
method  comes  to  an  end,  personal  character  quickly 
asserts  itself.  When  doctrine  ceases,  a  known  doctrine, 
a  doctrine  learned  from  practice,  men  act  on  personal 
lines. 

Moltke  :  a  Chief  of  Staff  constantly  appealing  to  his 
own  intelligence,  leaning  on  reason,  an  intellectual 
rather  than  a  performer,  meets  the  unknown  by  building 
up  an  hypothesis;  a  logical  hypothesis  it  is  true,  but 
one  exclusively  derived  from  his  own  imagination,  and 
one  which,  by  the  way,  he  does  not  consider  to  be  un- 
disputable;  he  thus  ends  by  framing  a  solution  which 
he  does  not  impose.  After  discussing  the  various  com- 
binations the  enemy  may  adopt,  he  selects  the  most 
rational  one,  wherefrom  his  own  scheme  of  manoeuvre 
will  be  derived.  His  supposition  seems  in  every  respect 
to  be  true,  however  it  is  not  true.  For  want  of  belief 
in  the  accuracy  of  his  own  decision,  he  does  not  dare 
to  impose  it ;  he  advises,  he  does  not  command,  remain- 
ing a  Chief  of  Staff  instead  of  being  a  commander  of 
armies.  For  that  reason,  the  great  results  of  the  war 
were  only  partly  due  to  him.  He  behaved  in  the  same 
way  at  Sedan,  where  he  again  ceased  commanding  on 
August  30th,  and  where  the  enveloping  movement 
resulted  from  an  understanding  between  two  armies, 
not  from  a  decision  taken  at  headquarters.  He  behaved 
in  the  same  way  during  the  operations  on  the  Loire. 

Frederick  Charles  was  a  man  of  action  in  the  highest 
degree ;  the  mere  thought  of  a  great  result  being  possible 
turned  his  head  to  the  point  of  depriving  him  of  the 
ability  to  perceive  what  should  be  his  starting-point, 
or  to  measure  all  the  import  and  risks  involved.  Von 
Moltke's  hypothesis  became  a  certainty  to  him.  He 
rushed  on  impetuously.     Up  to  the  end  and  uncon- 


STRATEGICAL   SURPRISE  245 

sciously  he  will  remain  blindfold.     He  claimed   a   kill 
before  finding  his  fox. 

This  is  precisely  what  happens  in  general  when  a 
man  starts  from  a  supposed  certainty  which  is  founded 
on  nothing.  Just  as  Frederick  Charles  had  not  felt  the 
need  of  getting  hold  of  a  well-founded  truth,  so  he  did 
not  find  it  necessary  to  verify  his  belief,  and  the  latter 
still  held  good  to  his  mind.  He  did  not  seek  for  infor- 
mation on  the  16th,  we  have  seen  that;  but  more  than 
this,  on  the  same  16th,  at  noon,  he  dictated  an  order 
which  settled  the  way  in  which  the  whole  of  the  Second 
Army  should  arrive  on  the  17th  at  the  Meuse  (he  was 
still  banking  on  the  alleged  victory  of  the  14th),  an  order 
which  the  official  Records  of  the  Great  General  Staff  has 
carefully  preserved  for  us  (although  it  Avas  not  carried 
out  in  the  least) ;  as  though  it  did  not  contain  the  most 
bitter  and  violent  criticism  of  the  decision  taken  by  that 
prince  during  these  days ;  as  though  it  were  not  a  kind 
of  ironical  monument  set  to  him,  the  interest  of  which, 
from  an  historical  point  of  view,  can  only  consist  in 
exonerating  von  Moltke  from  the  responsibilities  incurred 
during  the  acute  crisis  of  August  16th' — and  17th. 

"  Headquarters  at  Pont-a-Mousson, 

"  August  IQth,  1870,  Noon. 

"  Army   Order 

"  The  Second  Army  will  continue  to-morrow  to  march 
towards  the  Meuse.  The  First  Army  will  rapidly  come 
up  behind  its  right  wing.  In  view  of  the  direction  taken 
by  the  retreating  enemy,  this  wing  of  the  Second  Army 
will  perform  its  movement  as  follows  : 

"  The  Tenth  Corps  will  cross  the  Meuse  below  Verdun. 
It  will  send  out  detachments  towards  that  town. 

"  If  the  pursuit  results  in  carrying  that  army  corps 
rather  far  to  the  north,  the  points  of  Clermont-en- 
Argonne  and  Saint-Menehould  are  fixed,  from  this  date, 
as  being  those  in  the  direction  of  which  it  will  have  to 
march,  so  as  to  become  henceforth  the  right  wing  of  the 
army. 

"  The  Third  Corps  will  march  to-morrow  on  Etain, 
where  it  will  place  an  advance  guard,  unless  the  situation 
m  respect  of  the  enemy  makes  it  necessary  to  decide 
otherwise.     Troops  left  in  charge  of  the  bridge  thrown 


246        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

across  the  Moselle  will  rejoin  as  soon  as  they  shall  have 
been  relieved  by  the  Ninth  Corps,  a  relief  which  is  to  take 
place  to-day. 

"  The  Ninth  Corps  will  proceed,  to-morrow,  to  Mars- 
la-Tour.  If  possible,  this  army  corps  will  manage  during 
the  same  day,  to  replace  the  bridge  built  by  the  Third 
Corps  by  another  one,  made  with  boats  captured  on 
the  Moselle;  after  which,  the  light  bridge  train  of  the 
Third  Corps  will  resume  marching  in  order  to  rejoin  its 
corps.  The  three  corps  of  the  right  wing  above  men- 
tioned will  keep  mutually  connected  with  each  other,  and 
will,  every  day,  make  their  position  known  to  my 
headquarters,  at  points  mentioned  hereafter.  In  case 
of  a  serious  encounter  with  the  adversary  occurring. 
Infantry  General  von  Voigts-Rhetz  is  authorised  to  dis- 
pose first  of  the  Third  Corps,  then  also  of  the  Ninth,  if 
this  prove  necessary. 

"  If,  as  must  be  expected,  no  encounter  of  that  nature 
occurs,  the  Third  Corps  and  the  Ninth  will  proceed  on 
the  18th,  the  first  in  the  direction  of  Dieue-sur-Meuse, 
the  other  in  the  direction  of  Fresnes-Genicourt,  in  order 
to  take  possession,  as  soon  as  possible,  of  the  bridges 
there  crossing  the  Meuse. 

"  In  case  the  Ninth  Corps  should  arrive  in  advance, 
it  must  undertake  to  secure  these  two  crossings  at  the 
same  time. 

"  The  Twelfth  Corps  will  arrive  to-morrow,  with  the 
head  of  its  columns  as  far  as  Vigneulles,  with  its  main 
body  as  far  as  Saint-Benoit-en-Woevre,  where  it  will 
place  its  headquarters.  Cavalry  will  be  thrown  on  to 
the  Meuse  and  beyond  it. 

"  On  the  18th,  this  corps  will  continue  marching  on 
Bannoncourt,  and  take  possession  of  the  debouching 
point  on  the  Meuse  that  is  to  be  found  there. 

"  The  Guard  will  march  to-morrow  on  Saint-Mihiel, 
push  a  strong  advance  guard  on  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Meuse,  so  as  to  protect  that  important  crossing  point, 
and  place  its  headquarters  at  Saint-Mihiel. 

"  Its  cavalry  will  go  ahead,  in  the  direction  of  Bar-le- 
Duc. 

"  The  Fourth  Corps  will  soon  after  advance  on  Com- 
mercy  by  the  line  Jaillon- — Sauzey — Boucq,  in  so  far  as 
the  fortified  town  of  Toul  may  not  determine  a  partial 
interruption  of  the  movement. 


STRATEGICAL   SURPRISE  247 

"  The  Second  Corps  will  make  to-morrow  for  Pont- 
a-Mousson,  and  establish  the  head  of  its  column  in  the 
direction  Limey — Flirey — Saint-Mihiel.  Headquarters 
at  Pont-a-Mousson. 

"  My  headquarters  will  be  to-day  at  Thiaucourt,  from 
5  p.m. ;  to-morrow,  from  noon,  they  will  be  at  Saint- 
Mihiel  until  further  orders. 

"  Once  the  Second  Army  shall  have  arrived  on  the 
Meuse  and  the  bridges  over  that  river  shall  have  been 
secured,  the  troops  will  probably  remain  : n  their  positions 
for  a  few  days,  until  the  lateral  armies  shall  have  come 
up  in  line. 

"  Every  army  corps  will  send  an  aide-de-camp  every 
day  to  my  headquarters.  Such  ojfficers  may  use  carriages, 
if  need  be,  with  their  saddle-horse  following  the  carriage, 
and  must  further  be  escorted  by  infantry  orderlies. 

"  The  Cavalry  General, 
{Signed)       "  Frederick  Charles." 

"VMien,  after  the  war,  Moltke  criticised  the  decisions 
of  the  15th,  his  vindication  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
was  very  restrained.  Thus  he  wrote  in  the  Records  of 
the  General  Staff  : 

"  The  Third  and  Tenth  Corps,  as  well  as  the  two 
cavalry  divisions  attached  to  them,  had  the  mission  to 
outline  a  powerful  demonstration  against  the  Verdun 
road  (powerful,  with  this  reservation,  that  it  only  in- 
volved two  army  corps  separated  by  more  than  nine 
miles,  and  that  it  might,  between  Saint-Hilaire  and  Mars- 
la-Tour,  come  up  against  the  whole  French  army). 

"  As  for  the  other  fractions  of  the  army  (that  is,  four 
corps),  they  went  on  in  a  fully  westerly  direction  towards 
the  Meuse. 

"...  The  consequence  of  the  plan  of  the  commander 
of  the  Second  Army  was,  then,  to  turn  the  resultant  of 
these  movements  in  the  direction  of  the  Meuse.  If  the 
French  were  not  found  on  the  Moselle,  it  was  hoped, 
owing  to  the  marching  qualities  of  German  troops, 
that  they  would  be  rejoined  on  the  Meuse. 

"  Reports  received  from  the  5th  cavalry  division 
during  the  day  of  the  15th  had  not  yet  clearly  established 
the  actual  situation."  (Information  had  not  been 
asked  for,  because  they  were  convinced  that  they  were 


248         THE    PRINCIPLES    OF    WAR 

well  informed.  Otherwise  the  cavalry  would  have  re- 
ported that  the  French  were  not  retreating  on  the  roads 
from  Metz  to  Verdun ;  let  us  state  once  more  that 
reason  should  likewise  have  shown  that  their  movement 
ought  to  have  taken  at  least  forty-eight  hours.)  "  In- 
structions from  general  headquarters,  arriving  at  Pont-a- 
Mousson  on  the  15th  at  10  p.m.  attached  a  particular 
importance  to  the  occupation  of  the  roads  from  Metz 
to  Verdun ;  but  after  sending  in  that  direction  two  army 
corps  and  two  cavalry  divisions,  one  had  the  right  to 
believe  that  one  had  adequately  taken  that  recom- 
mendation into  account." 

On  the  morning  of  the  16th,  the  various  fractions  of 
the  German  army  started  without  the  above-mentioned 
decisions  having  been  altered,  without  anybody,  as  we 
have  seen,  attempting  to  verify  the  accuracy  of  the 
initial  assumption ;  besides,  until  1  p.m.,  nothing  in  the 
reports  received  by  the  Third  Corps  had  appeared  to 
the  Prince  to  be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  induce  him  to 
alter  in  any  way  the  measures  he  had  adopted.  The  true 
situation  was  only  known  at  that  moment  at  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Second  Army.  It  would  have  been 
known  earlier  if  it  had  only  been  sought  for,  as  is  clearly 
shown  by  the  actual  facts. 

But  the  certainty  and  quietude  which  occupied 
Prince  Frederick  Charles's  mind  were  not  shared  by  all 
his  subordinates  : 

"  Infantry  General  von  Voigts-Rhetz  (commanding 
the  Tenth  Corps),  feeling  some  anxiety  on  account  of 
those  French  bivouacs,  the  existence  of  which  had  been 
reported  on  the  preceding  day,  thought  it  necessary  to 
combine,  with  the  movement  of  his  army  corps  on  Saint- 
Hilaire,  a  strong  reconnaissance  on  the  camps  observed 
in  the  evening  of  the  15th  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Rezon- 
ville.  He  had  attached  to  that  operation  the  5th  cavalry 
division  under  General  von  Rheinbaben,  which  he  also 
reinforced,  very  early  on  the  16th,  with  two  horse  bat- 
teries from  the  corps  artillery  brought  from  Thiaucourt 
to  Xonville  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Tenth  Army  Corps, 
Lieutenant- Colonel  von  Capri vi,  under  escort  of  the 
2nd  squadron  of  the  2nd  regiment  of  dragoon  guards. 
In  order  to  support  this  reconnaissance,  the  order  was 
also  given  to  half  the  37th  infantry  brigade  which  was 


STRATEGICAL   SURPRISE  249 

at  Thiaiicourt  to  join,  at  Chambley,  the  detachment  of 
Colonel  von  Lynker,  sent  out  from  Noveant  in  the  Moselle 
valley.  General  von  Voigts-Rhetz  intended  to  march, 
meanwliile,  from  Thiaucourt  on  Saint-Hilaire,  with  the 
remainder  of  the  15th  division.  ..." 

Here  is  a  highly  practical  lesson.  People  in  high 
quarters  believed  they  could  do  without  security;  the 
performers  in  the  front  rank  reinstate  security.  They 
do  not  advance  blmdfold  in  the  midst  of  danger.  It  was 
merely  human;  such  a  game  would  have  proved  too 
risky  for  them.  However,  they  reinstated  security  im- 
perfectly and  too  late  to  undo  the  harm  that  had  been 
done.  Practice  as  well  as  theory  showed,  then,  that  the 
best  way  was  to  attend  to  security  before  doing  anything 
else,  and  to  form  this  advance  guard  (5th  cavalry  divi- 
sion, 37th  brigade,  two  corps  batteries). 

From  the  search  made  by  the  5th  cavalry  division, 
soon  to  be  continued  by  the  6th  division,  which  arrived 
close  behind  the  Third  Corps,  finally  arose  a  knowledge 
of  the  situation. 

What  was  found  is  well  known.  The  Third  Corps 
had  marched  into  an  ant-hill.  The  French  army,  instead 
of  being  in  full  retreat  towards  the  Meuse,  was  completing 
the  evacuation  of  Metz ;  its  moral  was  excellent,  having 
been  even  enhanced  by  the  fight  on  the  14th.  It  was 
assembled  between  the  two  roads  to  Conflans  and 
Mars-la-Tour,  four  miles  from  Gorze.  The  Third  Corps 
came  up  and  struck  full  against  that  assembly.  Under 
what  conditions  will  the  Second  German  Army  meet  the 
main  and  yet  unbeaten  forces  of  the  adversary  ? 

At  11  a.m.,  when  the  battle  was  in  full  swing,  all 
the  various  army  corps,  other  than  the  Third,  were  on 
their  way  in  order  to  reach  the  cantonment  assigned 
to  each  of  them  :  the  Tenth,  was  marching  by  the  road 
to  Thiaucourt,  Saint  Benoit,  and  Maizeray,  at  an  average 
distance  of  10|  miles  from  Vionville;  the  Guard,  at  a 
double  distance,  about  24  miles ;  the  Fourth  at  a  triple 
distance,  33  miles;  the  Twelfth,  Ninth  and  Second,  in 
second  line,  were  more  than  a  day's  march  to  the  rear. 

Under  those  conditions,  the  Second  Army  could  only 
oppose  to  the  French  forces  debouching  from  Metz, 
on  the  16th,  one  full  army  corps,  the  Third  and  the 
greater  part  of  the  Tenth,  on  the  17th,  three  or  four 
army  corps. 


250        THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   WAR 

It  had  to  wait  until  the  18th  to  assemble  the  largest 
part  of  its  forces. 

We  have  here,  then,  a  strategical  surprise  in  the  fullest 
sense  of  the  word.  In  the  presence  of  an  enemy  who 
should  have  been  an  active  and  able  tactician,  or  even 
in  the  presence  of  a  commander  who  had  the  object  of 
war  in  mind,  it  would  have  become  impossible  for  the 
Second  Army  to  assemble  on  the  16th  or  even  on  the 
17th,  which  would  have  meant  incurring  a  disaster;  it 
would  have  become  impossible  for  the  two  other  armies 
to  lend  that  Second  Army  any  efficient  help  :  what  would 
have  become,  then,  of  their  own  situation  ? 

Surprise  consists  in  the  hard  fact  that  the  enemy 
suddenly  appears  in  considerable  numbers,  without  his 
presence  having  been  known  to  be  so  near,  for  want  of 
information,  and  without  it  being  possible  to  assemble, 
for  want  of  protection  ;  for  want,  in  one  word,  of  a  security- 
service. 

The  crisis  arose,  as  we  have  seen,  from  the  lack  of 
strategical  security,  of  such  security  both  as  an  essential 
notion,  without  which  no  strategical  disposition  can  be 
provided  with  a  sound  and  safe  foundation ;  and  also  as 
a  thoroughly  organised  service  capable  of  mastering  the 
unknown  and  of  guarding  against  surprise. 

From  the  first,  the  Germans  had  made  a  leap  in  the 
dark  by  starting  from  an  hyj^othesis  (Moltke),  from 
a  conviction  devoid  of  foundation  and  verification 
(Frederick  Charles). 

A  whole  manoeuvre  was  based  on  these  data,  in  an 
uncautious  way. 

Let  us  profit  by  this  and  conclude  : 

1.  In  strategy,  as  in  any  other  business,  a  leap  in  the 
dark  is  the  reverse  of  sound  action ;  nobody  has  the 
right  to  substitute  for  actual  facts,  which  must  always 
be  sought,  the  productions  of  imagination,  mere  supposi- 
tions. On  facts  alone  can  a  rational  manoeuvre  be 
founded. 

2.  In  any  case,  in  strategy  as  well  as  in  tactics,  no 
manoeuvre  must  be  undertaken  that  leads  to  dispersion 
before  making  sure  that  one  is  able,  when  necessary, 
to  transform  it  into  a  concentrated  disposition.  The 
necessity  of  a  strategical  security-service  thus  becomes 
quite  clear :  an  advance  guard,  able  to  inform,  able  to 
protect. 


STRATEGICAL   SURPRISE  251 

Let  us,  besides,  remember  Napoleon's  quotation 
(p.  154)  concerning  the  necessity  for  an  army's  always 
being  in  a  position  to  put  forth  the  whole  resistance  of 
which  it  is  capable ;  concerning  also  the  necessity,  for 
a  general,  of  never  basing  his  decisions  on  anything  but 
reports  which  are  certain  and  true  at  the  moment  when 
those  decisions  are  to  be  carried  out. 

Whenever  men  like  von  Moltke  and  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  are  seen  to  err,  people  are  inclined  to  think  that 
the  problem  outreaches  the  limits  of  human  perception ; 
they  feel  inclined  to  charge  with  foolish  conceit  any  one 
attempting  to  be  more  clearsighted  or  more  farsighted. 
Theory,  at  any  rate,  is  tempted  to  such  a  conclusion. 
But  is  it  not  the  chief  characteristic  of  study  that  it 
attempts  to  discover  the  means  of  reducing  the  chances 
of  committing  those  errors  of  which  human  nature  is 
always  capable,  or  of  lessening  the  consequences  of  such 
errors  once  they  are  made ;  of  removing  the  limits  of 
the  unknown,  of  bringing  the  mind  from  ignorance  to 
knowledge,  so  as  to  make  our  intelligence  more  efficient  ? 
Is  it  not  characteristic  of  science  that  it  should,  by  means 
of  a  series  of  discoveries,  place  within  reach  of  average 
men  the  possibility  of  doing  better  than  superior  men 
of  the  past,  by  teaching  them  processes  discovered  by 
genius  ?  ^ 

It  is  in  a  slowly  progressive  manner  that  truth  is 
mastered.  The  German  army  of  1870  still  kept  to 
mere  tactical  security.  Yet  we  find  the  notion  of  strategi- 
cal security  in  its  fullest  sense  in  all  Napoleon's  wars,  as 
well  as  among  the  German  staffs  of  1814  and  1815.  The 
theory  is  likely  to  rise  again  to-day,  for  it  has  been 
fully  ahve  in  the  past. 

^  Progress  is  made  in  that  way;  one  instance,  among  others,  will 
show  it.  Do  not  commonplace  surgeons  successfully  perform  to-day, 
owing  to  Pasteur's  wonderful  discoveries,  operations  which  the  greatest 
practitioners  of  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  never  dared 
to  undertake  ? 


CHAPTER  IX 

STRATEGICAL   SECURITY 

Let  us  consider  an  instance,  taken  from  the  beginning 
of  the  campaign  of  the  army  of  Italy  in  Hmigary  in 
1809;  we  shall  find  Napoleon  explaining  to  Prince 
Eugene  the  method  which  tends  to  developing  a 
strategical  manoeuvre  both  surely  and  securely. 

We  are  at  the  end  of  May  1809.  The  army  of  Italy 
(Prince  Eugene),  pursuing  the  Archduke  John,  has 
reached  Gratz.  It  had  marched  in  the  direction  of 
Leoben,  then  in  the  direction  of  Vienna,  so  as  to  join  the 
army  of  Germany  on  May  26th  at  Briick,  while  the 
Archduke  John  withdraws  from  Gratz  into  Hungary, 
either  in  order  to  manoeuvre  on  Raab,  or  in  order  to 
operate  from  there  against  the  still  dispersed  troops  of 
the  army  of  Italy.     (See  Sketch  I.) 

Macdonald  actually  arrives  at  Gratz,  via  Laybach,  on 
the  30th  of  May.  He  stays  there,  waiting  for  orders 
from  Prince  Eugene,  as  well  as  for  news  of  Marmont, 
who  is  arriving,  on  his  side,  from  Istria  and  Carniola. 

The  general  situation  on  the  French  side  was  at  this 
moment  the  following  :  three  divisions  at  Neustadt,  the 
Macdonald  column  arriving  at  Gratz,  Marmont's  corps 
marching  in  the  same  direction.  The  whole  is  pro- 
tected by  a  strong  advance  guard  commanded  by 
Lauriston,  and  sent  out  by  the  army  of  Germany  as  far 
as  Oedenburg. 

Napoleon  writes  to  Eugene  : 

"  Ebersdorf,  June  3rd,  1809,  10  p.m. 

"  My  son ;  General  Lauriston  reports  that  the  advance 
guard  of  Prince  John  seems  to  be  making  for  Oeden- 
burg or,  at  any  rate,  that,  instead  of  marching  by 
Korinend,  it  has  gone  by  Rechnitz  in  a  direction  between 
Korinend  and  Oedenburg,  which  would  suggest  that 
his  corps  wants  to  rally  on  Raab  and  that,  intending  to 

252 


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STRATEGICAL   SECURITY  253 

take  the  road  to  Korinend,  he  is  sending  out  scouting 
parties  on  his  left  to  a  distance  of  seven  or  eight  leagues 
from  Korinend.  It  is  even  not  at  all  impossible  that, 
having  heard  from  the  inhabitants  what  small  numbers 
occupy  Oedenburg,  he  should  try  to  attack  that  town 
suddenly.  I  have  no  objection  to  your  transferring  your 
headquarters  to  Oedenburg  (General  Grouchy  can  go 
there  from  Briick  without  passing  through  Neustadt) 
and  setting  out  to  pursue  Prince  John  in  order  to  cut 
his  line  of  retreat,  provided  only  you  make  sure  he  should 
not  pass  over  to  your  right,  that  is,  between  you  and 
Briick  or  between  Oedenburg  and  Neustadt.  .  .  . 

"  I  leave  you  free  to  proceed  to  Oedenburg,  without 
giving  you  a  precise  order,  because  I  suppose  that  you 
are  getting,  from  your  right,  reports  which  enable  you 
to  act  in  compliance  with  my  intentions,  which  are 
contained  in  the  following  idea  :  you  must  try  to  do 
some  harm  to  Prince  John. 

"  You  can  do  this  if  he  retires  on  Raab ;  if  he  retires 
on  Pesth  you  can  do  nothing  without  being  compelled 
to  undertake  exaggerated  movements  which  would 
carry  you  too  far  from  the  army.  Finally,  at  Oedenburg 
you  will  not  be  further  from  the  army  than  from  Neu- 
stadt. To  repeat  it  once  more,  it  is  enough  if  nothing 
passes  over  to  your  right  and  cuts  you  off  from  Briick 
and  General  jMacdonald.  You  must  find  out  what  there 
is  at  Friedberg  and  at  Hartberg." 

Prince  Eugene  marches  on  Oedenburg,  whence  he 
first  of  all  attempts,  by  sending  out  his  cavalry  supported 
by  one  battalion  on  Korinend,  to  secure  some  information 
concerning  his  adversary,  who  seems  to  be  restless,  and 
who  might,  later  on,  either  proceed  to  the  Danube  and 
thereby  join  the  Archduke  Karl,  or  act  on  Macdonald,  via 
Korinend,  before  all  the  French  forces  coming  from 
Italy  should  have  assembled. 

Napoleon  writes  to  him  : 

"  Ebersdorf,  June  5th,  noon. 

"  My  son ;  I  have  your  letter  of  the  4th,  9  p.m.  I 
approve  of  the  movement  you  have  made  on  Korinend. 
The  cavalry  ought,  however,  not  to  have  gone  there 
without  infantry.  I  fear  lest  that  Baden  battalion 
should,   at  such  a  distance  from  the  main  forces,   be 


254        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

involved  in  some  risk.  As  it  appears  from  General 
Macdonald's  letter  that  the  enemy  is  still  opposite 
Wildon,  and  that  the  Gyulai  corps  is  near  Radkersburg, 
a  strong  cavalry  division  on  Korinend,  pushed  on  to  the 
rear  of  the  enemy,  could  protect  our  communications, 
especially  if  it  be  supported  by  a  detachment  from 
General  Macdonald  on  the  same  point.  Write  to  himi 
in  that  sense.  General  Macdonald  must  not  send  out  a 
reconnaissance,  but  a  strong  advance  guard  to  Fiirsten- 
feld  and  thence  on  Korinend." 

Napoleon,  then,  does  not  believe  cavalry  to  be  able 
to  fulfil  by  itself  that  first  part  of  the  task;  he  wants 
the  cavalry  to  be  supported  at  Korinend  by  a  strong 
advance  guard  coming  from  Fiirstenfeld.  It  is  a  strongly 
constituted  organ  of  this  sort,  instead  of  even  numer- 
ous squadrons,  which  he  expects  to  carry  out  a  real 
reconnaissance. 

Meanwhile,  however.  Prince  Eugene  had  conceived 
at  Oedenburg  the  idea  of  proceeding  to  Raab  in  order 
to  cut  the  Archduke  John  off  from  the  road  to  the 
Danube  by  which  the  latter  might  have  joined  the 
Archduke  Karl.  Such  a  manoeuvre  arose  from  a  pre- 
conceived view  :  it  might  fail  to  go  home,  it  might  in 
any  case  be  parried.  We  shall  see  what  theory  Napoleon 
opposed  to  it. 

"  Schoenbrunn,  June  6th,  1809,  9  a.m. 

"My  son;  I  have  your  letter  of  the  5th,  10  p.m., 
in  which  I  see  that  Colbert  has  at  last  found  the  Arch- 
duke John.  The  first  thing  you  have  to  do  is  to  march 
together  and  united.  I  do  not  think  that  the  Seras  and 
Durutte  divisions  and  the  five  cavalry  regiments  of 
General  Grouchy  will  suffice;  the  corps  of  Baraguey 
d'Hilliers  and  the  Guard  must  be  with  you,  so  that  you 
should  have  30,000  men,  who  should  march  in  close 
formation  in  order  to  come  into  action  together,  and  be 
able  all  to  arrive  on  the  same  battle-field  within  three 
hours'  time.  I  leave  the  Lauriston  corps  at  your  dis- 
posal, so  that  you  will  be  reinforced  by  3000  infantry, 
and  the  three  cavalry  regiments  of  Colbert.  I  also 
leave  at  your  disposal  the  Montbrun  division,  which 
consists  of  four  cavalry  regiments.  Thereby  you  will 
have  eleven  regiments  of  light  cavalry,  three  regiments 


STRATEGICAL   SECURITY  255 

of  dragoons  and  a  corps  of  nearly  36,000  men.  Send  at 
least  half  of  these  36,000  men  as  an  advance  guard  to 
march  on  Korinend.  The  Duke  of  Auerstaedt  is  opposite 
Presburg  with  the  Gudin  division  and  the  light  cavalry 
division  of  General  Lassalle.  You  will  not  receive  this 
letter  before  noon ;  it  is  impossible  that  you  should  not 
have  received  news  by  then  from  General  Lauriston, 
from  General  Montbrun,  from  General  Colbert,  and 
even  from  General  Macdonald,  which  should  give  you 
clear  particulars  about  the  situation  of  Prince  John. 

"  In  plains,  such  as  these  of  Hungary,  manoeuvring 
will  necessarily  be  different  from  what  it  is  in  the  passes 
of  Carintliia  and  Styria.  In  the  passes  of  Styria  and 
Carinthia,  if  one  succeeds  in  forestalling  the  enemy  at 
a  point  of  junction,  as,  for  instance,  at  Saint-Michel, 
one  cuts  off  the  enemy  column;  in  Hungary,  on  the 
contrarj^,  as  soon  as  the  enemy  shall  have  been  fore- 
stalled on  one  point,  he  will  make  for  another.  Suppose, 
for  instance,  the  enemy  is  making  for  Raab  and  you 
arrive  in  that  town  before  him  :  the  enemy,  after  hearing 
of  it  on  its  way,  will  change  his  direction  and  make  for 
Pesth  .  .  . ;  in  that  case,  your  movement  on  Raab  would 
increase  the  distance  between  you  and  the  enemy;  it 
might  even  induce  him  (for  the  enemy  is  not  as  we  are ; 
being  in  his  own  country  he  is  well  informed)  to  attack 
IMacdonald  and  rout  him.  I  think,  therefore,  that  the 
movement,  first  on  Giins,  later  on  Stein-am-Anger,  then 
on  Kormend,  or  from  Giins  to  Sarvar,  is  the  soundest 
movement,  provided  you  have  no  other  information 
than  what  I  have  at  the  present  moment.  You  may 
march  to-night  on  Giins  with  the  Colbert  brigade,  the 
seven  regiments  of  the  Grouchy  division  and  a  con- 
siderable force  of  artillery  (you  must  put  your  light 
artillery,  at  least  twelve  guns,  with  your  cavalry),  and 
the  Seras  and  Durutte  divisions.  Baraguey  d'Hilliers's 
corps  may  arrive  to-night  at  Oedenburg,  or  even  get  as 
far  as  Giins,  or  march  to  the  junction  of  the  road  to 
Sarvar  and  Raab,  on  Zinkendorf.  According  to  the 
news  you  receive,  you  may  combine,  to-morrow,  the 
movement  of  your  two  columns  on  Sarvar  or  on  Kori- 
nend. General  Montbrun  ought  to  have  been  yesterday 
night,  the  5th,  at  Gols,  and  as  he  must  link  himself  up 
with  General  Lauriston,  you  will  not  fail  to  be  supplied 
with  information." 


256         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF    WAR 

Let  us  pay  attention  to  the  following  points  in  this 
letter  : 

In  a  country  of  easy  communications  like  Hungary 
(and  it  is  the  same  case  in  a  great  part  of  Europe),  the 
enemy  remains  free  to  move  in  every  direction  so  long 
as  we  have  not  seized  him.  The  a  priori  manoeuvre  on 
Raab  may  then  : 

1.  Either  strike  into  the  void,  if  the  eneniy  does  not 
come  on. 

2.  Or  be  parried :  forestalled  on  that  point,  he  will 
make  for  another. 

3.  Or  even  bring  about  a  crisis :  incite  the  enemy  to 
attack  Macdonald  and  to  rout  him. 

The  soundest  mianoeuvre  consists  in  marching  on  Giins, 
then  on  Stein-am-Anger,  then  on  Korinend,  in  the 
direction  where  the  enemy  has  been  reconnoitred. 

How  should  this  march  be  organised  ?  By  sending 
forward  a  strong  advance  guard  followed  by  a  united 
main  body. 

Looking  at  the  question  again  from  a  higher  stand- 
point, Napoleon  writes  on  the  following  day  : 

"  Schoenbrunn,  June  1th,  2.30  a.m. 

"...  While  pursuing  Prince  John  from  the  Taglia- 
mento,  you  have  not  marched  in  a  sufficiently  close 
order,  and  we  might  have  had  unpleasant  experiences. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  had  Prince  John  concentrated  his 
forces  at  Tarvis,  it  might  have  been  impossible  for 
you  to  beat  him.  You  were  distributed  into  three 
corps  :  Macdonald,  Seras  and  yourself.  .  .  .  You  know 
I  am  making  those  remarks  for  your  own  benefit.  It 
is  necessary  to  march  with  all  one's  forces  well  to- 
gether ;  let  us  have  no  small  parties.  Here  is  a  general 
principle  in  war :  a  corps  of  25,000  or  30,000  men  may 
be  isolated;  if  well  led,  it  can  fight  or  avoid  fighting 
or  manoeuvre  according  to  circumstances  without  ex- 
periencing anything  disastrous,  because  it  cannot  be 
forced  to  fight,  and  finally  because  it  is  able  to  fight 
for  a  long  time.  One  division  of  9000  or  12,000  men 
miay  be  left,  without  risk,  isolated  for  one  hour ;  it  will 
hold  the  enemy  in  check,  however  numerous  that  enemy 
may  be,  and  give  the  army  time  to  arrive.  It  is 
therefore   customary   not  to  form   an   advance   guard 


STRATEGICAL  SECURITY  257 

with  less  than  9000  men,  to  make  the  infantry  of  that 
advance  guard  camp  in  close  order,  and  to  place  it  at  an 
hour's  distance  from  the  army.  You  have  lost  the  35th 
because  you  ignored  this  principle ;  you  formed  a  rear 
guard  with  one  regiment,  which  was  subsequently  out- 
flanked. If  there  had  been  four  regiments  there,  they 
would  have  formed  such  a  resisting  mass  that  the  army 
would  have  come  up  in  time  to  succour  them. 

"...  To-day  you  are  about  to  start  upon  a  regular 
operation  :  you  must  march  with  an  advance  guard 
composed  of  plenty  of  cavalry,  a  dozen  guns  and  a  good 
infantry  division. 

"  The  w^hole  remainder  of  your  corps  will  have  to 
bivouac  one  hour  in  the  rear,  light  cavalry  covering, 
of  course,  as  much  as  possible.  .  .  . 

"  From  your  advance  guard  to  the  rear  of  your  park, 
there  must  not  be  more  than  three  or  four  leagues.  .  .  ." 

The  strongly  organised  advance  guard  just  mentioned, 
therefore,  is  not  merely  the  reconnoitring  force  we  have 
already  seen  to  have  been  sent  from  Oedenburg  on 
Korinend.  It  is  also  such  a  resisting  mass  that  the  army 
may  arrive  in  time  to  reinforce  that  advance  guard 
and  continue  the  battle  engaged,  to  strike  the  enemy 
when  he  is  held  at  last. 

To  sum  up,  contrary  to  Prince  Eugene,  who  organises 
scouting  and  manoeuvre  independently  from  each  other, 
by  basing  himself  in  both  cases  on  the  ground  and  on 
the  supposed  intentions  of  the  enemy.  Napoleon  wants 
manoeuvre  to  be  but  a  development  of  scouting,  the  latter 
being  successively  modified  to  that  end,  owing  to  the 
strong  advance  guard  capable,  ^r*^,  of  supporting  explor- 
ing parties  searching  for  news;  secondly,  the  enemy 
having  been  found,  of  itself  taking  up  the  intelligence 
ser\dce,  and,  to  this  end,  of  transforming  exploration 
into  a  reconnaissance  ;  thirdly,  capable,  after  finding  and 
reconnoitring  the  enemy,  of  fixing  him  for  such  a  length 
of  time  as  is  necessary  for  the  main  army  to  arrive. 

The  main  body  of  the  army  follows  behind,  ready  to 
utilise  those  results  immediately,  to  set  up  a  system 
or  a  combination.  How  could  this  army  manoeuvre 
otherwise  than  surely  and  securely,  being  protected  by 
those  dispositions  which  constantly  aim  at  scouting,  at 
covering  and  preparing  the  manoeuvres? 
s 


258        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Does  not  every  duel,  moreover,  every  fight  against 
a  living  and  free  adversary,  develoj)  in  the  same 
way? 

On  guard  .  .  .     Cover  j^ourself. 

Engage  the  sword     .  .     Establish  contact. 

Stretch  out  the  arm  .     Threaten  the  adversary  in 

the  direct  line  so  as  to 
fix  him. 
Double    or    disengage    or     Manoeuvre  only  when  this 
what  not.  stage  is  reached. 

We  shall  see  later  on  how  these  views  might  have 
been  applied  to  the  situation  of  August  15th,  1870,  which 
we  have  criticised  above. 

Let  us  for  the  time  being  keep  to  Napoleon,  when  he 
explains  strategical  security  to  Prince  Eugene  by  means 
of  the  following  considerations  : 

"  As  you  did  not  know  anything  about  the  enemy's 
schemes,  you  were  perfectly  right  in  sending  your  whole 
cavalry  on  Korinend,  in  sending  for  news.  But  you 
were  wrong  in  sending  it  without  infantry,  for  cavalry 
cannot  fulfil  this  task  by  itself;  it  ought  to  have  been 
accompanied  by  a  strong  infantry  advance  guard.  .  .  . 

"  You  were  equally  wrong  in  deciding  from  the  first 
to  make  for  Raab  in  order  to  cut  off  the  Archduke 
John  from  his  road.  He  would  have  heard  of  your 
movement,  he  would  have  escaped.  ..." 

In  countries  with  numerous  communications,  one 
ought  not  to  manoeuvre  a  priori  against  an  enemy  in 
possession  of  his  freedom  of  movement.  One  ought 
to  begin  by  getting  hold  of  him ;  once  that  preliminary 
condition  has  been  fulfilled,  the  opportunity  will  arise 
to  carry  out  a  manoeuvre  the  effect  of  which  shall  be 
safe  and  certain. 

The  advance  guard,  which  has  fulfilled  the  first  part 
of  the  task,  getting  information,  must  then  fulfil  the 
second,  keeping  a  hold  on  the  adversary,  keeping  actually 
in  touch  with  him,  so  as  to  make  it  possible  to  organise  a 
well-founded  and  right  manoeuvre,  that  is,  a  manoeuvre 
corresponding  to  the  circumstances.  The  advance  guard 
attacks  the  enemy  if  he  tries  to  escape.  It  resists  by 
means  of  a  defensive  and  of  a  retreating  manoeuvre  if 
he  attacks. 


STRATEGICAL  SECURITY  259 

Entering  upon  operations  implies,  therefore,  to  the 
Emperor's  mind :  making  for  the  enemy,  with  an 
advance  guard  and  a  main  body  capable  :  The  one 
(namely,  the  main  body)  of  carrying  out  a  manoeuvre 
at  the  last  hour,  set  up  according  to  circumstances  : 
The  other  (namely,  the  advance  guard)  of  guaranteeing 
sure  action,  that  is,  of  supplying  positive  information 
and  certainty  as  a  base  for  the  contemplated  manoeuvre ; 
security,  so  that  the  manoeuvre  may  be  prepared  and 
carried  out  without  danger. 

We  shall  find  this  notion  of  security,  thus  understood, 
to  be  present  in  all  the  actions  of  war  undertaken  by 
Napoleon  (1805,  1806,  1809,  1812),  and  each  time  with 
dispositions  varying  according  to  the  moment  and  the 
operation  undertaken;  always,  however,  leading  to  a 
certain  combination  of  time,  space  and  forces. 

The  notion  of  strategical  security  was  completely 
ignored  by  the  German  armies  of  1870,  and  the  result 
of  that  fault  in  conducting  the  war  was  that  they  often 
found  themselves  in  a  particularly  critical  situation. 
Nothing  but  the  immobility,  the  complete  passiveness 
of  the  French  made  it  possible  for  them  to  come  out  of 
such  situations  without  a  disaster. 

Strategical  security  was,  however,  known  and  put  in 
practice  by  the  Germans  of  1813  and  1814.  Taught 
by  the  severe  lessons  received  from  the  Emperor,  they 
had  grasped  its  importance.  They  scoffed  at  those 
French  generals  who  misappreciated  its  import.  Thus 
Clausewitz  wrote  : 

"  Have  we  not  seen,  in  spite  of  the  method  adopted 
by  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  French  corps  of  60,000  or 
70,000  men  march,  under  Marshal  Macdonald  into 
Silesia  and  under  Marshals  Oudinot  and  Ney  into  the 
Mark,  without  an  advance  guard  being  so  much  as 
mentioned  !  " 

He  was  alluding  to  the  French  defeats  of  the  Katzbach, 
of  Donnewitz,  of  Gross-Beeren. 


I.  A  TYricAL  Disposition  ensuring  Strategical 
Security 

The  beginnings  of  the  campaign  of  1815  show  clearly 
how  the  army  of  the  Lower  Rhine  comprehended  the 


260 


THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 


organisation  and  utilisation  of  bodies  in  advance  guard.* 
The  enemy  having  assumed  the  offensive,  the  first  thing 
to  be  done  was  to  concentrate  the  forces.  The  First 
Prussian  Corps  shows  us  what  tactics  ought  to  be  used 
to  that  effect  by  the  advance  guard.  (See  Map  No.  9.) 
In  the  first  half  of  June  1815,  the  army  was  distributed 
as  follows  : 


'  1st  brigade  at  . 
2nd  brigade  at 
3rd  brigade  at  . 
4th  brigade  at  . 
Cavalry  reserve  at 
.Artillery  at 
'  5tli  brigade  at  . 
6th  brigade  at  , 
7th  brigade  at  . 
8th  brigade  at  . 
Cavalry  reserve  at 
.Artillery 
'9th  brigade  at  . 
10th  brigade  at 
11th  brigade  at 
12th  brigade  at 
Cavalry  reserve 
.Artillery  at 
Fourth  Corps     TlSth  brigade  at 
Biilow  J  14th  brigade  at 

Headquarters  atl  15th  brigade  at 
Liege  1.16th  brigade  at 

fist  brigade  at  . 
2nd  brigade  at 
3rd  brigade  at  . 

ArtUlery  reserve  fGloms 
\Aihem. 


First  Corps 
General  Ziethen 
Headquarters  at 

Charleroi 


Second  Corps 

General  Pirch 

Headquarters  at] 

Namur 


Third  Corps 

Thislmann 

Headquarters  at] 

Cinay 


Fontaine-L6veque 

Marchiennes 

Fleurus 

Moustier-sur-Sambre 

Sombre  fEe 

Gembloux. 

Namur 

Thoremberg-les-BeguiBes 

Heron 

Huy 

Hanut 

along  the  road  to  Louvain. 

Assesse 

Cinay 

Dinant 

Huy 

between  Cinay  and  Dinant 

Cinay. 

Liege 

Warenne 

Voiroux-Gorey 

Voiroux-les-Liers. 

Tongres 

Dahlem 

Lootz. 


The  total  of  the  forces  was  110,000  men. 

That  distribution  of  the  army  was  far  from  perfect 
from  a  military  point  of  view.  It  resulted  mainly  from 
the  difficulty  in  which  they  found  themselves  of  enabling 
troops  to  live.  Bliicher  was  receiving  no  money  from 
his  government ;  the  local  authorities  were  little  inclined 
to  supply  him  with  the  same ;  the  inhabitants  had  to  be 

1  The  Prussian  army  of  the  Lower  Rhine,  commanded  by  Marshal 
Bliicher,  had  General  Gneisenau  as  Chief  of  the  Army  Staff,  General 
Clause witz  as  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Third  Corps.  It  is  from  the  writings 
of  the  latter  that  we  borrow  part  of  the  considerations  which  justify 
the  distribution  of  the  army  on  the  ground,  as  well  as  the  use  its 
leaders  thought  they  would  be  able  to  make  of  it. 


STRATEGICAL  SECURITY  261 

applied  to  in  order  to  feed  the  army,  and  this  for  a  long 
period  of  time.  Bliicher  did  not  contemplate  taking 
the  offensive  before  July  1st,  and  the  troops  had  arrived 
in  the  country  as  early  as  in  May.  In  view  of  that 
situation,  he  had  been  compelled  to  scatter  them. 

The  Prussians  nevertheless  retained  their  intention  of 
making  an  offensive ;  however,  while  they  were  waiting 
for  the  third  allied  army  (Austrians,  Bavarians,  Wur- 
tembergians)  to  arrive  on  the  field  of  operations,  they 
had  granted  Wellington's  request  to  postpone  offensive 
operations,  and  it  had  been  agreed  that,  in  case  of 
any  unforeseen  attack  on  the  part  of  Napoleon,  the 
Prussian  and  the  English  armies  should  effect  their 
junction  on  the  road  from  Namur  to  Nivelle  via 
Sombreffe. 

Indeed,  such  an  adversary  as  Napoleon  was,  a  man 
"  who  dared  to  place  the  whole  decision  in  a  single, 
eagerly-sought  battle "  (Clausewitz),  could  only  be 
met  by  concentrating,  at  the  right  moment,  both  allied 
armies  on  a  common  point  or  on  two  points  so  near  to 
each  other  that  they  could  act  together,  then  by  resorting 
to  tactics  in  order  to  make  victory  result  from  the  large 
numerical  superiority  this  first  operation  would  provide. 

With  this  end  in  view,  "  the  Prussian  Army,  separately 
considered,  stands  as  to  two  of  its  army  corps  in  the 
Meuse  valley,  where  the  towns  of  Liege,  Huy  and  Namur 
supply  billets  for  numerous  troops.  It  has  one  corps 
(the  First)  on  the  Sambre  towards  Charier oi  ;  another 
(the  Third)  towards  Cinay,  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Meuse,  both  being  pushed  ahead  as  feelers  ;  headquarters 
at  Namur,  a  central  point,  three  or  four  miles  from  the 
corps  sent  on  ahead,  and  connected  with  Brussels  by 
a  main  road.  Its  extension  is  32  miles  of  front  and 
32  miles  in  depth;  it  can  therefore  close  up  on  its 
centre  within  two  days — it  is  sure  to  have  two  days  in 
which  to  do  that.  Once  assembled,  it  may  either  risk  a 
battle,  if  it  thinks  itself  strong  enough,  or  withdraw  in 
any  direction,  for  it  has  in  its  neighbourhood  nothing 
that  ties  it  up  or  limits  its  freedom  of  action.^ 

^  In  contrast  with  this  view  of  the  Prussian  staffs,  another  would 
seem  to  have  prevailed  within  the  EngHsh  army.  Being  distributed 
from  Mons  to  the  sea  (80  miles),  from  Toumay  to  Antwerp  (60  miles), 
with  headquarters  at  Brussels  (45  miles  from  the  most  advanced 
body),  it  cannot  assemble  on  any  central  point  within  less  than  four 


262        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

"  At  Bliicher's  general  headquarters,  the  ground  of 
Sombreffe  had  been  adopted  as  a  point  of  concentration 
for  the  Prussian  army.  The  rivulet  of  Ligny  and  a 
small  tributary  to  it  form,  parallel  to  the  road  to  Som- 
breffe and  as  far  as  Saint-Balatre,  a  depression  in  the 
ground,  which  of  course  is  neither  very  steep  nor  very 
deep,  but  is  sufficiently  so  to  ensure  on  the  left  slope  of 
the  valley  (which  is  the  commanding  one)  an  excellent 
position  for  the  action  of  all  arms.  Its  extent  was  an 
average  one  (two  miles),  so  that,  once  occupied  by  one 
or  two  corps,  it  could  supply  a  prolonged  resistance. 
Bliicher,  then,  kept  in  hand  two  corps  in  view  of  an 
offensive  movement  and  might  thus  decide  the  fate 
of  the  battle,  either  by  himself,  or  together  with 
Welhngton." 

In  the  Prussian  general's  mind,  the  idea  of  a  con- 
centration and  that  of  the  point  where  it  must  be 
effected  are  quite  clear.  It  remains  to  discuss  the 
possibilities  of  carrying  out  the  same  at  the  right  time. 

"  The  point  of  Charleroi  is  nearest  to  the  point  of 
concentration ;  it  is  only  fourteen  miles  from  it.  If  the 
news  of  the  enemy's  arrival  come  from  Charleroi  to 
Namur,  and  the  order  for  concentration  is  sent  on  from 
there  to  Liege  (which  is  the  remotest  cantonment), 
sixteen  hours  will  be  necessary  for  that  order  to  arrive, 
another  eight  hours  for  the  troops  to  be  warned  and  to 
gather  :  in  all,  twenty-four  hours  will  be  needed  before 
the  Fourth  Corps  can  start  marching. 

"  From  Liege  to  Sombreffe  is  some  forty  miles,  two 
very  full  days'  march;  three  days  will  be  needed, 
therefore,  before  the  Fourth  Corps  can  arrive  at  Som- 
breffe. The  Third  Corps  at  Cinay  might  arrive  within 
thirty-six  hours;  the  Second  at  Namur  within  twelve 
hours. 

or  five  days.  How  can  it  hope  to  find  those  four  or  five  days,  with 
its  most  advanced  cantonments  (Toumay)  within  one  day's  march 
of  the  great  French  fortified  town  of  Lille  ?  It  is,  indeed,  obvious  that 
any  important  French  attack  starting  from  the  neighbourhood  of  that 
town  could  be  sufficiently  held  up  during  the  four  or  five  days  required 
for  the  contemplated  concentration. 

Wellington  had  never  personally  confronted  Napoleon.  Ignoring 
the  violence  and  quickness  of  the  Emperor's  attacks,  he  very  hkely 
beUeved  his  dispositions  to  be  sufficiently  good  to  give  him  the  time 
to  meet  the  adversary's  undertakings,  and  more  particularly  to  be 
able  to  join  the  Prussians. 


STRATEGICAL  SECURITY  263 

"  Moreover,  the  resistance  of  General  Ziethen  on  the 
Sambre,  and  his  withdrawal  as  far  as  the  neighbourhood 
of  Fleurus,  could  not  provide  more  than  one  day's 
retention  of  the  enemy — from  a  morning  to  an  evening. 
The  night  would  provide  the  remainder  of  the  twenty- 
four  hours. 

"  It  might  be  expected,  besides,  that  the  enemy's 
march  would  be  laiown  before  the  first  gunshot  should 
have  been  fired,  at  any  rate  when  he  had  reached  the  last 
position  before  assaulting  the  Prussian  troops,  and  very 
likely  (owing  to  other  information)  a  few  days  before. 

"  Should  the  latter  opportunity  arise,  there  would  be 
enough  time  for  concentration. 

"  In  case  no  other  intelligence  was  forthcoming  than, 
that  supplied  by  actual  observation  {i.  e.  in  case  the 
enemy  schemes  should  only  be  disclosed  by  his  attack 
on  the  outposts),  the  Second  and  Third  Corps  alone 
could  arrive  near  Sombreffe  in  time  to  Join  the  First; 
the  Third,  besides,  only  with  difficulty;  the  Fourth 
would  be  missing  at  the  general  concentration. 

"  This  danger  was  clearly  perceived  by  Bliicher's 
staff,  but  it  was  very  difficult  to  bring  the  Biilow 
corps  nearer  (on  account  of  supply).  However,  as 
soon  as  movement  was  observed  on  the  French  side  (on 
June  14th),  that  corps  was  ordered  to  make  for  Hanut, 
which  was  only  twenty  miles  distant  from  the  con- 
centration point,  and  where  would  therefore  be  nearer 
than  the  Third  Corps  at  Cinay. 

"  Under  those  conditions,  Bliicher  thought  he  would 
be  able  to  assemble  his  army  near  Sombreffe  within 
thirty- six  hours.  Though  one  might  well  bet  100  to  1 
that  the  march  of  the  enemy  would  be  known  more 
than  thirty-six  hours  before  his  reaching  the  Sombreffe 
region,  it  was  a  very  risky  thing  to  remain  thus  dispersed 
with  an  advance  guard  so  close  to  one's  main  bodies  (at 
Charleroi).  Such  a  situation  would  not  have  been 
accepted  at  all  had  it  not  been  for  the  constant  diffi- 
culties in  supply  raised  by  the  Dutch  authorities.  But 
for  this  they  would  have  concentrated  their  forces  far 
more  densely  from  the  first." 

Here  we  have  Clausewitz  soundly  developing  the  whole 
theory  of  the  time  and  space  necessary  to  the  operation 
of  assembly,  which  time  and  space  an  advance  guard  is 
expected  to  provide. 


264        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Let  us  come  to  facts,  so  as  to  see  how  the  system  of 
forces  thus  organised  actually  worked. 

Napoleon,  intendmg  to  enter  upon  operations  on 
June  15th,  sends  forward,  on  June  6th,  the  Fourth  Corps 
from  Metz;  a  few  days  before  that,  the  First  Corps 
from  Lille;  at  the  same  time  he  screened  these  moves 
by  reinforcing  the  outposts  with  a  certain  number  of 
national  guards.  On  June  8th  he  sent  forward  the 
Guard,  from  Paris,  the  Sixth  Corps  from  Laon,  and  the 
Second  Corps  from  Valenciennes. 

On  the  12th,  he  left  Paris  himself. 

All  these  corps  reached,  on  the  13th,  the  region 
between  Philippeville  and  Avesnes;  on  the  14th  they 
concentrated  and  distributed  themselves  into  three 
columns  :  that  on  the  right  including  the  Fourth  Corps 
and  cavalry;  that  in  the  centre  (including  the  Third 
Corps,  the  Sixth  Corps,  the  Guards,  the  largest  part 
of  the  cavalry)  was  in  the  region  of  Beaumont;  that 
on  the  left,  including  the  First  and  Second  Corps,  was 
near  Solre-sur-Sambre. 

These  movements  completely  escaped  the  attention 
of  the  allies  until  the  14th,  at  which  date  they  heard 
of  the  Emperor  having  arrived  at  the  army,  and  of  the 
French  marching  in  order  to  concentrate.  On  receiving 
this  first  warning,  Bliicher  orders,  in  the  evening  of 
the  14th,  his  Fourth  Corps  to  assemble  at  once  so  as 
to  be  able  to  reach  Hanut  within  one  day's  march. 

It  was  only  during  the  night  from  the  14th  to  the 
15th  that  the  whole  truth  was  known  from  General 
Ziethen's  reports;  he  saw  the  enemy  reinforcing  in 
front  of  him,  he  foresaw  that  he  would  be  attacked  on 
the  following  day.  On  receiving  this  new  warning 
Bliicher  added,  to  the  order  already  given  General  von 
Billow,  a  new  order  to  make  for  Hanut  with  all  speed. 

This  second  order  reached  General  von  Biilow  on  the 
15th,  at  11  a.m.  If  he  had  immediately  ordered  his 
troops  to  resume,  after  a  short  rest,  their  march  towards 
Hanut,  the  Fourth  Corps  would  have  been  assembled, 
in  the  night  from  the  15th  to  the  IGth,  on  that  point. 
General  von  Biilow  thought  he  could  postpone  carrying 
out  the  order  until  the  following  day,  the  16th.  He 
reported  accordingly.  His  report,  however,  did  not 
find  Bliicher  at  Namur;  no  more  than  the  orders  sent 
out  by  Bliicher  on  the  15th  had  found  Biilow  at  Hanut, 


STRATEGICAL   SECURITY  265 

where  he  was  still  under  orders  to  remain  on  the  evening 
of  the  15th.  The  new  order  told  him  to  continue  his 
march  on  the  16th,  with  his  army  corps,  from  Hanut  on 
to  Sombreffe.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  had  he  carried  out 
the  orders  received,  the  Fourth  Corps  might  have  been, 
in  the  night  between  the  15th  and  the  16th,  at  Hanut; 
from  that  point  to  Sombreffe  the  distance  is  still  a  good 
twenty-two  miles;  he  might,  on  the  16th,  have  brought 
liis  advance  guard  there  at  about  noon  and  the  remainder 
of  his  troops  in  the  evening,  with  much  difficulty,  of 
course,  but  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  Battle  of  Ligny 
and  maybe  reverse  its  issue. 

The  Third  Corps  at  Cinay,  also,  only  received  its 
marching  orders  on  the  15th  at  10  a.m. ;  it  none  the  less 
arrived  on  the  battle-field  on  the  16th  at  about  10; 
the  Second  had  arrived  without  any  difficulty. 

Given  a  more  regular  system  of  communications,  the 
concentration  of  the  four  Prussian  army  corps  would 
have  then  been  made  in  time,  even  starting  from  the 
dispersion  which  special  difficulties  of  supply  had 
made  necessary.  In  any .  case,  Bliicher  was  able  to 
bring  to  the  battle-field,  on  the  16th,  three  corps 
(out  of  four) — that  is,  forces  superior  to  those  of  the 
Emperor. 

This  result  was  due  to  his  using  an  advance  guard, 
the  First  Army  Corps,  capable  of  providing  the  time 
and  space  necessary  to  the  contemplated  operation — a 
concentration. 

It  was,  further,  by  means  of  a  running  fight  that  this 
army  corps  managed  to  hold  on  for  twenty-four  hours 
in  the  presence  of  very  superior  forces  without  being 
destroyed. 

Running  fight  is  a  plirase  composed  of  two  terms 
which  are  essentially  contradictory.  The  more  one 
retreats,  the  less  one  fights;  the  less  one  retreats,  the 
more  one  has  to  fight.  The  First  Corps  had  to  retreat 
over  a  short  distance,  nine  miles;  it  therefore  had  to 
fight  several  times.     We  shall  see  how  it  did  it. 

The  order  the  commander  of  this  corps  had  received 
from  Bliicher,  dated  Namur,  14th,  11  p.m.,  prescribed 
to  him  to  retreat  on  Fleurus,  in  case  he  should  have  to 
deal  with  superior  forces ;  however,  he  must  not  lose 
sight  of  the  enemy,  hut  eagerly  dispute  the  ground. 

In  the  first  hours  of  the  16th,  his  forces  were  dis- 


266        THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   WAR 

tributed  as  ^  follows  :  His  1st  brigade  (Steinmetz)  .at 
Fontaine-l'Eveque,  occupying  Thiiin  (with  one  bat- 
talion of  the  2nd  regiment  of  Westphalian  Landwehr) ; 
the  2nd  (Pirch  II)  at  Marchiennes  (two  battalions  in 
outposts) ;  the  3rd  ( Jagow)  at  Fleurus ;  and  the  4th 
(Henke)  at  Moustier-sur-Sambre. 

The  line  of  outposts,  in  that  part  which  is  of  interest 
to  us,  ran  by  Thuin,  Ham-sur-Heure,  Gerpinnes. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  French  army  had  been  ordered 
to  move  in  three  columns  :  the  left  column  (Second 
Corps,  Reille,  and  First,  d'Erlon)  by  Thuin  and  Mar- 
chiennes ;  the  central  column  (Third  Corps,  Vandamme, 
and  Sixth  Corps,  Lobau,  the  Guard  and  the  cavalry 
reserve,  Grouchy),  by  Ham-sur-Heure,  Jamioux,  Marci- 
nelle  Charleroi;  and  the  right  column  (Fourth  Corps, 
Gerard)  by  Florenne,  Gerpinnes,  le  Chatelet. 

The  Prussian  outposts  were  attacked  at  about  4  a.m. ; 
first  of  all  those  of  the  2nd  brigade  of  the  First  Corps. 
It  was  the  light  cavalry  of  General  Domon,  marching 
at  the  head  of  the  central  column,  which  thus  appeared. 
The  company  on  main  guard  at  Ham-sur-Heure  (4th  of 
the  F.  of  the  28th)  being  strongly  assaulted  and  hard 
pressed  by  the  French  cavalry,  was  surrounded  while 
retreating  and  compelled  to  surrender;  three  other 
companies  of  the  same  regiment  assembled  at  Ger- 
pinnes and  managed  to  withdraw  from  there,  under 
the  shelter  of  the  valley,  from  Gerpinnes  on  to  le 
Chatelet. 

Thuin  was  attacked  at  about  the  same  time  by  the 
French  column  on  the  left.  We  have  here  two  bat- 
talions, five  squadrons,  three  guns,  going  into  action 
against  that  place,  which  was  occupied,  as  we  have 
seen,  by  one  German  battalion.  After  about  one 
hour's  fight,  the  Westphalians,  who  have  stayed  too 
late  at  Thuin,  are  surrounded  there;  they  attempt  to 
force  their  way  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  over  the 
Montigny  plateau,  two  squadrons  of  the  1st  Dragoons 
of  Western  Prussia  try  to  receive  them.  Those  squad- 
rons are  soon  thrown  back  by  the  French  cavalry;  the 
battalion  is  partly  wiped  out,  partly  made  prisoner. 
The  destruction  of  this  battalion  must  be  ascribed  to 
its  having  been  late  in  leaving  Thuin,  as  well  as  to  the 
direction  taken  in  retreat.     By  going  along  the  steep 


STRATEGICAL  SECURITY  267 

banks  of  the  Meuse  valley,  it  might  without  doubt 
have  more  easily  escaped  the  attacking  French  cavalry. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place,  General 
Ziethen,  after  hearing,  during  the  night,  of  the  impend- 
ing attack,  had  called  all  his  troops  to  arms  and  had 
ordered  them  to  remain  without  movement,  while  he 
awaited  reports  from  the  outposts.  He  had  not  the 
slightest  intention  to  resist  with  his  main  forces  on  the 
line  of  outposts.  He  only  expected  the  latter  to  let 
him  know  the  extent  of  the  attack  that  was  taking 
place.  But  this  manoeuvre  soon  met  with  a  difficulty, 
that  of  withdrawing  the  troops  on  outpost  duty. 
Cavalry  are  entrusted  with  the  task  of  receiving  them  : 
at  first  the  1st  regiment  of  dragoons  were  given  this 
task,  but  the  regiment  had  soon  to  be  reinforced  by 
other  squadrons. 

Ziethen  received  (between  6  and  7  a.m.)  reports  to 
the  effect  that  the  whole  French  army  was  advancing. 
The  menace  was  mainly  directed  against  his  2nd 
brigade.  The  latter  received  the  order  to  avoid  any 
kind  of  serious  action;  to  this  end  they  were  to  form 
another  line  of  resistance  on  the  Sambre,  the  crossings 
of  which  were  to  be  occupied  at  Charleroi,  Chatelet, 
Marchiennes,  and  then,  later,  to  withdraw  on  Gilly. 

The  line  of  outposts  of  the  1st  brigade  had  not  been 
attacked  (save  at  Thuin,  where  it  had  one  battalion); 
m  spite  of  this,  the  brigade  received  the  order  to  with- 
draw :  it  took  the  direction  of  Gosselies,  keeping  in 
line  with  the  2nd  so  as  to  prevent  the  latter  from 
being  outflanked. 

The  3rd  and  4th  brigades,  the  cavalry  reserve  and 
the  corps  artillery  all  met  and  took  up  a  position  at 
Fleurus.  It  will  be  seen  later  what  use  was  made  of 
them.  They  had  become  a  reserve  upon  which  to  draw 
in  order  to  facilitate  the  task  of  the  troops  in  action.^ 

As  for  the  latter,  they  successively  (and  on  the  whole 
front  assaulted  by  the  enemy)  organised  a  number  of 
resistances  compelling  the  enemy  to  take  up  dispositions 
for  attack.  After  the  attack,  thus  prepared,  had  taken 
place,  they  abandoned  the  ground  without  seriously 
disputing  it,  so  as  to  go  and  take  up  elsewhere  the 
same  disposition  on  a  new  line  of  resistance  previously 

^  Where  no  decision  is  aimed  at,  there  reappears  the  reserve,  a 
reservoir  of  force. 


268        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

occupied  by  echelons  in  the  rear — towards  Gilly,  for 
the  2nd  brigade,  towards  Gossehes  for  the  1st. 

At  8  a.m.  the  French  cavalry,  after  driving  back  all 
the  outposts  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Sambre,  reached 
that  river.  They  arrived,  under  Pajol,  before  Char- 
leroi,  coming  from  Marcinelles.  A  dam,  and  above  that 
a  bridge  connected  the  village  of  Marcinelles  with  the 
town  of  Charleroi.  The  bridge  had  been  barricaded. 
Being  masters  of  Marcinelles,  the  French  cavalry  (4th 
and  9th  chasseurs  regiment)  attempt  at  first  to  approach 
the  dam  and  the  bridge,  they  are  repulsed  by  the  fire 
from  Prussian  skirmishers.  Later  on  (between  9  and  10), 
the  attack  is  resumed  by  the  1st  Hussars,  which  tries  to 
assault  the  bridge ;  it  is  stopped  by  a  heavy  fire  from 
the  barricade.  Infantry  are  needed  to  force  that  posi- 
tion. Pajol  decides  to  wait.  At  about  11,  the  Emperor 
arrives  with  the  bluejackets  and  the  sappers  of  the 
Guard,  as  well  as  with  the  young  Guard.  Sappers  and 
bluejackets  rush  on  the  bridge,  carry  the  barricade  and 
clear  the  road  for  Pajol's  cavalry.  The  latter  climb 
at  a  sharp  trot  the  steep  and  winding  street  which 
traverses  Charleroi  from  the  south  to  the  north. 

The  Prussian  battalion  at  Charleroi  had  already 
withdrawn ;  it  marched  on  in  good  order  with  a  view 
to  reaching  the  position  of  Gilly;  the  charges  of  the 
French  cavalry  did  not  succeed  in  doing  it  any  serious 
harm. 

While  the  central  French  column  was  thus  attacking 
Charleroi,  the  left  column  was  attacking  Marchiennes. 
According  to  the  Emperor's  decisions,  it  ought  to  have 
occupied  Marchiennes  at  9.  The  stubborn  resistance 
of  the  battalion  at  Thuin  had,  however,  delayed  the 
movement.  It  took  that  column,  too,  almost  two 
hours  to  prepare  the  attack  on  the  Marchiennes  bridge. 
In  short,  it  only  carried  the  bridge  at  about  noon, 
when  Charleroi  was  already  taken. 

The  retreating  movement  of  the  2nd  Prussian  brigade 
on  Gilly  was,  according  to  orders,  to  determine  that 
of  the  1st  brigade  towards  Gosselies.  In  order  to 
facilitate  this  retreat  of  the  1st  brigade,  Ziethen  had 
detached  in  the  morning  a  back  echelon  at  Gosselies, 
namely,  the  27th  Infantry  regiment  (of  the  3rd  brigade) 
and  the  6th  Uhlans  (of  the  army  corps  cavalry  reserve). 
Soon  after  12,  these  troops  were  in  position  (one  bat- 


STRATEGICAL  SECURITY  269 

talion  in  Gosselies,  two  in  reserve  behind),  while  the 
1st  brigade  was  beginning  to  cross  the  rivulet  called 
the  Picton.  At  that  very  moment,  the  French, 
debouching  from  Charleroi,  were  starting  upon  the 
pursuit ;  in  the  direction  of  Gillies,  this  was  effected  by 
the  Pajol  cavalry,  followed  closely  by  the  young  Guard; 
in  the  direction  of  Gosselies,  by  the  1st  Hussars  under 
Clary. 

Colonel  Clar}^,  arriving  at  Jamet,  attacked  Gosselies; 
he  was  repulsed  by  the  29th  regiment,  while  the  1st 
Prussian  brigade,  owing  to  the  resistance  of  the  28th, 
finished  its  crossing  of  the  Picton  brook  and  reached 
Gosselies.  As  soon  as  the  1st  brigade  had  gone  through 
Gosselies,  the  29th  regiment  retreated  on  Ransart. 
The  first  brigade,  instead  of  continuing  its  movement 
in  the  direction  of  that  place,  decided  to  make  a  stand 
on  the  Gosselies  road.  It  was  soon  attacked  and  thrown 
back  by  Colonel  Clary,  who  had  been  reinforced  by 
the  advance  guard  of  the  Second  French  Corps  coming 
from  INIarchiennes ;  it  was  cut  off  from  Ransart,  which 
the  Girard  division  of  the  same  army  corps  had  just 
carried ;  it  withdrew  on  Heppignies,  covered  by  the  6th 
Uhlans  and  the  1st  Hussars. 

These  events  around  Gosselies  show  what  the  diffi- 
culties of  a  retreating  movement  may  be,  as  well  as 
by  what  means  such  difficulties  may  be  overcome. 

There  is  a  special  danger  lest  the  line  of  retreat  be 
cut  by  the  enemy's  outflanking  movements.  The 
remedy  is  found  in  establishing  to  the  rear  a  supporting 
force  (29th  Infantry,  6th  Uhlans)  which  receive  the 
retreating  troops  (1st  brigade). 

The  facts  give  a  good  example  of  the  way  in  which 
such  a  supporting  force  may  prove  useful.  It  held  up 
Clary's  cavalry  until  the  1st  brigade  got  out  of  its 
difficult  postion.  Having  done  this,  the  supporting 
force  immediately  withdrew  in  order  to  occupy  the 
important  points  on  the  line  of  retreat  (Ransart,  Ran- 
sart wood).  The  retreating  body  ought  to  have 
followed  that  movement  without  delay.  It  could  not 
think  of  stopping,  by  means  of  a  fight,  very  superior 
forces  (Clary's  cavalry  reinforced  by  the  Second  French 
Corps) ;  this  is  not  the  mission  it  has  been  entrusted 
with;  moreover,  it  exposes  itself  to  being  destroyed  or 


270        THE   PRINCIPLES   OF  WAR 

to  being  cut  off  from  its  line  of  retreat  by  such  superior 
forces. 

This  is  precisely  what  happened.  Steinraetz,  once 
arrived  at  Gosselies  with  his  1st  brigade,  let  go  the 
rope  (29th  Infantry)  which  had  been  happily  extended 
to  him  and  which  had  saved  him  the  first  time.  Instead 
of  continuing  to  retreat  on  Ransart  (which  had  been 
occupied  by  the  29th),  he  still  remained  in  Gosselies, 
and  prepared  to  fight  a  battle  which,  in  the  event,  he 
lost ;  he  was  compelled  to  retreat  again  on  Heppignies ; 
he  was  cut  off  from  the  army  corps  by  the  French 
Girard  division  which  had  occupied  Ransart.  He 
found  it  difficult  to  rejoin  his  corps. 

Events  of  the  same  order  were  happening  at  the 
same  time  on  the  road  to  Fleurus  and  Som,breffe  via 
Gilly. 

General  Pirch  II  had  been  ordered  to  assemble  his 
brigade  at  Gilly,  to  carry  out  a  second  resistance  there, 
as  that  of  the  line  of  the  Sambre  had  been  broken. 

We  have  already  seen  how  he  had  progressively 
evacuated  the  points  of  Marchiennes  and  Charleroi, 
reducing  his  occupation  of  the  Sambre  in  proportion 
as  the  enemy  columns  arrived.  He  similarly  withdrew 
from  Chatelet  the  28th  Infantry,  which  had  occupied 
it  at  first,  and  replaced  it  by  the  1st  Dragoons  of 
Western  Prussia.  He  had  thus  assembled  at  Gilly  the 
greatest  part  of  his  brigade  at  the  moment  when  the 
French  were  entering  Charleroi.  The  detachments  at 
Marchiennes  and  Charleroi  were  the  only  ones  he  still 
had  to  withdraw. 

Pirch  II  established  his  brigade  behind  Gilly,  his 
front  being  covered  by  the  muddy  brook  of  the  Grand- 
Rieux.  Four  battalions  and  the  brigade  battery  were 
established  on  the  slopes  of  the  hills  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  brook,  namely  :  the  2nd  of  the  58th  north  of 
the  road,  covered  by  Soleilmont  Abbey ;  the  F.  of  the 
1st  south  of  the  road,  reposing  on  a  small  wood;  the 
F.  of  the  28th  to  the  left  rear  of  the  preceding.  To 
the  right  rear  of  the  F.  of  the  1st,  artillery  (four  guns) 
were  on  a  small  hillock  south  of  the  road;  two  other 
guns  were  between  that  point  and  the  road;  two  others 
north  of  the  road,  firing  on  the  exit  from  Gilly;  the 
2nd  battalion  of  Westphalian  Landwehr  was  in  reserve, 
behind  the  artillery;  and  three  battalions  were  also  in 


STRATEGICAL   SECURITY  271 

reserve,  near  the  road  to  Lambusart  (1st  of  the  28th, 
1st  and  2nd  of  the  1st  regiment). 

The  retreating  direction  of  the  brigade  was  on  Lam- 
busart. In  order  to  protect  it  from  an  outflanking 
attack  which  the  French  would  not  fail  to  carry  out  on 
Gilly  and  the  road  to  Fleurus,  that  road  had  been 
barricaded  with  an  abatis  of  felled  trees. 

The  position  thus  occupied  was  covered,  on  the  left, 
at  Chatelet :  by  the  1st  Dragoons  of  Western  Prussia, 
also  in  charge  of  maintaining  liaison  with  the  brigade 
holding  Farciennes ;  on  the  right  by  a  cavalry  post 
(one  officer  and  thirty  men)  at  Ransart,  which  General 
Steinmetz  was  to  occupy.  We  have  seen  in  conse- 
quence of  what  tactical  mistake  General  Steinmetz  had 
been  cut  off  from  Ransart  and  had  thus  disorganised 
these  methodical  dispositions. 

This  situation  of  the  Prussian  advance  guard  remained 
unchanged  for  the  whole  afternoon — until  6  p.m. 

Pajol,  after  debouching  from  Charleroi  at  about 
noon,  had  marched  on  Gilly,  where  he  was  soon  followed 
by  the  Exelmans  cavalry  division ;  the  arrival  of  this 
numerous  cavalry,  united  under  Grouchy,  had  the 
result  of  deciding  the  Prussians  to  evacuate  com- 
pletely the  immediate  surroundings  of  Gilly  village, 
where  up  to  the  last  moment  they  had  covered  the 
main  position  north  of  the  rivulet.  Grouchy  was  not 
in  a  situation  to  attack  this  position  with  nothing  but 
cavalry.  He  came  back  to  Charleroi  to  report  to 
Napoleon  on  the  situation,  while  the  young  Guard  was 
arriving  before  Gilly  and  while  the  head  of  Vandamme's 
column  was  reaching  Charleroi.  The  time  was  past 
3  o'clock. 

Napoleon  rode  up  himself  in  order  to  find  out  what 
the  situation  might  be.  In  spite  of  the  extension  of 
the  Prussian  line — knowing,  moreover,  in  what  a  state 
of  dispersion  a  sudden  attack  always  find  an  enemy — 
he  did  not  think  he  had  more  than  ten  thousand  men 
in  front  of  him.  He  therefore  ordered  the  enemy  to 
be  assaulted  in  front  by  one  of  the  Vandamme  divisions, 
supported  by  the  Pajol  cavalry  division,  while  Grouchy 
with  the  Exelmans  division  should  manoeuvre  the 
adversary  by  his  left  wing,  which  was  the  most 
approachable  one. 

An   outflanking   manoeuvre   is   specially   convenient 


272        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

when  attacking  a  rear  guard,  for  the  latter  cannot 
fulfil  its  mission  once  it  has  been  turned. 

After  giving  these  orders,  Napoleon  came  back  to 
Charleroi  in  order  to  watch  the  events  taking  place 
on  the  road  to  Gosselies,  and  to  hasten  (so  it  is  said) 
the  march  of  Vandamme's  Corps.  His  absence  brought 
indecision  back  into  the  minds  of  the  French  generals 
before  Gilly ;  they  believed  themselves  to  be  confronted 
by  considerable  forces.  They  had  heard  of  movements 
made  by  troops  of  the  3rd  brigade  (Jagow)  coming 
from  Sombre ffe.  These  were,  so  they  thought,  rein- 
forcements coming  up.  Such  news  and  the  difficulty 
of  reconnoitring  through  the  wood  delayed  their  action. 
It  took  them  more  than  two  hours  to  combine  their 
attack.  At  about  5.30,  Napoleon,  feeling  uneasy  at 
not  hearing  the  guns  from  the  direction  of  Gilly,  came 
up  again  in  person.  He  felt  no  doubt  either  as  regarded 
the  enemy's  state  of  surprise,  or  as  regarded  his  state 
of  dispersion,  or,  above  all,  as  regarded  the  necessity 
under  which  he.  Napoleon,  found  himself  of  advancing 
rapidly.  He  ordered  the  attack;  it  was  nearly  6  p.m. 
A  battery  of  sixteen  French  guns  opened  the  attack. 
Then,  all  dispositions  having  been  taken  behind  the 
Windmill  hill,  near  Grand-Trieu  farm,  three  columns 
debouched;  that  on  the  right  went  in  the  direction  of 
the  small  wood  occupied  by  the  F.  of  the  1st;  that  in 
the  centre  left  Gilly  on  its  left  and  marched  on  the 
centre  of  the  position;  that  on  the  left  went  to  the 
north  of  that  village.  They  were  supported  by  Pajol's 
cavalry. 

The  Prussian  battery  soon  suffered  heavy  losses 
from  the  fire  of  the  French  artillery.  The  skirmishers 
had  come  into  action  on  both  sides,  when  General 
Ziethen  ordered  General  Pirch  II  to  retreat.  The 
Prussian  battalions  had  no  sooner  begun  this  movement 
than  they  were  charged  by  the  French  cavalry.  It  was 
the  Emperor  who  had  ordered  General  Letort  to  charge 
with  the  squadrons  on  duty  near  himself.  Seeing  that 
the  Prussians  were  about  to  reach  the  woods  and 
thereby  to  escape,  he  threw  against  them  the  very 
first  cavalry  to  his  hand.  Letort  did  not  take  the 
time  to  collect  his  four  squadrons,  he  started  with  those 
of  the  15th  Dragoons;  the  others  were  to  follow  as 
soon  as  they  could.     Crossing  the  brook  north  of  the 


STRATEGICAL  SECURITY  273 

road,  then  the  road  in  front  of  the  Vandamme  columns, 
he  struck  the  retreatmg  Prussian  battahons.  The 
first  to  be  assaulted  were  the  F.  of  the  28th,  who  lost 
two-thirds  of  their  numbers ;  then  he  assaulted  the  F. 
of  the  1st,  who  were  still  500  yards  from  the  wood 
and  who  had  time  to  form  square  and  to  open  a  regular 
fire :  the  charge  of  the  French  cavalry  was  already 
slowing  down;  the  battalion  succeeded  owing  to  these 
favourable  circumstances,  in  reaching  the  wood,  the 
outskirts  of  which  it  occupied  with  one  company, 
which  thus  prevented  any  kind  of  pursuit. 

General  Letort  was  mortally  wounded  in  this  affair. 

Meanwhile  the  Exelmans  division,  debouching  above 
Chatelet,  had  routed  the  1st  Dragoons  of  Western 
Prussia,  and  driven  back  a  reserve  battalion  which 
had  been  holding  Pironchamps  wood.  These  cavalry 
attacks  were  joined  by  the  Pajol  division,  which  suc- 
ceeded at  last  in  outriding  the  Vandamme  columns. 
The  whole  Pirch  brigade  was  in  retreat  on  Lambusart, 
where  it  vainly  tried  to  take  up  a  position  again.  The 
French  cavalry  did  not  leave  them  the  time  to  do  so. 
The  brigade  withdrew  on  Fleurus,  then  on  Sombreffe. 
It  was  now  free  from  attack.  Night  had  come.  The 
Vandamme  Corps  established  its  bivouac  between 
Winage  and  Soleilmont  wood,  covered  by  the  whole 
Grouchy  cavalry  established  before  Fleurus. 

On  the  road  to  Brussels,  Marshal  Ney  had  halted 
the  heads  of  his  columns  in  a  line  with  Gosselies,  sending 
beyond  that  point,  to  Mellet,  only  one  division  (Bachelu) 
and  the  Pire  light  cavalry,  detaching  towards  Quatre- 
Bras  the  lancers  and  chasseurs  of  the  Guard.  By  the 
end  of  the  day  his  most  advanced  troops  were  at 
Froesnes.  The  Prussian  Steinmetz  brigade  (1st)  had 
reached  the  road  to  Sombreffe  by  a  circuitous  road. 

The  losses  suffered  by  the  Prussians,  at  the  moment 
when  they  undertook  the  retreat  from  Gilly,  show 
well  what  difficulty  troops  experience  in  extricating 
themselves  from  an  £  ttack  if  they  wait  too  long  before 
beginning  their  movement.  This  necessity  would  now- 
adays be  felt  earlier,  because  modern  arms  extend 
their  powerful  effects  to  a  far  longer  range. 

In   the    morning    of   the    following    day,    the    16th, 

T 


274        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Grouchy  informed  the  Emperor  from  FJeurus  that 
strong  colmnns,  seemingly  coming  from  Namur,  were 
going  in  the  direction  of  Brye  and  Saint-Amand,  behind 
Fleurus.  These  were  the  Second  and  Third  Corps, 
which  were  coming  up  to  join  the  First.  In  spite  of 
the  absence  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  the  Prussians  would 
be  able  to  oppose  during  that  day  nearly  90,000  men, 
that  is,  forces  markedly  superior  to  those  the  Emperor 
could  bring  up. 

The  Ziethen  Corps  had  suffered  heavy  losses,  but 
attained  a  considerable  result :  that  of  delaying  the 
battle  until  the  16th;  of  making  concentration  possible. 

As  Clausewitz  puts  it :  "  One  sees  thereby  what  caution 
and  what  delay  circumstances,  however  little  complicated 
they  may  be,  unavoidably  impose  even  on  the  most  resolute 
of  generals,  on  Napoleon.'" 

Among  the  complications  which  Ziethen  skilfully 
utilised,  must  undeniably  be  placed  that  double  retreat 
on  the  roads  to  Gilly  and  Gosselies,  which  prevented 
Ney  from  going  to  Quatre-Bras,  which  made  Napoleon's 
intervention  necessary  on  that  side,  and  thereby  also 
delayed  the  action  on  the  road  to  Namur. 

It  must  be  also  pointed  out  that  this  divergent 
retreat  did  not  prevent  the  First  Prussian  Army  Corps 
from  having  its  four  divisions  assembled  on  the  fol- 
lowing day. 

This  instance  clearly  shows  how  retreating  advance 
guards  must  fight,  while  keeping  in  mind  the  twofold  task : 
observing  the  enemy  and  delaying  him  in  his  approaches. 

Advance  guards  delay  the  enemy,  by  compelling 
him  to  take  up  fighting  dispositions,  to  assemble,  to 
deploy,  to  use  his  superiority  in  order  to  outflank. 

The  nature  of  the  ground,  as  well  as  the  distance  of 
the  force  to  be  covered,  determine  of  course  how  long 
the  resistance  must  last;  however,  under  any  circum- 
stances, the  losses  will  depend  upon  the  resistance  one 
has  decided  to  make.  And  it  is  also  for  this  reason 
that  resistance  must  not  be  resorted  to,  whenever  the 
necessary  time  can  be  secured  in  another  way. 

Normally  and  rationally,  therefore,  one  must  attempt 
to  hold  the  enemy  back,  and  to  delay  him  as  he  ap- 
proaches, by  three  means  only ;  (1)  by  compelling  him 


STRATEGICAL  SECURITY  275 

to  be  cautious,  and,  to  this  end,  to  moderate  his  pace ; 
(2)  by  prolonging  resistance  on  the  spot  as  far  as 
prudence  allows  it,  but  never  more;  (3)  by  carrying 
out  the  retreat  as  slowly  as  possible. 

That  retreat,  which  must  be  as  deliberate  and 
cautious  as  possible,  must  enable  the  troops  to  reform 
and  establish  themselves  anew  on  the  positions  pro- 
vided by  the  road  taken.  Action  on  positions  and  the 
retreating  movement  must  therefore  interpenetrate  and 
prolong  one  another;  the  struggle  must  not  end  on  a 
given  point  before  it  can  be  resumed,  as  methodically 
as  ever,  on  a  series  of  other  points. 

An  advance  guard  succeeds  in  delaying  the  enemy 
in  proportion  to  its  strength;  in  order  to  compel  it  to 
withdraw,  the  adversary  will  need  time  to  develop 
adequate  means  of  action. 

If  figures  are  demanded,  though  they  possess  only  a 
relative  value,  here  are  those  which  Clausewitz  gives 
for  his  period,  1815. 

An  infantry  division  of  12,000  men,  including  some 
cavalry,  and  sent  eighteen  miles  on  ahead  of  the  main 
body,  may  hold  the  enemy  in  check  one  and  a  half  times 
the  nmnber  of  hours  which  would  be  required  to  cover 
that  distance  without  fighting.  Instead  of  ten  hours,  it 
will  take  the  enemy  fifteen  hours  to  cover  that  distance. 

The  same  division,  at  a  distance  of  five  miles  from 
the  corps  to  be  covered,  may  hold  the  enemy  in  check 
for  five  or  six  hours,  because  it  can  send  its  reserves 
unsparinglj^  in  action. 

In  either  case,  it  is  very  difficult  for  the  enemy  to 
begin  the  battle  with  his  main  forces  by  the  evening  of 
the  same  day.  This  means,  then,  that  another  night 
has  been  won  for  the  concentration  which  the  advance 
guard  is  covering. 

The  time  the  resistance  may  last,  as  given  by  Clause- 
witz, has  obviously  increased  with  modern  arms,  which 
compel  the  enemy  to  manoeuvre  from  a  greater  distance. 

To  sum  up  :  "7^  is  less  by  their  action  than  by  the 
mere  fact  of  their  being  present,  it  is  less  by  fighting  than 
by  unceasingly  threatening  to  fight,  that  advance  guards 
fulfil  their  mission.  They  do  not  put  a  stop  to  the 
enemy  s  action,  but  they  act  like  a  pendulum  ;■  they  make 
his   movements   slower  and  more  regular   and   make    it 


276        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

thereby  jjossihle  to  find  out  the  mechanism  and  import  of 
such  movements"  (Clausewitz). 

We  have  seen  the  difficulties  of  a  running  fight : 
(1)  the  danger  of  being  turned :  once  turned,  the 
advance  guard  no  longer  covers  the  main  body;  it 
may,  besides,  be  cut  off;  (2)  the  danger  of  being 
assaulted  from  too  short  a  distance,  which  makes  it 
very  difficult  to  extricate  the  fighting  troops;  and 
(3)  the  necessity  of  fighting  by  fire  and  from  a  great 
distance,  in  order  to  act  on  the  enemy  at  long  range. 

The  arrangement  of  forces  corresponding  to  these 
various  conditions  generally  consists  in  having  each  of 
the  successive  positions  occupied  by  a  relatively  strong 
body  of  artillery,  in  principle  by  all  the  guns  available ; 
and  by  infantry  numbers  proportionately  sufficient  to 
guard  and  support  that  artillery;  while  the  remainder 
of  the  infantry  prepare,  and  carry  out  the  occupation 
of,  the  second  position. 

Numerous  cavalry  are  also  required  to  discover  and 
parry  outflanking  movements.  They  usually  form  the 
reserve  on  each  position  taken. 

Thus  an  advance  guard  consisting  of  six  battalions, 
six  batteries,  six  squadrons,  will,  as  a  rule,  bring  up  to 
the  first  position  its  six  batteries,  two  or  three  battalions, 
and  its  six  squadrons,  while  the  other  battalions  occupy 
the  second  position,  where  the  artillery  will  join  them 
at  a  trot  after  leaving  the  first  position;  finally,  the 
cavalry  covers  the  retreat  of  the  last  infantry  elements 
from  the  first  position  and  afterwards  resumes  its  role 
of  a  general  reserve. 

In  an  advance  guard  manoeuvring  in  retreat  so  as  to 
cover  a  manoeuvre  of  the  main  body,  as  well  as  in  an 
advance  guard  going  ahead  in  order  to  find  and  seize 
the  enemy,  a  strong  body  of  cavalry,  supported  by 
artillery  and  infantry,  is  a  necessary  part. 

The  projjortion  to  be  given  to  each  arm  varies,  never- 
theless, according  to  the  distance  up  to  which  the  advance 
guard  has  advanced ;  an  advance  guard  at  a  short  distance 
will  increase  its  resisting  elements  (infantry,  artillery), 
and  diminish  its  cavalry;  because  information  coming 
from  very  near  is  of  little  use,  and  because  the  available 
space  allows  of  little  retreating  movement,  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  compels  one  to  fight.  This  was  the 
case  of  the  Prussian  First  Corps  in  1815. 


1 


STRATEGICAL  SECURITY  277 

In  either  case,  once  the  enemy  has  come  on,  battle 
begins  if  the  manoeuvre  is  ready  and  the  concentration 
effected;  the  advance  guard  is  then  reinforced  by  a 
force  capable  of  a  lasting  action :  artillery  masses. 
Under  the  shelter  provided  by  this  first  disposition, 
the  battle  manoeuvre  begins. 


II.  Strategical  Security  as  applied  to  the 
Situation  of  August  15th,  1870 

To  the  Second  German  Army  on  August  15th,  1870, 
forty-eight  hours  were  necessary,  as  we  have  seen,  for 
concentrating  while  advancing  and  making  for  the  left 
bank  of  the  Moselle.  How  might  that  army  have 
avoided,  by  complying  with  theory,  the  crisis  which 
took  place?  This  is  what  we  shall  now  see.  (See 
Sketches  No.  10  and  11.) 

In  the  morning  of  August  14th,  1870,  the  retreating 
French  army  had  fully  arrived  under  Metz  :  the  battle 
of  the  day  would  not  change  anything  in  that  situation. 
It  would  only  succeed  in  delaying  the  retreat.  More- 
over, the  main  body  of  the  French  army  had  not  been 
beaten.  The  Germans  must  therefore  continue  to 
guard  themselves  against  it. 

Direct  pursuit  of  the  French  becomes  impossible 
from  that  day,  the  14th,  in  view  of  the  protection 
provided  for  them  by  the  fortified  town  of  Metz. 

In  order  to  attack  anew,  it  is  necessary  to  envisage 
action  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle,  and  therefore, 
first  of  all,  the  crossing  of  that  river,  and  this  in  the 
presence  of  an  enemy  who  will  still,  for  several  days,  be 
able  to  attack  on  either  of  the  two  banks. 

Crossing  the  river  is  in  itself  an  operation  so  risky 
as  to  make  it  imperative  (while  putting  aside  for  the 
moment  any  scheme  of  an  attack  to  be  made  later  on 
towards  the  Meuse,  or  towards  the  road,  or  towards 
Metz)  to  obtain  for  the  carrying  out  of  such  a  crossing 
all  the  security  possible. 

What  did  the  Germans  know  of  the  enemy  ?  That 
he  was  near  Metz  on  the  14th.  If  their  desire  was  to 
complete  the  transference  of  the  main  forces  of  the  Second 
Army  to  the  left  bank  on  the  16th  or  so,  the  operation 
might  have  involved  the  following  dispositions. 


278        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

(1)  Transferring  the  crossing-point  for  the  army  to 
Pont-a-Mousson  and  above,  at  a  distance  which  would 
allow  a  concentration  of  the  army  before  it  could  be 
seriously  assaulted  by  the  enemy. 

(2)  Bringing  the  troops  on  the  14th  and  15th  towards 
those  crossings,  under  the  protection  of  an  advance 
guard  on  the  right  hank,  keeping  in  touch  with  the 
enemy;  combining  the  march  and  the  dispersion  of 
forces  with  the  resisting  power  of  the  advance  guard; 
so  that,  should  the  enemy  sally  forth  from  Metz  on  the 
14th  or  15th,  the  army  should  be  able  to  accept  battle 
within  twenty-four  hours,  on  the  right  bank. 

(3)  No  attack  having  been  made  by  the  enemy, 
throwing  the  army  by  surprise,  on  the  morning  of  the 
16th,  on  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle,  and  this  under 
the  protection  of  a  new  advance  guard  on  the  left  hank, 
which  should  provide  the  time  and  space  necessary  to 
carrying  out  the  movement,  to  assemble  the  forces, 
and,  if  need  be,  to  send  them  into  action  in  case  the 
French  should  attack  on  that  day,  August  16th. 

Keeping  this  in  mind :  three  roads  might  be  utilised 
by,  and  allotted  to,  the  Second  Army  in  the  following 
way: 

Cheminot' — Pont-a-Mousson     Third,  Ninth  Corps. 
Nomeny-south  of  Pont-a-|     ^^^^    ^^^j^^j     g^^^^^ 

Mousson  —  Blenod    (one  |       p    , 

bridge  to  be  built)  j  P  • 

Lixieres- — Dieubouard         .     Guard,  Fourth  Corps. 

From  the  standpoint  of  march  and  time,  the  First 
Army  would  have  been  ordered  to  continue  performing 
on  the  right  bank  the  part  of  an  advance  guard ;  there- 
fore it  would  have  had  a  defensive  mission,  during  the 
14>th.  The  various  corps  of  the  Second  Army  would 
have  lengthened  that  day's  march  as  far  as  possible 
so  as  to  come  up  with  the  heads  of  their  columns,  thus  : 

Those  of  the  first  line,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
Moselle,  namely  : 

Third  at  Cheminot; 

Tenth  at  Pont-a-Mousson  (concentrated);  Twelfth, 
head  at  Atton; 

Guard  at  Dieubouard. 

Those  of  the  second  line :  their  heads  of  column  in 
the  rear  of  the  preceding,  marching  by  echelons. 


STRATEGICAL   SECURITY  279 

All  the  forces  would  thus  be  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Moselle  in  a  situation  enabling  them  to  concentrate, 
for  battle,  within  twenty-four  hours.  Had  an  attack 
been  made  by  the  French,  it  would  have  borne  first 
on  the  First  Army;  the  latter  would  have  been  kept 
in  position  or  would  have  manoeuvred  in  retreat, 
according  to  the  point  reached  by  the  Second  Army's 
movement  of  concentration.  Battle  might  take  place 
with  either  or  both  armies. 

During  the  15th,  the  First  Army,  still  performing  the 
part  of  an  advance  guard,  would  have  reached  the  region 
Fleurj^,  Chesny,  Courcelles ;  within  the  Second  Army  : 

The  corps  in  first  line  (Third,  Twelfth,  Guards)  would 
have  closed  up  on  to  their  heads  of  column  (depth 
from  three  to  four  miles); 

The  corps  in  second  line  (Ninth,  Second,  Fourth) 
would  have  closed  up  on  to  those  in  first  line ; 

In  the  evening  of  the  same  day  the  corps  in  the  first 
line,  which  had  made  a  short  march,  would  have  resumed 
their  movement  at  about  11  p.m.  in  order  to  cross  the 
Moselle,  an  operation  ended  at  6  a.m.  on  the  16th. 
The  corps  in  the  second  line  would  have  started  marching 
on  the  16th  at  5  a.m.  towards  the  Moselle  and  finished 
crossing  the  river  at  noon.  The  whole  army  would 
thus  have  been  on  the  left  bank  on  the  16th  by  noon. 

In  order,  however,  to  be  sure  to  have  the  time  and 
space  necessary  for  carrying  out  that  operation  without 
risk,  an  advance  guard  would  have  been  thrown  on  the 
left  bank  in  the  evening  of  the  15th. 

To  this  end,  the  Tenth  Corps,  after  concentrating  at 
Pont-a-Mousson  in  the  evening  of  the  14th,  would  have 
stood  to  arms  in  that  town  on  the  15th  at  about  noon, 
and,  having  been  reinforced  by  the  four  cavalry  divisions 
of  the  army,  would  have  proceeded  on  Chambley  in 
order  to  take  up  a  position  there  in  advance  guard  on 
the  left  hank,  and  to  be  able  to  guarantee  for  the  Second 
Army  the  possibility  of  assembling  all  its  forces  on  the 
left  bank  in  the  morning  of  the  16th. 

Moreover,  in  proportion  as  the  crossing  of  the  Second 
Army  should  have  approached  completion,  the  necessity 
of  keeping  an  advance  guard  on  the  right  bank  would 
have  progressively  disappeared.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
as  early  as  in  the  evening  of  the  15th,  the  advance 
guard    (First    Army)    at    Fleury,    Chesny,    Courcelles 


280        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

would  have  lost  its  raison  d'etre.  That  army,  which 
had  undertaken  short  marches  only  during  the  14th 
and  15th,  might  have  resumed  its  movement  to\^ards 
the  Moselle  in  the  evening  of  the  15th — first  of  all  with 
its  second-line  troops.  It  would  have  crossed  the  river 
below  Pont-a-Mousson,  near  Pagny,  over  bridges 
specially  built  for  it,  the  security  of  which  would  have 
been  guaranteed  by  presence  of  the  Tenth  Corps  at 
Chambley. 

In  the  morning  of  the  16th  that  army  might  have 
had  two  of  its  corps  on  the  left  bank,  the  third  being 
kept  on  the  right  bank  or  withdrawn  later  on,  without 
difficulty. 

The  Tenth  Corps,  on  arriving  at  Chambley  in  the 
evening  of  the  15th,  would  have  obviously  sent  forward 
occupying  troops  (important  bodies  of  infantry;  artil- 
lery; cavalry  main  guards)  over  all  the  dangerous 
roads,  to  Gorze,  Vionville,  Mars-la-Tour.  The  main 
cavalry  forces  kept  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Xonville 
and  Sponville,  would  have  supplied  an  active  scouting 
service  on  the  front  and,  in  the  region  more  to  the  north, 
towards  the  road  from  Metz. 

The  main  body  of  the  army  corps,  having  assembled 
in  the  region  Buxieres,  Chambley,  Hageville,  Saint- 
Julien,  etc.,  would  have  left  a  rear  guard  and  its  train 
on  the  Rupt-de-Mad  near  Rembercourt. 

By  proceeding  thus,  the  situation  on  the  right  bank 
would  have  remained  untouched  during  the  14th  and 
15th.  As  for  the  movement  prepared  in  order  to  cross 
the  Moselle,  the  enemy  could  not  have  perceived  it 
before  the  night  of  the  15th.  Such  dispositions  as  he 
might  have  taken  in  order  to  impede  the  movement, 
having  been  decided  on  the  15th  at  night,  could  only 
have  been  carried  out  in  the  morning  of  the  16th,  too 
late  to  prevent  the  army  from  crossing  the  river  and 
concentrating  if  need  be. 

Should  he  have  taken  any  dispositions  before  the 
evening  of  the  15th,  the  movement  of  the  Tenth  Corps 
would  have  disclosed  them  and  enabled  the  commander- 
in-chief  either  to  crush  them  or  to  meet  them  by  taking 
new  counter-dispositions.  In  any  case  that  movement 
would  have  enabled  the  army  to  receive  information  of 
any  impending  danger  and  to  avoid  being  surprised. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   BATTLE  :   DECISIVE   ATTACK 

Lectures  on  the  tactics  of  a  single  arm  have  described 
infantry  in  battle,  cavalry  in  battle,  artillery  in  battle. 
A  study  has  thus  been  made  of  the  various  kinds  of 
action  termed :  artillery  action,  encounter  between 
numerous  squadrons,  advance  guard  actions,  frontal 
attacks,  feinting  attack,  preparatory  attacks,  decisive 
attacks,  etc. 

From  this  study,  which  confines  itself  to  general 
description  as  regards  the  whole,  but  insists  on  minutely 
analysing  and  discussing  the  details,  one  may  not  have 
been  able  to  deduce  the  logical  connection  between 
acts,  the  relations  between  causes  and  effects,  which 
determine  battle  considered  as  a  whole. 

The  conclusion  may,  indeed,  have  been  drawn  from 
such  a  form  of  study  that  battle  is  a  fixed  drama,  con- 
ducted in  the  same  way  as  those  dramas  we  see  on  the 
stages  of  our  theatres  or  even  in  life;  a  drama  which 
derives  its  effect,  its  success,  either  from  the  refinement 
or  abundance  of  details,  or  from  a  strongly  emphasised 
climax,  or  from  the  characters  put  on  the  stage,  or  from 
the  interest  of  a  given  thesis ;  in  a  word,  from  changing 
causes. 

Others  may  have  considered  battle  to  be  the  develop- 
ment of  a  manoeuvre,  something  like  our  autumn 
manoeuvres ;  to  be  a  methodical,  successive  use  of  arms 
so  made  that  each  should,  in  its  own  way  and  own  zone 
of  action,  develop  the  whole  power  of  which  it  is  capable ; 
such  a  methodical  use  having  the  object  of  producing  a 
series  of  advantageous  results  and  thereby  a  sum,  or 
at  any  rate  an  excess  of  favourable  results  which  are 
called  victory. 

Well,  no  !  Battle  is  not  to  be  discovered  in  any  of 
these  conceptions.  Far  from  being  a  sum  of  distinct  and 
partial  results,   victory  is  the  consequence  of  efforts, 

281 


282        THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   WAR 

some  of  which  are  victorious  while  others  appear  to  be 
fruitless,  which  nevertheless  all  aim  at  a  common  goal, 
all  drive  at  a  common  result  :  namely,  at  a  decision, 
a  conclusion  which  alone  can  provide  victory. 

Either  there  is  a  favourable  conclusion  or  everything 
is  lost :  "In  war,  so  long  as  something  remains  to  be 
done,  nothing  is  done"  (Frederick).  All  battle-actions 
aim,  therefore,  at  ensuring  such  a  conclusion.  Moreover, 
as  there  is  direction,  convergence  and  a  result,  it  may  well 
be  assumed  that  logic  governs  here,  that  it  asserts  its 
full  rights,  that  it  imposes  itself  in  its  most  ruthless 
vigour.     There  is  such  a  thing  as  a  theory  of  battle. 

Let  us  study  that  event  the  conclusion,  in  itself,  next 
the  manner  of  securing  it ;  we  shall  be  then  in  possession 
of  the  general  view  which  must  direct  the  decisions  of 
the  high  command,  as  well  as  the  acts  of  the  com- 
manders of  all  ranks,  if  battle  is  to  be  well  led  and 
conducted  to  a  successful  end. 


In  order  to  reach  its  end — which  is  the  imposing  of 
our  will  on  the  enemy — modern  war  uses  but  one  means  : 
the  destruction  of  the  organised  forces  of  the  enemy. 

That  destruction  is  undertaken,  prepared,  by  battle, 
which  overthrows  the  enemy,  disorganises  his  command, 
his  discipline,  his  tactical  connections,  and  his  troops 
as  a  force. 

It  is  carried  out  by  the  pursuit,  in  the  course  of  which 
the  victor  utilises  the  moral  superiority  which  victory 
provides  over  the  vanquished,  and  tears  to  pieces, 
finishes  off,  troops  already  demoralised,  disorganised,  no 
longer  manageable — that  is,  forces  which  are  no  longer 
a  forc^. 

What  we  are  considering  now  is  the  act  of  war,  the 
means  of  overthrowing  the  enemy  and  of  securing 
victory. 

Such  was  not  the  case  with  the  actions  we  studied 
in  the  preceding  chapter,  the  combats  of  an  advance 
guard,  a  rear  guard,  or  a  flank  guard — as,  for  instance, 
in  the  case  of  Nachod.  All  of  these  had  but  a  limited 
end,  to  be  separately  determined  on  each  occasion. 
They  were  preparatory  to  battle,  they  were  not  battle 


THE   BATTLE:   DECISIVE   ATTACK     283 

itself,  though  they  made  a  considerable  use  of  force. 
At  Nachod,  the  object,  for  the  Prussian  Fifth  Corps,  was 
to  come  out  of  the  pass,  to  open  the  door  for  the  Sixth 
Corps  which  followed  it :  for  the  Austrians,  it  was 
to  prevent  the  Prussian  corps  from  doing  so.  It  is  the 
same  vnth  all  actions  originated  by  the  service  of 
security. 

In  every  one  of  these  cases,  the  tactics  to  be  adopted 
were  entirely  dependent  upon  the  nature  of  the  special 
goal  to  be  reached,  of  the  mission  to  be  fulfilled,  and  this 
under  well-determined  circumstances  of  time  and  place. 

Let  us  come  to-day  to  battle  which  is  the  only  argu- 
ment in  war,  therefore  the  only  end  that  must  be  given 
to  strategical  operations,  and  let  us  observe  if  there  be 
not  a  tactical  means  of  overthrowing  the  enemy,  and  if 
so,  what  that  means  may  be. 

Let  us  first  of  all  establish  this  principle  that,  if  it  is 
wholly  to  fulfil  the  twofold  object  of  being  the  rational 
end  of  strategical  operations  and  the  efficient  means  of 
tactics,  battle  cannot  be  merely  defensive. 

Under  that  shape,  it  may  indeed  succeed  in  holding 
up  a  marching  enemy;  it  prevents  him  from  reaching 
an  immediate  objective.  Such  results  are,  however, 
exclusively  negative.  Defensive  battle  never  brings 
about  the  destruction  of  enemy  forces;  it  never  allows 
one  to  conquer  the  ground  held  by  the  enemy  (which 
after  all  is  the  only  external  sign  of  victory),  therefore 
it  is  unable  to  create  victory. 

Such  a  purely  defensive  battle,  however  well  con- 
ducted, does  not  make  a  victor  and  a  vanquished.  The 
game  has  to  be  begun  all  over  again.  A  purely  defensive 
battle  is  a  duel  in  which  one  of  the  fighters  does  nothing 
but  parry.  Nobody  would  admit  that,  by  so  doing,  he 
could  succeed  in  defeating  his  enemy.  On  the  contrary, 
he  would  sooner  or  later  expose  himself,  in  spite  of  the 
greatest  possible  skill,  to  being  touched,  to  being  over- 
come by  one  of  his  enemy' s  thrusts,  even  if  that  enemy 
were  the  weaker  party. 

Hence  the  conclusion  that  the  offensive  form  alone, 
be  it  resorted  to  at  once  or  only  after  the  defensive,  can 
lead  to  results,  and  must  therefore  always  be  adopted — 
at  least  in  the  end. 

Any  defensive  battle  must,  then,  end  in  an  offensive 
action,    in    a   thrust,    in    a   successful    counter-attack. 


284        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

otherwise  there  is  no  result.  Such  a  notion  will  seem  to 
some  elementary;  still  it  cannot  be  omitted  without 
all  the  ideas  one  ought  to  hold  on  war  becoming  con- 
fused. This  idea  was  ignored  by  the  French  army  of 
1870,  otherwise  they  would  not  have  given  the  name  of 
a  victory  to  the  battles  of  the  14th  and  16th  of  August, 
1870,  and  others  which  might  have  become  victories,  but 
certainly  did  not  deserve  that  name  at  the  stage  in 
which  they  were  left.  To  use  a  term  current  at  the 
time,  "  positions  had  been  maintained,"  and  no  more. 
Nothing  could  be  expected  to  come  of  such  battles. 
Maintaining  a  position  is  not  synonymous  with  being 
victorious;  it  even  (implicitly)  prepares  defeat  if  one 
stops  there,  if  an  offensive  action  is  not  resorted  to. 

Hence  the  following  moral : 

In  tactics,  action  is  the  governing  rule  of  war. 

"  To  make  war  always  means  attacking  "  (Frederick). 

Of  all  faults,  only  one  is  ignominious,  inaction. 

We  must  therefore  constantly  try  to  create  events 
instead  of  submitting  to  them,  and  to  organise  attack 
from  the  first,  the  rest  being  subordinate  and  having 
to  be  considered  only  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
advantages  which  may  result  for  the  attack. 

Once  the  necessity  of  the  offensive  has  been  granted, 
does  battle,  henceforth  considered  in  its  raison  d'etre, 
of  itself  and  in  its  original  nature — fighting  in  order  to 
defeat — involve  a  certain  conduct,  a  reasoned  use  of 
troops,  a  rational  kind  of  tactics  ? 

Should  the  result  flow  from  a  large  number  of  single 
fights,  of  individual  fights,  of  fights  between  units 
(between  individual  men,  between  companies,  between 
battalions),  or,  on  the  contrary,  from  a  well-determined 
combination  of  forces,  which  it  should  be  possible  to 
grasp,  which  contrast  several  totals  of  well-determined 
efforts,  working  together  in  one  or  more  directions,  with 
a  mass  of  ill-ordered  individual  efforts  ?  Before  answer- 
ing this  question,  let  us  remember  Napoleon's  saying: 
"  Two  mamelukes  could  hold  their  own  against  3  French- 
men; but  100  Frenchmen  did  not  fear  100  mamelukes; 
300  would  beat  an  equal  number;  and  1000  would 
beat  1500 — so  great  was  the  influence  of  tactics,  order 
and  manoeuvres'''  Individual  valour  in  the  rank  and 
file  is,  then,  insufficient  to  create  victory.     From  being 


THE   BATTLE:   DECISIVE   ATTACK    285 

decisive  in  the  elementary  origins  of  combat,  it  gradu- 
ally loses  its  influence,  its  weight,  in  proportion  as  the 
numbers  employed  increase.  Had  Napoleon  developed 
his  thought,  he  would  have  told  us  that  at  the  battle  of 
the  Pj^ramids,  a  handful  of  Frenchmen,  commanded  by 
him,  had  conquered  about  30,000  of  these  Orientals, 
though  the  latter  were  quite  as  valiant  as,  and  even 
individually  superior  to,  the  French. 

What  is  it,  then,  that  determines  the  result  ?  What 
is  it  that  provides  victory  ? 

Tactics,  Order,  Manoeuvre. 

There  are  such  things  as  advantageous  tactics  and 
rational  fighting  dispositions,  that  is,  a  combination  of 
forces  set  up  by  the  commander.  The  influence  of  that 
commander,  of  that  directing  mind,  soon  becomes  con- 
siderable and  decisive ;  it  gets  the  better  of  the  sum  of 
individual  valour  whenever  the  numbers  of  the  fighters 
is  large,  as,  for  instance,  at  the  Pyramids.  Let  us 
learn  a  lesson  from  this.  In  the  presence  of  such  a 
situation,  let  us  admit  self-examination  and  confirm  our 
conclusions.     • 

We,  the  French,  possess  a  fighter,  a  soldier,  undeniably 
superior  to  the  one  beyond  the  Vosges  in  his  racial 
qualities,  activity,  intelligence,  spirit,  power  of  exalta- 
tion, devotion,  patriotism :  he  is  the  mameluke  as 
opposed  to  the  French  cavalrymen. 

If  we  are  beaten,  it  will  be  due  to  the  weakness  of  our 
tactics.  Let  us  then  find,  and  provide  our  soldiers  with, 
those  tactics  which  get  the  better  of  numbers  and  valour 
as  at  the  Pyramids ;  which  will  doubly  enable  us  to  get 
the  better  of  an  army  the  individual  valour  of  which  is 
inferior  to  our  own. 

In  what  direction  shall  we  look  for  that  combination 
the  existence  of  which  can  no  longer  be  disputed  ?  Is 
that  combination  to  consist  in  attempting  to  inflict  a 
high  total  of  losses  on  the  enemy?  in  doing  him  the 
greatest  possible  harm  by  opposing  to  him  better  guns, 
better  rifles,  or  more  guns  and  more  rifles  ?  Shall  our 
combination  attempt  to  secure  a  superiority  through 
physical  effects,  or  shall  it,  on  the  contrary,  try  to  attain 
the  result  by  means  of  effects  of  a  different  kind  ?  This 
is  what  we  shall  settle  after  analysing  the  psychological 
phenomenon  of  battle. 


286        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

"  One  hundred  thousand  men  suffer  ten  thousand 
casualties  and  confess  themselves  beaten  :  they  retreat 
before  the  victors  who  have  lost  as  many  men,  if  not 
more.  Moreover,  neither  the  one  side  nor  the  other 
knows,  when  retiring,  either  what  numbers  they  have 
lost  themselves  or  what  the  casualties  have  been  on  the 
opposite  side"  (General  Cardot).  It  is  not,  therefore, 
the  physical  fact  of  having  sustained  losses,  still  less  a 
comparison  between  losses,  which  makes  them  yield, 
and  withdraw,  give  up  fighting,  abandon  to  the  enemy 
the  disputed  ground  the  conquest  of  which  marks  the 
beginning  of  victory. 

"  Ninety  thousand  vanquished  men  withdraw  before 
ninety  thousand  victors  merely  because  they  have  had 
enough  of  it,  and  they  have  had  enough  of  it  because 
they  no  longer  believe  in  victory,  because  they  are 
demoralised,  because  their  moral  resistance  is  exhausted  " 
(General  Cardot),  (merely  moral :  for  the  physical 
situation  is  the  same  on  both  sides).  It  was  with  this 
in  his  mind  that  Joseph  de  Maistre  wrote  :  "A  battle 
lost  is  a  battle  one  thinks  one  has  lost;  for,"  he  added, 
"  a  battle  cannot  be  lost  physically."  Therefore,  it  can 
only  be  lost  morally.  But  then,  it  is  also  morally  that 
a  battle  is  won,  and  we  may  extend  the  aphorism  by 
saying  :  A  battle  won,  is  a  battle  in  which  one  will  not 
confess  oneself  beaten. 

Von  Brack,  Frederick  being  already  dead,  was 
passing  by  an  old  castle  in  Silesia.  A  coat  of  arms  stood 
on  the  door  :  two  stags  fighting  each  other  and  the 
motto  :  The  more  stubborn  conquers.  "  Here  is  the  true 
source  of  success,"  said  that  man  of  arms.  Victory 
means  will. 

Concerning  this  capital  importance  of  moral  in  war, 
concerning  also  the  nature  of  the  cause  which  determines 
a  decision,  an  issue,  more  particularly  in  battle,  in- 
numerable proofs  and  quotations  might  be  advanced. 
Let  us  be  content  to  recall  Bugeaud  who,  in  his  narrative 
of  the  battle  of  Arly,  shows  us  the  enemy  in  flight 
without  a  single  shot  having  been  fired,  merely  because 
troops  advanced. 

"  O  moral  Power,"  he  concludes,  "  thou  art  the 
prince  of  armies  !  " 

"  Demoralisation,"  says  General  Cardot,  "  is  the 
ultimate  end,  the  efficient  cause  and  true  explanation  of 


THE   BATTLE:   DECISIVE   ATTACK     287 

success.  .  .  .  The    decisive    victory,    the   true    victory, 
is  bound  to  be  a  moral  victory." 

Von  der  Goltz  adds  to  this  :  "  It  is  not  so  necessary 
to  annihilate  the  enemy  combatants  as  to  annihilate  their 
courage.  Victory  is  ours  as  soon  as  the  enemy  has  been 
brought  to  beHeve  that  his  cause  is  lost."  And  again, 
somewhere  else  :  "  An  enemy  is  not  to  be  reduced  to 
impotence  by  means  of  complete  individual  annihilation, 
but  by  destroying  his  hope  in  victory.'' 

Frederick  sums  this  up  in  one  word  :  "  To  conquer  is 
to  advance.'' 

"  But  who  advances  ?  The  one  whose  conscience 
and  countenance  compel  the  other  to  withdraw  "  (De 
Maistre). 

Therefore  :  War  =  the  domain  of  moral  force. 
Victor}?-  =  moral  superiority  in  the  victors ;  moral 
depression  in  the  vanquished.  Battle  =  a  struggle 
between  two  wills. 

Li  order  that  our  army  be  victorious,  it  must  have  a 
moral  superior  to  that  which  the  enemy  possesses  or 
receives  from  his  commander.  To  organise  battle  con- 
sists in  enhancing  our  own  spirit  to  the  highest  degree 
in  order  to  break  that  of  the  enemy. 

The  will  to  conquer  :  such  is  victory's  first  condition, 
and  therefore  every  soldier's  first  duty;  but  it  also 
amounts  to  a  supreme  resolve  which  the  commander 
must,  if  need  be,  impart  to  the  soldier's  soul. 

Here  appears  the  necessity,  for  an  army  which  desires 
to  conquer,  of  being  provided  with  a  factor  of  the  first 
order,  command :  as  well  as  the  necessity,  in  the  man 
who  would  undertake  battle,  of  possessing  a  certain 
gift :  that  of  cominanding. 

To  think  and  to  will,  to  possess  intelligence  and  energy, 
will  not  suffice  for  him;  he  must  possess  also  the  "  im- 
perative fluid"  (De  Brack),  the  gift  of  communicating 
his  own  supreme  energy  to  the  masses  of  men  who  are, 
so  to  speak,  his  weapon ;  for  an  army  is  to  a  chief  what  a 
sword  is  to  a  soldier.  It  is  only  worth  anything  in  so 
far  as  it  receives  from  him  a  certain  impulsion  (direction 
and  vigour). 

"  The  Gauls  were  not  conquered  by  the  Roman  legions, 
but  by  ^Caesar.  It  was  not  before  the  Carthaginian 
soldiers  that  Rome  was  made  to  tremble,  but  before 
Hannibal.     It  was  not  the  Macedonian  phalanx  which 


288        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

penetrated  to  India,  but  Alexander.  It  was  not  the 
French  army  which  reached  the  Weser  and  the  Inn,  it 
was  Turenne.  Prussia  was  not  defended  for  seven 
years  against  the  three  most  formidable  European 
Powers  by  the  Prussian  soldiers,  but  by  Frederick  the 
Great." 

These  are  Napoleon's  words.  What  would  he  not 
have  written,  and  still  more  rightly,  had  he  included 
in  his  enumerations  that  dazzling  period  of  history,  the 
fascinating  memory  of  which  will  live  through  future 
centuries  under  the  name  of  "  the  Napoleonic  epic," 
and  to  which  he  gave  all  its  life  by  his  own  gigantic 
personality  ! 

Great  results  in  war  are  due  to  the  commander. 
History  is  therefore  right  in  making  generals  responsible 
for  victories — in  which  case  they  are  glorified;  and  for 
defeats — in  which  case  they  are  disgraced.  Without  a 
commander,  no  battle,  no  victory  is  possible. 

Let  us  remember,  besides,  what  Scharnhorst  so  rightly 
said  when  Bliicher  was  appointed  commander  of  the 
army  of  Silesia  in  1813  :  "  Is  it  not  the  manner  in  which 
the  chiefs  fulfil  that  task  {commanding,  imparting  a  resolve 
to  other  mens  hearts),  which  makes  them  true  warriors, 
much  more  than  all  cither  abilities  or  faculties  theory  may 
require  from  them  ?  ' ' 

Facts  were  soon  to  vindicate  the  soundness  of  this 
appreciation  of  Bliicher,  whom  courtiers  were  still 
calling  an  imbecile  and  a  sick  old  man,  an  embodiment 
of  impotence ;  although' — owing  to  his  influence  over  the 
country — he  was  to  his  fellow-citizens  the  very  embodi- 
ment of  patriotism  and  had  taken  in  hand  all  national 
claims;  although — owing  to  his  popularity  within  the 
army — he  had  conquered  the  soldier's  love  by  con- 
stantly attending  to  the  soldier's  interests  and  was 
able  to  request,  undertake,  attain  anything.  Reposing 
on  so  considerable  an  influence,  this  man  who  dared  to 
face  the  French  Caesar — a  man  of  a  little  mind,  but  of 
a  will,  of  a  passion  which  would  never  tire  and  would 
never  lay  down  arms— was  to  draw  whole  nations  into 
the  war  and  lead  his  armies  to  victory,  just  as  he  was  to 
carry  to  Paris  the  sovereigns  of  Europe,  and  this  in  spite 
of  themselves — at  least,  as  regarded  one  of  them,  the 
Emperor  of  Austria,  who  did  not  desire  to  dethrone  his 
son-in-law  and  to  make  his  daughter  a  widow,  and  a 


THE   BATTLE:   DECISIVE  ATTACK     289 

widow  without  a  crown.  Was  there  not  in  all  this  will, 
impulsion,  commanding  ability,  such  as  to  justify 
Scharnhorst'  s  appreciation  ? 

Is  it  not  again  this  influence  of  the  commander,  the 
very  enthusiasm  derived  from  him,  which  alone  can 
explain  the  unconscious  movements  of  human  masses, 
at  those  solemn  moments  when,  without  knowing  why  it  is 
doing  so,  an  army  on  the  battle-field  feels  it  is  being  carried 
forward  as  if  it  were  gliding  down  a  slope  {terms  used  by 
eye-witnesses)  ? 

It  is,  moreover,  easy  to  perceive  why  such  an  influence 
is  necessary.  Let  us  come  to  that  point.  When  the 
moment  comes  to  take  decisions,  face  responsibilities, 
enter  upon  sacrifices — decisions  which  ought  to  be  taken 
before  they  are  imposed,  responsibilities  which  ought 
to  be  welcomed,  for  the  initiative  must  be  secured  and 
the  offensive  launched — where  should  we  find  a  man 
equal  to  these  uncertain  and  dangerous  tasks  were  it 
not  among  men  of  a  superior  stamp,  men  eager  for 
responsibilities  ?  He  must  indeed  be  a  man  who,  being 
deeply  imbued  with  a  will  to  conquer,  shall  derive  from 
that  will  (as  well  as  from  a  clear  perception  of  the  only 
means  that  lead  to  victory)  the  strength  to  make  an 
unwavering  use  of  the  most  formidable  rights,  to 
approach  with  courage  all  difficulties  and  all  sacrifices, 
to  risk  everj^thing;  even  honour — for  a  beaten  general 
is  disgraced  for  ever. 

"It  is  difficult  to  appreciate  correctly  what  moral 
strength  is  required  to  deliver — after  having  completely 
thought  out  the  consequences — one  of  those  great  battles 
upon  which  the  history  of  an  army  and  of  a  country, 
the  possession  of  a  crown  depend."  So  wrote  Napoleon. 
He  added  that,  "  generals  who  give  battle  willingly  are 
seldom  found";  and  "a  morally  strong  personality 
must  be  understood  to  mean  not  one  who  is  only 
possessed  of  strong  emotions,  but  one  whose  balance 
is  not  upset  by  the  strongest  possible  emotions " 
(Clausewitz). 

Let  us  salute,  too,  that  sovereign  power  of  the  com- 
mander, just  as  he  will  be  saluted  by  drums  and  bugles 
when  appearing  on  the  battle-field;  a  power  necessary 
to  the  organisation  of  the  whole,  of  a  final  thrust,  and 
alone  capable  of  thus  fixing  fortune. 

Let  us  at  the  very  beginning  of  our  study,  make  a 
u 


290        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

note  of  that  factor  of  the  first  order;  the  commander's 
personal  action.  No  victory  is  possible  unless  the 
commander  be  energetic,  eager  for  responsibilities  and 
bold  undertakings,  unless  he  possess  and  can  impart 
to  all  the  resolute  will  of  seeing  the  thing  through; 
unless  he  be  capable  of  exerting  a  personal  action  com- 
posed of  will,  judgment,  and  freedom  of  mind  in  the 
midst  of  danger.  These  are  natural  gifts  in  a  man  of 
genius,  in  a  horn  general;  in  an  average  man  such 
advantages  may  be  secured  by  means  of  work  and 
reflection. 

In  order  to  manifest  itself,  such  a  personal  action 
requires  the  temperament  of  a  chief  (a  gift  of  nature), 
ability  to  command,  inciting  power,  which  teaching 
cannot  provide. 

The  effects  of  that  personal  action  are  numerous,  for 
by  using  such  gifts  (natural  or  acquired),  it  finds  in  the 
most  unlimited  use  of  forces  a  means  of  increasing  the 
efficiency  of  such  forces;  it  also  transforms  its  instru- 
ment, giving  birth,  as  it  were,  to  officers  and  troops, 
creating  an  ability  and  devotion  which,  failing  such  spark 
or  impulsion  from  above,  would  have  remained  sunk 
in  mediocrity. 

This  task  of  the  commander  becomes  an  immense 
one  where  modern  numbers  are  concerned.  It  is, 
indeed,  seldom  possible  for  a  single  man  to  fulfil  it; 
several  men  are  needed.  This  is  the  new  conception 
which  the  French  Revolution  brought  into  war,  by 
making  the  personal  initiative  of  subordinate  chiefs  (all 
working  in  the  same  direction  and  complying  with  the 
same  doctrine)  concur  in  setting  up  a  complete  direction 
of  armies.  It  became,  at  any  rate,  a  fully  developed 
reality  with  the  German  armies  of  1870. 

In  the  presence  of  this  factor — command — theory 
must  humble  itself.  The  finest  schemes  are  of  no  avail 
without  the  qualities  which  execution  requires  of  the 
directing  mind.  Theory  may  nevertheless  maintain  its 
right  to  observe,  to  analyse,  to  conclude,  to  lay  down 
the  bases  of  truth,  by  studying  how  a  commander-in- 
chief,  especially  if  he  is  a  genius,  proceeds  :  if  only  in 
order  to  walk  in  his  footsteps. 

Theory  immediately  deduces  a  number  of  corollaries 
from  the  principles  we  have  just  established. 

For  example  :    If  the  will  to  conquer  is  necessary  to 


THE   BATTLE:   DECISIVE   ATTACK     291 

offering  battle  with  any  chance  of  success,  it  is  criminal 
in  the  commander-in-chief  to  deliver  or  accept  battle 
without  possessing  that  superior  will  which  must  provide 
direction  and  impulsion  for  all. 

And  if  battle  is  thrust  upon  him  by  circumstances,  he 
must  decide  to  give  battle,  to  fight,  in  order  to  conquer 
in  spite  of  it  all. 

On  the  other  hand,  one  must  not  fight  for  the  sake  of 
fighting.  "  Battles  concerning  which  one  cannot  say 
why  and  to  what  purpose  they  have  been  delivered  are 
commonly  the  resource  of  ignorant  men  "  (Marechal  de 
Saxe). 

However  obvious  these  points  may  be,  they  seem  to 
have  been  overlooked  during  the  tragic  periods  of  our 
history. 

E.  g.  :  the  great  battles  round  Metz  (16th,  18th,  and 
31st  August,  1870),  in  which  we  see  an  army  fighting 
bravely  without  its  chief  desiring  to  secure  victory. 
How  could  victory  be  thus  secured  ? 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  great  events  of  history,  the 
disasters  it  relates  from  time  to  time,  such  as  the 
collapse  of  French  power  in  1870,  are  never  accidental, 
but  result  from  superior  and  general  causes;  from  for- 
getting the  most  elementary  moral  and  intellectual 
truths,  as  well  as  from  relaxing  that  activity  of  mind 
and  body  which  is  the  very  life  and  sanity  of  armies. 
Therefore,  if  one  wishes  to  grasp  the  notion  of  war  fully, 
it  is  by  no  means  useless  to  grasp  its  vital  principles  at 
the  outset. 

II 

Granted  an  army  provided  with  a  true  commander, 
how  is  it  to  hreak  the  enemy's  spirit?  To  what  actions 
should  war,  "  the  domain  of  moral  force,"  lead  us? 

In  order  to  be  able  to  answer  that  question,  it  will 
suffice  to  discover  in  what  a  moral  impression  consists, 
how  it  is  created. 

"  Whatever  a  thing  may  be,"  writes  Xenophon,  "  be 
it  pleasant  or  terrible,  the  less  it  has  been  foreseen,  the 
more  it  pleases  or  frightens.  This  is  seen  nowhere 
better  than  in  war,  where  surprise  strikes  with  terror 
even  those  who  are  much  the  stronger  party." 

He   well   mentions   terror y    "  that   cold   deity.    Fear. 


292        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Not  the  womanly  fear  that  flies  shriekmg.  It  is  permitted, 
it  is  even  necessary,  to  regard  such  fear  as  impossible, 
although  it  is  not  a  phenomenon  altogether  unknown. 
What  we  mean,  however,  is  that  other,  much  more  terrible 
fear,  which  can  enter  the  most  manly  heart,  chill  it,  and 
persuade  it  that  it  is  vanquished  "  (J.  de  Maistre). 

The  means  of  breaking  the  enemy's  spirit,  of  proving 
to  him  that  his  cause  is  lost,  is,  then,  surprise  in  the 
widest  sense  of  that  word. 

Surprise  bringing  into  the  struggle  something  "  un- 
expected and  terrible  "  (Xenophon) ;  "  everything 
unexpected  is  of  great  effect "  (Frederick).  Surprise 
depriving  the  enemy  of  the  possibility  of  reflection  and 
therefore  of  discussion. 

Here  we  have  a  novel  instrument,  and  one  capable 
of  destructive  power  beyond  all  knowledge.  However, 
one  cannot  obtain  this  at  will;  setting  an  ambush, 
attacking  in  reverse,  are  possible  in  a  small  war,  but 
impracticable  in  a  great  one ;  it  is  necessary,  therefore, 
to  resort  in  case  of  great  wars  to  bringing  forth  a  danger 
which  the  enemy  shall  not  have  the  time  to  parry  or 
which  he  shall  not  be  able  to  parry  sufficiently.  A 
destructive  force  must  be  made  to  appear  which  should 
be  known,  or  seem,  to  the  enemy  to  be  superior  to  his 
own;  to  this  end,  forces  and  thereby  undisputable 
efforts  must  be  concentrated  on  a  point  where  the  enemy 
is  not  able  to  parry  instantly,  that  is,  to  answer  by  deploy- 
ing an  equal  number  of  forces  at  the  same  time.  Such 
will  be  our  conclusion. 

To  surprise  amounts,  then,  to  crushing  an  opponent 
from  a  short  distance  by  numbers  in  a  limit  of  time  ;  other- 
wise, the  adversary  though  overtaken  by  numbers 
retains  the  power  to  meet  the  attack,  to  bring  up  his 
reserves,  in  which  case  the  assailant  loses  the  advantage 
of  surprise. 

He  loses  the  same  advantage,  if  surprise  starts  from 
a  great  distance,  for  the  enemy  may  then,  owing  to  the 
range  and  delaying  power  of  modern  arms,  regain  the 
time  to  bring  up  his  reserves. 

Such  are  the  conditions  of  numbers,  time,  space, 
military  action  must  fulfil  in  order  to  contain  these 
elements  of  surprise  which  are  necessary  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  enemy's  spirit. 

Hence  the  superiority  of  manoeuvring  armies,  which 


THE   BATTLE:    DECISIVE   ATTACK     293 

alone  are  capable  of  quickness  and  nimbleness  in  pre- 
paring an  attack  ;  launching  it  at  short  distance,  and 
carrying  it  out  quickly. 

One  similarly  perceives  the  common  intentional 
features  possessed  by  the  attacks  in  flank  of  former 
generations;  the  oblique  order  of  Frederick;  the 
"  event  "  of  the  Napoleonic  battle,  and  the  decisive 
(generally  enveloping)  attacks  of  modern  battle. 

Under  these  various  shapes  there  appears  a  develop- 
ment of  this  common  idea  of  a  surprise;  the  idea  of 
trying  to  produce  among  the  enemy  the  same  moral 
effect' — terror;  of  creating  in  the  enemy's  mind,  by 
suddenly  using  unexpected  and  undeniably  powerful 
means,  a  feeling  of  impotence,  the  conviction  that  he 
cannot  conquer,  that  he  is  vanquished. 

To  break  the  enemy's  will :  such  is  the  first  principle 
we  derive  from  our  study;  to  break  it  by  means  of  an 
unexpected  and  supremely  violent  stroke — such  is  the 
first  consequence  of  that  principle. 

Such  a  supreme  and  unexpectedly  violent  stroke  need 
not  necessarily  bear  on  the  whole  enemy  army.  That 
army  is  a  living  and  organised  being.  Now  an  organism 
is  a  set  of  organs,  the  health  and  good  condition  of  all  in 
which  are  necessary  to  the  individual's  life.  A  loss  in 
them — be  it  but  the  loss  of  one  of  them — brings  about 
death. 

To  beat  an  adversary,  it  is  not  necessary  "  to  sever 
his  arms,  his  legs  and  his  head,  pierce  his  chest  and  burst 
open  his  belly  all  at  once "  (General  Cardot).  One 
sword  thrust  to  the  heart,  or  one  stunning  blow  on  the 
head  ensures  the  result.  It  is  enough  to  overthrow 
the  wing  of  an  army,  its  centre — any  important  part  of 
the  whole — to  ensure  the  result. 

An  army  is,  moreover,  a  delicate  being  kept  alive 
by  discipline.  "  Discipline  is  the  strength  of  armies," 
they  say.  It  is  much  more;  it  is  the  very  first 
condition  of  their  existence.  Discipline  alone,  owing 
to  hierarchic  organisation,  and  to  the  transmission 
and  execution  of  orders  resulting  therefrom,  permits  a 
commander  to  direct  any  action. 

Therefore,  to  break  the  chain  is  to  put  a  stop  at  once 
to  the  functioning  of  all  ranks;  to  transform  tactical 
units  into  mere  masses  of  men ;  to  make  execution  of 
orders  impossible ;   to  annihilate  the  commander's  will ; 


294        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

to  prevent  any  action  from  taking  place.  In  order  to 
break  it,  all  you  need  do  is  to  spread  moral  disorder 
or  physical  disorder ;  to  overthrow  the  organisation  on 
one  point  of  the  system. 

All  this  reasoning  leads  us  to  striking  one  supreme 
stroke  on  one  point.  Napoleon  expressed  this  when  he 
said  that  it  is  necessary  and  sufficient,  in  order  to  secure 
victory,  "to  be  the  stronger  on  one  given  point  at  one 
given  moment."  He  abundantly  proved  this  truth  by 
his  own  way  of  conducting  battle  :  "  Whether  we  tear 
away  or  merely  lift  the  veil  which,  in  Napoleon's  battles, 
covers  all  the  delays  he  needed  for  finding  his  way,  or 
for  the  arrival  of  a  neighbouring  corps,  or  for  carrying 
out  a  movement,  one  always  sees  at  last  the  decisive 
attack  :  masses  entering  upon  the  stage  with  full  fury 
and  full  tragedy  of  action  "  (Clausewitz). 

Napoleon  was  explaining  this  very  idea  when  he 
wrote  to  Marshal  Gouvion-Saint-Cyr.  "  No  preference 
must  be  given  to  any  kind  of  attack;  one  must  act 
according  to  circumstances.  After  sending  into  action 
the  various  corps  nearest  to  the  enemy,  one  must  leave 
them  alone,  without  troubling  over-much  about  their 
favourable  or  unfavourable  chances.  Only  one  must 
be  careful  not  to  grant  too  easily  any  request  for  help 
which  may  be  made  by  their  commanders." — "  He 
added,"  said  the  Marshal,  "  that  it  was  only  at  the  end 
of  the  day,  when  he  found  that  the  tired  enemy  had 
brought  into  action  the  greater  part  of  his  forces,  that 
he  collected  whatever  he  might  have  kept  in  reserve, 
so  as  to  hurl  on  to  the  battle-field  a  strong  mass  of 
infantry,  of  cavalry,  of  artillery;  as  the  enemy  had 
not  foreseen  this,  he  (Napoleon)  was  then  in  process  of 
creating  what  he  called  '  an  event,"  and,  by  that  means, 
he  almost  always  secured  victory." 

Let  us  bear  in  mind,  from  the  above,  the  conception 
in  which  is  summed  up  all  battle;  the  idea  of  a  man- 
oeuvre ultimately  leading  to  an  intentional,  resolute, 
sudden  and  violent  action  of  the  masses  on  a  selected 
point. 

This  idea  is  again  found  in  the  battles  at  the  close  of 
the  Empire.  We  then  find  those  heavy,  massive,  mis- 
shapen columns  of  Macdonald's  troops  at  Wagram,  of 
General  d'Erlon's  troops  at  Waterloo,  which  are  obvi- 
ously opposed  to  detailed  tactics,  and  to  the  art  of 


THE   BATTLE  :   DECISIVE   ATTACK     295 

making  the  best  possible  use  of  a  given  number  of  troops, 
or  of  getting  out  of  them  all  the  effects  of  which  they  are 
capable.  None  the  less  such  formations  betray  the 
Emperor's  mind.  They  are  the  very  embodiment  of 
his  theory  of  event — but  of  that  theory  carried  to  excess 
and  violence.  As  a  principle  of  war,  such  a  tactic 
presents  a  sort  of  exalted  violence  :  if  you  look  at  it 
in  detail  it  seems  absurd.  Surprise,  at  any  rate,  is  pushed 
in  such  a  scheme  to  its  utmost  limits.  This  is  so  true 
that  when  the  Archduke  Charles  saw,  on  the  battle-field 
of  Wagram,  that  formidable  machine  of  attack,  the 
IMacdonald  column,  advancing,  he  felt  he  could  not  parry 
the  blow  and  immediately  ordered  a  retreat. 

Napoleon  realised  thoroughly  that  you  cannot  de- 
moralise and  overthrow  a  strong  enemy  by  resorting  to 
an  open  order,  to  skirmishers,  to  lines,  even  when  making 
a  general  attack. 

In  order  to  get  the  better  of  the  enemy,  to  make  him 
confess  himself  vanquished,  he  produced  an  unexpected 
effort,  an  effort  of  an  unknown  and,  so  to  speak,  unheard 
of  violence ;  to  this  end  he  made  use  of  masses,  and,  in 
order  to  be  sure  of  their  effect,  he  organised  these  masses 
in  column. 

War  is  like  all  other  human  activities.  In  the  presence 
of  new  difficulties,  of  increasingly  important  obstacles, 
it  returns  to  its  origins,  to  its  own  primitive  nature, 
which  is  wholly  made  up  of  violence ;  it  seeks  a  means 
of  more  efficiently  surprising,  in  order  more  efficiently  to 
overthrow  the  enemy ;  to  break  his  spirit  more  thoroughly. 
Keeping  this  in  mind,  Napoleon  constantly  rein- 
forced the  simplicity,  the  crudity,  the  violence  of  his 
attacks. 

Decisive  attack  is  the  supreme  argument  used  by 
modern  battle,  which  itself  is  a  struggle  between  nations 
fighting  for  their  existence,  for  independence,  or  for  some 
less  noble  interest;  fighting,  anyhow,  with  all  their 
resources  and  passions.  These  masses  of  men  and  of 
passions  have  to  be  shaken  and  overthrown. 

If  we  study  in  detail  the  attack  of  that  Macdonald 
column  just  mentioned  (which  includes  all  the  phases 
of  the  tragic  act  of  battle)  we  should  find  its  attack  : 

(1)  Prepared  {a)  by  a  charge  of  40  squadrons  (the  ob- 
ject of  which  was  to  make  it  possible  for  the  attacking 


296        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

column  to  assemble) ;  (6)  by  fire  from  102  guns  (in  order 
to  halt  and  shake  the  enemy). 

(2)  Carried  out  by  50  battalions  (22,500  men). 

We  should  find  that  mass  of  infantry  unable  to  act  by 
fire,  in  view  of  the  formation  it  has  taken ;  unable  to  use 
the  bayonet.  The  enemy  nowhere  awaits  the  shock. 
Finally,  it  does  no  harm  whatever  to  the  adversary; 
on  the  contrary,  it  suffers  a  great  deal  itself;  it  was 
reduced  to  1500  victorious  men  when  it  reached  its 
objective,  Siissenbrunn. 

In  summing  up,  we  should  find  that  this  decimated 
force  was  able  to  beat  the  decimating  one ;  moreover,  this 
decimated  force  determined  the  forward  movement  of 
the  whole  army,  the  victory  on  the  wide  Marchfeld. 

This  result  was  secured  not  by  physical  means — ^these 
were  all  to  the  advantage  of  the  vanquished — it  was 
achieved  by  a  purely  moral  action,  which  alone  brought 
about  decision  and  a  complete  decision. 

Ill 

To  such  a  battle -manoeuvre  characterised  by  one 
supreme  effort,  a  decisive  attack  which  achieves  surprise, 
has  often  been  opposed  parallel  battle  or  battle  of  lines, 
in  which  one  goes  into  action  at  all  points,  and  in  which 
the  commander-in-chief  expects  a  favourable  circum- 
stance, or  a  happy  inspiration  (which  are  not  usually 
forthcoming)  to  let  him  know  the  place  and  time  when 
he  must  act ; — unless  he  leaves  all  this  to  be  decided  by 
his  lieutenants,  while  the  latter,  again,  leave  this  to  their 
own  subordinates.  So  that  in  the  end  the  battle  is  won 
by  the  privates  :    an  anonymous  battle. 

History  has  often  decided  in  favour  of  that  theory; 
it  has  shown  that  such  a  battle  has  existed,  that  it  was 
often  put  in  practice  and  followed  by  victory.  Nothing 
would  be  less  astonishing  in  an  army  such  as  ours.  In 
such  an  army  (where  the  fundamental  qualities  of  our 
race  place  at  random  in  any  rank  of  the  hierarchy,  among 
petty  commanders,  as  officers  commanding  a  regiment, 
a  battalion,  a  company,  or  even  among  the  rank  and 
file,  treasures  of  initiative,  of  valour,  of  spontaneity,  so 
long  as  these  are  not  artificially  suppressed)  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  success  should  result  from  the  natural  mani- 
festation of  such  qualities,  rather  than  from  the  actual 


THE   BATTLE:    DECISIVE   ATTACK     297 

intervention  of  a  commander-in-chief  organising  a 
combined  distribution  of  forces,  a  combat  on  a  front, 
a  decisive  attack. 

In  all  lotteries  there  are  fortunate  men  who  draw 
prizes ;  in  spite  of  this,  it  will  occur  to  nobody  that  buy- 
ing a  ticket  in  a  lottery  is  an  investment.  Certain  causes 
which  are  independent  of  our  wills,  among  which  are 
chance  and  successful  initiative,  sometimes  settle  and 
determine  events  :  that  cannot  be  denied.  But  it  is 
not  possible  to  rely  on  them,  it  is  even  less  possible  to 
make  them  the  bases  of  a  policy. 

Let  us  analyse  this  theory  of  "  the  parallel  battle." 
What  do  we  discover  ? 

Troops  go  into  action  everywhere;  once  in  action, 
they  are  supported  everywhere.  In  proportion  as  forces 
are  used  up,  they  are  renewed,  and  replaced.  Such  a 
battle  consists  in  putting  up  with  a  constant,  a  successive, 
wear  and  tear,  until  the  result  ensues  from  one  or  more 
successful  actions  of  particular  combatants — subordinate 
commanders  or  troops.  Such  actions  all  remain  second- 
rate,  because  their  decision  never  involves  more  than  a 
portion  of  the  forces  engaged.  As  for  the  whole,  it  is 
but  a  chain  of  more  or  less  similar  combats,  in  which 
command  is  broken  up,  has  to  specialise  the  means  of 
action  in  detail,  and  in  which  the  issue  must  proceed 
from  a  sum  (or  excess)  of  successful  local  results  which 
escape  the  direction  of  the  commander. 

This  is  therefore  a  battle  of  an  inferior  kind  when 
compared  to  the  battle  of  manoeuvre  which  makes 
an  appeal  to  the  commander-in-chief's  action,  to  his 
manoeuvring  ability,  to  a  sound  and  combined  use  of 
all  the  forces  present;  which  achieves  a  true  economy 
of  those  forces,  by  attempting  to  concentrate  effort  and 
mass  on  one  selected  point  and  neglecting  all  else; 
which  remains  to  the  very  last  a  combination — due  to 
one  command — of  combats  varying  in  intensity,  but  all 
aiming  in  the  same  direction  to  produce  a  final  resultant  : 
an  intentional,  resolute  and  sudden  action  of  masses 
acting  by  surprise. 

The  parallel  battle  uses  inferior  methods,  and  is  bound 
to  lead  to  inferior  results. 

Its  weakness  lies  in  the  fact  that  attack,  in  such  a 
battle,  develops  everywhere  with  equal  force,  and  ends 
by  exerting  a  uniform  pressure  against  a  defender  who 


298         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

in  his  turn  offers  a  uniform  resistance ;  a  resistance 
which,  however,  is  more  efficient  than  the  pressure, 
because  the  defender  disposes  of  special  advantages 
such  as  shelter,  fire-power,  etc.,  which  the  assailant 
does  not  possess  to  the  same  degree. 

Such  a  battle  means  bringing  up  forces  piecemeal ;  it 
soon  amounts  to  throAving  drops  of  water  into  a  sea. 

We  have  a  wave  breaking  against  a  strong  dam.  The 
dam  will  not  be  broken. 

Suppose,  however,  we  should,  as  a  result  of  some  mental 
vision,  discover  a  crack  in  the  wall  of  the  dam ;  a  point 
of  inadequate  resistance.  Or  again  should  we  manage, 
by  means  of  a  particular  combination  of  forces,  to  add 
to  the  rhythmical  and  methodical  action  of  the  wave 
some  kind  of  water-hammering  capable  of  breaking  the 
wall  of  the  dam  on  some  one  point,  then  the  balance 
would  be  upset;  the  mass  would  rush  in  through  the 
breach  made,  and  carry  the  whole  obstacle.  Let  us 
look  for  the  crack,  for  the  point  of  inadequate  resistance, 
or  let  us  organise  to  this  end  our  water-hammering  on 
one  point  of  the  enemy  line;  we  shall  thus  attain  the 
one  result. 

That  is  the  "  battle  of  manoeuvre." 

Defence,  once  it  has  been  overthrown  on  one  point, 
collapses  on  all.  Once  the  resistance  has  been  pierced, 
the  whole  line  falls. 

Mechanics  as  well  as  psychology  leads  us  to  the 
"  battle  of  manoeuvre."  The  means  provided  by  the 
first  consist  in  applying  superior  forces  on  one  point; 
the  means  provided  by  the  latter  consist  in  producing 
a  peril,  an  attack  that  cannot  he  parried. 

By  either  road,  we  come  in  the  end  to  decisive  attack. 

Such  an  attack  is  necessary,  because  otherwise  nothing 
is  really  achieved,  and  we  are  relying  on  nothing  but 
chance. 

It  is  adequate,  because,  as  soon  as  it  has  succeeded,  the 
result  is  attained. 

Theoretically  a  well- conducted  battle  is  a  decisive  attack 
successfully  carried  out. 

Theoretically  too,  in  order  to  be  stronger  than  the 
enemy  on  a  given  point  and  at  a  given  moment,  all 
forces  must  be  simultaneously  applied  on  that  point,  and 
this  in  an  unforeseen  manner. 


THE   BATTLE:   DECISIVE   ATTACK     299 

When  we  turn  to  practice,  we  shall  see  that  such  a 
necessity  involves  other  necessary  things;  the  notion 
of  security  will  reappear  and  impose  sacrifices,  and  absorb 
forces. 

In  order  to  direct  the  attack,  to  guard  it  from  enemy 
imdertakings,  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  undertaking 
the  same  manoeuvre,  we  shall  have  to  support  a  great 
number  of  combats,  each  of  which  must  have  a  well- 
detei mined  end.  Let  us  nevertheless  consider  it  settled 
that,  decisive  attack  being  the  keystone  of  battle,  all 
other  actions  which  battle  involves  must  be  faced, 
considered,  organised,  supplied  with  forces,  only  in  so 
far  as  they  prepare,  facilitate  and  guarantee  the  develop- 
ment of  the  decisive  attack,  which  is  characterised  by 
mass,  surprise,  speed  ;  in  view  of  which,  therefore,  the 
maximum  of  forces  and  of  manosuvring  troops  must  be 
kept  in  reserve. 

Hence  the  economy  of  forces,  that  is,  their  distribution 
and  use  in  battle. 


IV 

The  difference  between  the  battle  of  manoeuvre  and 
the  parallel  battle  does  not  consist  only  in  a  difference 
as  to  the  issue  :  such  an  issue  being,  in  the  first  case, 
prepared,  sought,  reached  by  means  of  a  decisive  attack, 
while,  in  the  second,  it  is  rather  expected  in  a  successful 
action  springing  up  on  one  or  more  undetermined 
points  of  the  front.  They  also  differ  radically  in  respect 
of  conduct,  execution,  economy  of  forces. 

It  is  important  to  establish  this  point,  for  even  though 
parallel  battle  be  theoretically  put  aside,  one  comes  back 
to  it  unless  a  plan  of  the  battle,  concerning  first  of  all 
the  decisive  attack,  has  been  strongly  set  up  and  made  a 
basis  for  the  combination  of  forces. 

In  the  parallel  battle,  tactics  attempt,  consciously  or 
unconsciously,  to  break  the  other  party's  resistance  by 
slowly  and  progressively  using  up  enemy  forces.  To 
this  end,  fighting  is  kept  up  everywhere.  It  is  fed  every- 
where. Reserves  are  devoted  to  this  supporting  task. 
Reserves  become  a  kind  of  reservoir  of  forces  from  which 
one  draws  what  is  necessary  to  making  up  the  wear  and 
tear  which  continues  and  must  be  repaired.  Art  con- 
sists in  still  keeping  a  reserve  up  to  the  point  where  the 


300        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

enemy  has  none  left,  so  as  to  be  able  to  have  the  last  word 
in  a  struggle  where  wear  and  tear  is  the  only  valid  argu- 
ment. In  such  a  battle,  however,  reserves  have  no 
place  allotted  to  them  beforehand;  they  have  to  be 
everywhere,  so  that  it  should  be  possible  to  use  them 
according  to  our  needs,  that  is,  to  continue  the  action 
on  the  whole  front.  They  afterwards  scatter  and  melt 
away  in  a  combat  where  a  favourable  circumstance  is 
always  hoped  for,  without  it  being  known  where  and 
when  such  a  circumstance  may  be  found,  and  where 
their  only  effect  is  to  prevent  the  struggle  from  coming 
to  an  end. 

In  the  battle  of  manoeuvre,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
reserve  is  a  club,  prepared,  organised,  reserved,  carefully 
maintained  in  view  of  carrying  out  the  one  act  of  battle 
from  which  a  result  is  expected — the  decisive  attack. 
The  reserve  is  spared  with  the  utmost  parsimony,  so 
that  the  instrument  may  be  as  strong,  the  blow  as  violent 
as  possible. 

Such  a  reserve  must  be  hurled  in  the  last  instance, 
without  any  thought  of  sparing  it;  with  a  view  to 
carrying  by  force  a  selected  and  well-determined  point. 
It  must  therefore  be  hurled  as  one  block,  in  the  course  of 
an  action  exceeding  in  violence  and  energy  all  the  com- 
bats of  the  battle,  under  the  conditions  demanded  by 
surprise,  mass,  and  speed.  We  envisage  a  single  goal; 
a  determining  act  in  which  all  our  forces  take  part, 
either  in  order  to  prepare  it,  or  in  order  to  carry  it  out. 

Thus  is  convergence  of  efforts  achieved ;  thus  is  their 
resultant  applied  to  the  objective  given,  to  the  decisive 
attack,  which  is  the  supreme  argument.  All  this  is  a 
mere  development  of  that  principle  of  "  economy  of 
forces  "  which,  instead  of  specialising  credit,  of  subdivid- 
ing resources  in  a  fixed  and  unvarying  way,  puts  them 
in  connection  with  each  other  so  as  to  pour  them  out  in 
one  single  direction  (that  of  the  result  desired)  at  a 
given  instant. 

One  historical  instance  will  show  clearly  the  difference 
between  the  two  schools.  The  scene  took  place  at 
Abukeer,  during  the  battle.  Bonaparte  was  dictating 
an  order  to  his  Chief  of  Staff,  Berthier  (a  man  who  kept 
everything  in  mind,  and  particularly  the  filling  up  of 
blank  order  forms).  Bonaparte  stopped,  and  Berthier 
asked  him  what  troops  he  desired  to  form  the  reserve. 


THE   BATTLE:   DECISIVE   ATTACK     301 

"  Do  you  take  me  for  Moreau  ?  "  answered  Bonaparte. 
There  was  obviously  no  such  a  thing  in  his  mind  as  a 
necessary  reserve.  Troops  must  be  reserved,  but  only 
in  order  to  manoeuvre  and  to  attack  with  more  energy 
than  the  others.  Such  was  the  use  of  forces  he  had  been 
led  to  by  the  idea  of  an  attack  which  must,  in  the  last 
result,  exclude  any  reserve,  any  caution.^ 

This  difference  in  the  way  of  using  reserves  is  so  deeply 
rooted  in  both  forms  of  battle  (the  parallel  battle  and 
the  battle  of  manoeuvre)  that  some  have  gone  so  far  as 
to  regard  it  (though  in  a  superficial  way)  as  the  only 
difference,  the  only  distinction  between  them.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  distance  between  them  is  very  great. 

The  notion  of  a  parallel  battle  was  the  ruling  one  in  the 
French  army  of  1870;  or  rather  it  was  an  absence  of 
notion  regarding  the  conduct  of  battle  as  a  whole. 
Adequate  proof  of  this  may  be  derived  from  official 
and  private  narratives  recording  the  struggles  of  that 
time.  The  Germans  are  always  supposed  to  have 
achieved  victory,  because  numerous  reinforcements 
came  up,  as  though  these  numerous  reinforcements  had 
not  been  troops  reserved  and  brought  up  in  the  numbers 
and  in  the  time  required  to  produce  that  demoralising 
effect  which  overthrows  an  army  ! 

This  way  of  putting  things  shows  clearly  enough 
that,  if  such  fresh  troops  had  arrived  on  our  side,  they 
would  have  been  used  as  reinforcements — not  as  a  means 
of  undertaking  a  special  and  decisive  action  which  no 
one  contemplated. 

As  in  the  battle  of  manoeuvre  (the  superior  form  of 
battle,  for  it  implies  making  the  most  complete  possible 
use  of  one's  forces)  the  decisive  attack  is  the  necessary 
and  adequate  condition  of  success,  and  the  rest  is  second- 
ary;   the  smallest  possible  forces  must  be  devoted  to 

^  "  One  often  speaks  of  the  usefulness  and  necessity  of  strong 
reserves.  That  dogma  is  closely  connected  with  the  theory  of  pro- 
gressive consumption  of  forces  :  it  is  held  to  be  a  sacred  dogma. 
Thus  one  often  sees,  on  manoeuvres,  large  infantry  masses  attacking 
though  deploying  only  a  small  number  of  rifles.  The  whole  of  the 
remainder  follows  in  close  order,  with  drums  beating,  and  hurrahs,  as 
if  such  means  would  drive  the  enemy  away.  All  reserves  are  dead 
forces.  .  .  .  Reserves  are  only  useful  under  the  condition  that  they 
should  come  into  action.  .  .  .  One  may  even  imagine  a  case  where  one 
might  conveniently  abstain  from  setting  up  a  reserve ;  such  would  be 
the  case  if  one  exactly  knew  the  strength  of  the  enemy  aaid  if  the 
latter  had  already  completely  deployed." — Von  der  Goitz. 


302        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

that  subsidiary  part  of  the  task,  and  the  use  to  be  made 
of  those  subsidiary  forces  must  only  be  considered  in  so 
far  as  it  prepares  the  decisive  act. 

Nevertheless  we  must  acknowledge  that,  besides 
the  ultimate  execution  of  that  decisive  attack,  such  an 
attack  must  be  : 

(1)  Well  directed  by  means  of  scouting; 

(2)  Secondly,   prepared;    and, 

(3)  Thirdly,  protected  and  utilised;  in  view  of  the 
enemy  being  otherwise  able  first  to  conceal  his  disposi- 
tion; secondly,  to  alter  them;  thirdly,  to  impede  our 
preparations ;  and,  fourthly,  to  make  similar  preparations. 

Hence  the  necessity  of  a  series  of  dispositions  (of 
security-dispositions,  if  you  will),  the  object  of  which 
will  be,  first,  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy;  secondly,  to 
immobilise  him  ;  and,  thirdly,  to  paralyse  him  and  absorb 
his  activity. 

Such  dispositions  are  included  in  what  is  termed  the 
first  frontal  attack,  which  is  rather  the  preparation  of 
battle  than  battle  itself. 

But  reconnoitring  that  enemy,  wherever  he  shows 
himself,  requires  large  forces ;  immobilising  him  requires 
large  forces  :  you  cannot  stop  him  with  nothing ;  and 
paralysing  him,  holding  him,  requires,  again,  both  large 
forces  and  time. 

Finally,  the  frontal  attack,  to  which  one  may  have 
intended  devoting  but  small  numbers  (so  as  to  keep  faith- 
ful to  theory),  in  practice  will  absorb  the  largest  part  of 
our  forces,  as  well  as  it  will  take  up  the  largest  part  of  the 
time,  at  our  disposal;  while  our  decisive  attack  only 
uses  the  smaller  part  of  our  troops  and  lasts  but  for  a  few 
moments;  hence  a  second  optical  delusion,  which  has 
confirmed  (in  superficial  minds)  the  belief  that  the  frontal 
attack  was  the  true  battle;  for  their  judgment  was 
based  on  quantities  (forces  and  time),  not  on  results^ — 
an  error  which  thus  brought  them  back  to  the  doctrine 
of  parallel  battle. 

Let  us  beware  of  such  superficialities.  Even  should 
theory  fail  when  applied  by  unskilful  hands,  should  the 
essentials  of  theory  be  absorbed  by  accessories  or  its 
foundation  be  obscured  by  detail,  history  and  reason 
have  shown  us  that  there  is  in  battle  only  one  valid 
argument :    the  decisive  attack.     This  alone  is  capable 


THE   BATTLE:   DECISIVE   ATTACK    303 

of  ensuring  the  result  desired,   for  it  overthrows  the 
enemy. 

All  acts  of  battle  should  tend  to  : 

(1)  Preparing  that  conclusion;  be  they  called  the 
action  of  an  advance  guard,  frontal  attack,  artillery  duel, 
encounter  of  cavalry,  they  cannot  be  studied  and  con- 
ducted alone,  but  only  in  so  far  as  they  prepare  the 
conclusion ; 

(2)  Carrying  out  that  conclusion,  and, 

(3)  Utilising  it  by  pursuit,  so  as  to  destroy  the  fallen 
enemy. 

Therefore,  and  from  the  outset,  it  is  necessary  to  make 
a  plan  involving  such  a  succession  of  efforts  and  a  corre- 
sponding distribution  of  forces. 


CHAPTER  XI 

BATTLE  :  AN  HISTORICAL  INSTANCE 

Now  that  we  have  seen  how  theory  leads  to  the 
conclusion:  "Battle  is  a  decisive  attack;  conduct  of 
battle  solely  and  exclusively  tends  to  preparing  and 
successfully  carrying  out  the  decisive  attack,"  let  us 
examine  history  to  discover  how  this  conduct  of  battle, 
aiming  at  a  decisive  attack,  may  be  put  into  practice. 

We  will  take  for  the  moment  an  example  of  limited 
dimensions,  the  battle  of  Saalfeld.  We  shall  find  there 
all  the  acts  of  battle  on  a  small  scale.  We  shall  see, 
together  with  the  certain  goal  of  action  by  force  (over- 
throwing the  enemy  so  as  to  heat  him),  all  the  acts  which 
our  theory  regards  as  characteristic  of  the  battle  of 
manoeuvre. 

It  is  October  9th,  1806.  The  Grand  Army,  in  three 
columns,  is  completing  its  crossing  of  the  Franken-Wald 
in  order  to  enter  Saxony.  The  advance  guard  of  the 
army  (First  Army  Corps  and  three  cavalry  divisions 
under  Murat)  precedes  the  central  column.  It  has 
beaten,  at  Saalburg  and  Schleiz,  the  Tauenzien  division 
coming  from  Hof  and  aiming  at  Jena. 

In  the  right-hand  column,  the  head  corps  (Fourth) 
has  reached  Plauen ;  the  Sixth,  which  is  followmg,  is  at 
Hof. 

In  the  left-hand  column,  the  Fifth  Corps  (Lannes), 
which  forms  the  head,  is  coming  from  Coburg.  On  the 
9th  of  October,  after  a  long  and  difficult  march,  it  has 
reached  Graffenthal  with  the  Suchet  division  and  its 
cavalry ;  its  2nd  division  is  four  miles  to  the  rear ;  the 
Seventh  Corps  (Augereau)  has  reached  Coburg.  (See 
Map  J.) 

Napoleon  knows  the  main  enemy  army  to  be  under 
Brunswick,  between  Gotlia  and  Erfurt ;  advance  guard 
at  Eisenach  :  the  Hohenlohe  army  to  be  at  Jena,  advance 
guard  at  Saalfeld.     Napoleon  believes  the  intention  of 

304 


At  t'-  Foch.—  Des  Principes  de  la  guerre. 


SAALFELD  -  1806 


Cro^uis  J 


Echelle    1:    320  000 


BATTLE  :  AN  HISTORICAL  INSTANCE  305 

the  enemy  generals  to  be  a  march  on  Wiirtzburg- — the 
first  army  via  Gotha  and  Memingen,  the  other  via 
Saalfeld  and  Coburg. 

While  continuing  to  bring  his  lengthy  column  out  of 
the  mountains  in  order  to  assemble  it,  to  act  afterwards 
with  all  his  forces,  to  take  the  initiative  of  attack  as 
soon  as  possible.  Napoleon  has  to  foresee  the  possibility 
of  his  enemy's  forestalling  him  and  attacking  with 
superior  forces  the  left  column  of  the  Grand  Army. 
Hence  the  line  of  conduct  he  fixes  for  Marshal  Lannes. 
He  orders  him  : 

(1)  To  call  up  the  Seventh  Corps  and  to  attack,  if 
the  enemy  has  not  more  than  15,000  or  18,000  men; 

(2)  In  the  contrary  case,  that  is,  if  the  enemy,  after 
concentrating  superior  forces  at  Saalfeld,  himself  attacks, 
to  hold  on  so  as  to  give  the  Emperor  the  time  to  arrive 
with  20,000  or  25,000  men;    and 

(3)  In  case  the  enemy  by  a  rapid  advance  should  not 
allow  such  help  the  time  to  intervene,  to  withdraw  on 
Graffenthal. 

This  policy  is  clearly  seen  in  the  letters  between  the 
Emperor  and  Marshal  Lannes. 

The  Chief  of  Staff  writes  to  Lannes  : 

"  NordJialben,  October  9th. 

"  The  Emperor  will  be  to-night  at  Ebendorf,  Davout 
at  Lobenstein,  Murat  at  Schleitz. 

"It  is  assumed  that  the  enemy  intends  defending 
Saalfeld;  if  he  is  there  with  superior  forces,  you  must 
not  do  anything  until  you  are  joined  by  Marshal  Auge- 
reau.  News  of  the  enemy  will  he  received  during  the  day  ; 
if  he  has  substantial  forces  at  Saalfeld,  the  Emperor  will 
march  with  20,000  or  25,000  men  during  the  night  so 
as  to  arrive  to-morrow,  at  about  noon,  on  Saalfeld  via 
Saalberg. 

"  If  such  is  the  situation  of  things.  Monsieur  le 
Marechal,  namely,  if  the  enemy  assembles  all  his  forces 
at  Saalfeld,  we  have  only  one  thing  to  do,  which  is  to 
take  up  a  position  at  Graffenthal. 

"  The  enemy  cannot  venture  to  march  against  j^ou, 
mth  such  considerable  forces  on  his  left  flank;  still, 
if  he  should  do  so  with  very  superior  forces,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  you  ought  to  retreat ;  because  he  would  then 

X 


306        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

be  caught  and  attacked  in  flank  by  the  corps  in  the 
centre. 

"  But  if  the  enemy  has  only  15,000  or  18,000  men,  you 
must  attack  him  after  carefully  studying  his  position; 
it  being  understood  that  Marshal  Augereau's  corps  will 
by  that  time  be  with  you.  What  is  most  important 
under  such  circumstances,  Monsieur  le  Marechal,  is  that 
you  should  send  the  Emperor  news  of  your  situation 
and  of  the  enemy's,  three  times  a  day. 

"  If  the  enemy  withdraws  before  you,  you  must  arrive 
at  Saalfeld  as  soon  as  possible  and  there  take  up  a 
military  position." 

As  we  see,  should  the  Fifth  Corps  strike,  in  the  course 
of  its  march,  upon  an  enemy  provided  with  superior 
or  verv  superior  forces,  it  must  escape  destruction  by 
means  of  a  defensive  or  by  a  running  fight. 

The  advanced  corps  or  advance  guards  of  1806  are 
ready  to  use  three  kinds  of  tactics  :  To  attack,  to  resist, 
to  withdraw,  that  is,  to  manoeuvre  while  retreating, 
according  to  what  they  may  see  or  hear  concerning  the 
enemy  with  whom  they  are  about  to  come  in  touch. 

Marshal  Lannes  writes  on  the  same  day  : 

"  Grdffenthal,  October  9th,  5  p.m. 

"  I  am  arriving  at  this  very  moment  with  the  Suchet 
division  and  the  whole  cavalry  at  Graffenthal.  It  is 
now  5  p.m.  The  Gazan  division  will  bivouac  between 
the  posts  at  Judenbach  and  Graffenthal  village.  To- 
morrow, one  hour  after  dawn,  the  whole  army  corps  will 
he  placed  two  hours  from  here  on  the  road  to  Saalfeld, 
waiting  for  your  Majesty's  orders,  which  I  hope  to  receive 
in  the  course  of  the  day  or  of  the  night.  ...  It  has  been 
a  horrible  day  for  troops  and  artillery,  with  frightful 
roads,  no  resources.  ...  It  is  impossible  for  Augereau 
to  be  here  to-morrow,  there  being  twelve  endless  leagues 
from  Coburg  to  Graffenthal.  ..." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  situation  in  the  evening  of  the 
9th  was  the  following  :  In  the  Fifth  Corps,  cavalry  at 
Gesseldorf;  both  divisions  bivouacking  at  the  places 
mentioned  above  :  In  the  Seventh  Corps,  advance  guard 
ahead  of  Coburg  :  1st  division  at  Coburg :  and  the 
2nd  division  south  of  Coburg. 


BATTLE  :  AN  HISTORICAL  INSTANCE     307 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  10th  the  following  letter 
was  ^vTitten  to  Lannes  by  the  Emperor's  order  : 

"Edendorf,  October  lOth,  6  a.m. 

"  The  Emperor  approves  of  the  dispositions  you  have 
taken.  Urge  M.  le  Marechal  Augereau  to  come  on,  and 
do  you  yourself  immediately  attack  Saalfeld.  The 
Grand  Duke  of  Berg  and  Marshal  Bernadotte  are 
occupying  Schleitz," 

He  also  writes  to  Marshal  Soult : 

"  Edendorf,  October  lOth,  5  a.m. 

"...  Marshal  Lannes  will  only  arrive  to-day  at 
Saalfeld,  unless  the  enemy  be  there  with  considerable 
forces.^  Thus  the  days  of  the  10th  and  11th  will  be 
lost.     If  my  junction  is  effected  ..." 

^Vhen  this  order  of  the  Emperor  reached  the  Fifth 
Corps,  that  corps  had  already  been  on  the  march  for 
several  hours ;  it  had  only  received  Marshal  Lannes's 
order  up  to  that  time. 

From  Graffenthal  to  Saalfeld,  the  distance  is  twelve 
miles ;  it  is  ten  miles  from  Graffenthal  to  the  far  side 
of  the  woods.  Having  started  at  5  a.m.  and  doing 
four  kilometres  (2|  miles)  an  hour,  the  army  corps 
might  be  expected  to  reach  the  end  of  the  woods,  with 
the  head  of  its  column,  at  9. 

The  road  follows  deep  gorges,  in  mountains  which 
are  of  a  moderate  height,  but  their  slopes  steep  and 
covered  with  forests,  and  in  most  places  impenetrable. 
The  main  watershed  between  the  Mein  and  the  Elbe 
was  passed.  The  troops  were  now  marching  in  the 
main  down-hill. 

How  was  this  column  formed  ?  It  consists  in  :  the 
advance  guard :  a  light  cavalry  brigade  (Treillard) ;  9th 
and  10th  Hussars,  21st  Chasseurs,  of  three  squadrons 
each ;  one  section  of  horse  artillery  (2  guns  of  4) ;  1  "  elite'' 
battalion  (8  companies  of  the  4  last  regiments  of  the 

^  This  is  obscure,  but  it  is  an  exact  rendering  of  Napoleon's  hurried 
phrase.  What  the  Emperor  seems  to  have  had  in  mind  was  :  "  Lannes 
will  get  to  Saalfeld  unless  it  is  strongly  occupied;  but  he  could  not 
get  there  before  to-day." — Translator. 


308        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

division),  the  17th  Light  Infantry  (2  battalions  and  2 
"elite"  companies)  under  Claparede. 

The  main  body  of  the  column :  34th  regiment  (3 
battalions),  40th,  64th,  88th,  of  2  battalions  each; 
divisional  artillery  (2  guns  of  12,  6  of  8,  2  howitzers). 

There  is  no  interval  between  the  advance  guard  and 
the  main  body;  such  an  interval  would  have  been 
useless  in  view  of  the  range  of  arms.  Once  the  advance 
guard  should  have  closed  up  on  its  head,  and  the  main 
body  also  closed  up  on  its  head,  the  commanding  officer 
would  have  at  his  disposal  a  manoeuvre-zone  of  1500 
or  1800  yards  in  which  either  to  withdraw  his  forces 
or  send  them  into  action  under  shelter  from  enemy 
guns. 

The  troops  set  out  at  a  brisk  pace,  on  a  fine  autumn 
morning,  before  dawn  (5  a.m.),  the  air  being  fresh  and 
biting. 

The  men  were  rather  heavily  loaded  with  three  days' 
food  in  their  haversacks;  they  carried  only  three 
days'  supply  because  they  had  already  consumed 
five  days'  supply  out  of  the  eight  with  which  they 
had  started  :  at  Wlirtzburg  (four  days'  biscuits) ;  at 
Schweinfurt  (four  days'  bread). 

They  marched  well,  in  spite  of  that.  We  have  here 
the  Grand  Army  in  full  possession  of  its  powers.  Songs 
are  heard  all  along  the  column;  new  songs  written  for 
the  new  war. 

At  the  first  halt,  the  Emperor's  proclamations  are 
read  to  the  troops  :  the  proclamation  to  the  army,  and 
that  to  the  peoples  of  Saxony,  through  which  the  army 
is  about  to  march.  They  are  greeted  by  thousands  of 
cheers  :  "  Vive  I'Empereur  !  "  which  wake  the  remotest 
echo  in  those  silent  passes.  Then  the  march  is  resumed 
at  the  same  brisk  pace. 

At  the  head  of  the  troops  rode  Marshal  Lannes,  the 
most  brilliant  commander  of  an  advance  guard  ever 
known,  the  victor  of  Montebello,  in  whom  we  shall  soon 
find  cause  to  admire  calm,  measure,  caution,  as  well  as 
decision  and  energy.  He  is  just  thirty-seven  years  old. 
It  was  about  him  that  Napoleon,  who  was  a  good  judge 
of  men,  wrote  : 

"He  was  wise,  cautious,  bold  in  the  presence  of 
the  enemy,  imperturbably  self-possessed.     He  had  had 


BATTLE  :  AN  HISTORICAL  INSTANCE  309 

little  education.  Nature  had  done  everything  for  him. 
Napoleon,  who  had  seen  the  progress  of  his  intellect, 
often  expressed  his  wonder  at  it.  He  was  better  than 
all  the  generals  of  the  French  army  on  the  battle-field 
in  manoeuvring  25,000  infantry.  .  .  ." 

His  Chief  of  Staff  represents  the  elder  element  in  the 
column  :  this  is  General  Victor,  forty  years  old.  Then 
come  :  Divisional  Commander  Suchet,  thirty-four  years 
old ;  Brigadier  Claparede,  thirty-two ;  and  Brigadier 
Reille,  thirty-one. 

Between  6  and  7,  a  man  listening  with  care  might 
have  heard  a  few  musket  shots  in  the  far  distance. 

For  light  cavalry  patrols  were  circulating  ahead  of 
the  column,  searching  in  all  directions,  making  recon- 
naissances everywhere.  Those  patrols  were  provided 
and  supported  by  cavalry  parties  (one  squadron,  half  a 
squadron) ;  these  latter  followed  the  side  roads  which 
lead  from  the  state  road  to  Ausgereuth  into  the  Saale 
valley  :  the  Eiba  road,  and  the  high  road  to  Wittzens- 
dorff,  Wittmansgereuth,  Beulwitz. 

All  this  reconnoitring  cavalry  started  very  early. 
It  had  already  been  sent  a  substantial  distance  ahead 
on  the  preceding  day. 

"\Miile  trying  to  get  out  of  the  wood  in  order  to  see 
more  clearly,  it  met  and  routed  certain  enemy  patrols 
on  the  road  to  Ausgereuth;  those  patrols  withdrew  on 
Garnsdorf. 

The  roads  going  right  and  left  through  the  woods,  and 
the  woods  themselves,  were  clear;  but  a  few  enemy 
squadrons  had  been  seen  above  Saalfeld.  A  long 
column  had  been  seen  northward,  marching  from 
Schwarza  on  Saalfeld. 

The  cavalry  brigade  made  at  a  trot  for  the  issue  of  the 
wood,  followed  by  the  "elite"  battalion  which  hurried 
forward.  The  rest  of  the  column  continued  marching 
carelessly  and  gaily. 

The  Marshal  arrived  at  the  issue  of  the  woods. 

A  few  mixed  enemy  outposts  had  been  established 
near  the  road  and  on  the  hills  commanding  Saalfeld. 
They  are  reconnoitred,  then  attacked  with  infantry 
(first  action  at  about  9) ;  they  are  driven  back.  The 
advance  guard  arrives  in  front  of  Saalfeld;  it  is  nearly 
10  a.m. 


310        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Once  out  of  the  woods,  the  view  grew  clearer;  then 
it  suddenly  becomes  quite  clear.  Marshal  Lannes,  at 
the  head  of  his  infantr}^  halts  on  the  hill  commanding 
Garnsdorf.     This  is  what  he  sees  : 

At  a  distance  of  two  miles,  the  Saale;  on  the  river, 
Saalfeld,  a  big  town  of  a  circumference  of  two  miles, 
300  feet  below  the  level  of  the  woods ;  Garnsdorf  half- 
way down  the  slope ;  more  to  the  north,  a  small  valley, 
that  of  the  Siegenbach;  then  another,  that  of  the 
Beulwitz  brook ;  Beulwitz,  Crosten,  Wolsdorf .  Further 
to  the  north,  the  ground  rises  and  forms  a  spur  which 
commands  the  bend  of  the  Schwarza  and  its  confluence 
with  the  Saale ;  highest  point :  the  Sandberg.  The 
country  is  absolutely  without  cover. 

This  observation  is  completed  by  that  of  the  enemy 
army.  At  the  foot  of  the  slopes,  on  three  regularly 
and  correctly  drawn  lines,  there  appears  a  force  which 
an  expert  observer  might  rate  at  6000  or  7000  men.  It 
is  the  division  of  Prince  Louis  of  Saxony. 

Saalfeld  is  occupied  by  the  enemy. 

A  few  squadrons  are  seen  manoeuvring  up-river  above 
the  town  in  the  direction  of  the  gap  of  the  Saale. 

What  had  happened  on  the  enemy  side? 

Since  October  7th,  the  division  of  Prince  Louis — ^the 
advance  guard  of  Hohenlohe's  army,  including  18 
squadrons,  12  battalions,  27  guns — was  cantoned  north 
of  Rudolstadt.  Its  outposts  went  down  from  Oberhof 
to  Kahlerten,  and  had  their  reserves  at  Appurg  (5 
squadrons),  and  at  Blankenberg  (3  battalions,  |-  battery, 
3  squadrons). 

On  the  9th,  Prince  Louis,  after  hearing  that  Lannes' s 
corps  had  arrived  at  Graffenthal,  concentrates  his 
division  at  Rudolstadt,  and  orders  Saalfeld  to  be  occupied 
by  the  reserve  at  Blankenberg  (less  one  battalion) 
reinforced  by  one  heavy  battery  (in  all  12  guns).  There 
are,  therefore,  at  Saalfeld,  since  the  night  of  the  9th  : 
2  Prussian  battalions ;  |  light  battery ;  1  heavy  battery ; 
1  company  light  infantry;    and  3  squadrons  of  hussars. 

On  the  same  day,  the  9th,  Prince  Louis  received  from 
Prince  Hohenlohe  the  order  to  come  to  Possnech  via 
Saalfeld,  as  soon  as  the  posts  of  Blankenburg  and 
Rudolstadt  should  have  been  relieved  by  detachments 
from  Bliicher.  Yielding  to  a  different  idea  of  his  own 
(highly  debateable,  by  the  way),  he  decides  to  forestall 


BATTLE  :  AN  HISTORICAL  INSTANCE  311 

the  attack  and  to  give  battle  in  order  to  save  Saalfeld, 
where  there  was  a  depot  of  stores. 

In  the  morning  of  the  10th,  having  heard  early  of  the 
march  of  the  French  corps  on  Saalfeld,  he  sets  his  division 
moving  via  Schwarza  on  Saalfeld. 

He  arrives  at  about  9  at  a  point  in  a  line  with  Wolsdorf, 
while  the  small  advance-guard  action  above  mentioned 
is  taking  up  its  position.  He  forms  his  division  in 
three  lines,  on  a  low  ridge  placed  to  the  left  rear  of 
Crosten,  and  in  front  and  to  the  right  of  Graba. 

Such  is  the  sight  Marshal  Lannes  sees  when  he  reaches 
the  plateau. 

The  Prussian  division  has  its  back  to  the  Saale;  in 
case  of  a  check,  it  can  only  retire  over  the  bridge  of 
Saalfeld  or  over  that  of  Schwarza.  It  is  easy  to  measure 
its  forces.  It  cannot  be  reinforced  for  a  long  time. 
Lannes  will  therefore  attack,  thus  keeping  to  the  spirit 
of  the  instructions  he  has  received. 


Rt  MuFlmq 


What  does  Prince  Louis  intend  to  do  on  his  side  ? 

Led  by  a  very  Prussian  instinct,  he  has  left  to  the 
French  the  uncomfortable  and  difficult  slopes  which  rise 
towards  the  woods,  and  has  made  for  the  plain  and  kept 
to  the  bottom  of  the  valley,  where  regular  manoeuvres 
are  easier.  It  is,  indeed,  a  matter  of  principle  with  the 
Prussian  army  that  it  is  necessary  to  attack  and  to  start 
Rosbach  all  over  again;  that  attack  must  take  place 
when  the  enemy  debouches  from  difficult  ground,  out 
of  a  pass,  for  instance ;  to  attack  in  echelons  is  with  them 
the  last  word  of  science.  In  order  to  achieve  that 
manceuvre,  what  you  need  before  all  else  is  an  open 
ground  for  manoeuvre.  The  Prussians  at  that  time  did 
not  know  how  to  fight  in  any  other  fashion.  Caput 
moHuum,  as  Frederick  would  have  said. 

Moreover,  as  a  result  of  the  eighteenth-century  views 
prevailing  within  the  Prussian  army,  they  do  not  doubt 
that  the  French  will  take  Saalfeld  as  an  objective. 
Saalfeld  is  a  storehouse,  a  road  junction,  a  crossing 
over    the    Saale,    a    complete    geographical    objective. 


\5.puis  SEscddrona 

ling. 
B'P'^.^CIemenl  fit  Xavier.      -    Rt  Elecleur. 


312         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Unfortunately  for  Prince  Louis,  generals  trained  by  the 
French  Revolution  ignore  that  whole  science  of  geo- 
graphical points,  which  is  foreign  to  war,  which  is  the 
very  negation  of  struggle,  which  is  a  symptom  of  decay, 
which,  in  any  case,  is  "  ce  fin  du  fin  qui  est  la  fin  des  fins."  ^ 
They  know  one  thing  only,  they  desire  but  one  thing, 
a  thing  which  is  undeniably  the  true  goal :  the  defeat 
of  the  enemy. 

The  Prussian  army  not  only  lacks  sound  views;  it 
also  lacks  food.  To  mention  but  one  point,  they  found 
it  extremely  difficult,  in  this  pasture  country,  and  in 
October  to  feed  the  horses  of  one  small  division  ! 

There  is  irony  here.  An  order  arrives  during  the  battle 
to  the  effect  "  that  the  forage  rations  must  be  equalised 
with  the  greatest  care,"  such  rations  not  being  in  exist- 
ence at  all.     Formalism  was  expected  to  save  everything. 

Though  this  striking  observation  of  the  division  on 
the  bank  of  the  Saale  has  singularly  and  undeniably 
simplified  the  difficulties  of  preliminary  reconnaissances, 
all  dispositions  are  nevertheless  taken,  on  the  French 
side,  so  as  to  be  able  to  conquer  such  difficulties  as  may 
arise  :  scouting  has  been  undertaken  ahead,  to  the 
right,  and  to  the  left;  insufficiently  strong  patrols  are 
supported  by  the  cavalry  brigade ;  the  latter  has  been 
reinforced  by  an  "elite"  battalion.  It  further  disposes 
of  certain  artillery  with  a  view  to  "  taking  soundings  " 
of  the  ground  as  well  as  for  resistance. 

The  opportunity  has  come  for  tearing  through  the 
screen  formed  by  the  enemy  outposts  at  the  issue  of 
woods ;  the  advance  guard  has  immediately  intervened, 
and,  owing  to  its  composition,  it  has  succeeded  in  get- 
ting a  clear  view  of  things,  at  least  towards  Saalfeld  and 
Crosten. 

Light  cavalry  parties  have  also  occupied  Beulwitz  as 
well  as  the  eastern  corner  of  the  forest,  on  the  right 
above  the  gap  of  the  Saale.  They  scout  from  that  point 
in  all  directions  in  order  to  confirm  such  reports  as  have 
already  been  received  concerning  the  enemy. 

In  the  presence  of  this  situation,  once  the  Marshal 
has  decided  to  attack,  how  will  the  action  develop 
against  an  enemy  so  neatly  drawn  up  at  the  foot  of 
the  hills  ? 

^  Literally :    "  That  finesse   which  is   the   end  of  everything,"   a 
quotation  frOTO  Rostand's  Cyrano. — Note  of  the  translator. 


BATTLE  :  AN  HISTORICAL  INSTANCE  313 

Before  organising  the  attack,  its  direction  must  first 
of  all  be  fixed.  Shall  he  attack  by  the  right  ?  There  is 
no  manoeuvring  space  in  that  direction ;  moreover, 
Saalfeld,  a  strong  "  point  d'appui,"  closely  bordered  by 
the  Saale,  would  have  in  that  case  to  be  carried  as  a 
first  step. 

Shall  he  attack  in  front  ?  This  would  amount  to 
taking  the  bull  by  the  horns,  to  making  it  possible  for 
the  enemy  to  use  the  advantages  of  his  line  by  means 
of  fire  and  march.  It  would  mean  attacking  him  in  his 
strongest  part. 

By  the  left  ?  There  defiladed  Avays  of  access  are  avail- 
able as  well  as  an  easy  manoeuvring  ground,  that  is,  a 
wide  ground  without  obstacles  and  well  provided  with 
cover. 

In  that  direction,  the  attack  may  be  prepared  without 
the  enemy  being  aware  of  it ;  it  may  be  launched  without 
being  stopped  by  important  obstacles ;  it  may  develop 
the  whole  extent  which  the  forces  available  allow. 

The  attack  will  therefore  be  launched  on  that  side,  in 
the  space  extending  between  Aue,  the  Sandberg  and 
Wolsdorf,  which  ground  is  easy  to  advance  over,  though 
hiUy. 

It  is  now  10  a.m.  The  French  column  is  arriving, 
but  its  march  grows  slower,  owing  to  the  heat  of  the 
day  and  the  congestion  of  the  roads ;  three  or  four  hours 
pass  before  all  the  forces  can  be  assembled  on  the 
reconnoitred  ground. 

But  during  such  a  long  lapse  of  time,  the  enemy  may 
attack  the  debouching  column;  he  must  be  prevented 
from  doing  so ;  that  is  the  task  of  the  advance  guard. 

To  stand  on  guard  by  getting  hold  of  everything  that 
helps  one  to  check  the  enemy's  advance,  such  is  the 
first  act  in  the  preparation  for  battle.  Hence  the 
occupation  of  ridges  from  which  to  fire ;  hence  the 
occupation  and  defensive  organisation  of  villages,  so 
as  to  increase  the  resisting  power  of  a  force  the  numbers 
of  which  are  reduced  to  a  minimum. 

The  assembled  enemy  may  also  change  place,  undertake 
a  manoeuvre,  in  short,  alter  the  dispositions  against  which 
our  attack  is  being  organised.  How  can  he  be  prevented 
from  doing  so  ?  By  attacking  him,  but  without  risking 
anytliing;  with  weak  numbers  but  on  a  wide  front, 
so  as  to  spare  the  forces.     Hence  an  offensive  made  by 


314        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF    WAR 

small  units  starting  from  villages  which  shall  remain 
occupied.  Thus  we  shall  see  in  this  battle  swarms  of 
skirmishers  advancing  through  gardens,  orchards,  hollow 
roads,  in  order  to  threaten  the  enemy  and  to  extend  the 
action  far  ahead  from  the  outskirts  of  the  villages. 

After  having  been  first  used  as  centres  of  resistance, 
those  villages  next  become  starting-points  for  a  number 
of  offensive  actions. 

To  sum  up,  a  number  of  occupied  villages  marking  the 
ground  with  strong  points,  and  connected  with  each 
other  by  means  of  lines  of  skirmishers,  who,  being  on 
the  ridges,  can  see  and  act  while  under  cover  and  pro- 
vide elements  for  a  partial  offensive  :  such  is  the  first 
line. 

There  must  be  in  the  rear  a  reserve  of  mobile  troops 
kept  for  an  emergency.  This  will  be,  in  our  present 
case,  composed  of  cavalry.  After  the  first  needs  are 
provided,  that  reserve  will  consist  of  infantry.  The 
reconnoitring  task  of  the  advance  guard  must,  by  the 
way,  be  understood  in  the  same  offensive  sense. 

In  the  present  case  such  a  reconnaissance  is  absolutely 
useless,  as  the  enemy  dispositions  and  numbers  are  very 
clearly  seen  in  the  plain.  But  in  the  presence  of  a  con- 
cealed and  sheltered  enemy,  it  would  have  been  necessary 
to  reconnoitre,  that  is,  to  determine  the  distribution  and 
importance  of  his  forces,  so  as  to  be  able  to  set  up  a 
rational  manoeuvre. 

How  would  such  a  reconnaissance  have  been  carried 
out  ?     Obviously  by  means  of  an  offensive. 

Such  an  offensive,  if  it  were  not  to  risk  anything, 
would  have  started  from  resisting  points  which  should 
have  been  kept  occupied.  It  would  then  have  developed 
by  successive  movements  against  the  enemy  front.  It 
would  in  any  case  have  been  made  to  bear  only  on  that 
part  of  that  front  which  might  be  of  interest  for  our 
attack,  that  is,  on  that  part  where  we  later  intended  to 
strike  our  main  blow,  or  wherefrom  we  could  be  struck 
ourselves. 

The  enemy  is,  then,  reconnoitred  and  fixed  on  the 
whole  of  the  front  which  is  of  interest  to  the  action 
undertaken.  This  is  the  way  in  which  must  be  under- 
stood Napoleon's  maxim  :  "  One  must  go  into  action 
everywhere."  In  compliance  with  this  view,  a  division 
which  has  been  ordered  to  attack  will  not  reconnoitre 


BATTLE  :  AN  HISTORICAL  INSTANCE  315 

a  front  of  four  or  five  miles  which  is  of  no  interest  to  the 
attacking  force.  Similarly,  as  soon  as  a  reconnaissance 
has  supplied  sufficient  information  concerning  the  part 
of  the  line  to  be  attacked,  that  reconnaissance  must 
come  to  an  end. 

Having  thought  out  these  things,  Marshal  Lannes 
orders  the  following  disposition  to  be  taken.  (See 
Sketch  K)  : 

(1)  The  "  elite  "  battalion  will  continue  to  drive  back 
on  Saalfeld  the  Prussian  posts  holding  the  hill,  and  will 
stop  at  Garnsdorf,  which  it  will  occupy  in  strength. 
Cavalry  will  place  themselves  in  reserve  in  the  bottom 
of  the  Siegenbach  valley,  then  the  17th  Light  Infantry 
must  order  its  two  "  Slite "  companies  to  occupy  the 
north-eastern  corner  of  the  wood  facing  the  gap  of  the 
Saale,  which  they  will  have  to  defend.  It  will  occupy, 
with  the  remainder  of  its  forces,  Beulwitz,  which  it  will 
reach  by  marching  along  the  woods.  The  artillery 
section  will  fight  at  Garnsdorf.  General  Victor  will 
command  at  Garnsdorf  and  south  of  it.  General 
Claparede  will  command  at  Beulwitz. 

(2)  The  remainder  of  the  division  will  march  through 
the  wood  or  along  the  outskirts  of  the  wood,  making 
for  Beulwitz  (the  remainder  of  the  division  consists  of 
four  regiments  and  artillery). 

(3)  The  "  points  d'appui  "  of  Garnsdorf  and  Beulwitz 
must  be  connected  by  skirmishers.  Cavalry  are  to 
establish  themselves  behind  those  skirmishers. 

Later,  after  the  troops  shall  have  arrived  in  sufficient 
numbers,  this  front — which  is  still  weak — will  be  con- 
solidated by  a  reserve ;  it  will  be  formed  of  the  two  last 
battalions  arrivmg  on  the  ground. 

As  is  seen  from  the  above,  the  operation  tends  from 
the  outset  to  directing  on  Beulwitz  the  main  effort  of 
the  division. 

In  consequence  of  these  decisions,  enemy  recon- 
naissances soon  report  French  troops  to  be  coming  on 
in  three  columns,  which  greatly  surprises  the  Prussians, 
who  are  attached  to  the  single-column  system. 

At  about  11,  the  French  had  established  two  com- 
panies at  the  southern  corner  of  the  wood ;  one  battalion 
and  two  guns  at  Garnsdorf;  and  two  battalions  at 
Beuhvitz. 


316        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

From  the  corner  of  the  wood  to  Beulwitz  the  distance 
is  3500  yards;  Lannes  is  not  afraid,  as  we  have  seen, 
to  spread,  for  the  purposes  of  an  advance  guard,  over  so 
considerable  a  front,  three  battahons  and  a  half  and  the 
cavalry  brigade;  and  this  with  muskets  the  efficient 
range  of  Avhich  was  not  superior  to  150  or  200  yards. 
Such  are  the  dispositions,  such  the  dispersion,  to  which 
some  people  object  even  nowadays,  with  quick-firing 
rifles  which  really  and  powerfully  sweep  the  ground 
over  a  range  of  1200  to  1500  yards.  They  object  to 
such  dispositions  by  quoting  the  regulations  which 
prescribe  that  the  front  of  a  battalion  in  action  must 
never  be  more  than  300  yards.  Those  regulations  were 
never  meant  to  contradict  what  we  see  Marshal  Lannes 
doing  here.  For  the  object,  here,  is  not  to  beat  the 
enemy,  therefore  no  "  front  of  action  "  is  in  question. 
Troops  are  so  far  only  taking  possession  of  the  ground, 
which  they  do  by  putting  a  certain  number  of  watchmen 
at  all  the  entrances — watchmen  who  should  be  able  to 
shut  the  doors  if  a  thief  comes,  and  also,  after  having 
strongly  established  themselves,  to  go  and  draw  the 
neighbourhood  to  see  what  has  become  of  the  thief,  and, 
if  need  be,  to  chase  him. 

We  shall  soon  have  the  combat,  the  attack  proper; 
then  we  shall  see  the  fronts  comply  with  these  rules; 
then  we  shall  find  the  average  front  of  a  battalion  to  be 
far  less  than  300  yards. 

Such  a  situation,  once  secured  on  the  French  side, 
will  continue  for  some  time  without  much  change. 
Meanwhile  the  whole  first  part  of  the  programme  is 
carried  out,  that  is,  preparation. 

The  Simonet  artillery  section,  making  use  of  a  favour- 
able position,  continues  to  fire  against  a  much  superior 
battery  (12  guns,  1  heavy  battery,  \  light  one),  and 
against  the  troops  at  Saalfeld,  that  is,  two  battalions, 
which  are  holding  in  the  open  the  approaches  to  that 
town.  The  section  is  being  supported  in  its  action  by 
a  line  of  skirmishers  established  on  the  ridge,  and  by 
the  occupation  of  Garnsdorf.  Soon  it  even  succeeds  in 
advancing. 

At  Beulwitz,  the  17th  has  occupied  the  village  and 
sent  out  skirmishers  who,  utilising  gardens  and  orchards, 
have    arrived    near    Crosten.     Some    scouting    is    also 


M^'Foch  -  Des  Principes  de  la  guerre. 


Croauis  K 


Combat  deSAALFELD 

10  Oct.  1806. 


Ob. 
PrjVpp 


r  Moment,  11^ 


BlanJctnburg 


BERGER  ifiVRAUW 


BATTLE  :  AN  HISTORICAL  INSTANCE  317 

carried  out  for  the  regiment  towards  the  north  by 
cavahy  patrols. 

At  Beulwitz  as  at  Garnsdorf,  the  skirmishers  who  have 
crept  ahead  keep  up  against  the  enemy,  lying  un- 
sheltered in  the  plain,  a  very  deadly  target-fire.  This 
is  in  every  respect  a  complete  fire  action. 

Owing  to  the  favourable  circumstances,  which  make 
preparation  easier  as  a  result  of  the  dispositions  taken, 
the  programme  develops  gradually,  and  the  greater 
part  of  French  troops  are  found,  by  1  p.m.,  to  have 
arrived  as  ordered. 

As  for  the  enemy,  what  impression  did  he  derive  from 
all  these  actions  ?     We  have  his  own  evidence  on  this. 

All  our  information  concerning  him  is  borrowed 
from  the  work  of  an  eye-witness,  the  Saxon  engineer 
Miimpfling,  author  of  the  Vertraute  Brief e. 

After  describing  with  little  praise  the  situation  in 
which  the  Prussian  army  was  drawn  up,  he  adds  ; 

"  Can  you  not  see  us  all  in  line  before  that  threatening 
rampart  and  lying  unsheltered  on  the  narrow  stretch  of 
meadows  which  separates  it  from  the  Saale,  with  our 
backs  to  that  river?  From  that  rampart,  enemy 
skirmishers,  themselves  under  perfect  cover,  could 
easily  pick  out  any  one  of  us,  without  its  being  possible 
to  return  the  fire  on  completely  invisible  men ;  and  this 
pastime  lasted  for  several  hours.  During  that  time,  the 
French  commanders,  who,  from  their  places,  could 
thoroughly  mark  the  weak  points  in  our  line,  took  their 
dispositions  accordingly.  .  .  . 

"  The  manoeuvres  of  the  French  were  developing 
more  and  more,  their  object  was  to  fend  off  the  troops 
posted  on  the  left  wing  above  and  near  Saalfeld,  and  to 
keep  the  whole  front  of  the  Prince's  position  busy  with 
their  skirmishers,  always  edging  for  the  left,  so  as  to 
envelop  the  Prince  and  cut  him  off  from  the  Schwarza." 

This,  of  course,  was  written  after  the  event ;  and  the 
"WTiter  has  understood  what  the  preparation  aimed  at. 
During  the  action  itself,  however,  the  intentions  of  the 
French  were  not  so  easy  to  discover.  Save  the  fire 
of  those  "  invisible  "  skirmishers,  whose  shots  could  not 
be  returned,  nothing  was  to  be  seen  on  the  horizon. 
Reconnoitring  parties  sent  out  very  early  in  the 
day  saw  columns  marching  on  Elba,  on  the  main 
road,  on  Beulwitz.     These  columns,   however,  had  all 


318        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

disappeared,  and  nothing  but  an  insignificant  attack 
was  taking  place.  What,  then,  are  the  intentions  and 
movements  of  these  numerous  columns  of  which  nothing 
is  seen?  The  Prussians  do  not  understand,  they  grow 
uneasy ;  what  should  they  expect  ?  In  case  of  a  check, 
are  they  sure  of  being  able  to  cross  the  Saale  or  the 
Schwarza  ?  Obviously  not.  One  battalion  (2nd  Miifling) 
is  sent  to  Schwarza. 

At  the  same  time  an  order  arrives  from  Prince 
Hohenlohe  to  remain  at  Rudolstadt  and  not  to  attack, 
as  the  army  is  coming  from  Blankenhayn  to  the  Saale. 
A  retreat  by  Schwarza,  in  case  of  a  check,  becomes  more 
and  more  important.  The  Prince  orders  the  foot 
battery  and  the  1st  Miifling  battalion  to  occupy  the 
Sandberg.     (See  Sketch  L.) 

The  Prince -Clement  regiment  is  ordered  to  establish 
one  battalion  (the  1st)  between  Aue  and  Crosten,  in 
order  to  connect  this  occupation  of  the  Sandberg  with 
the  main  body  of  the  division.  The  2nd  Clement 
battalion  is  to  climb  up  on  to  the  Sandberg,  where  it 
is  to  place  itself  to  the  right  of  the  battery  and  of  the 
1st  Miifling. 

Such  is  the  dispersion  one  always  falls  into  through 
tactics  in  which  considerations  of  ground  are  allowed  to 
prevail  over  everything  else. 

Instead  of  attempting  to  carry  out  a  military  plan, 
and  using  to  that  effect  such  physical  means  as  are 
provided  by  the  ground,  it  is  the  ground  which  here 
dictates  the  conduct  of  operations.  In  consequence, 
certain  points  are  first  of  all  occupied  by  reason  of  their 
intrinsic  value — without  measuring  their  importance 
in  relation  to  an  operation  which  is  not  fully  willed; 
later  on,  gaps  in  the  occupied  ground  are  filled ;  at  last 
one  is  led  to  impotence,  because  one's  forces  will  be 
most  scattered  at  the  very  moment  when  it  is  decided 
to  act. 

Here  two  regiments  and  fifteen  guns  are  devoted  to 
occupying  Schwarza  and  hills  commanding  that  place; 
two  battalions  and  twelve  guns  to  occupying  Saalfeld. 

It  is  about  1  p.m.  After  maldng  all  those  concessions 
to  the  value  of  positions.  Prince  Louis,  an  enterprising, 
bold  man  of  action,  who  is  growing  anxious  as  a  result 
of  the  complete  uncertainty  in  which  he  finds  himself 
in,  decides  to  attack ;  he  attacks  straight  in  front  of  him 


•'.'toch.  — Des  Principes  de la  guerre. 


Cro(j^uis  L 


Combat  deSAALFELD 

1,0  Oct.  1806. 


Blankenbitiyt 


2'Moment.l^ 


Mten- 
Saalfeid 


BATTLE  :  AN  HISTORICAL  INSTANCE     319 

■with  all  the  forces  available  :  six  battalions  out  of 
twelve  (without  artillery,  without  any  kind  of  prepara- 
tion) ;  four  are  in  the  first  line,  two  in  the  second.  As 
soon  as  that  attack,  going  up  east  of  the  line  Crosten- 
Beulwitz,  shows  itself,  its  right  is  immediately  fired  upon 
by  the  numerous  swarms  of  French  skirmishers  filling 
the  gardens,  orchards,  and  hollow  roads  near  the 
villages,  still  invisible  and  pouring  a  hail  of  bullets  on 
the  right  of  the  attack.  We  get  a  fight  between  the 
lion  and  the  gnats.  The  line  wavers,  stops,  answers  by 
volley  fire — without  result,  by  the  way — when,  at  the 
same  moment,  it  is  attacked  in  flank  by  two  battalions 
of  the  34th,  which,  after  marching  under  the  cover  of 
the  slopes,  appear  and  charge  in  column  with  drums 
beatmg,  General  Suchet  at  their  head. 

The  ordeal  is  too  severe.  The  Xavier  regiment 
completely  falls  back,  the  left  of  the  line  withdraws  in 
the  same  way  (regiment  of  the  Elector).  The  French 
17th  follows  on  their  heels  into  Crosten;  but  being 
assaulted  itself  by  the  reformed  Prussians,  mainly  by 
the  regiment  of  the  Elector,  which  has  not  suffered  and 
now  attacks  in  flank,  the  17th,  having  no  cartridges 
left,  loses  Crosten  and  retires  on  Beulwitz,  where  it  is 
relieved  by  the  64th,  and  goes  over  to  the  reserve. 

INIarshal  Lannes  finds  at  this  moment  that  the  situation 
is  maturing. 

It  is  about  2  p.m.;  (1)  all  his  troops  are  present; 
(2)  the  enemy  has  been  well  reconnoitred;  (3)  he  has 
been  immobilised;  and  (4)  his  forces  are  dispersed  in 
order  and  already  shaken. 

The  Marshal  will  attack  in  the  direction  previously 
decided  upon  :  by  the  region  of  Beulwitz  and  Crosten. 
He  will  strike  the  enemy  mass  in  the  plain  with  the 
main  forces  of  the  division ;  the  Claparede  brigade  (17th, 
64th)  attacking  in  front,  the  Reille  brigade  (34th,  40th) 
attacking  in  flank. 

But  he  must  previously  protect  himself  against  the 
troops  holding  the  Sandberg  and  Aue,  and  give  to  the 
attacking  division  the  space  required  for  deployment. 
(See  Sketch  M.) 

The  Reille  brigade  is  entrusted  with  that  twofold 
task.  To  this  end,  it  marches  in  the  direction  of  the 
Sandberg  and  advances  towards  the  Aue  wood  under 
the  protection  of  numerous  skirmishers,  the  34th  being 


320        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

in  the  first  line  :  in  echelon  to  the  left  rear,  the  40th ; 
and  in  echelon  to  the  right  rear,  the  21st  Light  Infantry. 
(The  flanks  of  the  attack  are  protected,  how?  By 
echelons  capable  of  counter-attacking  any  troops  that 
might  threaten  those  flanks.) 

The  brigade  first  strikes  the  Clement  regiment,  then 
the  battery  of  the  Sandberg,  fifteen  guns,  which  it 
captures ;  it  ensures  the  position  of  those  points :  Aue, 
Sandberg ;  it  carries  out  the  pursuit  with  part  of  its  forces, 
and  resumes,  with  what  remains  available,  that  wing 
attack  which  it  has  the  mission  to  perform.  The  34th 
will  carry  out  that  attack,  the  40th  having  been  almost 
wholly  absorbed  by  the  struggle  against  the  battery 
and  the  occupation  of  the  conquered  point. 

The  moment  has  come  to  determine  the  whole  affair. 
It  is  nearly  3  p.m.  The  manoeuvre,  in  view  of  which 
all  these  efforts  have  been  made  since  the  morning,  will 
at  last  be  carried  out.     (See  Sketch  N.) 

Artillery  has  arrived  in  the  meantime ;  it  takes  up 
a  position  near  Beulwitz,  then  advances,  and,  by  firing 
a  few  rounds  of  case,  prepares  the  infantry  attack. 

Marshal  Lannes  orders  the  charge  to  be  beaten  and 
sounded  on  the  whole  line  :  then,  on  that  enemy  already 
shaken  by  fire,  are  seen  to  arrive  "  masses  of  infantry 
which,  coming  down  at  full  speed  from  the  heights, 
fall  on  the  Prussian  battalions  like  wild  torrents  and 
rout  them  in  one  instant  "  (Marbot). 

Engineer  Miimpfling  describes  this  very  well  too  : 

"  At  about  3,"  he  writes,  "  the  French  columns  fell 
upon  us  like  an  avalanche.  In  the  twinkling  of  an  eye, 
we  found  ourselves  cut  up  into  three  bodies,  surrounded 
by  a  circle  of  fire  and  forced  back  on  the  river." 

Such  is  the  Prussian  impression ;  such  are  the  results. 
But  what  had  happened  on  the  French  side  ? 

Well,  at  the  general  signal  of  attack  given  by  the 
Marshal,  all  the  troops  near  Beulwitz  pushed  forward. 
Thus  was  launched  :  (1)  a  frontal  attack,  including  to 
the  right,  9th  and  10th  Hussars,  in  the  centre,  54th 
Infantry,  to  the  left,  21st  Light  Infantry;  having  in  the 
second  line  the  87th  Infantry  and  17th  Light  Infantry; 
(2)  a  flank  attack,  34th  Infantry  (three  battalions). 

We  have,  then,  the  whole  cavalry,  the  whole  artillery 
(less  two  guns)  and  four  infantry  regiments  (out  of  five) 
attacking  at  once  an  enemy  already  shaken  b}'^  fhe,  so 


•M**  Foch  —  Des  Pnncjpes  de  la  guerre. 


Ci 


^auis 


M 


Combat  de  SAALFELD 
10  Oct.  1806. 


3' Moment.  1^/2 


M^  Foch,  —  Defe  Prmcipes  de  la  guerre. 


Croauis  N 


Combat  deSAALFELD 

10  Oct.  1806. 


§ob.  4^'Moment.2^!/2 

PrjUpp  -    ~       - 


.'-^' 


*ut. 


BlcmJembitrg 


&t\\.v 


ScItyrarzaA 


i  Cidm. 


S&aJtfeld 


BATTLE  :  AN  HISTORICAL  INSTANCE  321 

as  to  finish  him  off;  attacking  by  surprise,  that  is,  with 
an  undeniable  superiority  of  means,  suddenly,  and  from 
a  short  distance,  that  very  point  of  the  enemy  line  which 
had  been  selected  as  the  easiest  to  approach  and  had 
been  specially  prepared  as  a  point  of  attack  :  the  front 
of  the  attack  is  1500  or  1800  yards  wide  for  all  the 
acting  troops-  this  is  less  than  the  300  yards  of  front 
to  a  battalion  prescribed  by  the  regulations. 

It  is  mainly  the  French  left  which  strikes — the  more 
advanced  wing.  To  the  right,  we  find  cavalry  supported 
by  infantry  (88th) ;  they  came  down  in  one  mass  to 
the  plain. 

That  cavalry  soon  found  a  favourable  opportunity 
for  charging  the  Prussian  infantry,  which  was  being 
hard  pressed  on  all  sides  by  the  French  infantry  and 
fired  on  by  artillery.  The  cavalry  charged  and  sabred 
through  a  mass  of  men  for  half  an  hour.  Prince  Louis 
of  Prussia,  seeing  his  infantry  beaten,  hurried  up  to  his 
squadrons  near  Wolsdorf  and  came  on,  but  in  vain, 
at  their  head.  He  fell  upon  the  French  10th  Hussars, 
and  came  himself  upon  Sergeant  Guindet,  who,  being 
close  against  him,  called  out  to  him  to  surrender;  the 
Prince  answered  by  a  sword  thrust,  and  fell  himself 
immediately,  pierced  by  a  thrust. 

The  defeat  was  complete. 

There  remained  nothing  but  fugitives  flying  as  best 
they  could  towards  Blankenberg,  Schwarza,  or  across 
the  Saale. 

At  the  moment  when  the  general  attack  started, 
Victor  had  assembled  at  Garnsdorf  his  "  elite  "  battalion, 
both  companies  of  the  17th,  and  marched  on  Saalfeld, 
which  he  carried ;  he  continued  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy 
as  far  as  Rudolstadt  by  the  right  bank  of  the  Saale. 

Pursuit  was  also  continued  in  the  direction  of  the 
Schwarza.  Clapar^de  there  led  a  whole  brigade  (17th, 
34th),  which  drove  the  enemy  back  beyond  Blanken- 
berg and  crossed  the  Schwarza  with  the  water  up  to 
their  waists.  Three  captains  of  the  17th  fell  there, 
mortally  wounded. 

Fifteen  hundred  prisoners,  four  flags,  twenty-five 
guns,  two  howitzers,  six  wagons,  such  were  the  trophies 
of  the  day. 

No  one  has  related  with  precision  the  losses  in  dead 

Y 


322        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

of  the  Prussians ;  writing,  however,  that  very  evening 
to  the  Emperor  in  order  to  report  the  battle  Marshal 
Lannes,  who  was  not  much  of  a  sentimentalist,  writes  : 
*'  The  battle-field  horrifies  one.'' 

The  Suchet  division,  which  alone  had  come  into 
action,  had  172  casualties,  ten  horses  killed.  The 
Simonet  artillery  section  of  four  had  fired  264  rpunds. 
The  divisional  artillery  had  not  used  up  quite  so  much 
ammunition — about  236  rounds.  The  infantry  had 
fired  about  200,000  cartridges,  which  makes  the  rather 
considerable  average  of  20  per  man. 

What  a  methodical  spirit  there  is  in  this  action  con- 
ducted by  the  young  Marshal !  One  wonders  which 
deserves  to  be  most  admired  in  him,  the  enlightened 
wisdom  with  which  he  patiently  prepared  the  battle  for 
six  hours,  or  the  fitness  and  dash  with  which  he  launched 
his  final  attack.  So  true  is  it  that  the  art  of  fighting 
does  not  consist,  even  with  the  most  eager  and  energetic 
of  chiefs,  even  when  the  best  of  troops  are  available,  in 
falling  on  the  enemy  no  matter  how. 

The  theory  which  has  been  put  in  practice  is  here 
obvious  :  one  clearly  sees  how  the  manoeuvre  of  long 
duration  (from  9  a.m.  to  3  p.m.)  aims  exclusively  at 
bringing  about  the  powerful,  undisputable  conclusion 
by  means  of  all  the  main  forces ;  such  a  conclusion 
being  preceded  by  a  preparation  to  which  the  smallest 
nunibers  possible  were  devoted. 

That  preparation  includes  the  combat  of  the  advance 
guard,  the  object  of  which  was  reconnoitring,  fixing,  if 
need  be  stopping  the  enemy ;  this  combat  is  followed  by 
a  frontal  attack  which  completes  the  enemy's  immo- 
bilisation and  wears  him;  it  ends  in  a  decisive  attack, 
a  surprise  in  time  and  space,  effected  by  means  of 
number,  speed,  choice  of  starting-point,  and  of  a 
peculiar  violence  which  changes  the  attack  into  an 
avalanche. 

When  we  try  to  apply  our  theory  to  modern  circum- 
stances, changes  must  of  course  be  made,  so  as  to  take 
into  account  the  influence  of  modern  arms  upon  battle ; 
but  the  picture  remains  the  same  in  the  main. 

The  battle  of  Saalfeld,  had  it  to  be  fought  to-day, 
would  not  be  conducted  in  another  fashion. 

The    advance    guard    would    seize    Garnsdorf    and 


BATTLE  :  AN  HISTORICAL  INSTANCE  323 

Beiilwitz  and  protect  itself  towards  Saale.  It  would 
be  reinforced  by  part,  or  the  whole,  of  the  artillery, 
according  to  needs;  and  it  would  act  offensively  or 
defensively  against  the  enemy  according  to  circum- 
stances; (1)  according  as  the  enemy  may  be  sheltered, 
concealed  or  reconnoitred;  (2)  according  to  whether  he 
attacks  or  merely  resists;  (3)  according  as  he  may 
manoeuvre  or  keep  still;  and  (4)  according  as  he  may 
send  his  forces  into  action  or  spare  them. 

Under  the  protection  of  this  combat  in  advance  guard, 
then  of  the  frontal  attack,  of  the  preparation,  the  main 
body  of  forces  arrives  to  the  point  where  one  intends 
to  produce  the  main  effort. 

That  point  would  obviously  be  determined  by  the 
same  considerations.  The  direction  selected  for  attack 
must  include  good  means  of  access,  few  obstacles,  and 
space  so  as  to  manoeuvre  in  force. 

Of  the  main  body  in  reserve,  two  parts  must  be 
made  :  a  main  one,  devoted  to  the  decisive  attack  (17th, 
34th,  64th)  and  to  the  security-dispositions  that  attack 
involves,  the  other  weaker  (88th)  designed  to  keeping 
the  front  attack  mviolate  in  any  case  :  this  is  the 
reserve  of  the  front. 

In  the  process  of  execution,  the  decisive  attack  would 
tend  to  achieve  such  a  combination — envelopment  or 
attack  in  front  and  in  flank — as  would  enable  numerical 
superiority  to  develop  all  the  effects  of  which  it  is 
capable :  fire,  march ;  the  attack  in  front  and  the 
attack  in  flank  remaining  in  any  case  closely  connected 
with  each  other. 

The  attack  would  have  to  be  still  more  carefully  pre- 
pared by  artillery.  Finally,  at  the  moment  when  the 
enemy,  worn  down  and  held  on  his  front,  threatened  on 
his  most  exposed  flank,  should  be  on  the  point  of  being 
assaulted  by  the  decisive  attack,  the  general  attack  would 
have  then  to  be  let  loose,  to-day  as  in  the  past,  in  order 
to  prevent  the  enemy  from  parrying  the  final  effort. 

Then  comes  the  pursuit,  without  truce  or  mercy, 
with  troops  as  well  in  hand  as  possible,  commanded,  here, 
by  Victor  and  Claparede. 

That  theory  of  the  decisive  attack  had  been  perfectly 
grasped  by  the  Germans  of  1813,  from  studying  the 
Avars  of  the  Empire.     Proof  : 


324         THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Instructions  for  officers  commanding  corps,  brigades, 
etc.,  delivered  by  King  Frederick  William  during  the 
truce  of  1813  : 

"As  it  has  come  to  my  notice  that,  during  actions 
and  battles,  the  various  arms  have  not  been  always 
conveniently  brought  into  action,  and  that  disposi- 
tions in  view  of  battle  are  generally  unsatisfactory,  I 
desire,  upon  the  occasion  of  the  coming  resumption  of 
hostilities,  to  recall  the  following  rules  of  war : 

"  These  are  the  general  principles  : 

"  (1)  In  view  of  the  manner  in  which  our  enemy  is 
making  war,  it  is  generally  unwise  to  begin  a  battle 
with  cavalry,  or  to  bring  all  the  troops  immediately  into 
action.  Owing  to  the  way  in  which  he  uses  his  infantry, 
he  succeeds  in  delaying  and  supporting  the  action; 
he  carries  villages  and  woods,  hides  behind  houses, 
bushes,  and  ditches;  he  knows  how  to  defend  himself 
skilfully  against  our  attacks  by  attacking  himself;  he 
inflicts  on  us  losses  with  few  troops,  when  we  advance 
against  him  in  great  masses;  he  then  relieves  those 
troops,  or  sends  fresh  ones  into  action,  and,  if  we  have 
on  our  side  no  fresh  troops  to  oppose  to  his,  he  compels 
us  to  give  way.  We  must  draw  therefrom  this  prin- 
ciple, which  is  the  enemy's,  that  we  must  spare  our  forces 
and  support  the  action  until  we  turn  to  the  main  attack. 

"  (2)  Our  artillery  has  not  produced  a  great  effect, 
because  it  had  been  too  much  divided.  .  .  . 

"  (6)  War  in  general,  but,  above  all,  the  issue  of 
battle,  depends  upon  superiority  of  forces  on  one  point. 

"  (7)  In  order  to  secure  this  superiority  of  forces,  it 
is  necessary  to  deceive  the  enemy  concerning  the  real 
front  of  attack  and  to  make  a  false  attack  and  a  real 
attack. 

"  (8)  Both  attacks  must  be  masked  by  skirmishers, 
so  that  the  enemy  should  be  unable  to  distinguish  the 
difference. 

"  (9)  A  line  of  skirmishers  is  first  of  all  to  be  sent 
out.  The  attention  of  the  enemy  is  to  be  drawn  by 
several  battalions  designed  to  fire  on  one  of  the  wings, 
on  which  guns  must  be  firing  heavily  at  the  same 
moment.     Battle  must  be  ordered  in  that  fashion. 

"  (10)  Meanwhile,  the  real  attack  is  still  postponed, 
and  it  only  begins  later  on,  at  the  moment  when  the 
enemy's  attention  is  entirely  turned  on  the  false  attack. 


BATTLE  :  AN  HISTORICAL  INSTANCE  325 

"  (11)  That  real  attack  is  made  as  quickly  and  as 
vigorously  as  possible,  and  above  all  by  a  large  mass 
of  artillery  and  infantry,  of  a  superior  force,  if  possible, 
while  a  particular  corps  goes  round  the  enemy  flank.  .  .  . 
In  principle,  a  commander  should  devote  one  brigade  to 
the  false  attack,  two  brigades  to  the  real  one,  and  have 
one  brigade  in  reserve. 

"  These  are  principles  which  are  well  known  to  you, 
and  which  have  been  several  times  commended.  We 
have  put  them  frequently  into  practice  in  our  peace 
manceu\Tes,  but  I  remmd  you  of  them,  because  what  is 
laio^Aii  is  sometimes  forgotten,  because  though  a  simple 
thing  may  seem  to  be  a  commonplace,  yet  victory 
often  depends  upon  it.  Unless  one  is  careful  to  recall 
it  every  day  to  mind,  one  indulges  in  combinations 
which  are  too  scientific,  or,  what  is  worse,  one  goes 
into  battle  without  having  taken  any  dispositions 
whatever." 

As  we  see,  after  explaining  the  theory  of  the  pre- 
paratory  combat,  or  false  attack,  and  of  decisive  attack, 
which  he  calls  the  real  attack,^  after  showing  by  what 
kind  of  actions  this  theory  must  express  itself,  the 
King  states,  in  order  to  make  it  more  precise  for  the 
use  of  undecided  minds  :  Out  of  four  brigades,  you 
shall  devote  one  to  the  false  attack,  two  to  the  real  one, 
and  one  to  the  reserve.  Later  on,  a  perfected  doctrine 
will  lay  down  the  formula  :  a  third  in  order  to  open, 
a  third  in  order  to  wear  down,  and  a  third  in  order 
to  finish. 

The  specialisation  of  forces  reappears  in  either  for- 
mula. The  German  army  have  to-day  crudely  and  simply 
adopted  that  idea,  without  fixing  any  limits  to  it,  so 
that  we  see  at  their  manoeuvres  decisive  attacks  to  be 
carefully  prepared,  brought  up  under  shelter,  then  launched 
from  a  distance  of  800  or  1000  yards,  and  including 
three-fourths  of  the  forces  in  action. 

Who  would  venture,  in  the  presence  of  such  processes, 
to  resort  to  parallel  battle,  be  it  the  outcome  of  an 
accepted  system  or  of  a  wrong  economy  ? 

^  Once  that  notion  had  penetrated  the  ranks  of  the  German  army, 
it  was  never  overlooked  by  them.  Seeing  the  formidable  attack  at 
Leipzig,  Napoleon  is  said  to  have  comforted  himself  by  exclaiming  : 
"  At  last,  I  have  taught  them  something." 


326        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Let  us,  moreover,  go  back  to  August  18th,  1870. 
That  very  idea  of  a  decisive  attack  to  be  prepared  was 
the  foundation  of  von  Moltke's  whole  combination  : 
while  the  First  Army  was  to  attack  in  front,  the  Second 
was  to  attack  the  right  French  wing  in  front  and  in 
flank. 

Where  was  that  right  wing?  No  one  knows.  But, 
wherever  it  may  be,  it  will  be  assaulted  with  an 
undeniable  numerical  superiority.  Sufficient  numbers 
have  been  attached  for  that  purpose  to  the  army  of 
manoeuvre  and  of  decision,  the  Second;  it  has  five  army 
corps  :  Third,  Ninth,  Tenth,  Twelfth  and  the  Guard. 

Finally,  that  right  French  wing  was  found  to  be 
much  further  away  than  had  been  supposed.  It  was 
believed  to  be  at  La  Folic ;  it  was,  as  a  fact,  at  Saint- 
Privat. 

The  Second  Army  had  to  take  over  part  of  the  frontal 
attack ;  it  devoted  to  that  attack  one  army  corps,  which 
was  therefore  missing  in  the  decisive  attack.  Did 
Moltke'  s  forecast  go  wrong  for  that  ?  It  was  altered, 
but  it  did  not  cease  to  be  right.  Decision  was  secured 
on  a  more  distant  point;  but  he  still  had  the  means 
of  securing  it. 

At  the  end,  as  we  know  (without  mentioning  the 
isolated  and  fruitless  enterprise  of  the  Guard,  due  to 
an  ill-conceived  initiative),  we  find  the  Guard  and  the 
Twelfth  Corps,  with  the  Tenth  in  second  line,  acting 
against  Saint-Privat :  three  army  corps  against  one 
single  objective.  The  infantry  of  the  two  first  army 
corps  proved  sufficient;  that  of  the  Tenth  was  ready 
to  act,  however,  in  case  of  need.  In  any  case,  the 
artillery  of  all  three  army  corps  took  part  in  the  attack ; 
in  all  nearly  300  guns  against  a  single  common  objective. 

We  have  here  an  undeniable  superiority  of  means 
utilised  on  a  reduced  space,  within  a  very  short  time — 
a  blow,  therefore,  which  it  is  impossible  to  parry, 
producing  under  a  new  form  the  surprise,  the  event 
of  the  Napoleonic  battle. 


CHAPTER  XII 

modekn    battle 

Execution  ^ 

If  from  the  battle  of  Saalfeld  studied  above  we  come 
to  the  act  of  force  which  is  impHed  by  modern  armies, 
many  data  must  be  altered  : 

(1)  Arms  have  a  longer  range;  they  are  more  deadly; 
which  compels  forces  to  take  up  their  dispositions  for 
attack  at  a  greater  distance  and  under  better  cover. 
Similarly,  when  in  action,  dispositions  must  tend,  more 
than  in  the  past,  to  utilising  in  its  entirety  the  power  of 
modern  arms,  which  is  henceforth  indisputable. 

(2)  Armies  are  more  than  ever  manoeuvring  forces; 
they  cover  themselves  with  greater  care  than  ever. 
It  is  therefore  more  difficult  to  reconnoitre  the  disposi- 
tions of  the  enemy;  reconnaissance  must  be  carried 
on  to  a  later  stage;  it  has  also  become  more  difficult 
to  immobilise  the  enemy. 

(3)  The  numbers  opposed  to  each  other  have  reached 
unheard-of  proportions. 

In  consequence,  assembling  troops  in  view  of  a 
decisive  attack  requires  a  long  time.  Such  troops, 
once  assembled,  can  generally  be  used  only  on  the 
ground  on  which  they  find  themselves,  for  time  is 
lacking  to  bring  them  to  some  other  place.  Hence  a 
necessity  for  deciding  early  in  what  direction  the  attack 
must  be  delivered,  also  of  more  completely  reconnoitring 
the  enemy  dispositions  and  the  ground. 

The  part  played  by  preparation  is  becoming  greater 
in  every  way  :  Inform  better;  Resist  for  a  longer  time; 
and  Fix  more  efficiently. 

Similarly,   again,    the   conduct   of  attack,    once  the 

^  According  to  the  studies  of  battle  by  Colonel  Ardant  du  Picq, 
the  lectures  of  General  Cardot,  the  combat-instructions  of  General 
Millet  and  General  Bonnal. 

327 


328        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

direction  has  been  settled,  will  involve  a  more  exacting 
kind  of  tactics,  as  it  aims,  besides  exerting  a  moral 
action,  at  entirely  utilising  such  perfected  physical 
means,  rifles  and  guns,  as  are  at  its  disposal. 

In  any  case,  what  has  been  said  about  the  philosophy 
of  battle  and  about  the  arguments  it  puts  forward 
remains  true  in  the  main,  as  it  is  the  same  moral  being, 
man,  who  is  fighting;  the  forces  in  action  are  ruled  by 
the  same  mechanics. 

The  various  acts  of  battle  will  therefore  remain  the 
same :  to  prepare,  to  carry  out,  and  to  utilise  the 
decisive  attack. 

The  task  of  the  commander  consists,  as  in  the  past, 
in  foreseeing  those  acts  from  the  outset,  and  in  adopting 
a  distribution  of  forces  which  should,  so  as  to  meet  the 
needs,  tend  to :  (1)  Protecting  the  forces  from  the 
enemy,  and  therefore  opposing  to  him,  on  all  points 
where  he  shows  himself,  forces  capable  of  resisting  for 
the  whole  time  the  preparation  will  last;  and  (2)  Organ- 
ising the  decisive  act,  while  reserving  a  mass  which  should 
be  ready  to  meet  the  unforeseen  or  to  intervene  at  the 
right  time  in  the  struggle,  according  as  it  is  necessary 
to  parry  or  to  thrust ;  a  disposition  which,  in  order  to 
comply  with  the  principle  of  economy  of  forces,  devotes 
to  preparation  what  is  strictly  necessary;  to  execution 
the  largest  numbers  possible,  and  to  utilisation  every- 
thing that  is  left  valid.  But  it  is  not  possible  to  submit 
the  distribution  of  the  whole  to  absolute  rules  of  a 
mathematical  nature,  more  especially  as  regards  the 
reserve  of  the  last  hour,  the  strength  of  which  obviously 
depends  upon  such  information  concerning  the  enemy 
as  one  may  possess  at  that  moment,  also  upon  circum- 
stances and  upon  the  temperament  of  the  commander. 

Let  us  remember  Bonaparte  sending  his  last  man 
into  action  at  Abukeer,  and  Napoleon  in  1812  sparing 
his  reserve  at  the  Moskowa  (Borodino),  because  at  the 
Moskowa,  instead  of  being  a  young  general  with  a 
future  who  had  nothing  to  risk,  but  everything  to 
gain,  he  was  a  successful  Emperor  who  had  everything 
to  lose.  So  true  is  it  that,  according  to  the  stake,  he 
himself  altered  his  play. 

Let  us  then  resume,  under  these  modern  conditions, 
the  study  of  the  preparation  and  execution  of  a  decisive 


MODERN   BATTLE  329 

attack,  so  as  to  see  what  tactics  are  required  by  these 
two  acts  of  battle,  what  use  ought  to  be  made  of  the 
different  arms. 

(a)  Preparation 

By  preparation  is  meant  all  the  dispositions  the 
object  of  which  is  to  make  possible,  that  is,  to  set  in 
the  right  direction,  and  ensure  the  execution  of,  that 
decisive  act  which  is  the  principal  act  of  battle.  This 
is  a  new  development  of  the  idea  of  security  already 
studied,  taken  here  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  word, 
and  aiming  at  acting  with  knowledge  and  manoeuvring 
under  sheter  from  enemy  blows,  so  long  as  one  is  not 
able  to  return  the  blows  and  to  return  them  abundantly. 

The  first  object  of  preparation  is,  then,  to  supply 
the  commander  with  the  intelligence  he  needs  in  order 
to  direct  and  execute,  with  full  knowledge  of  the  case, 
the  decisive  act  of  battle.  Considered  from  that  stand- 
point, it  involves  seeking  the  objective  to  be  struck, 
for  the  means  and  ways  leading  to  that  objective,  as 
well  as  determining  the  enemy's  situation.  The  part 
it  plays  in  thus  looking  for  direction  and  information 
has  to  be  carried  on  until  the  moment  when  the  decisive 
act  is  performed- — that  is  obviouS' — but  it  also  begins 
sometimes  several  days  before  the  battle.  If  one  has 
to  deal  with  large  units,  for  instance,  with  armies, 
the  information  collected  during  these  days  concerning 
the  situation  and  distribution  of  enemy  forces,  already 
indicate  how  one's  own  forces  must  be  distributed, 
and  largely  determine  the  direction  and  importance  of 
the  decisive  attack,  although  it  is  impossible  to  think 
of  altering  one' s  plan  at  the  last  moment. 

Thus  the  strategical  advance  guards  of  Napoleon 
(more  particularly  those  of  1806  and  1809)  supply  by 
their  intelligence  service  a  basis  for  the  Napoleonic 
manoeuvres,  as  well  as  providing  later  on,  by  their 
resistance  and  their  hold  over  the  enemy,  the  pivot 
around  which  that  manoeuvre  develops. 

Thus  again  did  Moltke  set  up  the  battle  he  was 
seeking  about  August  9th,  1870,  on  the  Sarre.  It 
was  after  receiving  reports  on  the  situation  of  the 
French  army  that  he  decided  to  attack  it  in  front 
with  the  First  and  Second  Armies,  while  the  Third, 
debouching  from  the  Vosges,  should  carry  out  a  flank 


330        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

attack  which  was  to  be  the  decisive  act  of  his  scheme. 
The  preparation,  here,  had  begun  long  before  August  9th. 

At  the  outset,  preparation  consists,  as  you  see,  in 
trying  to  secure  information  by  means  of  exploration  ; 
it  devolves  thereby  on  cavalry  supported  by  artillery. 

In  proportion  as  the  enemy  comes  nearer,  intelligence 
devolves  upon  the  service  of  security.  But  as  prepara- 
tion must  also  maintain  the  commander's  freedom  of 
action  up  to  the  last  moment,  so  as  to  make  it  possible 
for  him  not  to  take  a  decision  before  he  can  do  so  with 
full  knowledge,  preparation  and  security  are  con- 
veniently left  in  the  same  hands.  The  advance  guards 
then  intervene  in  order  to  stoj^  the  enemy,  or  at  least 
to  keep  him  off. 

Let  us  remember  Saalfeld.     To  this  end  : 

The  "  elite  "  battalion  occupies  Garnsdorf ; 

\  The  south-eastern 

rvu     iirj-i,         -4.  •  outskirts  of  the 

ihe  17  th  regiment  occupies   V  , 

J  Beulwitz. 

As  has  been  also  seen,  had  Marshal  Lannes  been 
confronted  by  a  more  carefully  concealed  Saxo-Prussian 
division,  he  would  have  extended  his  reconnaissance; 
the  advance  guard  would  have  been  more  active  :  it 
would  have  sent  out  reconnaissances  on  Saalfeld,  on 
Crosten,  fired  with  guns  on  one  or  the  other  of  these 
places,  so  as  to  compel  the  enemy  artillery  to  disclose 
itself.  It  would  have  in  any  case  kept  the  points  d  appui 
occupied,  so  as  to  be  ready  to  resist. 

Once  that  moment  has  come  and  the  advance  guard 
has  gone  into  action  to  fulfil  its  task,  a  plan  of  action 
(if  it  has  not  been  set  beforehand,  as  often  happens 
with  large  units)  must  be  decided  upon;  that  is,  it  is 
necessary  to  make  a  distribution  of  forces,  or  decide  to 
break  off  the  fight. 

But,  besides  what  has  just  been  said,  preparation 
must  also  conceal  the  direction  and  moment  of  the 
decisive  attack ;  it  must  cover  the  organising  process  : 
hence  a  new  mission,  that  of  protecting  and  covering 
the   attack. 

Preparation  must  at  the  same  time  maintain  the  pre- 
viously reconnoitred  situation  of  the  enemy,  deprive  him 


MODERN   BATTLE  331 

of  the  means  and  possibility  of  preparing  a  manoeuvre 
on  his  part;  therefore,  immobilise  him  by  depriving 
him  of  the  physical  possibility  of  assembling  an  ade- 
quate force  whicii  he  might  victoriously  oppose  to  the 
effort  of  the  decisive  attack;  to  this  end,  undertake  a 
number  of  actions  against  the  enemy. 


Processes  of  Preparation 

In  order  to  fulfil  this  twofold  task,  preparation 
must  attack  the  enemy  wherever  he  shows  himself,  so 
as  to  inflict  serious  losses  on  him,  to  deprive  him  of 
his  means  of  action,  to  paralyse  him,  to  threaten 
him,  which  prevents  him  from  removing  his  forces  to 
some  other  place.  Its  attitude  must  therefore  be  a 
resolutely  offensive  one. 

But  it  must  at  the  same  time  keep  him  off  if  he 
becomes  threatening,  it  must  be  able  to  resist  and  know 
how  to  do  it.  While  acting,  preparation  must  prepare 
the  means  of  successfully  defending  itself. 

To  conquer  and  to  maintain  with  ever-increasing 
vigour  is  its  formula. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  small  number  of  troops 
preparation  has  at  its  disposal  on  a  usually  wide  front 
(several  miles  :  from  Garnsdorf  to  Beulwitz  the  distance 
is  2500  yards)  does  not  allow  it  to  act  with  harmony 
on  the  whole  line.  The  offensive  action  tends  to  sub- 
divide itself;  it  aims  at  conquering  the  points  of  the 
ground  ("points  d'appui,"  or  commanding  points),  the 
possession  of  which  will  make  it  possible  to  conquer 
easily  and  afterwards  utilise  the  intervals  betwee^ 
them. 

Had  the  enemy  protected  alid  organised  himself  at 
Saalfeld,  he  would  have  occupied  Garnsdorf  and 
Beulwitz.  Garnsdorf  then  Beulwitz  would  have  been 
attacked;  the  possession  of  the  interval  would  have 
resulted  from  that.  All  the  troops  available  would 
have  supported  each  other,  if  need  be,  in  order  to  carry 
the  first  of  these  two  villages.  The  thing  being  done 
and  the  hold  secured,  they  would  have  occupied  the 
first  with  as  few  men  as  possible  and  would  have 
reformed  with  a  view  to  carrying  the  second  village. 


332        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

On  a  modern  battle-field,  where  resistance  is  usually 
organised  in  depth,  a  second  line  of  obstacles  will  be 
found  behind  a  first  line;  troops  which  have  started 
fighting,  which  have  deployed,  come  into  action  and 
get  mixed  up ;  they  must  constantly  be  taken  in  hand 
again  by  officers  commanding  small  units  (battalions, 
companies),  so  as  to  be  able  to  undertake  new  combined 
efforts  against  the  numerous  objectives  they  have  to 
assault  successively,  and  also  to  assault  simultaneously' — 
an  indispensable  condition  to  success. 

Thus  preparation  troops  will  in  practice  soon  be 
found,  not  to  start  ojie  single  action,  but  to  be  fighting 
several  partial  actions,  conducted  independently  of  each 
other  with  the  object  of  conquering  the  resisting  centres 
of  the  enemy. 

As  the  latter  is  also  attempting  to  do  the  same  thing 
(until  he  has  been  completelj^  immobilised),  or  as  he  is 
trying  to  recapture  the  points  he  has  lost,  there  results 
a  series  of  offensive  and  defensive  actions,  with  a  view 
to  disputing  the  points  of  the  ground,  which  generally 
impart  to  the  combat  of  preparation  a  special  kind  of 
tenacity,  of  desperation,  of  length,  producing  among 
the  enemy  a  wear  and  tear  of  forces  and  means,  losses, 
physical  and  moral  exhaustion,  all  of  which  are  equally 
desirable  results. 

Hence  also  the  duration  of  the  combat  of  prepara- 
tion which  has  been  improperly  termed  a  dragging 
fight;  while  it  actually  results  in  a  constant  offensive, 
carried  on  everywhere,  moreover,  under  difficult  con- 
ditions; in  case  of  failure,  it  changes  into  a  defensive 
prepared  beforehand  and  kept  up  with  desperation,  so 
that  it  remains  in  either  case  the  very  reverse  of  a 
slack  action. 

To  attack  the  important  points  of  the  ground,  to 
carry  them,  to  occupy  them;  to  defend  them,  if  they 
are  attacked;  to  retake  them  if  they  are  lost;  to  make 
them  a  new  base  for  new  progress  if  the  enemy  does  not 
attack  them  :  such  are  the  processes  preparation-troops 
must  continuously  maintain,  until  the  enemy  gives  up 
every  hope  of  conquering  and  leaves  the  place,  or 
until  they  stop  of  themselves  as  a  result  of  complete 
exhaustion.  But  even  in  that  latter  case  they  have 
to  establish  themselves  in  front  of  the  enemy,  so  as  to 


MODERN   BATTLE  333 

threaten  him  or  to  drive  him  back  if  he  attempt  to 
advance. 

As  has,  then,  been  seen,  preparation  consists  in  a 
multitude  of  partial  combats,  each  of  which,  in  order 
to  secure  success,  to  lead  to  decision,  that  is,  to  the 
conquest  of  the  objective  selected,  involves  a  decisive 
act,  a  convergency  towards  the  saine  point,  at  the  same 
moment,  of  all  available  co-ordinated  efforts.  Such  a 
decisive  act  will  contain,  in  a  lesser,  but  still  certain 
proportion,  the  three  phases  involved  by  battle  :  'pre- 
paration, execution,  utilisation.  In  the  case  of  each 
of  these  phases,  the  use  and  formation  of  troops  are 
directed  by  the  principles  which  should  command  the 
corresponding  acts  in  battle. 

It  is  also  certain  that  such  a  great  number  of  actions 
cannot  be  directed  by  a  single  man.  The  commander- 
in-chief  plays  his  part  by  dividing  the  task  of  prepara- 
tion between  a  certain  number  of  subordinate  officers, 
to  the  initiative  of  each  of  whom,  according  to  his  own 
means,  he  leaves  the  reduction  of  the  enemy. 

General  Victor  commands  at  Garnsdorf,  General 
Claparede  commands  at  Beulwitz. 

The  commander  keeps  to  himself  the  main  task,  that 
of  directing  and  carrying  out  the  decisive  attack,  and 
he  also  keeps,  in  any  case,  the  possibility  of  intervening 
up  to  the  last  moment  with  the  help  of  general  reserves. 

Preparation  finally  ends  in  a  general  action  along 
the  whole  front,  in  sometimes  a  very  hard  and  often 
very  long  struggle.  Therefore,  although  this  operation 
should  theoretically  only  absorb  a  minimum  of  forces, 
it  requires  in  reality  serious  sacrifices,^  which  the  com- 
mander must  make  ungrudgingly,  so  long  as  the  waste 
thus  incurred  does  not  endanger  the  subsequent  phases 
and  more  particularly  the  success  of  the  decisive  act; 

^  On  August  18th,  1870,  the  Germans  devoted  to  the  first  frontal 
attack  the  First  Army  (Seventh,  Eighth,  Second  Corps);  the  Second 
Army  remained  by  destination  the  army  of  manoeuvre  reserved  for  the 
decision;  its  task  was  therefore  to  go  and  find  the  right  wing  of  the 
French  army  wherever  it  might  be,  and  to  extend  its  front  as  far  as 
the  point  on  which  that  wing  reposed ;  the  Second  Army  also  devoted 
to  the  frontal  attack  the  Ninth  corps,  with  the  Third  in  the  rear; 
finally,  therefore,  we  have  no  less  than  five  corps  taking  part  in  the 
preparation. 


334        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

sacrifices  which  he  must  make  early,  as  the  deployment 
of  forces,  that  is,  the  process  of  establishing  units 
facing  their  objectives,  must  take  place  out  of  the 
reach  of  guns,  and  therefore  at  a  very  great  distance. 

Preparation  is,  then,  a  multitude  of  partial  combats, 
the  object  of  which  generally  is  to  conquer  successively, 
on  the  field,  "  points  d'appui"  or  commanding  points, 
organised  and  transformed  into  resisting  centres  and 
starting-points  for  new  offensive  actions ;  each  of  these 
combats  involving  three  acts — preparing,  carrying  out 
and  utilising  a  decisive  action. 

In  such  a  preparation,  what  should  be  the  part  played 
by  each  different  arm  ? 

Part  Played  by  the  Three  Arms 

Artillery.' — Artillery  must  obviously  be  the  first  to  act, 
owing  to  its  range,  its  mobility,  and  the  fact  that  it  can 
easily  come  into  action  and  go  out  of  it  in  order  to  pro- 
ceed, when  necessary,  to  some  other  place;  moreover, 
it  can  act  so  as  to  get  hold  of  the  enemy. 

Therefore  the  artillery  of  the  main  body,  the  largest 
part  of  which  is  marching  close  behind  the  head  of  the 
column,  will  speed  up  its  movement.  Protected  by 
infantry,  it  reinforces  the  artillery  of  the  advance  guard. 

What,  then,  are  these  bodies  of  artillery  about  to  do  ? 

The  guns  will  help  the  advance  guard  in  its  mission, 
which  consists  in  reconnoitring,  immobilising,  and  wear- 
ing down  the  enemy ;  this  implies  taking  the  offensive ; 
therefore  guns  will  break  the  obstacles  opposing  infantry 
■ — "  points  d'appui,"  and  enemy  artillery. 

As  soon  as  progress  becomes  possible,  the  guns  will 
avail  themselves  of  that  opportunity  and  advance  in 
their  turn  in  order  to  settle  in  a  final  way  the  fate  of 
the  enemy  artillery.  They  will  undertake  to  this  end 
a  struggle  at  a  short  range.  This  is  the  artillery  duel. 
It  is  obviously  a  matter  of  the  highest  importance  to 
secure  as  soon  as  possible  a  superiority  in  that  duel 
between  guns  holding  under  their  powerful  fire  the  whole 
of  the  ground  they  can  observe. 

To  this  end,  superiority  of  numbers  must  be  secured 
immediately;  a  long  line  of  fire  must  be  immediately 
organised;   all  guns  must  be  brought  up,  nothing  must 


MODERN    BATTLE  335 

be  kept  in  reserve.  Such  is  first  of  all  the  tactical 
formulae  for  artilleries  engaged  in  an  artillery  struggle. 

Once  the  enemy  artillery  has  been  overthrown  or 
silenced,  guns  must  return  to  the  task  of  helping  infantry ^ 
by  preparing  the  attack  on  the  points  which  are  the 
latter' s  objectives. 

That  preparation  involves  (as  we  shall  see  by  and  by, 
more  particularly  when  studying  the  decisive  attack) 
clearing  the  ways  of  access,  the  approaches  leading  to  the 
objective,  as  well  as  breaching  the  objective ;  following 
up  the  attack. 

Opening  a  way  to  infantry  on  the  whole  front  so  as 
to  enable  it  to  reach  decisive  acts;  helping  it  in  these 
attacks,  in  these  decisive  acts;  these  are  the  tactics 
of  artillery  in  the  course  of  the  preparation. 

Such  an  alternate  function  in  the  artillery  struggle 
and  the  infantry  actions  leads  to  varying  the  grouping 
of  batteries.  In  the  first  case  (artillery  struggle), 
divisional  artilleries  must  attempt  to  join  the  corps 
artillery,  under  the  effective  or  nominal  command 
of  the  officer  comrnanding  the  artillery  of  the  army  corps. 
All  the  batteries  must  then  try  to  form  a  whole,  the 
artillery  of  the  army  corps  working  in  a  common  direction 
(which  does  not  mean  in  a  single  place). 

In  the  second  case  (infantry  action,  artillery  in  support 
of  infantry),  divisional  artilleries  of  course  remain  under 
the  orders  of  the  generals  commanding  the  divisions; 
they  are  reinforced  by  all  or  part  of  the  corps  artillery, 
which  thus  becomes  an  artillery  attached  to  infantry 
under  the  orders  of  generals  commanding  the  divisions. 
The  whole  artillery  of  the  army  corps  tends  to  become 
divisional,  and  therefore  to  dividing  itself  and  acting 
in  two  or  three  directions,  those  of  the  divisions. 

Moreover,  in  proportion  as  arms  are  improved  (quick- 
firing  rifles  and  guns),  infantry  is  compelled,  when 
advancing,  to  move  under  cover,  at  least  from  gunfire; 
to  this  end,  infantry  has  to  utilise  all  practicable  defi- 
lades and  to  follow  them  for  the  longest  time  possible. 
The  -necessity  of  cover  increases  every  day. 

But  these  ways  of  access  are  easily  paralysed  nowadays 
by  weak  troops  occupying  ''  points  d'appui "  and  armed 
with  quick-firing  rifles,  or  enfilading  with  a  few  quick- 


836        THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   WAR 

firing  guns  (two  or  three).  Formerly  many  guns  were 
needed  to  produce  an  effect.  To-day,  a  few  suffice. 
Hence  this  consequence,  that  the  numerous  ways  of 
access,  more  and  more  necessary  to  infantry,  would  be 
impracticable  if  infantry  were  not  helped  from  close  at 
hand  by  an  artillery  capable  of  putting  out  of  action 
the  resisting  means  of  the  enemy.  The  union  of  both 
arms  has  become  more  necessary  than  ever.  It  is  only 
when  preceded  by  shells  which  break  obstacles  and 
silence  the  fire  of  enemy  guns,  that  infantry  will  manage 
to  move  even  in  small  numbers  along  its  avenues  of 
approach.  And  as  the  divisional  artillery,  be  it  rein- 
forced or  not,  could  not  fire  from  one  single  central 
position  along  all  these  means  of  access  in  order  to  clear 
them,  that  artillery  will  often  be  brought  to  subdivide 
itself  in  order  to  follow  and  help  infantry  troops.  Thus 
we  shall  have  guns  attached  to  a  brigade  or  to  a  regiment, 
this  being  a  temporary  device  which  must  not  alter  our 
organic  constitution,  but  on  the  contrary  must  be  made 
to  show  what  elasticity  and  suppleness  have  to  be  dis- 
played nowadays  in  managing  an  army.  It  is  further 
obvious  that  the  inconvenience  resulting  from  the  parcel- 
ling and  apportionment  of  batteries  becomes  much 
smaller  when  we  pass  from  a  gun  firing  two  shots  a 
minute  to  a  gun  firing  twenty. 

One  must  nevertheless  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that 
the  moral  effect,  the  characteristic  of  artillery,  increases 
rapidly  with  the  concentration  of  fire.  It  is  only  by 
means  of  an  action  en  masse  that  one  can  try  to  secure 
important  and  decisive  results. 

Moreover,  artillery  possesses  in  the  highest  degree  the 
means  of  effecting  surprise :  it  is  able,  as  soon  as  it 
appears,  to  make  effect  follow  upon  menace  without 
delay.  The  reality  of  the  blow  follows  the  first  apparition 
of  danger.  It  must  see  to  it  that  its  action  keeps  this 
characteristic,  and  even  possesses  it,  if  possible,  to  an 
ever-increasing  degree ;  to  this  end,  destruction  must  be 
made  to  coincide  with  the  entrance  of  guns  in  line,  and, 
as  few  direct  hits  are  wanted  to  put  the  enemy  out 
of  action,  artillery  must  attempt  from  the  moment  of 
opening  fire  (this  is  made  possible  by  firing  processes 
as  well  as  by  the  effects  of  projectiles)  to  bracket  the 
objective  widely,  even  if,  in  order  to  reach  its  result. 


MODERN  BATTLE  837 

it  should  have  to  fire  sometmies  on  a  rather  extensive 
zone. 

Infantry.' — ^Though  it  is  artillery  which  begins  the 
battle,  it  cannot  do  so  unless  it  is  safely  protected.  The 
alternative  is  too  great  a  risk.  Infantry  must  therefore 
open  the  battle-field  for  artillery  and  constantly  cover  the 
batteries  by  occupying  points  wherefrom  it  can  protect 
them  (Garnsdorf  in  our  lasit  example,  and  the  ridges), 
and  this  at  a  sufficient  distance  for  the  batteries  to  be 
under  shelter  from  enemy  infantry  fire. 

Besides  performing  this  protective  mission,  infantry 
holds  the  first  place  in  preparation,  the  object  of  which 
is,  as  we  have  seen,  to  wear  down  the  enemy ;  and  this 
more  particularly  leads  to  developing  action  by  fire  : 
thus  we  had  Saalfeld,  200,000  cartridges  fired,  that  is, 
20  per  man. 

The  preparation-force  must  further  immobilise  the 
enemy.  This  makes  it  necessary  for  infantry  to  strike 
at  the  enemy,  to  threaten  him  with  a  close  attack^  with 
assault,  and  first  of  all  to  approach  as  near  as  the  distance 
required  for  such  an  operation. 

We  shall  now  study  this  twofold  action,  by  means  of 
fire  and  march.  We  shall  try  and  discover  how  such  an 
action  may  be  developed,  with  numbers  reduced  to  what 
is  strictly  necessary,  so  as  to  reach  the  result  wanted; 
namely,  the  threat  at  close  range,  which  is  not  decision, 
but  which  it  is  none  the  less  difficult  to  secure. 

It  is  obvious  at  the  outset  that  nowadays  the  direction 
of  fire  assumes,  in  the  course  of  fights  along  the  front, 
a  capital  importance.  Fire  has  become  the  decisive 
argument.  The  most  ardent  of  troops,  those  the  spirit 
of  which  has  been  enhanced  to  the  highest  degree,  will 
always  want  to  conquer  ground  by  performing  successive 
bounds,  but  they  will  meet  with  heavy  difficulties  and 
incur  considerable  losses  whenever  their  partial  offensive 
has  not  been  prepared  by  effective  fire.  They  will  be 
thrown  back  on  their  starting-point,  with  still  more 
severe  losses.  A  superiority  of  fire,  and,  therefore,  a 
superiority  in  directing  and  performing  fire  and  in 
making  use  of  fire,  will  become  the  main  factors  upon 
which  the  efficiency  of  a  force  will  depend. 

Officers  must  keep  the  direction  in  hand  as  far  as  the 
assaulting  distance.  Therefore,  fire  by  command,  or 
at  least  fire  directed  and  mastered  (volley  fire  or  fire 


338        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

at  will  of  a  short  duration  and  in  squalls)  is  the  only 
kind  that  good  infantry  will  deliver  when  engaged  in  a 
lively  action.  On  the  contrary,  slow,  continuous  fire, 
undirected  fire  (wasteful  fire),  as  well  as  disorderly  fire 
at  will,  in  which  the  objective  has  not  been  sufficiently 
determined  or  in  which  the  number  of  cartridges  fired 
or  the  effect  produced  is  not  checked,  must  be  absolutely 
prohibited  as  leading  to  a  useless  waste. 

The  fact  that  it  is  impossible  to  secure  fully  in  peace 
the  results  of  a  true  action  must  not  prevent  our  trying 
to  reach  it  in  training  practice. 

No  combat  could  be  maintained  between  one  body 
of  troops  having  neither  theory,  nor  training,  nor  fire 
discipline,  therefore  deprived  of  efficiency  in  action, 
and  another  body  of  troops  perfectly  trained,  shooting 
and  using  fire  with  discipline,  undeniably  superior  on 
the  battle-field,  even  though  it  can  display  there  but 
part  of  what  it  knows  and  what  it  is  able  to  do. 

In  this  connection  we  also  discover  the  value  of  a 
knowledge  of  one' s  arm ;  the  influence  of  the  ground  in 
determining  what  position  must  be  selected.  Such  con- 
siderations must  in  no  case  restrict  offensive  action,  which 
fire  should,  on  the  contrary,  favour  and  foster,  for  fire,  far 
from  being  an  end,  is  never  more  (during  preparation) 
than  a  means  of  keeping  an  advance  going ;  it  is  to  this 
end  that  we  resort  to  it ;  and  fire  must  cease  as  soon  as 
the  result  desired' — namely,  the  possibility  of  resuming 
the  advance' — has  been  secured. 

Any  rush  forward  must  be  preceded  by  a  storm  of 
bullets  designed  to  shake  the  enemy,  in  any  case  to 
getting  him  to  ground  :  this  is  the  formula  which  has 
to  be  put  into  practice  in  order  to  promote  preparation 
and  to  allow  the  movement  to  develop.  Progress  has, 
however,  to  be  made  over  a  ground  strewn  with  shelters 
and  obstacles  of  all  kinds ;  preparation  must  therefore  : 
drive  the  enemy  from  the  covers  of  his  ground ;  run  up  to 
the  "  points  d'appui"  and  occupy  them;  should  they 
be  in  enemy  hands,  attack  them  by  setting  up  a  number 
of  combined  actions  in  which  the  nearest  first-line  units 
or  parts  of  units  shall  take  part;  put  them  in  a  state 
of  defence- — organise  them- — as  soon  as  they  have  been 
carried ;  set  the  troops  in  order  again,  reform  the  various 
echelons;    start  from  the  points  conquered  in  order  to 


MODERN  BATTLE  339 

try  and  advance  again,  take  new  objectives  which  will 
give  rise  to  new  attacks  involving  a  new  utilisation  of 
forces  :  such  is  the  series  of  undertakings  to  be  carried 
on  during  the  preparation,  until  the  limit  of  the  last 
covers  or  the  main  line  of  resistance  of  the  enemy  have 
been  reached,  or  again,  until  the  troops  are  in  a  state  of 
complete  exhaustion. 

These  efforts  mainly  devolve  upon  the  first-line  troops, 
as  a  result  of  the  necessity  of  keeping  the  others  covered 
at  a  distance,  of  reserving  them  in  order  to  maintain  and 
supply  the  preparation. 

They  cannot  be  directed  by  a  high  command,  nor  by  a 
commander  acting /rom  the  rear  and  sending  up  troops. 
Yet  these  first-line  operations  cannot  succeed  without 
having  forces  at  their  disposal.  It  therefore  behoves 
officers  commanding  first-line  units  (companies,  bat- 
talions) to  display  initiative  and  understanding  in  order 
to  combine  the  action  of  their  forces,  however  disorgan- 
ised they  may  be,  against  the  objectives  to  be  successively 
carried;  in  order  to  reduce  to  a  minimum  such  forces 
as  are  holding  the  conquered  points  of  the  ground,  and 
to  use  the  rest  of  their  forces  against  the  points  which 
have  still  to  be  conquered. 

Once  progress  has  become  impossible,  they  must  try 
and  attain  by  their  fire  the  enemy  artillery  and  organise 
their  forces  in  order  to  drive  back  the  enemy' s  attempts ; 
this  will  be  the  last  phase  of  preparation,  until  the 
moment  when  decisive  attack  is  to  be  carried  out. 

To  be  well  conducted,  preparative  action  must  assume 
an  ever-increasijig  vigour  and  energy  from  its  outset  until 
the  moment  when  the  decisive  act  is  about  to  be  per- 
formed; this  requires  successive  reinforcement,  and,  in 
consequence,  a  distribution  of  troops  in  depth,  which 
is  further  unavoidable  from  the  necessity  of  keeping 
one's  reserves  sheltered  for  a  long  time  from  the  fire 
directed  on  the  first  line. 

Though  this  preliminary  action  is  often  termed  a 
combat  of  mere  demonstration,  it  implies  an  extreme  energy 
on  the  part  of  the  performers.  For  troops  in  action, 
for  secondary  first-line  units,  there  is  only  one  manner 
of  fighting,  and  that  is  to  fight  with  the  utmost  vigour^ 


340        THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   WAR 

with  all  available  means,  utilising  fire,  march,  tools  if 
they  have  any.  These  are  the  only  principles  the  rank 
and  file  and  units  used  in  preparation  must  know.  To 
speak  to  them  of  a  demonstration,  a  dragging  fight,  a 
slow  action,  still  more  of  keeping  still,  would  amount 
to  inducing  them  not  to  act,  to  preparing  them  for  flight, 
to  breaking  their  spirit  at  the  very  moment  when  that 
spirit  must  be  most  enhanced. 

Such  an  action,  both  slow  and  of  long  duration,  which 
preparation  demands,  is  a  result  of  the  commander's 
applying  the  principle  of  economy  of  forces  in  a  fashion 
he  alone  can  appreciate  and  determine. 

The  higher  command  devotes  to  preparation  a  mini- 
mum of  force,  so  as  to  be  able  to  reinforce  the  decisive 
act  as  strongly  as  possible ;  the  subordinate  commanders, 
who  are  in  charge  of  preparation,  establish  and  reinforce 
their  three  lines  according  to  the  front  ascribed  to  them 
and  to  the  efforts  to  be  made.  The  rank  and  file,  when 
in  action,  must  only  know/wZ/  action,  the  object  of  which 
is  to  conquer  or  to  hold. 

In  consequence,  every  attack,  once  undertaken,  must  he 
fought  to  a  finish ;  every  defence,  once  begun,  must  he 
carried  on  with  the  utmost  energy. 

A  force  must  never  stop  till  it  is  exhausted,  and  when 
echelons  in  support,  of  which  the  commander  disposes, 
begin  to  fail  it.  The  more  or  less  considerable  inter- 
vention of  these  echelons  thus  regulate  the  advance  at 
the  commander's  will. 

Finally,  as  we  have  seen,  the  troops  of  the  initial 
attack  have  to  make  use  of  improvised  fortification  in 
order  to  protect  the  points  conquered  against  enemy 
counter-attacks. 

Not  only  will  first-line  companies  try  and  reinforce 
with  the  help  of  all  the  means  within  their  reach  and  to 
their  best  ability  the  extreme  "points  d'appui"  they 
may  occupy  at  certain  moments,  but  second-line  com- 
panies and  battalions  must  also  consolidate  those  points 
in  proportion  as  the  progress  of  the  action  brings  them 
up. 

Finally,  partial  reserves,  with  or  without  the  help  of 
engineers,  may  organise  supporting  positions  in  prevision 
of  a  failure. 


MODERN    BATTLE  341 

(6)  Decisive  Attack 

Owing  to  its  continually  offensive  attitude,  the  prepara- 
tion has  finally  succeeded  in  throwing  back  the  enemy's 
first  lines,  in  carrying  the  enemy's  advanced  posts  and 
in  immobilising  him  by  the  series  of  its  efforts  and  by 
threatening  him  with  close  attack.  It  holds  him  exposed 
to  a  more  violent  attack. 

But  it  is  by  this  time  in  a  state  of  exhaustion;  the 
greatest  part  of  its  reserves  are  in  action,  units  are 
mixed,  the  number  of  officers  is  reduced,  ammunition 
begins  to  grow  scarce. 

The  preparation  is  now  confronted  by  the  main  enemy 
forces,  by  important  obstacles;  a  ground  swept  by  fire 
or  strong  "  points  d'appui  "  (strongly  occupied  and  only 
to  be  approached  with  difficulty). 

In  front,  there  is  a,  so  to  speak,  "  impassable"  zone; 
no  defiladed  ways  of  access  are  left;  a  hail  of  bullets 
sweeps  the  ground  in  front  of  the  first  line.  But  success 
has  not  yet  been  secured;  "  nothing  is  done  so  long  as 
something  remains  to  be  done  "  (Frederick).  The  laurels 
of  victory  are  at  the  point  of  enemy  bayonets.  They 
must  be  plucked  there ;  they  must  be  carried  by  a 
fight  hand  to  hand,  if  one  really  means  to  conquer. 

To  reinforce  the  troops  of  preparation  in  order  to 
attain  the  result  would  be  without  effect :  a  battle  of 
parallel  lines  would  begin  and  would  remain  powerless. 

To  run  away  or  to  fall  on,  such  is  the  unavoidable 
dilemma.  To  fall  on,  but  to  fall  on  in  numbers  and 
masses  :  therein  lies  salvation.  For  numbers,  provided 
we  know  how  to  use  them,  will  allow  us,  by  means  of 
the  physical  superiority  placed  at  our  disposal,  to  get  the 
better  of  that  violent  enemy  fire.  Having  more  guns  we 
will  silence  his  own ;  it  is  the  same  with  rifles,  the  same 
with  bayonets,  if  we  know  how  to  use  them  all. 

Numbers  imply  a  moral  superiority  in  our  favour, 
owing  to  the  feeling  of  strength  connected  with  numbers, 
a  feeling  we  shall  increase  by  means  oi  formation. 

Numbers  create  surprise  in  the  enemy's  ranks,  as  well 
as  the  conviction  that  he  cannot  resist;;  a  conviction 
caused  by  the  sudden  appearance  of  danger,  by  the  speed 
and  proportions  of  an  attack  he  neither  has  the  time,  nor 
the  means  to  parry. 

But   in    view    of   that    decisive    attack,    we    must : 


342        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

(1)  complete  the  preparation  of  it;    (2)  carry  it  out; 
and  (3)  round  it  up  and  utilise  it. 

The  attack  has  to  be  prepared,  in  view  of  the  enemy' s 
powerful  fire  which  must  be  silenced  by  superior  fire,  also 
in  view  of  the  resistance  offered  by  the  "  points  d'appui  " 
which  must  be  broken.  The  zone  over  which  the  ava- 
lanche will  pass  must  be  cleared ;  a  breach  must  be  made, 
through  which  the  avalanche  shall  assault  the  obstacle  : 
such  is  the  object  of  final  preparation  for  decisive  attacks. 
This  is  effected  by  resorting  to  artillery  in  the  mass. 

Preparation  :    Artillery 

"  Whoever  manages  to  bring  by  surprise  a  mass  of 
guns  to  a  certain  point,  is  sure  of  carrying  the  day" 
(Napoleon).  Hence  the  part  played  by  the  Emperor's 
artillery  reserves  at  Friedland,  Wagram,  Lutzen,  etc. 

In  1870,  the  artilleries  of  the  Guard,  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps,  part  of  the  Tenth,  about  300  guns,  open  fire  against 
Saint-Privat. 

To  make  a  breach  on  the  front  of  attack,  to  open  the 
way  for  infantry,  to  keep  it  clear  once  it  is  open,  to  sacri- 
fice itself  if  need  be  in  order  to  enable  infantry  to  per- 
form its  task,  to  watch  the  batteries  and  counter-attacks 
of  the  enemy ;  such  is  at  this  moment  the  mission  of  our 
artillery. 

To  this  end,  the  largest  possible  number  of  guns  enters 
into  action  towards  the  point  of  attack.  There  can  never 
be  too  many  guns,  there  are  never  enough  of  them. 

All  the  artillery  groups  placed  near  that  point,  those 
which  would  still  be  available  and  could  enter  in  line  : 
corps  artillery,  the  artillery  of  the  infantry  divisions,  of 
the  cavalry  divisions,  of  second-line  army  corps,  those 
which  have  taken  part  in  the  preparation  and  which  are 
now  without  an  object;  all  of  them  work  in  the  same 
direction,  by  means  of  a  fire  at  the  same  time  violent 
and  suddenly  unmasked,  the  intensity  of  which  continu- 
ally increases. 

In  order  to  fulfil  this  task,  it  is  enough  that  artillery 
should  see  ;  all  the  batteries  which  can  act  from  their 
position  must  be  left  where  they  are.  They  must,  on 
the  contrary,  be  moved  if  they  cannot  see.  Such  are 
the  tactics  to  be  adopted. 


MODERN    BATTLE  343 

A  quarter  of  an  hour's  quick  fire  by  a  mass  of  artillery 
on  a  clearly  determined  objective  will  generally  suffice  to 
break  its  resistance,  or  at  any  rate  to  make  it  uninhabit- 
able and  therefore  uninhabited. 

The  mass  of  artillery  must  then  open  a  quick  fire  a 
quarter  of  an  hour  before  the  infantry  mass  enters  in 
line.  Such  will  be  the  rule;  artillery  fire  must  begin 
later  if  the  infantry  attack,  starting  from  a  great  distance, 
needs  a  longer  time  before  coming  within  efficient  range 
for  infantry  fire. 

Against  what  should  fire  be  opened?  Against  the 
obstacles  which  may  delay  the  march  of  infantry. 

The  first  obstacle  is  the  enemy  gun.  It  will  be  the 
first  objective  assigned  to  artillery  masses. 

Once  superiority  shall  have  been  secured  in  that 
struggle,  obstacles  and  shelters  covering  the  road  to  that 
objective  will  have  to  be  smashed,  or  at  any  rate  made 
untenable.  The  second  part  of  the  same  task  of  pre- 
paration will  consist  in  destroying  and  riddling  with 
projectiles  the  infantry  occupying  or  surrounding  them. 

Once  the  road  is  open,  it  must  be  kept  clear ;  once 
the  breach  is  inade,  the  enemy  must  be  prevented  from 
filling  it;  therefore  one  must  be  able  to  go  on  firing 
against  the  part  of  the  enemy  front  which  is  our  target 
until  it  shall  be  assaulted  by  the  attacking  infantry. 

The  success  of  the  attack  must  also  be  ensured  by 
striking  at  any  kind  of  troops  the  enemy  may  oppose  : 
fresh  batteries,  counter-attacks. 

In  order  to  fulfil  this  third  role,  the  artillery  masses 
prepare  groups  of  batteries  (called  groups  of  attack  and 
of  counter-attack),  designed  to  follow  and  support  the 
infantry  columns,  as  well  as  to  manoeuvre  in  the  direc- 
tions which  threaten  danger. 

As  their  movements  must  be  carried  out  very  quickly, 
it  behoves  the  commanders  to  foresee  those  movements 
and  to  see  that  roads  and  positions  should  be  recon- 
noitred in  the  direction  each  of  them  will  take  :  ahead, 
on  the  exterior  wing,  etc. 

Such  a  simultaneous  action  can  only  be  performed  by 
numerous  batteries  after  a  single  command  over  them 
has  been  set  up,  which  shall  be  capable  of  directing  fire 
as  well  as  of  dividing  between  them  the  various  portions 
of  the  task  just  mentioned  and  of  making  their  efforts 
comply  with  the  needs  of  the  infantry  attack. 


344        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

Moreover,  while  the  artillery  of  the  decisive  attack 
thus  enters  upon  the  stage,  all  the  other  batteries 
taking  part  in  the  original  preparatory  attack  increase 
at  the  same  time  their  fire  along  the  whole  line. 

Execution  :  Infantry 

During  the  general  preparation  for  battle,  which  has 
lasted  for  the  greater  part  of  the  day,  infantry  troops 
designed  to  carry  out  the  decis've  attack  have  assembled 
facing  the  objective,  utilising  to  this  end  all  the  ways 
of  access  on  the  ground.  They  have  halted  behind  the 
cover  nearest  to  the  enemy,  sheltered,  protected  by  the 
preparation-troops.  They  must  also  be  kept  there  free 
from  the  strain  of  combat;  they  must  be  distributed 
facing  the  zone  of  ground  they  will  have  to  cover  in 
order  to  reach  their  objective,  in  a  condensed  disposi- 
tion which  should  enable  them  to  take  without  difficulty 
the  formation  and  echeloning  prescribed  in  view  of  the 
attack.  The  mass  should,  of  "course,  be  protected  by 
scouting  and  covered  in  all  dangerous  directions. 

The  moment  has  come  to  act.  Artillery  is  shaking 
the  enemy's  resistance;  infantry  must  now  overthrow 
him.  In  order  to  decide  the  enemy  to  retreat,  we  must 
advance  upon  him;  in  order  to  conquer  the  position,  to 
take  the  enemy's  place,  one  must  go  to  where  he  is. 
The  most  powerful  fire  does  not  secure  that  result. 
Here  begins  more  particularly  the  action  of  infantry 
masses.  They  march  straight  on  to  the  goal,  each 
aiming  at  its  own  objective,  speeding  up  their  pace  in 
proportion  as  they  come  nearer,  preceded  by  violent 
fire,  using  also  the  bayonet,  so  as  to  close  on  the  enemy, 
to  be  the  first  to  assault  the  position,  to  throw  them- 
selves in  the  midst  of  the  enemy  ranks  and  finish  the 
contest  by  means  of  cold  steel  and  superior  courage 
and  will.  Artillery  contributes  to  that  result  with  all  its 
power  while  following,  supporting,  covering  the  attack. 

How  shall  these  infantry  masses  act? 

The  formation  to  be  taken  obviously  varies  according 
to  the  ground  and  to  the  distance  at  which  the  infantry 
is  unmasked.  It  is  in  any  case  determined  by  the 
general  considerations  ruling  all  infantry  action,  the 
value  of  which  is  accentuated  when  a  decisive  attack 


MODERN    BATTLE  345 

is  in  question,  as  such  an  attack  implies  a  specially 
severe  action,  the  single  object  of  which  is  to  lead 
without  delay  to  the  integral  solution,  the  decision. 

First  of  all  the  mass  has  to  be  brought  to  a  distance 
(600,  700,  800  yards)  wherefrom  it  may  make  an  efficient 
use  of  its  arms.  Until  it  reaches  that  distance,  it 
remains  unable  to  act  usefully  by  fire  and  suffers  itself 
from  enemy  fire,  mainly  from  the  fire  of  the  artillery, 
which,  by  rapid  fire,  would  succeed  in  disorganising  an 
uncovered  attacking  body. 

We  find  then,  first  of  all,  a  period  of  movement  during 
which  the  infantry  mass,  disarmed  so  to  speak,  attempts 
to  evade  as  much  as  possible,  by  means  of  methodical 
formations  and  quick  movements,  the  effects  of  enemy 
fire.  Hence  the  combinations  which  aim  at  making 
troops  less  vulnerable  and  more  mobile :  thin  lines, 
formations  on  one  rank,  subdivision  on  the  flanks; 
"  swarms,"  "  checker-board  formations,"  etc. 

However,  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy  master  of  his 
own  fire  and  free  to  use  it  against  the  oncoming  mass, 
a  formation,  however  skilful  it  may  be,  will  not  generally 
make  it  possible,  of  itself,  to  advance  under  fire  over 
an  open  ground,  not  even  to  cross,  under  those  con- 
ditions, spaces  of  any  length;  losses  would  be  incurred 
which  would  break  the  organisation  and  above  all  the 
spirit  of  the  troops,  of  the  infantry  mass. 

To-day  even  more  than  in  the  past,  the  art  will 
consist,  during  this  period  of  the  march,  in  utilising  all 
the  defiladed  ways  of  access  and  all  the  cover  provided 
by  the  ground.  The  formation  to  be  given  to  the  mass, 
far  from  aiming  at  symmetry,  at  harmony,  at  regularity, 
must  only  tend  to  enabling  the  greatest  possible  numbers 
to  secure  those  advantages  of  cover  which  nothing  can 
replace. 

On  the  contrary,  in  the  second  phase  of  combat,  from 
a  distance  of  600,  700,  800  yards  from  the  previously 
reconnoitred  enemy  position,  the  mass  is  able  to  develop 
its  whole  power  :  firing  power  and  striking  power.  The 
formations  to  be  adopted  must  tend  to  make  the  most 
efficient  use  possible  of  these  two  means  of  action  :  to 
make  one  succeed  the  other  without  a  hitch,  so  that 
the  combined  effects  of  fire  and  assault  should  be 
superimposed  and  added  one  to  the  other. 


346        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

The  consideration  of  what  fire  one  may  oneself  receive 
now  becomes  a  secondary  matter;  the  troops  are  on 
the  move  and  must  arrive;  moreover,  there  is  but  one 
means  to  extenuate  the  effects  of  enemy  fire  :  it  is  to 
develop  a  more  violent  fire  oneself,  capable  at  least  of 
getting  to  ground  and  paralysing  the  enemy;  another 
means  consists  in  rapid  advance. 

To  march,  and  to  march  quickly,  preceded  by  the 
hail  of  bullets;  in  proportion  as  the  enemy  is  hard 
pressed,  to  bring  forward  more  and  more  numerous 
troops,  and,  moreover,  troops  well  in  hand,  such  is  the 
fundamental  formula  for  the  formations  to  be  taken 
and  tactics  to  be  adopted. 

An  infantry  body  of  two  ranks  ^  obviously  fulfils  the 
twofold  condition  of  providing  powerful  fire  and  rapid 
advance.  Therefore  such  a  body  will,  for  a  certain 
time,  be  equal  to  the  task.  But  the  mass  melts  away 
while  performing  that  task;  it  soon  stops  and  becomes 
exhausted  before  reaching  the  position.  Hence  the 
necessity  of  having  a  second  line  which  should  be  par- 
ticularly strong,  coming  nearer  and  nearer  to  the  first, 
designed  to  prevent  the  attack  from  receiving  a  check, 
to  push  the  first  line  on  ahead,  to  draw  it  along  on  to 
its  destined  position.  We  thus  have  the  second-line 
battalion  (or  battalions)  of  the  regiment  in  fighting 
order,  launching  (in  order  to  make  an  end)  into  the 
more  and  more  billowy,  confused,  mixed  line,  whole 
companies  in  close  order  (line  or  column)  and  fully 
commanded. 

But  an  attack  organised  in  the  way  just  described 
can  only  act  straight  in  front.  If  left  to  itself,  it  would 
have  its  flanks,  or  at  any  rate  its  external  flank,  exposed 
to  the  enemy's  attacks  or  counter-attacks.  Still,  it 
cannot  succeed  otherwise  than  by  a  direct,  quick,  con- 
tinuous march.  Hence  the  necessity  of  protecting  the 
attacking  force  against  any  kind  of  surprise,  of  estab- 
lishing, therefore,  in  the  rear  a  group  independent  from 
the  attack  itself,  capable,  by  means  of  a  specially 
organised  security-service,  of  scenting  the  counter-attack, 
capable  also,  by  making  a  manoeuvre  which,  thanks  to 
that  security-service,  is  always  possible  in  time  and 
space  of  parrying  the  counter-attack,  which  generally 

^  Regulation  front  of  combat  for  one  battalion  :  about  300  yards. 


MODERN   BATTLE  347 

includes  the  largest  part  of  enemy  forces.  This  is  the 
first  part  to  be  performed  by  the  reserve. 

But  besides  this,  after  the  attack  has  assaulted  and 
carried  the  position,  enemy  reserves  come  up  before  it 
is  possible  to  restore  the  attacking  troops  to  order. 
These  reserves  must,  of  course,  be  immediately  dealt 
with' — more  especially  if  they  carry  out  any  counter- 
strokes.  Hence  another  necessity,  that  of  keeping  an 
important  reserve  for  the  attacking  force  up  to  the 
very  end,  which  reserve  shall  be  left  at  a  sufficiently 
long  distance  behind  not  to  be  involved  in  the  fight  of 
the  attacking  force  or  reached  by  the  fire  which  the 
latter  has  to  endure. 

Finally,  such  a  reserve  being  capable  (1)  of  imparting 
a  last  impulsion  to  the  attacking  force  if  the  latter  is 
held  up  close  to  its  objective;  (2)  of  protecting  the 
flank  or  flanks  of  the  attacking  force ;  and  (3)  of  imme- 
diately taking  charge  of  any  action  directed  against 
reserves;  that  reserve  will  need  :  (1)  considerable  num- 
bers, indeed  numbers  almost  equal  to  those  of  the 
attacking  force  ^;  (2)  a  distribution  in  space  which 
should  prepare  the  performance  of  its  threefold  task 
while  first  keeping  the  main  body  at  a  distance;  (3)  a 
distribution  which  should  make  it  possible  to  end  the 
affair  by  hurling  in  the  largest  part  of  the  available 
forces  on  the  heels  of  the  attacking  body. 

The  disposition  just  examined  presupposes,  of  course, 
that  the  preparation-troops  have  already  come  very  near 
to  the  objective.  This  is  not  generally  the  case,  at  any 
rate  when  large  units  (army  corps  or  divisions)  are  in 
question.  They  generally  come  in  action  over  a  ground 
which,  owing  to  its  very  extent,  is  but  imperfectly 
scouted,  against  an  enemy  who  is  but  incompletely 
invested,  or  even  is  not  invested  at  all,  at  least  in  the 
direction  they  have  to  follow.  This  was  the  case  of 
the  Twelfth  Corps,  on  August  18th,  1870.  Before 
marching  on  Saint-Privat- — the  objective  which  had  been 
assigned  to  it  and  which  was  the  resisting  centre  of 
the  enemy  on  that  part  of  the  battle-field- — it  had  of  all 
necessity  to  carry  Roncourt,  to  guard  against  Jaumont 

^  Thus  a  brigade  in  charge  of  carrying  out  a  decisive  attack  will 
generally  devote  one  regiment  to  the  attack  itself  (on  a  front  of  600 
or  800  yards)  and  one  regiment  to  the  reserve,  with  the  functions  just 
defined. 


348        THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   WAR 

woods,  to  drive  back  the  enemy's  advanced  posts,  to 
invest  him,  to  reconnoitre  his  establishments  in  the 
surroundings  of  the  appointed  objective,  and  therefore 
the  various  points  the  storming  of  which  had  to  be 
combined  with  the  attack  on  the  main  objective.  The 
decisive  attack  in  such  cases  changes  from  a  mere 
assault  to  a  manceuvre,  a  manoeuvre  of  decision. 

This  task  of  preparation  on  the  front  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps  was  that  of  the  advance  guard.  In  proportion 
as  it  was  fulfilled,  the  progressively  reinforced  advance 
guard  closed  more  and  more  on  the  enemy,  and  was 
changed  at  last  into  a  firing-line  which  attempted  to 
secure  superiority  in  the  direction  in  which  the  decisive 
attack  was  to  proceed,  such  a  firing-line  covering  at 
the  same  time  the  advancing  mass  which  was  to  strike 
the  blow. 

To-day  as  in  the  past,  the  attacking  mass  cannot 
succeed  unless  it  possesses  the  firm  will  to  reach  its 
objective.  Any  force  charged  with  carrying  out  -a 
decisive  attack  must  be  full  of  Bugeaud's  maxim : 
"  When  the  moment  has  come  to  act,  you  must  march 
on  and  meet  your  enemy  with  that  energy  and  self- 
possession  which  alone  enables  a  man  to  perform  anything 
whatsoever." 

Therefore  we  must  have  vigour,  speed,  violence,  no 
long  halts,  and  therefore  a  quick  pressure  from  troops 
behind  so  as  to  urge  forward  the  first-line  troops. 
These  must  be  the  characteristics  of  action  at  that 
moment. 

The  attack  on  the  whole  front  must,  of  course,  be 
resumed  at  the  same  time.  All  the  troops  of  the 
preparation  then  turn  to  execution.  The  charge  is 
sounded  on  all  points  :  let  us  remember  the  example 
Garnsdorf  in  the  action  studied  above. 

Cavalry,  Completion,  Utilisation 

At  the  very  time  when  the  crisis  of  the  tragedy,  the 
infantry  attack,  is  developing,  the  squadrons  of  the 
attack  suddenly  appear  out  of  a  cloud  of  dust  or  of 
smoke,  on  the  flank  or  in  the  rear  of  the  position. 
They,  too,  have  had  to  reach  the  ground  where  the 


MODERN   BATTLE  349 

fate  of  the  day  is  to  be  settled,  and,  since  distance  is 
no  obstacle  to  them,  they  have  found  sheltered  ways 
of  access  which  have  enabled  them  to  reach  at  any  rate 
the  external  wing  of  the  attack.  They  charge  thence 
on  anything  that  is  still  resisting  among  the  enemy,  or 
on  enemy  cavalry  trying  to  charge  on  the  attacking 
infantry,  or  on  arriving  enemy  reserves  as  they  come 
up.  Such  reserves  alone  are  capable  of  regaining  the 
upper  hand,  and  on  that  account  are  hastening  up.  It 
matters  little  whether  the  attacking  squadrons  make 
straight  for  them,  whether  they  unsparingly  charge  in 
front,  in  flank  or  in  reverse.  The  reserves  may  get  rid 
of  that  cavalry  by  fire ;  but  in  order  to  be  able  to  fire, 
they  must  halt — and  meanwhile  the  affair  is  decided. 

Whether  cavalry  aims  at  threatening  enemy  squadrons 
or  enemy  reserves,  it  will  always  find,  at  such  a 
moment  when  nerves  are  strained,  strength  and  caution 
absorbed  or  exhausted,  an  opportunity  for  being  useful. 

For  cavalry  as  well  as  for  other  arms,  then,  there  is 
both  a  necessity  and  a  possibility  of  acting,  and  this 
by  means  which  must  be  entirely  left  to  the  commander' s 
initiative,  the  object  being  to  facilitate  the  decisive 
attack.  That  attack  is  a  victory  for  all.  It  sometimes 
arises  even  from  the  apparently  fruitless  efforts  of  some, 
but  in  every  case  from  the  concord  between  different  arms, 
from  the  resultant  of  their  converging  efforts,  from  an 
assault  delivered  arm  in  arm. 

Such  are,  in  their  main  features,  the  principles  of 
execution  in  a  decisive  attack,  of  the  event  in  battle. 

Selecting  the  Point  of  Attack 

Decisive  attack  means  using  the  mass  and  securing 
thereby  moral  superiority  and  physical  superiority. 

Moral  superiority,  in  so  far  as  it  results  from  numbers, 
formation,  etc.,  does  not  suffice  nowadays  with  such 
arms  as  are  in  use :  the  effect  of  these  arms  is  too 
demoralising. 

Physical  superiority  must  be  developed  as  well,  by 
advantageously  using  the  numerous  guns  and  rifles 
provided  by  a  mass- — a  thing  which  requires  space. 

Hence,  in  modern  tactics,  the  vogue  of  flank  attack 
which  enables  one  to  develop  against  one  point  (the 
objective)  that  superiority  of  fire  which  we  seek;   to 


350         THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  WAR 

carry  out  fire  of  an  undeniable  moral  efficiency  in  flank 
and  even  in  reverse ;  which,  further  owing  to  the  space 
at  its  disposal,  makes  it  'possible  to  manoeuvre  a  mass. 

For  the  same  reason,  the  central  attack  so  often 
resorted  to  by  the  Emperor  has  been  given  up.  The 
assailant  resorting  to  it  nowadays  would  be  enveloped 
by  enemy  fire;  he  would  not  be  able  to  develop  all  his 
own  fire. 

Ground  also  intervenes  in  determining  the  objective 
to  be  assigned  to  the  decisive  attack  :  up  to  600  or 
800  yards,  the  attack  endures  much  and  does  little  harm 
itself  to  its  adversary. 

The  art,  then,  is  to  reduce  this  zone  of  advance,  in 
launching  the  attack  from  as  short  a  distance  as  possible. 
Ground  provides  the  means  for  it. 

Moreover,  an  attack,  once  started,  must  advance 
rapidly.  It  must  have,  therefore,  a  ground  free  from 
obstacles,  which  does  not  mean  free  from  shelter.  The 
ideal  ground  is  one  that  should  be  at  once  open  (not 
blind)  and  broken- — affording  cover.  What  is  important 
is  speed. 

Ground  may  determine  of  itself  the  point  of  attack, 
for  if  those  two  possibilities  are  secured' — starting  from 
a  short  distance,  and  advancing  rapidly' — the  drawbacks 
of  a  central  attack,  such  as  have  been  mentioned  above, 
will  disappear. 

Moreover,  battle  sometimes  makes  it  possible  to  dis- 
cover a  point  where  the  enemy  is  giving  way  ;  what 
we  termed,  at  the  beginning  of  these  pages,  a  point  of 
insufficient  resistance.  It  is  obviously  on  such  a  point 
that  one  should  hurl  the  avalanche  of  attack;  it  is 
there  that  the  decisive  assault  is  most  likely  to  succeed. 

Similarly,  it  will  be  often  necessary  to  use  the  masses 
wherever  they  may  be,  after  they  have  been  brought 
there  either  as  the  result  of  a  more  or  less  accurate 
knowledge  of  the  enemy's  situation,  or  by  following 
the  ways  of  communication,  etc.  They  cannot  be 
transferred  from  the  left  to  the  right  of  the  battle-field. 
Modern  extended  fronts  do  not  allow  of  this.  One  no 
longer  has  the  time  to  effect  it. 

Finally,  strategical  considerations  sometimes  deter- 
mine, as  at  Saint-Privat,  on  August  18th,  1870,  which 


MODERN    BATTLE  351 

enemy  wing  ought  to  be  assaulted,  what  objective  ought 
to  be  given  to  the  decisive  attack.  In  these  various 
cases,  tactics  must  start  from  an  initial  situation  often 
far  from  favourable  and  make  the  best  possible  use  of 
it,  in  order  to  carry  out  the  decisive  attack  successfully 
in  spite  of  all.  Tactics  still  remain  able  to  ensure  those 
results  provided  the  commander  takes  special  disposi- 
tions hy  measure,  so  to  speak,  and  avoids  indulging  in 
general  and  theoretical  dispositions  which,  having  been 
selected  in  advance,  cannot  fit  the  special  circumstances 
of  the  case. 

Finally,  and  with  reservation  of  the  advantages  men- 
tioned above,  decisive  attack  must  not,  in  the  battle  of 
to-morrow,  be  made  to  take  place  indifferently  on  any 
point  of  the  line;  whatever  theory  may  teach,  such 
a  point  may  be  imposed  on  us  either  by  our  own 
requirements,  or  by  the  enemy's  movements. 


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u  102   *F52  ;L92<:0CT  20  199 

Foch!' Marsha. 1. 

h'he  principles  of  war? 


U  102  *F52  1920 

Fochy Marshal 

The  principles  of  war? 


Boston  College 
Libraries 

Chestnut  Hiil,  Mass.     02167 


